After Phrenology: Neural Reuse and the Interactive Brain

by Michael L. Anderson

A proposal for a fully post-phrenological neuroscience that details the evolutionary roots of functional diversity in brain regions and networks. The computer analogy of the mind has been as widely adopted in contemporary cognitive neuroscience as was the analogy of the brain as a collection of organs in phrenology. Just as the phrenologist would insist that each organ must have its particular function, so contemporary cognitive neuroscience is committed to the notion that each brain region must have its fundamental computation. In After Phrenology , Michael Anderson argues that to achieve a fully post-phrenological science of the brain, we need to reassess this commitment and devise an alternate, neuroscientifically grounded taxonomy of mental function. Anderson contends that the cognitive roles played by each region of the brain are highly various, reflecting different neural partnerships established under different circumstances. He proposes quantifying the functional properties of neural assemblies in terms of their dispositional tendencies rather than their computational or information-processing operations. Exploring larger-scale issues, and drawing on evidence from embodied cognition, Anderson develops a picture of thinking rooted in the exploitation and extension of our early-evolving capacity for iterated interaction with the world. He argues that the multidimensional approach to the brain he describes offers a much better fit for these findings, and a more promising road toward a unified science of minded organisms.

Genres: Neuroscience, Philosophy, Science, Psychology, Brain, Nonfiction

416 pages, Hardcover

First published December 24, 2014

Reviews

[Johann Weber · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is a titanic piece of academic research into the structural-functional nature of the human brain (Phrenology), spanning over 400 high-quality academic citations.

It was only recently in 1798 when F.J. Gall convincingly established the human brain as a separate and distinct organ of consciousness with functionally differentiated faculties. However, it’s interesting that this view coincides with the era of Kantian rational reductivism which in essence reinforces the Cartesian notion of mind-body dualism. We have been stuck in this phrenological ontology ever since and have only recently in 1995 started to refine the functionalist perspective of the brain.

This has led us to a very deep metaphysical error by assuming that the human brain is a mere functional object underscored by a ‘computational theory of mind’. By contrast, why would we assume that a kitchen knife has a functional essence (of being a kitchen knife) when we know very well that a kitchen knife can have an infinite set of functional characteristics? This begs the question how we embed relevance into the structural-functional organization of the brain? The ontological question is therefore deeply dependent on the Epistemological understanding of the structural-functional relationships as a complex adaptive system. The emerging view is that we need to understand the brain as a fluid complex mediator of the mind-body-environment-relationship and that the primary ‘telos’ of the brain is to orient action selection within the salience landscape.

These findings have therefore caused a radical reframing of phrenological studies. We have for example discovered that the brain architecture is not only functionally diverse, but also functionally differentiated and integrated through multiple levels of organization. Interestingly, the language system permeates the whole brain network and seems to be responsible for mediating agent-arena relationships and can even be understood as a ‘meta-narrative’ that maps directly onto our physiology in a very real way. Abstract symbols such as “Up” or “Down” for example even have a positive and negative physiological valence, thereby emphasizing the fact that observed and embodied narratives can activate a diverse set physiological responses in the brain.

The key mystery within this paradigm is how these functionally differentiated regions of the brain are coordinated to manifest the desired agent-arena action relationship? This has led to the discovery of ‘Transiently Assembled Local Neuron Subsystem’ which functions as a cognitive subsystem that mediates the top-down, bottom-up, feedback and feed-forward interactions between local and distributed brain systems. We therefore have a very sophisticated ‘opponent-processing’ subsystem that mediates the network effects between systems and subsystems, thereby enabling the brain to optimally deploy cognitive resources for action-controls within the context of organism-environment relationships. This ‘relational view of the brain’ is therefore much more concerned with the systemic relevance of environmental contexts such as ‘throwability’, ‘climbability’, ‘learnability’, ‘lovability’ or ‘buildability’ as opposed to weight, slope, text, or salience.

This ontological shift of ‘embodiment’ has far-reaching implications on our understanding of the mind and therefore recalibrates our model of cognition as a complex adaptive system of affordances as opposed to a propositional-centric model of cognition that only relies on the prevailing ‘computational theory of mind’. We are therefore not mere victims of our social environment but rather dynamic ‘action-oriented’ agents not only possessing the ability to transform our relationship or ‘fittedness’ within the environment but also have the ability transform the environment in relationship to the agent. Human beings are therefore evolutionary optimised for leveraging affordances as a force multiplier for niche-switching capabilities within the context of dynamically complex environments. These niche-switching capabilities can even be applied to ‘higher-order’ cognitive functions such as symbolism, mathematics, and language to map transtemporal narrative structures onto agent-arena relationships.

Moreover, the higher order ‘symbolic simulation’ capability of the mind also transforms our notion of social networks and distributed cognition. Just like a smartphone is useless when disconnected from the network; an isolated mind is useless, withdrawn, narcissistic and only preoccupied with its own productions. The narrative structures and structural-functional relationships of collective cognition is in fact very much analogous to those of the brain.

Cultures will inevitably have functional-differentiation, -variability and -diversity to enable the collective to efficiently adapt to transtemporal environmental constraints and affordances. The structural-functional configuration of a culture will therefore not only depend on the level of integration of subsystems and individuals but will also depend on the mediation of the strength of independence and interdependence between a diverse set of network nodes. This paradigm of distributed cognition highlights the importance of symbolism, logic, and language as mechanisms for designing cultural architecture and social narratives. However, institutional, and organizational culture as hyper-objects with narrative structures can easily become ossified or even pathological when the integrity of opponent-processing subsystems is either compromised or oppressed. It can even be argued that cognition cannot function when the symbolic simulations are not mediated by healthy opponent-processing subsystems that facilitate ‘truth seeking’ as a means to construct an accurate representation of the salience landscape. However, well-integrated and coordinated groups can easily become more productive than isolated individuals and can unlock dynamic capabilities through extending our cognitive reach needed for a group to manage complex systems such as ship navigation, infrastructure development or launching rockets into space. This highlights the extreme importance of ‘truth’ as an accurate cognitive representation of the agent-arena relationship of individuals and groups of individuals both in its ontology and its epistemology.

In conclusion, the brain as a structural-functional system did not evolve as a computational system that constructs a world-view independent from the environment but is rather a result of action-oriented emergent embodiment that synergised the development neural mechanisms and bodily capabilities in relationship with the context of environmental, social and cultural constraints and affordances.

From a philosophical perspective this paradigm completely transforms the metaphysical and teleological ends of cognition because of the iterative nature of the mind-body-environment relationship and provides valuable insights into how ‘value’ and ‘meaning’ emerge as an underlying ethic of cognition.

[Sven · Rating 5 out of 5]

An accessible book, very up to date and complete on issues on dynamic approaches to cognition and philosophy of mind. Highly recommended for students of psychology and neuroscience since it's not too difficult and it presents an alternative view to what is taught in most university programs. It follows the 'alternative' narrative of embodied cognition or enactivism, which seems unintuitive at first, especially for me as a psychology student, but Anderson sort of 'eases into' it by explicitly contrasting it to more common cognitive psychology and it becomes more acceptable that way. Besides that, Anderson makes a lot of suggestions on research topics for young scientists to work on understanding the brain and cognition in this new way, which is very inspiring and useful. This is a real barn-burner!