Bunch of Five is General Sir Frank Kitson's military autobiography. In it this expert in counter insurgency describes his experiences in Kenya 1953-55, Malaya 1957, Muscat and Oman 1958, as well as his peacekeeping activities during two stints in Cyprus, 1963-64 and 1967-68. He wanted to write about Northern Ireland also but at the time of first publication that was too sensitive. Instead, in keeping with the title, he wrote a fifth part summarizing his conclusions in all the zones he had fought in. This fifth part was used by the United States army for a long time on its own
Bunch of Five has been out of print for many years with second-hand copies commanding high prices. This reissue will be welcomed.
General Sir Frank Edward Kitson GBE, KCB, MC and Bar, DL was a British Army officer and writer on military subjects, notably low intensity operations. He rose to be Commander-in-Chief UK Land Forces from 1982 to 1985 and was Aide-de-Camp General to Queen Elizabeth II from 1983 to 1985.
Bunch of Five is Frank Kitson's Autobiography of his military career from Kenya to Cypress and as such has many details about his involvement in these conflicts you are unlikely to find elsewhere. He described his involvement in Kenya in detail in Gangs and Countergangs, but Bunch of Five fills in the historical background for his involvement in Malaya, Aden, and Cypress that informed his theory of counterinsurgency in Low Intensity Operations. If you are interested in Kitson, I suggest Arquilla's overview in Insurgents Raiders and Bandits followed by Low Intensity Operations, Bunch of Five, and then Warfare as a Whole. Skip Gangs and Countergangs. It is too bad that Kitson never wrote a similar account of his time in Ireland although he's probably banned from discussing it considering the ongoing legal reviews of The Troubles.
I picked up a copy of this second-hand having seen it and another text by Kitson referred to frequently in a report from a few years ago. Kitson's writing style feels comfortably conversational, and the structure of the book begins by covering Kitson's periods of service in Kenya, Malaya, Muscat & Oman, and Cyprus followed by a series of short chapters articulating his thoughts on the effective construction and implementation of a counter-insurgency strategy.
The autobiographical chapters are a nice mix of personal recollection, observations and anecdotes, prefaced by a reasonably brief explanation of how the insurgency in question came to exist in the first place. Some things don't change - a number of anecdotes relating to those he served with could apply equally well to others of a similar background that I've known over the years. Kitson highlights the differences between each insurgency and the things that worked well, as well as those that didn't - and the struggle to successfully develop a working counter-insurgency doctrine against the backdrop of a military where many of those of any experience were veterans of World War II.
The closing chapters range across the security forces and government and their roles in a counter-insurgency strategy, from a candid but politically agnostic viewpoint, going to some lengths to highlight the differences and difficulties involved in constructing such strategies if the governments in play are democratic or autocratic, and with open acknowledgement of the political and moral issues around various elements of the strategies.
All in all, I found it rather fascinating and an enjoyable read.