Chokepoints: How Economic Warfare is Changing the World

by Edward Fishman

*

SHORTLISTED FOR THE FINANCIAL TIMES BUSINESS BOOK OF THE YEAR AWARD

THE INSTANT NEW YORK TIMES BESTSELLER

AN ECONOMIST 'BEST BOOK OF 2025'

'Chokepoints is a masterful narrative of US economic warfare in the 21st century.'Financial Times

'A timely, riveting world tour … absorbing'The Economist

'Compelling and dramatic'Wall Street Journal

'A gripping, firsthand account. Unparalleled.' Chris Miller, author of Chip War

If you want to understand what's happening to the world economy, start right here.

It used to take blockades and sieges to ravage a rival's economy. Now, a single statement posted online by the US government can bring a nation to its knees.

Chokepoints is a gripping behind-the-scenes account of one of the most pivotal geopolitical shifts of our time. Drawing on extensive research, personal experience and interviews with key players, Edward Fishman, a former top US State Department official, takes us deep into the back rooms of power around the world. He reveals how sanctions, tariffs and control over modern-day chokepoints – such as the US dollar, advanced microchip technology and critical energy supply chains – have become the primary weapons of twenty-first-century geopolitics.

This is the epic story of how America turned economics into a weapon – and how China, Europe and Britain are now doing the same. Urgent and brimming with rare insight, Chokepoints is the definitive guide to the Age of Economic Warfare.

Genres: Economics, Politics, Nonfiction, History, Business, Finance, International Relations

980 pages, Kindle Edition

First published February 25, 2025

About the author

Edward Fishman teaches at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and is a senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy. He previously served at the U.S. State Department, the Pentagon, and the Treasury Department, earning multiple awards for his contributions to U.S. foreign policy. His writing has appeared in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, Politico Magazine, and Boston Review, among other publications. A native of Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, he lives in New York City with his wife and two children.

Reviews

[Wick Welker · Rating 5 out of 5]

Sanctions should be used like antibiotics.

This is a phenomenal book about the economic weapons the US has used specifically against Iran, China and Russia dating back to the early 2000s up until today and the impact of those weapons. When George W. Bush was in office, the prevailing wisdom was that economic sanctions were an impotent tool to be used in geopolitical economic warfare but that convection has since been turned on its head with sometimes dramatic and other times unpredictable consequences. This book outlines the use of sanctions and multilateral and international banking pressure that has been used to some sort of geopolitical ends.

The financial sanctions prior against Hussein weren’t that useful and made sanctions seem like a weak tool to use at the time. The Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence or TFI was organized in 2004. It was created to target and sanctions money laundering of other countries. TFI discovered money laundering schemes with North Korea and China amongst other operations. The TFI, headed by a man named Stuart Levey, recognized a specific bank was doing the laundering and they shut that bank off from the American financial system. This action alone had an enormous ripple effect on North Korea which froze $25M from the country and it was an effective proof of concept test that found financial warfare could be a tool of the US.

After North Korea, Levey went after Iran. He and his team personally went out and threatened banks all over the world of penalties and threats of being shut off from the American financial system if they did any business with the Iranian government. Iran balked at this tactic until they really started to work. The weaponization of multinational banks against Iran was so effective that it brought Iran to the negotiating table and put their uranium enrichment on hold. The amazing thing about this was that the effect was really only on Iran without a backlash on American or European markets.

This book then goes into detail about TFI and the American effort to stop the Chinese global take over of 5G through the company Huawei which is clearly part of China’s multi-pronged effort to take America’s place as the world’ hegemony. From Obama, to Trump to Biden, many financial tools were used to try to prevent Hauwei’s routers from spreading through the US and Europe to varying success. The US restricted Huawei's access to semiconductors, even if produced abroad. These restrictions were included in Taiwan’s famous TSMCS chip making planet.

Enter Russia and its annexation of Crimea. This prompted TFI to act again. The challenge this time was much larger than Iran because Europe heavily relied on oil from Russia. Sanctions couldn’t be so broad on Russia or they would risk financial impact on Europe and contagion to the US. At first sanctions were simply targeted at Russian oligarchs but this mostly only affected their yacht-fairing lifestyles. Some Russian banks were banned from using SWIFT for international payments as well as caps on their oil. What impacted the economy most, and what Putin likely didn’t expect, was that the Russian central bank was sanctioned. Did this stop Putin from a full invasion of Ukraine? Nope. So, like the author says: sanctions are like antibiotics. They need to be used at the right time and at the right dose or they can have negative or neutral impacts.

This is a really, really, excellent non-partisan book about an unrecognized weapon that the US has employed to varying degrees across the world. This is a book firmly about geopolitics and will help you understand lots about what’s going on between world powers right now.

[Dale · Rating 5 out of 5]

With all the discussions about tariffs and sanctions this book is a must read. Very informative and easy to take in. The author does an outstanding job producing a book that is consumable by the average person.

[Ulysse Colonna · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent take on one of the most important subjects of our times. It’s a necessary read for anyone who is even vaguely interested in the world we live in.

The authors has had incredible access to all the major players and we always feel like the proverbial fly on the wall. Without neglecting how the sausage is made, Fishman is particularly good at pointing out the intellectual exercise necessary to develop the doctrine and the tools of this new weapon. He’s particularly good the junctures between one campaign and the next, he shows how the tools developed by Washington against Iran were then reused and gradually changed for the effort against Moscow and how these same tools were then used and changed against Beijing.

He’s a little lighter on the sort of world these tools are creating but, then again, that world has only just started to take shape.

The warnings he raises at the end unfortunately have not been heeded and now… well…

From a European pov the book is also a wake up call it shows quite how secondary the EU has been for years in that great game. More generally, it’s also a fantastic reminder that through timidity and lack of resolve, the West has brought the current situation upon itself.

[Sebastian Gebski · Rating 5 out of 5]

The best book on global economics sanctions I've ever read which is ... not really what I expected :)

I was interested in the general mechanisms of economic influence US uses on the daily basis in contacts with various countries - those they consider allies, and the ones they don't. How they leverage their advantages, how they build them up globally, etc. I was looking for to find out how Americans keep their strong position in the Middle East. And when it comes to sanctions (which are a very interesting topic indeed, I was mostly interested in how they are maintained "operationally" - because one way is to announce something, but it's something completely different to enforce it ...). But that's NOT what this book is about.

This is a detailed history of US economical conflicts against - Iraq, Iran, Russia (~2014), China, and Russia again (~2022). How they started, developed, what options were considered, how the support was gained, etc. To be very honest, in the initial ~2 chapters the level of detail was ... disappointing, but the further the better - China and Russia chapters are top-notch, one can learn a lot of details that were not 100% visible from the neutral observer perspective.

Recommended (if you're into modern geopolitics).

[Ali · Rating 5 out of 5]

"We are living in an age of economic warfare, sanctions, tariffs, export controls, they become the primary way that great powers compete with one another."

"Control over economic chokepoints—such as the U.S. dollar, advanced microchip technology, and critical energy supply chains—has become the key to geopolitical power in the twenty-first century."

Chokepoints is a detailed account of economic sanctions in the age of economic warfare. I picked this up in the heat of Iran crisis, the daily closing/opening of Strait of Hormuz followed by the renegotiated nuclear deal and the economic cards/ statecraft used in between. Chokepoints not only covers earlier years of Iran case but also sanctions used against Russia and China. Having both an academic mindset and also hands-on experience, Fishman dives deep into all three with detailed history of economic affairs, unintended consequences in each case, challenges of finding the right balance of force, and coming up with the right incentives in the first place. More importantly Fishman clearly demonstrates the impossible trinity of geoeconomics, namely economic interdependence, economic security, and geopolitical competition. Most crisis require scalpel like sanctions as opposed to superpowers sowing their own demise butchering multilateral relations. Therefore, Fishman concludes sanctions are like antibiotics, the timing and the dose determine their effectiveness.

"The paradox of globalization is that while it fostered unprecedented economic integration, it also created new vulnerabilities. The very systems designed for efficiency and profit became 'chokepoints' that could be exploited for political ends."

"Unlike a naval blockade against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the 1990s, where military force was essential, modern economic warfare can inflict significant harm through financial systems and supply chain chokepoints with the signing of a document."

"Just as certain chokepoints may lose potency over time, others will emerge. That's just what happens, and it's actually not typically the U.S. government that creates chokepoints. It's the private sector that does, and then it's the U.S. government that claims authority over them."

“We don’t yet know when the Age of Economic Warfare will end, but we can envision how. The trade-offs facing policymakers in Washington, Beijing, Brussels, and Moscow can be thought of as an impossible trinity consisting of economic interdependence, economic security, and geopolitical competition. Any two of these can coexist but not all three.”

[Brecht Rogissart · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book explains in particular detail and with a captivating narrative style a new era of economic warfare, waged by hegemon USA in the 21st century. It not only describes the events and actors ‘behind the scenes’, but also illuminates the trade-offs and doubts the actors involved had, giving much food for thought concerning the structural constraints and areas of agency for politics in markets and market actors in the face of the political hegemon in the context of political and economic competition. I always admire work which succeeds to write and explain the history of the present.

This book is divided into 4 main escalating events of economic warfare waged by the USA: the isolation of Iran from global finance and oil, the isolation of Russia from finance after 2014, the isolation of China from new technology from 2016 onwards, and the massive isolation of Russia from finance, oil, and technology after 2022. At every stage the author shows how the American policy wonks were trying to figure out how they would achieve their goals, hedge their power, learned from their previous mistakes, and innovated the warfare as the ‘enemy’ was learning and adapting from their previous economic boycotts. The basis of power for the US was initially the large power of the dollar, serving as the gateway to the global market, propped up by large financial American markets and Eurodollar markets which rapidly developed after the 1970s. This was a major leverage the Americans secured for themselves during the crisis: as the gold standard was dropped and OPEC pushed oil prices up, the exchange value of the dollar was dropping. OPEC countries wanted to replace sales in oil in dollar by a basket of currencies, but the Americans brokered a deal with Saudi-Arabia that, in exchange for more voting rights at the IMF, they and OPEC would continue to deal in dollars.

Fishman starts his narrative in Iran, when Bush was successfully convinced to push multinational banks to isolate the country from global business. They did so by restricting every transaction between banks having a subsidiary in the US (basically every bank) and an Iranian bank. Pushing on reputational risks to be one of the only banks dealing with fundamentalists, a bunch of bureaucrats bullied global banks into submission. This was not without the political pushback by other countries, but the Americans focused on the banks themselves and their corporate self-interest. As the strategy was working, the US pushed further. With the CISADA bill of 2010, the US would give secondary sanctions to all companies still involved in Iranian oil (bullying European oil companies out of the country) and more stringent sanctions on banks (to scare the last few remaining smaller banks willing to do business). Every week, the Americans were pressuring banks to cut ties with the Iranians or face losing access to the dollar.

There was one problem: Chinese business was filling in the gaps which Western business was leaving. How could America really isolate Iran? One option was to target the Iranian central bank and thus everybody doing business with the bank, but the White House feared it might backfire on the oil market and finance, and thus on domestic politics. Plus there were no guarantees that it would actually make non-Western countries fall in line. After negotiations with India and China, and severe threats of being cut from the financial dollar system, they complied (without many words) that they would diversify from Iranian oil. As oil prices were rising, and Saudi Arabia not keen on increasing supply, the US eventually found their alternative in good ol’ homegrown shale gas.

The last straw of sanctions were moving things back to the financial arena. The US ruled that foreign banks could still process Iranian oil money, but they could no longer make it available to them. It had to be locked on their shores. Iranians could only use it to buy non-sanctioned goods. 100 billion dollars of Iran’s oil money was now frozen abroad. It was easy to make companies comply to this, as it boosted their exports, while they could blame the US for being ‘tied’ to regulations. In the end, the Iranian economy was bleeding, the currency going in free fall, resulting in youth unemployment and domestic crisis. Eventually, Iran was willing to sit at the table and negotiate the Iranian Nuclear Deal in 2015.

In Russia, the flagrant imperial land grab in 2014 made sanctions necessary but also more challenging. Russia was more integral to the world economy, and European countries depended on Russian oil and gas. When a report came out that cutting of Russia could result in a full percentage point GDP loss for Germany, they went spiralling. Of course, the dependency was a double-edged sword, with Russia’s political economy completely depending on fossil export. Most of the large fossil companies also had huge dollar-denominated debts. Sanctions needed to be ‘scalpel-like’, and required the support of the European partners to be effective.

The first step was cutting these companies’ access to the US financial markets. When they could not get new loans, Russia’s central bank would be pushed to pay back the loans from their dollar war chest, which would lower their room of operation in monetary matters. Later on, they would also prohibit all state-owned financial institutions to the markets. Another, new chokepoint they addressed, was making sure Western oil companies no longer delivered top-notch technology for oil exploration to Russia.

Russia, meanwhile, turned east. It opened a new pipeline with China and a currency swap line with the Chinese. Russia also started its own alternative to SWIFT, the global communication platform for banks. However, in trying to defend his interests, Putin intensified his political capitalism and scared Yevtushenkov (who had refused to sell his oil company to a friend of Putin). As this scared the foreign investors even more, his main weakness was exacerbated and the Russian central bank had to rely on its war chest of over 500 billion dollars. Everything was coming together. While the bank was propping up the rubble, it was forced to raise interest rates to 17%. The domestic economy was in full collapse, the rubble losing half of its value.

Putin wanted to change things around by looking for the weakest links in the Western chain. First, he focused on Syriza. But as the Greeks demanded money immediately, Putin could not give them what they required, as he was having his own problems. He later tied closer ties to Hungary and other Eastern European parties. However, Putin did manage to lure Germans in with Nord Stream 2 and having Siemens deliver crucial technology. He was surely not successful, but he did manage to delay. In the context of the Minsk accords, the West was not very keen on intensifying sanctions.

The third part covers Chinese sanctions. Trump gave the starting salvo for this Chinese containment. Washington saw Beijing as a strategic enemy and replaced the win-win idea on globalisation by a zero-sum alternative. It now moved to cutting the Chinese economy from the technological frontier, by isolating Huawei. The US ruled that American chipmakers could no longer deliver to Huawei from 2018 on. This actually severed their positions, as Taiwanese chipmakers took over their spot. Here again, the US issued “secondary sanctions” again, forbidding any chipmaker to sell to Huawei when they used some kind of American technology (basically all chipmakers). Again, the message was clear to the world: you either deal with the US, or with China. Now Huawei was isolated. The Chinese had been prepared on the financial chokepoint, but not on this technological one. Moreover, the Americans also pressured Dutch company ASML in not selling the chipmaker production machine (they are the only ones who can make them, one piece costs 150 million dollars and is as large as a bus), blocking the Chinese SMIC chipmaker from growth.

At last, the US and EU gave their leverage over the global economy a full stretch after Russia’s invasion in 2022. The major move was choking off the Russian central bank, making sure they could not even use their war chest. Yellen, advisor to Biden, was very wary to do this, as it could stretch the dollar politicizing too far. However, von der Leyen called Draghi, who had to convince her (which worked). The US was putting a lot of skin in the game, threatening to balkanize the global system it had created. Thus, for this to be able to work, the US not only needed the EU, but the full G7. When they declared their intentions to sanction the Russian central bank, Russia was blindsided. They could never have thought that this could happen in the globalized economy. The 630 billion dollar warchest was now not operational in the global market. Russia was now forcing its Russian companies to give its dollars for rubles, using them effectively as central bank.

The West did avoid initially to cut off from fossil lifelines, this would be too costly. But this meant the Russian lifeline was still in place. Isolating Iranian oil was one thing, isolating Russian fossil fuels was another. EU immediately scaled down its gas and oil imports, but Russia just turned to India and China instead. The West also didn’t necessarily wanted to stop the flow of Russian fossils, for it would push prices up tremendously. They merely wanted to shrink Russian profit margins on their sales. Only after nine months did the US install a price cap, a mechanisms to keep Russian oil in the market, while it would hurt their revenues much. Basically, the US had ensured that European shippers, British insurers, and American finance would not do business with Russian fuels above a certain price. The Russians would still sell their fossils (as long as they could make a bit of money), while everybody would use these sanctions as a prerequisite to pressure Russian sellers to lower their prices.

Countries also grew wary of American power and its arbitrary leveraging of power over the global economy. The BRICS countries teamed up to what they saw as American bullying. As they tried to shield themselves from such power, the Russian central bank swapped dollars for euros and gold (ironically, as they thought the EU was too depended on them to cut them off), the Chinese central bank promoted its own digital currency of the renminbi. However, a major difficulty for the CCP is still that international players are not keen on relying too much on the renminbi: when shit hits the fan, even in the context of dollar politicizing, you’d rather be in front of an American court than a Chinese court when you want to protect your private property. But this could change. In addition, the Chinese also started developing its own chokepoint, spearheading their role in clean energy.

More importantly, it has kicked off a broader scramble for economic security. Now that the US has used its power to retaliate against its political opponents, trust is lost, and this is very hard to win back. There is an impossible trinity between economic interdependence, economic security, and geopolitical competition. During the Cold War, the Great Powers took security and geopolitical competition, during the 90s they took economic interdependence and security. Now, geopolitical competition is creeping in again, and we are left wondering what the Great Powers are going to relinquish in order to navigate through the trinity.

At last, some nice quotes:

Alan Greenspan in 2008: “National security aside, it hardly makes any difference who will be the next president. The world is governed by market forces.” (6)

Henry Morgenthau, Franklin Roosevelt’s treasury secretary in the closing remarks of Bretton Woods: the goal was to “drive the usurious moneylenders from the temple of international finance.” (30)

Robert Rubin, treasury secretary and former Goldman Sachs co-chairman, said that you shouldn’t “undermine the role of the dollar as the reserve currency. Once you do it once, you become a less reliable supplier.” (41)

Vladimir Putin, around 2014: “And with Ukraine, our Western partners have crossed the line. If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard. You must always remember this.” (199)

[Chad Manske · Rating 4 out of 5]

Edward Fishman’s “Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare” is a riveting exploration of how the United States has transformed the global economy into a potent weapon for confronting geopolitical adversaries. Fishman, a former top sanctions official at the U.S. State Department, combines insider knowledge with scholarly analysis to deliver a dramatic narrative about America’s use of economic tools against nations like Russia, China, and Iran. The book traces the evolution of economic warfare, revealing how successive U.S. administrations have exploited chokepoints—such as dominance in global finance, advanced technology, and energy supply chains—to exert influence on the world stage. Fishman takes readers behind closed doors, introducing the diplomats, lawyers, and financial experts who pioneered these strategies. His account is both thrilling and accessible, offering insights into the successes and failures of sanctions as a foreign policy tool. What sets “Chokepoints” apart is its ability to synthesize complex geopolitical shifts into a compelling story. Fishman demystifies the mechanisms behind America’s economic power, from leveraging the U.S. dollar to controlling microchip technology. He argues that these tools have reshaped international relations, creating an era of economic arms races and fractured global systems. The narrative is enriched by vivid anecdotes and strategic lessons that are crucial for policymakers and business leaders alike. While other books on economic warfare delve into specific aspects—like oligarchs or financial networks—Fishman’s work stands out for its holistic approach. It not only explains how America gained its outsized economic power but also examines the risks of overusing it. His recommendations for navigating this new era make “Chokepoints” indispensable reading for anyone seeking to understand the future of global power dynamics. In sum, “Chokepoints” is a masterful blend of history, strategy, and storytelling that illuminates one of the most critical developments in modern geopolitics. It is both urgent and engrossing—a must-read for scholars, policymakers, and curious minds alike.

[Andrew Cook · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book was a disappointment. The basic premise, that economic warfare is a little understood but valuable instrument, could easily have been proven in 80-100 pages. The remaining 400 pages are therefore extraneous fluff. The book leaves the reader asking many first order questions which the author alluded to, but did not address . . . If Sanctions are such an asymmetric advantage, why didn’t the United States use them before the 2000s? What does classic economic theory say about sanctions? What might be the second and third order effects of Americas use of sanctions? These are the most interesting questions, but ones which the author seems to stop short of addressing.

[Dan · Rating 3 out of 5]

I learned a bit about the behind-the-scenes debates and discussions that occurred around these policies over the last decade or so. However, if you're someone who pays close attention to the news, you probably won't learn a ton of new information from this book.

[Laurent Franckx · Rating 2 out of 5]

I have started reading this book a few weeks after Trump and Netanyahu started bombing Iran without clear political objectives and even less of a coherent strategy. Fishman's book on the increasing use of economic sanctions as an instrument of US foreign policy after the Iraq War was published about one year ago, and it already feels like it is referring to a different era. Fishman discusses the successes and failures in the use of economic sanctions against Iran (remember when Iran was willing to give up its enrichment program?), China and Russia, and evaluates the long term limitations of economic warfare. A timely and important book, but it could easily be reduced by 2/3rds and still contain all the relevant information.

[Jonika · Rating 1 out of 5]

This book was listed under a category for my library’s summer book bingo and it seemed up my alley. I was wrong. I finished this book out of spite.

This book intended to highlight the power of American economic sanctions through domination in the global financial system and it appears like it was successful in conveying this to the majority of reviewers. To me, this book explained how economic sanctions are a new and covert form of American imperialism and tyranny, though I understand that may have not been Fishman’s intention.

This review is not intended to be sympathetic to authoritarian regimes such as the ones observed in Russia, China, and Iran, but rather to point out that the argument Fishman builds in this book is in bad faith. It appears Fishman’s intention is not to (justly) criticize these regimes for the terror and instability they have created both domestically and abroad, but rather to justify American dominance and autocracy in the global political arena.

Fishman goes into excruciating detail about the endless strategies the US government has employed to enforce economic sanctions on Iran, China, and Russia. Despite 68 chapters and a conclusion, little historical context is provided for the reasons these countries have been targeted by US sanctions. Most glaringly, Fishman never addresses an underlying question to this entire discussion: what gives the US the right to enforce economic sanctions on other sovereign nations?

Fishman begins the discussion on Iran with a brief historical overview of US interactions with Iran but conveniently leaves out the CIA backed coup of Mosaddegh in 1953, after efforts were made by Mosadaegh to nationalize Iranian oil and remove British monopoly on the Iranian oil industry. This coup led to the shah, Pahlavi, taking power for 26 years with the United States’ support—as the shah was much more welcoming to US interests in Iranian oil. Fishman mentions, albeit briefly, the United States’ role in supporting the shah to build a nuclear program in Iran, as well as Reagan’s Iran-contra ordeal, and yet Fishman seems to gloss over the reality that the US is largely to blame for manufacturing the Iranian nuclear threat it so ferociously fears today.

Fishman feigns a neutral stance throughout the book, which on the surface makes sense as he is focused more on highlighting the “practical” uses of economic sanctions. And yet he makes repeated, subtle remarks that convey his views on Iran’s “nuclear threat” and dangerous political leaders, while conversely watering down the violent partnership that Israel and the US have created in the Middle East. For instance, when referencing Iran’s presidential election in 2013, Fishman states that “although Iranians got to vote for a president, the country was not a democracy” going on to state that Ayatollah Ali Khameni, the supreme leader of Iran chose the candidates that the public could vote on. I’m having a hard time understanding how this is so starkly undemocratic when compared to the results of United States’ most recent election cycle, enforced two-party system through the electoral college, and the de jure system of gerrymandering.

The Iranian nuclear threat is framed as a somewhat random and obscure creation, with no mention that Iran sits between three US backed nations—Israel, Pakistan, and India—that have refused to sign the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. Fishman notes Israel’s right to defend itself against Iranian threats, but by that logic, would it not make sense that Iran has similar rights when Netanyahu proclaims that Iran “must face a credible nuclear threat”? Iran does not assassinate Israeli scientists and US top ranking officials in international airports, nor does it bomb US nuclear power plants and primary schools, but Israel and the US do so to Iran. With full impunity no less.

This is not in defense of the horrendous human rights violations committed by Iran’s fundamentalist regime. However, it does make you wonder why American media often does not provide the same critique toward nations with similar, if not worse, violations, when those same nations are conveniently friendly to US “national interests,” such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Is the concern expressed by US media—and further backed up by books such as this—truly centered on the violations of human rights? Or is it more concerned with the identity of the perpetrator that commits these violations? The US and Israel share many similarities with Iran when it comes to state-sponsored atrocities. But when we do it, it is robust and diplomatic foreign policy against credible threats of terrorism.

Little is addressed on the fact multiple agencies such as the Congressional Research Services or IAEA have confirmed Iran’s cessation of nuclear weapons and compliance with the United States’ nuclear arms deals. When this subject is briefly commented on, it is framed as a success due solely to the tactful negotiation skills of US federal agents. And yet where is the recognition of Iran’s attempts to negotiate the US back into this deal when Trump abruptly, and with little cause, withdrew and reimposed sanctions and on Iran in 2018?

The largest issue with this book, beyond its perpetuation of the continued Western obsession with Iranian nuclear weapons, is the way it offers economic sanctions as a non-violent alternative to foreign intervention. This is not to say Fishman offers no critiques on economic sanctions, but most of his critiques are centered around their ineffectiveness in creating a desired outcome. Fishman claims that the Obama administration “always exempted humanitarian goods such as food, medicine, and medical devices” from their sanctions and that the administration “did their best” to allow these items in. But when economic sanctions ultimately led to skyrocketing prices for food and medical supplies in Iran, how good were the administration’s “best efforts”? We may never know, because Fishman does not describe what the Obama admin did to combat this issue. Fishman describes the scarcity of food and medication as an “unintentional”byproduct of economic sanctions. When US sanctions led to documented shortages of poultry during Eid or epilepsy medication and chemotherapy treatment for Iranian citizens, is it truly a nonviolent alternative? A 2025 Lancet Global Health study refutes Fishman’s claims, stating that from 1971 to 2021, economic sanctions brought by the US and EU have led to dramatically larger amounts of deaths than battle-related casualties (564,258 deaths vs 106,000 deaths to be exact).

At best this book reads as an obtuse and misguided fluff piece on American exceptionalism in the global economy, and I worry that Fishman may have considered this book a refreshing and original perspective on US foreign policy, despite him regurgitating the same overly-optimistic narrative that US media pumps out on the daily. Perhaps, I was naive to believe that Fishman—formally a lead in the US State Department’s Office of Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation—could provide a balanced perspective on the potential uses and pitfalls of economic sanctions.

[Adam · Rating 5 out of 5]

Chokepoints is a must-read exploration of the growing economic wars and their influence on global security, economics, and geopolitics. The book is both timely and timeless, and the writing is both engaging and deeply informative—making complex geopolitical issues accessible to any reader.

The author masterfully blends history, economics, and first-hand experience to show how vital economic chokepoints (waterways, the USD, telecom hardware, et al) are becoming growing leverage points in international relations—especially with the new authoritarian axis of Russia, China, and Iran.

What makes this book stand out is the author’s ability to take complex geopolitical issues and present them in a clear, engaging, and thought-provoking way. His expertise in foreign policy is evident, and he writes in a way that is accessible to both experts and casual readers alike by showing us an insider’s view of the black box of policymaking through compelling stories and the people behind them.

While geopolitical and economics books can be dense, this book is far from it. Chokepoints reads as a novel more akin to a beach read than a textbook. The writing reminds me of Michael Lewis or Malcolm Gladwell.

Required reading for everyone – whether you’re a diplomat, farmer, entrepreneur, or investor. Highly recommended!

[Russell Chee · Rating 2 out of 5]

this is quite interesting, particularly if read as a complement to Nicholas Mulder's 'The Economic Weapon'. although it inevitably at times exudes a bit of an American saviour complex, I thought it was nonetheless a pretty interesting account of the rise of economic sanctions as a tool of international statecraft over the past few decades, with a clear awareness of their limits too.

unfortunately, it tends towards the descriptive and sometimes veers vaguely towards hysteria; it is better in handling the sanctions enacted on Iran and North Korea than Russia, where there is too much of a moment-by-moment reporting feel to the writing.

I also think that it is a touch dated in its focus on financial tools; Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman's 'Underground Empire' is a bit more technical and interesting in exploring how the actual infrastructure that enables the US to undertake such actions works.

2.5?

[Alicia Haider · Rating 4 out of 5]

[rough quote] “instead of learning Arabic and studying counterterrorism, young IR professionals are learning Chinese and studying finance and trade regulations (economic warfare).”

one of the first historical/policy books i’ve read where i didn’t pick up on left or right ideologies - felt like information was presented clearly without personal judgement and i was allowed to form my own opinions on decision making. understand more of the backstory behind Tr*mps decisions with the PRC

[Jiaphet · Rating 5 out of 5]

Arguably the most dense book a person can read in regards to foreign economic policy that is also easily accessible at the same time. The language is easy to digest, but it's hard to keep track and remember everything due to so much information. This book was also an eye opener on how bad the current administration is at handling its macroeconomic policies.

[George · Rating 4 out of 5]

a comprehensive, minute by minute account of how the united states has leveraged her dominance of finance and trade to bludgeon adversaries over the past two decades. i found it very educational since i knew little about the intricate details of sanctions and the like. very helpful for understanding the current unraveling of globalization and trade wars being waged by 47

[Filip Batselé · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good read on the use of economic sanctions by the US since the mid-2000s, with the huge benefit of being written by an insider. Also reads very easily.

Disadvantages: hardback title probably covers the content better (paperback: "how economic warfare is changing the world")- - > the book is very America-centric, both in how it describes certain situations but equally in the lack of attention given to other players' offensive use of sanctions (eg China's own use of these tools, also only basic coverage of the EU's tools). Similarly, the "uniqueness" of our age is overestimated (in that respect, Mulder's "The economic weapon" offers a good complement to this book). Thirdly, at times also too descriptive and meandering on the broader context rather than the nitty-gritty of the economic warfare policy, especially on Russia.

[Edgar Van · Rating 4 out of 5]

A wonderful read on how the U.S. created economic warfare and the tools it needs. It tells the story of how it took on Iran, Russia and China with mixed success. I like to read about geopolitics and this one provides nice insights such as “economic sanctions are like antibiotics: they work well when used correctly but cause a host of problems when used excessively or inappropriately”. Or a quote from Sergei Lavrov: “Putin’s only real advisors were Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Catherine the Great”. The book is not a light read at over 500 pages but warmly recommended.

[Kaustubh · Rating 4 out of 5]

Chokepoints takes the international economic history of the past 20 years and repackages it into a high stakes espionage thriller. It gives you the technical know-how in such a clever way that it has you gasping and cheering for mundane things like the Department of Commerces Press Statements. It takes faceless government bureaucrats and administrations and make them rockstars and James Bond-esq espionage masters.

Particularly, Stuart Levey, Adam Szubin, David Cohen, Matt Pottinger, Daleep Singh, Elvira Nabiullina and Jack Lew are some of the "Characters" that will inspire me and stay with me for a while.

Highly recommend this book if you have even a slight interest in learning about Economic Warfare in the eras of growing and fractioning globalization and the knowledge depth and writing style of Fishman will get you hooked for the rest!

[Tim · Rating 4 out of 5]

Een soort economie college aan de hand van een reis door de recente geschiedenis.

[Jay Farber · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the exact book I needed to better understand the last 15 years of geopolitics when it felt like both a lot, and not that much, was happening. Really, really fun read and I learned a ton.

[Theo North · Rating 2 out of 5]

The chapter on Huawei and ZTE was tough to read and felt littered with classic problematic assumptions on China.

The book is framed against the backdrop of a ‘new Cold War’ between China and the United States, operating on the premise that the Chinese Communist Party has two overriding objectives: first, to maintain its grip on power domestically, and second, to displace the U.S. at the top of the global order. While the research is extensive and detailed, some of the author’s arguments - especially the claim that China’s policy of ‘civil-military fusion’ effectively makes Huawei an arm of the PLA - is based on limited evidence.

Reading Eva Dou’s House of Huawei makes clear that the Huawei story is considerably more complicated than the book allows. Still, if you approach this work with the understanding that it is structured around a fairly obvious East-versus-West world- and keep that framing in mind as you read - you will find some interesting nuggets and insights.

[idit isaacsohn · Rating 5 out of 5]

What a great book.So easy to follow, it grabs your attention from the first st page. it's chronologically told which brings clarity to the unfolding of history. I highly recommend it as an audiobook or the hard cover.
I can not wait for Mr. Fishman next book.

[Giuliano · Rating 3 out of 5]

If you're interested in the weaponisation of economic and financial interdependence, economic warfare/statecraft or Geoeconomics, this shouldn't be your first pick. Rather, you should go with 'underground empire ' by Farrell/Newman. Fishman offers another scope on the same phenomenon and he sure put a lot of work into this, but ultimately he doesn't provide a systemic analysis of the issue as the aforementioned authors do. Fishman is very in-depth on the inner mechanisms and engineers of American economic warfare and looks at the processes and decisionmaking thoroughly. If the workings of American government bureaucracy are not really your thing, you'll soon miss the focus on the wider theoretical framework.

Overall, too policy- and actor-oriented for my taste, but you have to pay respect to the gargantuan work the author put in conducting dozens of interviews. More of a book for practitioners than for theorists.

[Erik Fortmeyer · Rating 5 out of 5]

Let’s just say that you are a Cold War kid, and us who know, know when that time period is. When the Cold War “ended”, there would be a ‘peace dividend’ we were told. Instead, the CW era evolved into today’s Economic Warfare, not the Triad and the Bretton Woods system, but sanctions and export controls. For those of us who have wondered what exactly that is and how did it come to be, this book is for you. The author is absolutely masterful in tying together the origins and consequences of this new Economic Cold (?) War we have been in for the last 30 years. Three major sections are used to cover Iran, Russia, and China, the modern adversaries of the American financial system. Very readable, very worth your time if the above topics interest you.

[Noah Damski · Rating 5 out of 5]

Read read read this book. So incredibly digestible, so much good info about how the US executive branch has masterfully learned to counter foreign enemies by engineering new economic weapons rather than deploying any military force.

[Simonas · Rating 5 out of 5]

Apie "sankcijas" daug kas išgirdom tik karo prieš Ukrainą kontekste, bet gera ir skaitoma knyga apie didžiausius panašių priemonių naudojimo atvejus per pastaruosius keliasdešimt metų. Padeda suprasti kontekstą ir nepaskęsti kasdienių naujienų detalėse, kurios dažnai nieko nereiškia.

[Grace · Rating 5 out of 5]

Absolutely fascinating. I'd have to re-read this to fully digest everything though. Coming in with no knowledge on anything tied to economic warfare, this is a really insightful first look into the mechanics of it and the many, many different stakeholders necessary to keep American economic power effective.

[Kevin Hall · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hell yeah we're all going to die (or devalue the dollar! or both!)

[Dan Tadmore · Rating 5 out of 5]

Brilliant book on economic warfare for the past twenty years. Spans Iran, Russia, and China. Really illustrative of global policy in the real world, and the trade-offs & risks that are involved with strategic decision-making. I paticularly thought the chapter on the Russian oil price cap was really interesting.