Hard New World: Our Post-American Future

Quarterly Essay #98

by Hugh White

What is Australia’s place in the new global landscape?
Are we ready for our post-American future? In an era of rising danger for all, and dramatic choices for Australia, Hugh White explores how the world is changing and Australia should respond.


Under Donald Trump, America's retreat from global leadership has been swift and erratic. China, Russia and India are on the move. White explains the big strategic trends driving the war in Ukraine, and why America has "lost" Asia. He discusses Albanese Labor's record and its post-election choices, and why complacency about the American alliance – including AUKUS – is no longer an option. This essential essay urges us to make our way in a hard new world with realism and confidence.


"The Canberra establishment is shocked by any suggestion that we should walk away from the ANZUS commitments. They think we can and must depend on America more than ever in today's hard new world. But that misses the vital point. It is America that is walking away from the commitments it made in very different circumstances seventy-five years ago. That was plain enough under Joe Biden. It is crystal clear today under Trump."—Hugh White, Hard New World

Genres: Politics, Nonfiction, Australia, War, Essays, History, International Relations

169 pages, Kindle Edition

Published June 2, 2025

About the author

Librarian Note: There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.

Hugh White (born 1953) is a Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University in Canberra, Australia, long time defence and intelligence analyst, and author who has published works on military strategy and international relations. He was Deputy Secretary for Strategy and Intelligence in the Australian Department of Defence from 1995 until 2000 and was the inaugural Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). (Source: Wikipedia)

Reviews

[S · Rating 4 out of 5]

Not perfect, but an excellent and gripping argument to reorient Australia's defence and strategic policy to the new realities of the 2020s.

The strongest section is coverage on Asia, Taiwan and Australian defence policy. The author makes similar arguments to previous writings but provides interesting and compelling additions to these arguments. The savage distilling of arguments against AUKUS, dismantling it in four paragraphs (pp63-4) must feel like a satisfying culmination of years arguing against it. The analysis of Trump, his thinking and likely behaviour is unnerving but fantastic.

That said, I wished for a little bit more.

First, the greatest national security challenge of our era, climate change, is missing. As with most strategic studies authors, the catastrophy that is the effects of climate change, which are redefining nation-state relations to be about access to and sharing basic resources, not just the materiel of war, is ignored. For example, the author concludes (p60): "...China will be the strongest power in East Asia and the Western Pacific by a very long way. Its closest competitor will be India...Japan will not function as a great power in this East Asia...Other major regional countries -Vietnam, South Korea, perhaps Thailand and Singapore - will also be strong enough at least to deflect or modulate the way China ises its power." Each of these countries differently vulnerable to food and water security issues, yet this is ignored.

Second, the section on Ukraine. The author seems to have missed the revolution in military affairs of drone warfare, though to be fair this was written before the most recent strikes, but seems to oversimplify the equation, reducing the conflict to a crude comparison of 'mass'. Ukrainian ingenuity suggests this is wrong. Another place this is seen is oversimplifying the role of a nuclear deterrent - 'if Ukraine goes too far, the Russians will just nuke them' seems to be the gist. But time and again this has been bluff and bluster. Russia has ignored its own doctrine and is paralysed about when and what it might use nuclear weapons for. For example, is Russia really going to respond with nuclear weapons to Ukraine's current drone strategic bombing campaign? This is a more nuanced question that doesn't fit within the more simple model the author presents. It also makes it more of a glaring omission that the author doesn't talk about how Australia might fare with no US nuclear deterrent.

Finally, another critique is perhaps a more common critique with this realism line of argument: apart from NATO, the author wholly discounts the role of international institutions in shaping and setting norms in international engagement. Yes, the international system is under pressure, but to wholly discount this is short sighted (see, for example, the IMF investment in Ukraine).These institutions matter for most countries most of the time - to ignore them misses an important part of the picture.

All in all, a good read and one I'll be coming back to

[liv (≧▽≦) · Rating 4 out of 5]

Trump marks the end of optimism on the world stage. Hmmm. I conquer.

I have been blabbing on about how China is our friend and America is our enemy since I learnt how to speak. I clearly remember my parents thinking that statement was shocking about 10 years ago. If i had a dollar every-time I was right about something related to politics I’d be a millionaire (not like I have a politics degree or anything).

It’s about time our government acknowledged the shifting relations of the Asia-Pacific and stop trying to panda to America when they have done nothing but drag with country (Australia) down. This is an excellent analysis of the current issues facing Australia and the rest of the world surrounding America. If only governments would take the warning before its too late. I would have liked a little more discussion on Western Chinese propaganda causing the common fear of China as a global power but that’s just me being nitpicky.

No quotes, listened on audio.

[Maha · Rating 5 out of 5]

If only we had the courage to discuss the glaring inconsistencies in Australian political realities and face them meaningfully, there’d be no need to “fear” China or being dragged into conflicts we don’t need to fight in the future. AUKUS is such a bad idea… no wonder it was initiated by Morrison and a Liberal government. 😖

[Lucia Babette · Rating 4 out of 5]

With US affairs moving so quickly in the headlines, this publication probably wasn’t gonna remain the most relevant or enduring.

Referencing the cringeworthy event of the Zelesnkyy meeting as its key anecdote (which already feels like a lifetime ago) does also prove this point - The circus is never-ending.

Offered good advice for Australian leadership in a realist lens, but, by no fault of its own, felt out of date by the time it reached my door.

[Tara · Rating 5 out of 5]

so to translate for girlies he said we should break up w us but it doesn’t have to be messy and we can still be friends and then we should be nicer to china which might lead to a lovely romance w them instead but ultimately we should prioritise self care and self love bc all we have is us

[Jim Parker · Rating 5 out of 5]

Truth bombs galore in this brilliant essay by Australian defence guru Hugh White about the epochal changes underway in global politics and the implications for Australia of the now patent shift of international security arrangements from a unipolar to a multi-polar world.

As evidenced by Trump’s re-election, the American people are tired of the US having to assume global leadership and policy security arrangements in both the western and eastern hemispheres. The mood in the US is turning back toward isolationism, as existed for much of the 19th century and half of the 20th century. Even when Trump goes, White argues, this aversion to being the global cop on the beat is unlikely to change.

Meanwhile, in Canberra, the major political parties and the attendant security establishment are still so heavily invested in the unipolar moment of the 1990s, brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union, they refuse to imagine alternative security arrangements that reflect former Prime Minister Paul Keating’s astute observation back in the ‘90s that Australia must seek its security within Asia, not FROM Asia.

This is why, White writes, that both sides of politics are rusted on to the disastrous and ruinous AUKUS submarines deal, which was cooked up by Australia’s worst-ever PM, Scott Morrison, purely as a device to wedge the Labor Party. The apparatchiks and their minders continue to imagine, wrongly, that the US would defend Australia in a clash with China or to accept that it actually makes sense (as Trump recognises) for the US to look after its own backyard. In any case, there is very little chance that should China go after Taiwan, Washington would risk an attack on its soil by fighting a war with Beijing. . As we have seen with the US actions in Europe - distancing itself from traditional allies, cozying up to Putin and publicly humiliating Ukraine’s president - Washington can no longer be depended on.

That is all the more reason, White argues, for Australia’s policy establishment to get out of the cul de sac it has found itself in and start shaping a more independent policy, Instead of indulging America’s exceptionalist delusions and demonisation of China, Australia must learn to live peacefully in a multipolar world. That means building up our defence capabilities with more limber technology than white elephant nuclear submarines and surface ships.

"The Canberra establishment is shocked by any suggestion that we should walk away from the ANZUS commitments,”. White says. “They think we can and must depend on America more than ever in today's hard new world. But that misses the vital point. It is America that is walking away from the commitments it made in very different circumstances 75 years ago. That was plain enough under Joe Biden. It is crystal clear today under Trump."

These are tough choices but the longer Canberra puts off making them, the harder it will become and the greater chance we will have of being drawn into a war with our biggest export market, a country that poses no threat to us apart from due to unthinking devotion to a now unreliable and unhinged US ally.

Essential reading.

[Ash · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Quarterly essay has ramped it up here - with very real analysis of how nuclear war is becoming a real threat. How couldn't it? So for that reason - it became a rather harrowing read. More importantly - although suggestions were offered for a way forward for Australian govt. I hold no hope. I do feel that the Quarterly would benefit from a new essay with a new focus. We need the Quarterly essay to be exploring these issues, of course, but we also need diversity of thought. I am sick of reading about America.

[Michael O'rourke · Rating 4 out of 5]

Weird reading something that is so contemporary, like seeing it on the news as you read about it. Good recommendation Darcy

[Pedro L. Fragoso · Rating 5 out of 5]

From the antipodes (N.B.: I’m writing this from Portugal) comes a solid, well-founded, and highly compelling analysis of the current geopolitical dispensation—emerging under the aegis of the fast-approaching multipolar new world order. This is precisely the kind of material our politicians should be reading and debating to better understand the implications of their decisions. But they won’t—clearly. And that’s contemptible.

Some highlights.

So what has changed is not just that the costs of US global leadership are higher than expected. The imperatives that drove US strategic commitments in Europe and Asia in the twentieth century are far weaker today.
    This is the tide that, with or without Trump, is sweeping America away from the old vision of US leadership and back towards some version of isolationism. Indeed, as we will see, this tide drove much of what the Biden administration did, even as they swam against it. But Trump is swimming with this tide, which means his radical transformation of America’s role is going to stick.

What happens when America steps back from the role which has defined the global order for over three decades? What new order emerges when US leadership is withdrawn, and what role does America play in it? These are critical questions for everyone, including for Australia. It is no use asking Donald Trump, of course. But the answer is clear nonetheless. Instead of a unipolar order dominated by one overwhelmingly powerful leading country, we will see a global multipolar order in which a number of “great powers” play more or less equal roles in shaping world affairs through a complex combination of competition, accommodation and cooperation.
    This vision of global order feels very different from the unipolar model of the post–Cold War era, or from the bipolar order of the Cold War, but it is not unfamiliar. (...)

Trump has no such qualms. He likes the idea of cutting deals with powerful rivals in the ceaseless pursuit of advantage, and doesn’t mind that smaller, weaker players get done over in the process. That is his idea of fun.

From Europe to Asia, in the face of all the evidence, they have convinced themselves that America will always retain the strength and resolve to guarantee their security. Now, thanks to Trump, they are brought face to face with the need for long-overdue policy revolutions of their own. Nowhere is this more brutally true than in Europe, as the Europeans face the test of Ukraine.

It has been Ukraine’s fate to be the place where Washington’s illusions about America’s place in the world have collided most directly with the strategic realities of our age.
    The Russo–Ukrainian War marks the end of America’s strategic leadership in Europe, and signals very plainly the transition from the US-led global order of the post–Cold War era to the new multipolar order.
The war is so significant in this transition because of what it shows about the relative power and resolve of the rival powers involved. Any international order is defined ultimately by the issues on which the strongest powers – the great powers – can convince one another they are willing to go to war with one another over. That is because an international order defines the diplomatic frame within which countries interact, and the boundaries of that frame are set by the points at which diplomacy gives way to war.
    We can see how this worked in the past. The nineteenth-century multipolar Concert of Europe was defined by the clear willingness of all the European great powers to go to war to prevent any one of them becoming strong enough to dominate the rest. The bipolar Cold War order was defined by the clear willingness of both superpowers to go to war to prevent the other from upsetting the status quo by intruding into the other’s spheres of influence. The unipolar post–Cold War order has been defined ultimately by America’s presumed willingness to go to war to prevent any rival from contesting the US claim to be the world’s sole great power and establishing a sphere of influence from which it sought to exclude America.
    This presumption has been tested in Ukraine and found to be false. That is what Moscow hoped and intended.

It is easy to see why the idea of a compromise peace was so repugnant. Surrendering Ukrainian territory to Russia would leave Ukrainian citizens at Moscow’s mercy, and of course there could be no guarantee that it would end there. A deal to end the fighting would allow Russia to recover, rebuild and return to the attack. Conceding any of Moscow’s diplomatic demands, such as keeping Ukraine out of NATO, would leave Ukraine forever under Russia’s thumb. It would also threaten the rest of Europe, because if Russia was not stopped in Ukraine, where would it be stopped? Above all, it would seriously weaken the US-led order around the world – including in Asia.

(...) The problem was that it proved impossible to be even remotely confident that a limited nuclear war would not swiftly escalate to a full-scale nuclear holocaust. In the 1980s Australia’s own scholar Des Ball made a major contribution to debunking the “limited war” illusion, and the arguments he developed still hold good today. So in the end America’s Cold War deterrent relied on convincing the Soviets that America really was ultimately willing to risk nuclear attack on US cities to defend Western Europe, which it successfully did. Likewise, today Washington could only deter nuclear attacks on Ukraine if it could convince Moscow that it was willing to risk nuclear attacks on America itself. And no one believed that it was.
This has profound and disturbing implications for the whole Ukraine conflict. It means that Ukraine, facing a nuclear-armed Russia and with no nuclear deterrent of its own, could never have achieved the victory it sought over Russia. If at any point Ukraine seemed poised for such a victory, Russia could have credibly threatened to use nuclear weapons to stop it, because Ukraine’s supporters had no credible way to deter Moscow from carrying out those threats.
    Why cannot America deter Russia today in the way it deterred the Soviets in the Cold War? The difference is in the balance of resolve. (...) What was called at the time “the delicate balance of terror” in fact rested on a clearly understood balance of resolve. It was essential that each side believed the other side’s resolve was just as strong as its own, and that had to be demonstrated convincingly. (...) But perhaps equally important was what US leaders said. During the Cold War they spoke very frankly to the American people about the risks they had to face to contain the Soviet Union. At critical moments they explicitly declared that if necessary America would use nuclear weapons, and they acknowledged that America could suffer nuclear attack in return.
    The most famous instance is the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, but an even more telling example is the Berlin Crisis the previous year, when President Kennedy faced Soviet demands for the withdrawal of US and allied forces from West Berlin. At the height of the crisis, Kennedy delivered a televised national address in which he committed America to defend its position in West Berlin, acknowledged that this could lead to nuclear war, and instructed America to prepare to face a nuclear attack. The Kremlin backed down, US forces stayed in West Berlin, and the Berlin Wall went up instead. Kennedy’s explicit threat is a perfect example of a vital principle that is as true today as it was in the Cold War: that a nuclear power can be stopped, but only by an unambiguous demonstration of willingness to fight a nuclear war to stop it.

US leaders over the past twenty years have failed to prepare the American people for the costs and risks they would have to bear to defend US global leadership from the powerful challengers of today. Nor have they explained why Americans should bear those costs and risks. They have said that US global leadership must be defended, but have not made the case as to why that matters so much to Americans. And that is because, as we have seen, the case is not there to be made. America’s strategic stake in Europe is not now what it was in the Cold War, because today it has no reason to fear that a shift in the European balance could open the door to a Eurasian hegemon. The old Washington establishment might argue that America’s role as the bulwark of European security is vital to its claim to global leadership, but the truth is that global leadership is not vital to America’s own security when the alternative is not a hostile authoritarian hegemony but a diverse and a well-balanced global multipolarity. That is why, ultimately, America cannot defend Ukraine from Russia. That is the reality that Donald Trump, in his weird way, understands.

Europe will now have to defend itself, regardless of NATO.
    It would be foolish to imagine that America would be any more willing to risk nuclear war with Russia to defend a member of NATO than it has been to defend Ukraine. What would matter to America if it faced that momentous choice is not whether a country was a NATO ally or not but whether its defence was vital to America’s security. In post–Cold War Europe, and after NATO’s thoughtless expansion, being a member of the alliance no longer guarantees that a country is vital to America’s security.
    On the contrary, it is not clear today that any country in Europe is vital to America’s security, because Washington need no longer fear that by subjugating a defenceless Europe Russia might come to dominate Eurasia and threaten America itself. That is not just because Russia’s power in Eurasia would still be balanced by China and India. Even more to the point, Europe can defend itself from Russia. The EU’s combined GDP is as much as ten times Russia’s, and European NATO members have three times as many tanks and infantry fighting vehicles as Russia, and twice as many fighter aircraft. Europe today has the strategic weight to contain Russia without undue strain, so it makes no strategic sense for America to do it for them.

People complain that Donald Trump’s approach to alliances is transactional. But all alliances are transactional when the chips are down, when the costs are real and the risks potentially huge. Countries only ever make those choices to support another country’s security when their own vital interests demand it. If you doubt that, ask any Ukrainian. Or find an Australian who remembers the Fall of Singapore in 1942. We understand nothing about Australia’s alliance with America if we do not understand this.

There is always a price, of course, paid by the small and middle powers that get caught up in great-power rivalries, as Ukraine and Taiwan show. But it means that America does not have a truly vital interest in preventing China from replacing it as the leading power in East Asia and the Western Pacific.

(...) with trends going their way Chinese leaders may well decide that their best course is to sit back and wait for events to take their natural course. The way things are going, they won’t have to wait long. (...) In fact, the final nudge that brings the American era in Asia to a close may not come from China at all, but from Korea.     When Obama handed over the Oval Office to Trump in 2017, he warned his successor that the most serious problem he would face was North Korea’s nuclear capability.

The first thing to be clear about is that China will be the strongest power in East Asia and the Western Pacific by a very long way. Its closest competitor will be India, but neither China nor India will be strong enough to compete effectively in the other’s backyard.

We will thus find ourselves not just in a multipolar world but in a multipolar Asia, divided between two great powers and with a number of influential middle powers too. This is the region in which Australia should be preparing to make its way. We should start by recognising that Asia’s future, and Australia’s, will not be decided in Washington. It will be decided in Asia.

As things get tough with Washington over the months and years ahead, there will be a temptation to try to placate Donald Trump and earn his favour by meeting his demands for increased defence spending, or by siding with America in its economic war by cutting links with China. There may be good reasons to increase defence spending, but trying to buy Trump’s favour is not one of them. Likewise, that futile goal would in no way offset the many powerful arguments against joining a US-led anti-China economic coalition. There are no favours we can do Donald Trump which will keep America strategically engaged in Asia and committed to Australia’s defence.

It is not Australia but America that is walking away from the commitments it made in the ANZUS Treaty in very different circumstances seventy-five years ago. That was plain enough under Joe Biden. It is crystal clear today under Trump. This is the lesson we must draw from Washington’s failure to defend Ukraine, from its crumbling position in Asia and from the American voters’ decisive rejection of the old idea of US global leadership to which we still cling. Our best path now is to recognise this and start acting accordingly. And we should move quickly to make this clear, because we need to begin right now to build that new post-alliance relationship with America, and we need to start reshaping our armed forces to defend Australia independently.
    The place to start is with Taiwan. Through AUKUS and in countless other ways, successive Australian governments have encouraged Washington to believe that it can rely on Canberra’s total military support in a war with Beijing over Taiwan. But that is plainly not true. Coalition and Labor governments alike have wilfully avoided seriously considering whether they would send Australia to war with China when Washington calls. It is easy to see why: the question exposes with brutal clarity the fatal weakness of our strategic predicament today. It is unthinkable that Australia would join America in a war that America need not fight, that it cannot win and that would quite possibly become a nuclear war. But as long as we remain convinced that ANZUS is the only possible basis for our security, it is equally unthinkable that we would not join America in that war.
    This is not a hypothetical question, because a combination of impatience in Beijing and muddle on Washington means the risk of a US–China war remains very real.

Today we plan to build the Navy’s largest-ever surface fleet, at a time when surface ships are becoming less and less useful in high-intensity maritime warfare because they are becoming so much more vulnerable to aircraft, missiles and submarines. We should be spending the money on those.

[Zach · Rating 3 out of 5]

another classic Mr white piece in his beautiful ivory tower where any policy recommendations aren't seriously considered because he will die long before a single one can negatively impact his life. he makes many good points and this is brave policy suggestion. but at the end of the day he's living in a fantasy world where you can gamble on people's lives and still win a democratic election.

[Louis · Rating 5 out of 5]

What a relief it is to read analysis by people who actually know what they're talking about! on almost every issue our government seems determined to manage the decline rather than do anything about the problem. White's analysis is bang on as far as I can tell, something that makes me feel a little sad for a country that insists on trading good fortune for bad.

[Lloyd Downey · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is not a book. It doesn’t even purport to be a book: It is an essay and, as such, I find it rather curious. Hugh White is eminently qualified to pontificate about defence strategy. And this is what he does in this essay. But, as qualified as he is, much of the arguments depend on suppositions about what might happen. For example, he suggests the following scenario:
If the Chinese attack Taiwan, either by invasion or blockade, Washington would have to choose between abandoning Taiwan and going to war. If it abandons Taiwan, its entire position in East Asia will be severely, and perhaps fatally, damaged...... if America failed to defend Taiwan.
The Japanese would sooner or later - and probably quite soon - decide to go their own way........... US standing elsewhere in the region would crash, and China would be a big step closer to getting America out of East Asia, This is all clearly understood by leaders in Beijing, which is why they are so tempted to attack Taiwan.

Now most of this argument sounds quite convincing.....it’s easy to get seduced by the logic.... but it is pure supposition. Perhaps there is another way. For example, the US could start to publicly accept that Taiwan is part of China so that re-unification is acceptable to them (the US) This might/would totally change attitudes in Taiwan (would they still be so keen to go to war with the mainland?...doubtful).....and open the way for some sort of peaceful re-unification over time. Thus the Americans could still maintain the alliance with Japan and South Korea. ....
The essay is built entirely on suppositions about how Trump’s America will treat the world in the future. Basically retreat into its own borders and let the Atlantic and Pacific oceans do the defending for them. This may be right but in geopolitics things rarely work out the way strategy planners think. And I can think of all sorts of scenarios where White’s vision could go awry. For example, I can’t imagine the defence industry being happy about the US pulling back into its own borders. They will be promoting “involvement”.
White says that we have moved from a world where we could put all our eggs in the US basket as far as defence is concerned. Now we seem to face something even more fundamental: a shift from a world which worked well for us to one that looks a lot harder to navigate. The basis of our prosperity is imperilled by the collapse of globalisation and the prospect that rival trade blocs will be built on its ruins. The foundation of our security is undermined by the eclipse of the US-led rules-based order. And the power of our values is undermined by the persistence of strong authoritarian governments in many powerful states, and the rise of populism and the erosion of democratic norms in places where these once seemed strongest, especially the United States. The world America made for us is passing away. Its place is being taken by a new and harder post-American world, and we are at a loss to know what to make of it and how to make our way.
Now Trump is back, worse than ever. His first months back in office have been an astonishing spectacle. His absurdly inappropriate appointments to key jobs. His grotesque ideas on Gaza. His open contempt for US allies, His threats to Canada, Panama and Greenland. His treatment of Ukraine. His frontal assault on the global trading system. The wrecking ball he has swung at the machinery of US government. His contempt for democracy and the rule of law. We must now recognise that Trump and the movement he inspires constitute a decisive shift in the way America works and in how this shapes the world.
[Since WWII we have relied on the USA] but are not alone. US allies in Europe and Asia have also relied on America, but they are now thinking seriously about their post-American futures.
We have not even started........ the custodians of Australia's alliance with America - political leaders, officials, commentators and assorted schmoozers - believe that ours is something very special. They are convinced that between Australia and America there is a unique intimacy and mutual commitment that lifts our alliance under the ANZUS Treaty to a different level. [Basically, White does not support this view].
If the Chinese attack Taiwan, either by invasion or blockade, Washington would have to choose between abandoning Taiwan and going to war. If it abandons Taiwan, its entire position in East Asia will be severely, and perhaps fatally, damaged....... It is clear in Tokyo that the more powerful China becomes, the more it would cost America to defend Japan from a Chinese attack, and the more likely it therefore becomes that America would let Japan down by deciding not to.
Those doubts would quickly grow if America failed to defend Taiwan...... It is also clearly understood in Washington. They know that failing to defend Taiwan would be fatal to the US position in Asia, but they definitely do not want a war with China, so for them everything depends on convincing the Chinese that they would defend Taiwan. It is no exaggeration to say that America's strategic future in Asia depends on its success at doing this.
America's response to the invasion of Ukraine has a bearing on this..... the key message that Beijing took from the whole tragedy is that America is not willing to fight Russia to defend Ukraine..... And since China emerged as a strategic rival, no US leader has suggested to the American people that containing China's ambitions in East Asia was so important that it might mean nuclear attacks on US cities.
All this makes it very hard for Washington to neutralise Chinese nuclear threats with credible counterthreats of nuclear retaliation.
It is hard to escape the conclusion that the US policy elite have been very muddled about China for a long time......It is a pattern common to many strategic failures. We often overestimate the threat posed by an adversary by mistakenly seeing our most vital interests at stake - and then we underestimate what it will cost to deal with it. So we blunder into a needless rivalry or conflict, which we find we can't win.
There is no reason to believe that China will be strong enough to extend its primacy beyond Fast Asia and the Western Pacific.
It will not be able to dominate Asia as a whole, because India stands in its way. India is still a rising power, but it is formidable already and will be more formidable still in future, and it is determined not to live in China's shadow........ If China comes to dominate East Asia and then tries to extend its sway over Eurasia as a whole, the most likely outcome by far would be for India, Russia and Europe to act together to resist it. And........ The fact is that the "balance of power" principle really works to stop any single great power dominating all the others. Throughout history, in any group of great powers the weaker members have banded together to prevent the strongest from dominating them all.
[On the question of the nuclear subs for Australia].... eight Australian SSNs will do almost nothing to improve America's chances of winning a US-China war, and thus nothing to help America deter Chinese aggression.......And the AUKUS subs are not clearly committed to the fight. America seems to take it for granted that they are, but Canberra says they are not.....That muddle undermines any deterrent value they might have.
And most important, it is futile for Australia to frame its defence around US deterrence of China when America itself is not serious about it.
America will not be able to deter China's challenge unless and until Washington can convince Beijing that it is willing to fight a nuclear war to remain Asia's primary power, and as we have seen, there has been no sign of that.
US investments in facilities to support US Air Force long-range strike missions from Tindal in the Northern Territory make no serious difference to America's capacity to deter or win a war with China. But they mark a significant step in preparations for Australia to support America in such a war...... We've had an "America First" foreign policy too. It is sobering to see how narrowly directed our diplomacy now is to supporting the US........ Apart from resuming contact with Beijing, the big item on the Labor agenda has been deepening engagement with our neighbours in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. But in both regions the primary aim has been to urge our neighbours to side with America against China.
In future it will no longer be militarily impossible for China to attack Australia directly. And not just China: other major regional powers, especially India and eventually perhaps Indonesia, will have the potential to launch significant attacks on Australia.
But that does not mean we face now a serious threat of Chinese military attack. Today the only circumstance in which Australia could credibly find itself under attack from China would be if Australia joined America in a war with China over Taiwan...... While we should not ignore it, we should not allow the distant possibility of a Chinese military threat to dominate our thinking about China. There are many other dimensions to what is a very important, complex and ultimately inescapable relationship....... Once we abandon the illusion that America is going to manage China for us, we will realise that we have no choice but to find our own way with it. This will not be comfortable or easy. China is ruthless, demanding and completely transactional - though no more than other great powers. Over the past decade, in Canberra and around the country, exaggerated fears and a desire to stay in step with Washington have crowded out serious thinking about China itself and how the very complex range of interests we have in our relationship with it can best be balanced. We have less deep expertise on China now than we had thirty years ago. That has to change....... Our second big task is to rethink our relationship with America...... It is often said, for example, that the intelligence relationship is so close and so important to both sides as to be indissoluble. Don't bet on that. US access to Pine Gap as a location for its satellite ground station is valuable, but very far from essential. .....We should free ourselves of the debilitating assumption that we cannot look after ourselves...... Our diplomats will find this prospect terrifying, because there is nothing they dislike more than telling Washington things it does not want to hear.
But they might have a pleasant surprise in Trump's Washington. He is no fan of America's alliances, and no fan of war with China over Taiwan either....He might warm to a country that lets go of Washington's apron strings and goes its own way.
Australia will need to spend a lot more on defence if it wishes to manage the risk of aggression by a great power like China in the decades ahead but it is pointless to debate how much more will be needed until we have a much better idea of what exactly we want our forces to do......... The key step is to decide that our armed forces must be designed primarily to defend Australia independently rather than to support America in a war with China. Once that is agreed, it becomes much easier to decide what capabilities we need. One thing that becomes very clear immediately is that we do not need nuclear-powered submarines. A bigger fleet of conventionally powered submarines, much cheaper and less risky to build and operate, plus uncrewed surface and subsurface systems, would be far more cost-effective for defending Australia......... Another thing that becomes clear is that we should be spending far less on surface warships. Today we plan to build the Navy's largest-ever surface fleet, at a time when surface ships are becoming less and less useful in high-intensity maritime warfare because they are becoming so much more vulnerable to aircraft, missiles and submarines.
It may not be long before it becomes more effective to use uncrewed drones rather than crewed aircraft for the kinds of missions our fighters will be called upon to perform. It is time we started to shift investment from legacy systems to future capabilities.
However, AUKUS is now the overwhelming preoccupation of Defence, at the expense of everything else. Until it is abandoned, it will be impossible for the organisation to begin the real work of transforming our armed forces to meet the demands of a new era.
AUKUS is the perfect symbol of the failure of our entire political system to respond to a changed world. The failure starts at the top....... rising strategic rivalry in Asia has been acknowledged by everyone in politics, including Albanese himself, as one of the most pressing issues of our time. He has had plenty of time and opportunity to learn about it all. And yet he still has no capacity even to engage in a serious discussion of the issues. When questioned, his responses remain as scripted, stilted and superficial as ever. It is a major failure, and it has prevented his government from doing anything but follow the misguided tracks laid down by its Coalition predecessors....... But the failures of our political system transcend the shortcomings of individual leaders. The Albanese cabinet has passively acquiesced as the arguments and evidence against AUKUS have mounted up, and the government's defence of it has become correspondingly more threadbare. Have none of them had doubts and thought it their duty to air them? Neither party has generated the lively and urgent internal debate that issues of this importance warrant.
So what’s my overall take on the essay? I find that I’m pretty much in agreement with most of what White is saying, although I would like to see much greater emphasis on improving relations with China through education (sending students both ways), cultural exchanges; more cooperation and less hysteria with University research and more acceptance of China’s role in the world. And possibly even more cooperation on defence and humanitarian assistance. Despite more than 200 years of fear of the “yellow peril”, China has never shown any desire to invade Australia......the really dangerous players in this whole equation are our own, Australian, defence and security people. Ideally, one would think they are the people best placed to make the correct strategic calls. But, in practice, they all benefit from “talking up” the threat; (drums of war stuff), bigger budgets, more staff, more promotions, more toys......The Navy’s obsession with being a “Blue Water” Navy and holding their head up with the “big boys” is clearly dangerous. Also, our whole defence/security apparatus and thinking is hopelessly compromised and intertwined with the Americans...especially socially (on the diplomatic circuit via golf matches) and via training programs and purchasing contracts and defence exercises under ANZUS etc., I think we need to place more of the staff with the Chinese for a spell. ...Anyway, I liked what Hugh White is saying. Think he’s close to correct and happy to give his essay five stars.

[Peter Hodge · Rating 5 out of 5]

It is always a pleasure to read one of Hugh White's essays, and not because his conclusions are easy to digest - more so, because they are not. He encourages us to face difficult truths. I enjoy the well-formed logic of White's arguments, not that I always entirely agree with him. The general thrust is more often right, I think, and this has been justified by recent events. Yes, America is slowly withdrawing from multiple spheres of interest. Yes, we are entering a multi-polar world and yes, the trend is probably irreversible. Possibly it's in the details that one can challenge White - he was wrong about Iran, but can't be blamed for failing to foresee the sequence of events that led to the recent attacks. Honestly, who did? Reading White can feel like engaging in a form of game theory or a consideration of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Humans though, don't always optimise their risks and rewards. Even so, it's best to base our our policies on the type of hard-headed analysis White provides.

[Ron Brown · Rating 5 out of 5]

I am an avid fan of the Quarterly Essay and have subscribed for many years. I believe this is Hugh White’s fourth Quarterly Essay and all of them have been on the bilateral relationship of Australia and China. Now, with the dynamics of world relationships in turmoil he makes it a trilateral analysis with the added complexity of the US under Trump.

Up until the election of Donald Trump as US president Australia was fairly comfortable sitting at the bottom of the world and with a big muscular mate guarding our interests. We had volunteered to assist our big muscular mate in the many blues he managed to get himself involved in and we thought this support would guarantee his protection from any unfriendly force. For many years White argued that one day we might have to choose between our source of much of our wealth and our big muscular mate. Most recently we have come to the conclusion that our mate is not necessarily going to be there for us.

White spends pages explaining the fascinating rise of Trump. I think you have to be an American to fully understand the attraction this man has for the American electorate. He then goes on to write about Putin and his ambitions for Russia. Europe and US have had to tread carefully with its support of Ukraine as there is a belief that Russia would use nuclear weapons if it were to suffer major setbacks in Ukraine. White is critical of the Biden’s administration in its handling of the Ukraine crisis.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was not only a shock to Ukraine but Europe as well. Then Trump and his administration’s appalling attitude to Zelensky and Ukraine has changed European’s attitude to NATO and their own defence.

White then turns his attention to the balance of power in Asia. Trump has appointed a few China hawks to his administration but at no stage does he bad mouth China as a military threat but rather focusses on China being an economic rival.

“Trump’s attitude and his team’s divisions, plus their all-pervasive incompetence, means there will be no clear leadership from this administration to guide and focus an effective US response to China’s challenge.”

How strong and effective the alliances between America, Japan, Korea and Australia is anyone’s guess.

Australians are faced with the question is China’s military build-up part of their plan to strengthen their own defence or is it part of a plan for military action in their part of the world?

Back in 2013 Australia and China had a cordial relationship. While Tony Abbott was PM Xi Jinping visited Australia and spoke to a joint sitting in parliament. This relationship splintered when Australia started to be suspicious of Chinese economic interests. Huawei was banned. Legislation to counter Chinese involvement/interference in Australian politics. The closure of a number Confucius Institutes in Australian universites. (I was a student at the Confucius Institute at Newcastle University. My delightful female Chinese tutor never tried to corrupt me. She did ask for lifts home on a number of occasions.)

Then we had the Morrison Government’s call for an international enquiry into the COVID virus in China. That set off the wolf warrior diplomacy actions of the Chinese Government (only now to be copied by Donald Trump with his heavy tariffs on America’s allies and nothing on America’s perceived enemies!!)

White exams the possible threats to Australia from China. In Abbott’s day greed predominated. Today it is fear. He asks what do we fear?

Some claim that the recent Chinese Navy’s transit around Australia was in preparation for an imminent invasion. Here’s looking at SMH, Peter Hartcher, the Murdoch media and right wing think tanks. These pundits never mention the Australian warships that often shadow the PRC coastline.

White argues that Australia would only be attacked by China if Australia joined America in a war with China. He is considered in his analysis of the circumstances when Australia would be threatened with military aggression by China

Do we as a nation have leaders who can think and act rationally about how to defend our country without this constant supposed threat of China?

“AUKUS is the perfect symbol of the failure of our entire political system to respond to a changed world” - Malcolm Turnbull.

China is not a friend of Australia at the same time it is not an adversary. China is an authoritarian one-party state and has become increasingly so under the leadership of Xi Jinping. China states its territorial claims loudly and it does not respect the views of the local people, see Tibet and Uyghurs. It is in dispute with Taiwan over its independence from the PRC and, has been for more than seventy years. It is in dispute with the Philippines and Japan over territorial issues. It has one overseas military base. It has not invaded a foreign nation in living memory. It has built a defence force that could only be challenged by the US. It has used “wolf warrior diplomacy, hostage diplomacy and tariffs.These are facts there are no indicators present or past that demonstrate a willingness to invade a foreign country, let alone one thousands of kilometres away over oceans of water. China is not Russia and Australia is not Ukraine.

At this time when so much discussion about Australian foreign policy is dominated by right wing ideologues with little knowledge of China’s intentions and its history I turn to polymaths such as White to build an informed view of Australia and the world.

I find White an invaluable contributor to the discussion of Australia’s relationship with America, China and our other Asia/Pacific neighbours.

As I finish this review sections of the media are attacking PM Albanese for visiting and talking with our biggest trading partner. Even accusing him of betraying the alliance with Trump’s America.

[Gede · Rating 4 out of 5]

Another Quarterly Essay that doesn't disappoint!

Despite initially being more interested in domestic affairs rather than international ones, White's exploration of how Australia navigates the transition from the US-led unipolar world to a multipolar world was very interesting. The ending was my favourite, where he gave a hypothetical speech from a PM who recognised this new transition and took firmer actions on becoming more independent.

Although it was informative, I wouldn't be surprised that this book will quickly become outdated given how tumultuous world affairs are at this moment - an online article would've been sufficient.

[Jade Smith · Rating 4 out of 5]

3.5/5 This was an enlightening look at the United States’ role in international security, and into the implications for Australia both now and into the future. I just wish a bit more attention had been given to the role of climate change in this equation, and into the cultural ties Australia maintains to both the US and UK. But, as someone who admittedly doesn’t engage a whole lot with questions of military engagement, this was interesting. I was particularly interested in the conversation around Taiwan.

[Stanley Xue · Rating 3 out of 5]

Goes through the paces again - with the juciest bit at the end.
How come Hugh White is so prolific - I feel all the stuff I've read in this space is mostly by Hugh White...
But it's mostly about shaking Australia awake - that the US led order does no longer exist. And opens the conversation about how to build the new order and what that should look like (but maybe that's for another essay...).

[Greg · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent analysis of Australia's current geo- strategic situation and how Australia should deal with it. Very critical of recent Australian governments which have been desperately clinging to the US alliance in troubling times. The author strongly believes that the US alliance has withered away and can no longer be relied on. Australia must look to its own defence and cooperate more closely with various Asian countries who also feel threatened by China. AUKUS is a waste of time.

[Philip Hunt · Rating 4 out of 5]

Drawing deep on history, on war, on national alliances coming and fading, we have here a well argued analysis of our present world and predictions for the safety of the planet and her people. Hugh White writes about war or the prevention of it, he does so with a light touch. Complex though the future of the world may be, White pulls apart the complexity. His conclusions fall neatly from the analysis.

[Steven · Rating 4 out of 5]

A strong and persuasive case that Trump has done Australia a favour by waking them up to the reality of the hard new world.

ICBMs have changed the game, the US will not fight wars and risk her own cities for stakes in another land, when she can continue to have her own prosperity.

Australia is in Asia, and perhaps we should start rethinking its relationship with China and the US. Political denial of this reality may be just starting to crack.

[Liam McMahon · Rating 5 out of 5]

“the first step to recognise that the end of the alliance as we have known it for so long does not mean the end of the relationship. We have been such close allies for so long that it is hard to imagine what other form our relationship might take. But with careful management, a new, post-alliance relationship can evolve”

love it, sounds like a MAFS snippet, but love it.

[Loki · Rating 4 out of 5]

A searching look at the newly emerging multi-polar world Australia inhabits, that shies away from anything beyond 'Australia must have these conversations' as a conclusion - which is not wrong to say, but is far too little for Australia to do. Thought-provoking, but really just an introduction to something that would require much greater work to get to grips with.

[Reader · Rating 5 out of 5]

A sobering read on the stark strategic choices ahead of Australia as the international order is reshaped through the 21st century. An argument well made, leaving difficult questions for our defence and foreign affairs policymakers to first confront and ultimately answer.

[Ryan Thomson]

With the United States no longer able to be relied on for security in our region I think it is time we turn to the international supremacy we hold in rugby league and cricket for diplomacy in the indo-pacific region.

[Sophie · Rating 4 out of 5]

Super interesting, easy to read analysis on the emerging global order and Australia’s place within it. The essay’s thesis is strong, and is hammered home in a frank discussion of Australia’s relationship with China and the strategic challenges associated with Taiwan.

[Malcolm · Rating 5 out of 5]

Thought I was fairly well informed but Hugh’s arguments of where the world’s superpowers are likely to end up in deciding whether to engage in various potential future wars and whether they may respond with nuclear weapons added a level of understanding that I was missing. Well worth reading.

[Kara · Rating 5 out of 5]

4.75 rounded up for good reads

[Robert · Rating 4 out of 5]

A fascinating read about the changes in the world order happening now.

[Sam · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good but i've been on this shit for years please hire me DFAT 💯💯💯

[Tim Waters · Rating 4 out of 5]

Sobering analysis of an increasingly fragile & fragmented United States & its implications for Australia.