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Scapegoat: The Death of Prince of Wales and Repulse
" The Death of Prince of Wales and Repulse" is a radical new account of one of Britain's greatest naval disasters. Making full use of modern research and unrivaled access to private family papers, it suggests that Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, the commander of the so-called 'Force Z', was made the scapegoat for a battle in which he was blameless, and that Winston Churchill, the Admiralty, and chronic failures in ship design and Intelligence were what sank the ships. The book also shows what a very close run thing the sinkings were, and how Japanese success depended on them having luck on their side. 'Scapegoat' is a convincing attempt to right a wrong that has been allowed to stand for over 70 years, as well as a prime illustration of the way in which the Establishment always protects itself first.
256 pages, Hardcover
First published August 30, 2014
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About the author
Martin Stephen
42 books12 followersGeorge Martin Stephen is High Master of St Paul's School,London, and ex-High Master of The Manchester Grammar School. He is the author of 16 academic titles on English literature, modern naval history and war poetry, as well as the highly-acclaimed Henry Gresham historical crime novels, set in the London and Cambridge of Elizabeth I and James I.
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October 18, 2021
This is an uneven and partial book, and intentionally so, as it is a spirited defence of Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, who went down when his flagship HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse were sunk by Japanese torpedo bombers off of Malaya on 10 December 1941. As a work of polemic it has many strengths, particularly in establishing the strategic context and the weaknesses of Force Z, including the design limitations and faults of the ships, and provides a strong, if repetitive, 'barrister's brief' in defence of Phillips, but as a work of history it is compromised by that same one-sidedness, presenting its evidence in such a way as to support the author's argument rather than allowing the facts to speak for themselves.
That Phillips cannot be held to be solely responsible for the loss of the Eastern Fleet is well proven by the case made, but, unfortunately, in order to exculpate his subject from exaggerated criticisms, Martin Stephen tries to excuse an admiral who had both his battleship and battlecruiser sunk from under him of all responsibility, and by overly focusing upon strategic errors made by others that placed Force Z in a position where it was ill equipped to fight, underappreciates the questionable tactical decision Phillips made to undertake the fatal sortie out of Singapore harbour in search of Japanese invasion fleet. And, curiously, in a book determined to defend Phillips, the Admiral himself comes across as an almost passive figure at the behest of events, rather than an active participant in the events which would result in his losing his life and his fleet.
At the strategic level, responsibility for the loss of Force Z lies squarely with Winston Churchill and Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, who for political reasons dispatched to Singapore a woefully inadequate naval force incapable of defending itself against torpedo attack should the Japanese open hostilities, and who then, once invasion was under way, failed to order the withdrawal of Prince of Wales and Renown to safer waters. Phillips signalled that he intended to take his force to sea after the Japanese attack, and at this point the Admiralty should have intervened to order him to retreat to either Ceylon or Darwin. That this did not happen places ultimate culpability at the feet of Churchill and Pound, however, it was still Phillips' choice to seek to engage the Japanese when alternatives, however humiliating, were available.
Stephen makes a very strong case for why Phillips was appointed to Force Z rather than an admiral such as Layton or Somerville (who succeeded him as C-inC, Eastern Fleet) with greater sea fighting experience, in that his purpose was not to fight, but to carry out a politico-diplomatic mission with three aims, firstly, as part of a plan to draw the Americans into making Singapore a combined forward base and thus relieve the British of the need to reinforce it with a main fleet in the event of hostilities with Japan, secondly, to act as a deterrent against Japanese attack, and, thirdly, to act as a moral support for the people of Singapore. This explains why Phillips' forces were limited to a single battleship and a battlecruiser with four escorts, and why Churchill overruled the Admiralty and sent HMS Prince of Wales from home waters as the flagship rather than an older, less capable vessel, so as to make the force appear a greater political commitment than was the reality (this also explains why the arrival of Prince of Wales was publicised), and why the addition of a carrier was never an active intention, but more an afterthought once war had broken out.
However, this argument undermines Stephen's later defence of Phillips. If Phillips knew the purpose of his force was political and diplomatic and that was why there was no carrier support and it only had a limited, almost token, fighting capability, then he also knew that deciding to undertake offensive operations was a considerable, and, perhaps, unjustified risk. If Phillips and Force Z were dispatched to Singapore as a deterrent and to encourage US reinforcement of Singapore, then the Japanese invasion of Malaya meant the mission had not achieved its aims and the underpowered force was now otiose. It was at this point that mission creep set in as a small fleet designed for a political, peacetime purpose was now to be used as an offensive force for which it was unprepared. It can be argued that Phillips, supported by his senior officers, including Tennant commanding HMS Repulse, and who, unlike Leach of the flagship, survived, was acting in the fighting tradition of the Royal Navy when Force Z went to sea in search of the Japanese invasion force, but he knew when he did so he was exposing his fleet to a danger for which it was unprepared. Just like Churchill had gambled by sending Force Z, so Phillips gambled when he sailed out of Singapore harbour on 8 December. Unfortunately, both gambles failed, and Force Z offered no effective contribution to the defence of Singapore, and two capital ships were lost, along with hundreds of men, for no military purpose.
Phillips rightly deserves praise for breaking off his mission to intercept the enemy at Singora when his force was sighted, but the question arises as to whether he should have embarked upon that mission in the first place. In his passive defence of Phillips, Stephen, does not consider the possibility that when he was offered the opportunity to fight, an admiral regarded as primarily a staff officer, seized his chance and went to sea even though he knew it was a risk and that his fleet was not intended for that purpose.
In this book, and in the ongoing debate about Force Z, much focus is upon what air power was available to Phillips and whether Singapore and Rear Admiral Palliser, Phillips' ashore chief of staff, were at fault in not providing it, but this question is irrelevant to a defence of Phillips since he believed throughout that none was available, and this was why at no stage he called for fighter protection. All Phillips' decisions were made upon the assumption that he would not have air support, and, despite Singapore being ineffectually attacked by bombers before he set sail, he took the risk of hoping that cloud cover, good seamanship, and luck would permit him to interdict Japanese forces before the enemy could launch an air attack upon his capital ships. And while it is true that the whole defence of Singapore was a shambles and the quality of intelligence available to and sent onto Phillips was shockingly poor, it is also the case that Phillips knew that there were limitations to the intelligence he received, that he did not know either the size or location of the enemy, and, crucially, that he was unaware whether the Japanese had deployed torpedo bombers to Indochina within range of Force Z, and, yet, he still was willing to go into action without air cover. Phillips could not have known the specific air capabilities of the Japanese, but after seeing the effects of airborne torpedoes in the Norway campaign and at Taranto, and faced with the invasion of Malaya, he must have expected that the Japanese would have sought to provide not only air cover for their own invasion forces but also an offensive capability against the capital ships the British had at Singapore, which were superior to any they had in theatre, and therefore a threat that required an attempt at neutralisation for which air attack was the only viable option. Phillips therefore knew he was sailing into danger without any air cover against an enemy he must have known, whatever the details, would have posed a significant airpower threat to ships with comparatively weak anti-air defences, particularly against torpedo bombers. Phillips decided to take a tactical risk in the hope of being able to destroy part of the Japanese invasion force before he himself was sighted, but considering the limited power of his command, his lack of air support, and the likely offensive capability of an enemy whose size and location he did not know, the risk was unjustified, and instead, whatever the reputational damage to himself and the Royal Navy, he should have withdrawn his forces to fight another day rather than gamble them away in a battle in which he was disadvantaged and whose possible gains were far outweighed by the risks. Phillips' offensive intentions were understandable, but once he understood he would not have air cover, and knowing what he did of the threat posed by torpedo bombers to capital ships, his decision to seek battle was a tactical error, regardless of how well be and his two captains handled their ships in action. Force Z was, in effect, out on a suicide mission which would require enormous luck to have any success, and on 10 December, it had no luck at all.
That the whole operation was strategically flawed from the onset and that the basis of the defence of Malaya upon 'main fleet to Singapore' within ninety days was a bluff when there was no such main fleet available with the Royal Navy already engaged in huge commitments in the Atlantic and Mediterranean vital to home defence meant that the despatch of Force Z was a considerable error of planning and an unnecessary diversion of scarce resources, and for this Phillips cannot be held responsible. However, he was responsible for his actions once his original mission had been rendered useless by the Japanese invasion, and he was responsible for the decision to undertake offensive operations knowing his fleet's limited capacity and lack of air defence. It is probably true that in the same circumstances his contemporaries would have done the same, and that they too would have suffered a similar fate, but nonetheless it was Tom Phillips who made the decision to seek out the Japanese rather than withdrawing to a safe harbour, and while, as Martin Stephen shows, there are fully understandable reasons for why he did this, it is still the case that as the admiral commanding Force Z he was ultimately responsible for its loss, as he would have been acclaimed the victor if his gamble had paid off. With high rank comes high responsibility, and any admiral who has his fleet sunk from under him must be held responsible for the decisions he made which preceded that outcome if, as in this case, there was an alternative to seeking to engage the enemy. Admiral Sir Tom Phillips was a highly intelligent, competent, and brave naval commander who acted in the offensive tradition of the Royal Navy by sailing out of Singapore in search of Japanese transports and their escorts, but his sortie failed to achieve anything and resulted in the sinking of his two capital ships, and by this basic standard, he must bear the ultimate responsibility, although not culpability. He did what he thought was right, took a risk, but, unfortunately, he was proven wrong when airpower once again revealed its advantages over a battle fleet without it's own air defence.
That Phillips cannot be held to be solely responsible for the loss of the Eastern Fleet is well proven by the case made, but, unfortunately, in order to exculpate his subject from exaggerated criticisms, Martin Stephen tries to excuse an admiral who had both his battleship and battlecruiser sunk from under him of all responsibility, and by overly focusing upon strategic errors made by others that placed Force Z in a position where it was ill equipped to fight, underappreciates the questionable tactical decision Phillips made to undertake the fatal sortie out of Singapore harbour in search of Japanese invasion fleet. And, curiously, in a book determined to defend Phillips, the Admiral himself comes across as an almost passive figure at the behest of events, rather than an active participant in the events which would result in his losing his life and his fleet.
At the strategic level, responsibility for the loss of Force Z lies squarely with Winston Churchill and Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, who for political reasons dispatched to Singapore a woefully inadequate naval force incapable of defending itself against torpedo attack should the Japanese open hostilities, and who then, once invasion was under way, failed to order the withdrawal of Prince of Wales and Renown to safer waters. Phillips signalled that he intended to take his force to sea after the Japanese attack, and at this point the Admiralty should have intervened to order him to retreat to either Ceylon or Darwin. That this did not happen places ultimate culpability at the feet of Churchill and Pound, however, it was still Phillips' choice to seek to engage the Japanese when alternatives, however humiliating, were available.
Stephen makes a very strong case for why Phillips was appointed to Force Z rather than an admiral such as Layton or Somerville (who succeeded him as C-inC, Eastern Fleet) with greater sea fighting experience, in that his purpose was not to fight, but to carry out a politico-diplomatic mission with three aims, firstly, as part of a plan to draw the Americans into making Singapore a combined forward base and thus relieve the British of the need to reinforce it with a main fleet in the event of hostilities with Japan, secondly, to act as a deterrent against Japanese attack, and, thirdly, to act as a moral support for the people of Singapore. This explains why Phillips' forces were limited to a single battleship and a battlecruiser with four escorts, and why Churchill overruled the Admiralty and sent HMS Prince of Wales from home waters as the flagship rather than an older, less capable vessel, so as to make the force appear a greater political commitment than was the reality (this also explains why the arrival of Prince of Wales was publicised), and why the addition of a carrier was never an active intention, but more an afterthought once war had broken out.
However, this argument undermines Stephen's later defence of Phillips. If Phillips knew the purpose of his force was political and diplomatic and that was why there was no carrier support and it only had a limited, almost token, fighting capability, then he also knew that deciding to undertake offensive operations was a considerable, and, perhaps, unjustified risk. If Phillips and Force Z were dispatched to Singapore as a deterrent and to encourage US reinforcement of Singapore, then the Japanese invasion of Malaya meant the mission had not achieved its aims and the underpowered force was now otiose. It was at this point that mission creep set in as a small fleet designed for a political, peacetime purpose was now to be used as an offensive force for which it was unprepared. It can be argued that Phillips, supported by his senior officers, including Tennant commanding HMS Repulse, and who, unlike Leach of the flagship, survived, was acting in the fighting tradition of the Royal Navy when Force Z went to sea in search of the Japanese invasion force, but he knew when he did so he was exposing his fleet to a danger for which it was unprepared. Just like Churchill had gambled by sending Force Z, so Phillips gambled when he sailed out of Singapore harbour on 8 December. Unfortunately, both gambles failed, and Force Z offered no effective contribution to the defence of Singapore, and two capital ships were lost, along with hundreds of men, for no military purpose.
Phillips rightly deserves praise for breaking off his mission to intercept the enemy at Singora when his force was sighted, but the question arises as to whether he should have embarked upon that mission in the first place. In his passive defence of Phillips, Stephen, does not consider the possibility that when he was offered the opportunity to fight, an admiral regarded as primarily a staff officer, seized his chance and went to sea even though he knew it was a risk and that his fleet was not intended for that purpose.
In this book, and in the ongoing debate about Force Z, much focus is upon what air power was available to Phillips and whether Singapore and Rear Admiral Palliser, Phillips' ashore chief of staff, were at fault in not providing it, but this question is irrelevant to a defence of Phillips since he believed throughout that none was available, and this was why at no stage he called for fighter protection. All Phillips' decisions were made upon the assumption that he would not have air support, and, despite Singapore being ineffectually attacked by bombers before he set sail, he took the risk of hoping that cloud cover, good seamanship, and luck would permit him to interdict Japanese forces before the enemy could launch an air attack upon his capital ships. And while it is true that the whole defence of Singapore was a shambles and the quality of intelligence available to and sent onto Phillips was shockingly poor, it is also the case that Phillips knew that there were limitations to the intelligence he received, that he did not know either the size or location of the enemy, and, crucially, that he was unaware whether the Japanese had deployed torpedo bombers to Indochina within range of Force Z, and, yet, he still was willing to go into action without air cover. Phillips could not have known the specific air capabilities of the Japanese, but after seeing the effects of airborne torpedoes in the Norway campaign and at Taranto, and faced with the invasion of Malaya, he must have expected that the Japanese would have sought to provide not only air cover for their own invasion forces but also an offensive capability against the capital ships the British had at Singapore, which were superior to any they had in theatre, and therefore a threat that required an attempt at neutralisation for which air attack was the only viable option. Phillips therefore knew he was sailing into danger without any air cover against an enemy he must have known, whatever the details, would have posed a significant airpower threat to ships with comparatively weak anti-air defences, particularly against torpedo bombers. Phillips decided to take a tactical risk in the hope of being able to destroy part of the Japanese invasion force before he himself was sighted, but considering the limited power of his command, his lack of air support, and the likely offensive capability of an enemy whose size and location he did not know, the risk was unjustified, and instead, whatever the reputational damage to himself and the Royal Navy, he should have withdrawn his forces to fight another day rather than gamble them away in a battle in which he was disadvantaged and whose possible gains were far outweighed by the risks. Phillips' offensive intentions were understandable, but once he understood he would not have air cover, and knowing what he did of the threat posed by torpedo bombers to capital ships, his decision to seek battle was a tactical error, regardless of how well be and his two captains handled their ships in action. Force Z was, in effect, out on a suicide mission which would require enormous luck to have any success, and on 10 December, it had no luck at all.
That the whole operation was strategically flawed from the onset and that the basis of the defence of Malaya upon 'main fleet to Singapore' within ninety days was a bluff when there was no such main fleet available with the Royal Navy already engaged in huge commitments in the Atlantic and Mediterranean vital to home defence meant that the despatch of Force Z was a considerable error of planning and an unnecessary diversion of scarce resources, and for this Phillips cannot be held responsible. However, he was responsible for his actions once his original mission had been rendered useless by the Japanese invasion, and he was responsible for the decision to undertake offensive operations knowing his fleet's limited capacity and lack of air defence. It is probably true that in the same circumstances his contemporaries would have done the same, and that they too would have suffered a similar fate, but nonetheless it was Tom Phillips who made the decision to seek out the Japanese rather than withdrawing to a safe harbour, and while, as Martin Stephen shows, there are fully understandable reasons for why he did this, it is still the case that as the admiral commanding Force Z he was ultimately responsible for its loss, as he would have been acclaimed the victor if his gamble had paid off. With high rank comes high responsibility, and any admiral who has his fleet sunk from under him must be held responsible for the decisions he made which preceded that outcome if, as in this case, there was an alternative to seeking to engage the enemy. Admiral Sir Tom Phillips was a highly intelligent, competent, and brave naval commander who acted in the offensive tradition of the Royal Navy by sailing out of Singapore in search of Japanese transports and their escorts, but his sortie failed to achieve anything and resulted in the sinking of his two capital ships, and by this basic standard, he must bear the ultimate responsibility, although not culpability. He did what he thought was right, took a risk, but, unfortunately, he was proven wrong when airpower once again revealed its advantages over a battle fleet without it's own air defence.
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