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Genesis: Truman, American Jews, and the Origins of the Arab/Israeli Conflict
A probing look at one of the most incendiary subjects of our time―the relationship between the United States and Israel
There has been more than half a century of raging conflict between Jews and Arabs―a violent, costly struggle that has had catastrophic repercussions in a critical region of the world. In Genesis , John B. Judis argues that, while Israelis and Palestinians must shoulder much of the blame, the United States has been the principal power outside the region since the end of World War II and as such must account for its repeated failed diplomacy efforts to resolve this enduring strife.
The fatal flaw in American policy, Judis shows, can be traced back to the Truman years. What happened between 1945 and 1949 sealed the fate of the Middle East for the remainder of the century. As a result, understanding that period holds the key to explaining almost everything that follows―right down to George W. Bush's unsuccessful and ill-conceived effort to win peace through holding elections among the Palestinians, and Barack Obama's failed attempt to bring both parties to the negotiating table. A provocative narrative history animated by a strong analytical and moral perspective, and peopled by colorful and outsized personalities and politics, Genesis offers a fresh look at these critical postwar years, arguing that if we can understand how this stalemate originated, we will be better positioned to help end it.
There has been more than half a century of raging conflict between Jews and Arabs―a violent, costly struggle that has had catastrophic repercussions in a critical region of the world. In Genesis , John B. Judis argues that, while Israelis and Palestinians must shoulder much of the blame, the United States has been the principal power outside the region since the end of World War II and as such must account for its repeated failed diplomacy efforts to resolve this enduring strife.
The fatal flaw in American policy, Judis shows, can be traced back to the Truman years. What happened between 1945 and 1949 sealed the fate of the Middle East for the remainder of the century. As a result, understanding that period holds the key to explaining almost everything that follows―right down to George W. Bush's unsuccessful and ill-conceived effort to win peace through holding elections among the Palestinians, and Barack Obama's failed attempt to bring both parties to the negotiating table. A provocative narrative history animated by a strong analytical and moral perspective, and peopled by colorful and outsized personalities and politics, Genesis offers a fresh look at these critical postwar years, arguing that if we can understand how this stalemate originated, we will be better positioned to help end it.
448 pages, Paperback
First published February 4, 2014
38 people are currently reading
667 people want to read
About the author
John B. Judis
19 books57 followersJohn B. Judis is an American journalist. Born in Chicago he attended Amherst College and received B.A. and M.A. degrees in Philosophy from the University of California at Berkeley. He is a senior editor at The New Republic and a contributing editor to The American Prospect.
A founding editor of Socialist Revolution (now Socialist Review) in 1969 and of the East Bay Voice in the 1970s, Judis started reporting from Washington in 1982, when he became a founding editor and Washington correspondent for In These Times, a democratic-socialist weekly magazine.
He has also written for GQ, Foreign Affairs, Mother Jones, The New York Times Magazine, and The Washington Post.
In 2002, he published a book (co-written with political scientist Ruy Teixeira) arguing that Democrats would retake control of American politics, thanks in part to growing support from minorities and well-educated professionals. The title, The Emerging Democratic Majority, was a deliberate echo of Kevin Phillips' 1969 classic, The Emerging Republican Majority. The book was named one of the year's best by The Economist magazine.
A founding editor of Socialist Revolution (now Socialist Review) in 1969 and of the East Bay Voice in the 1970s, Judis started reporting from Washington in 1982, when he became a founding editor and Washington correspondent for In These Times, a democratic-socialist weekly magazine.
He has also written for GQ, Foreign Affairs, Mother Jones, The New York Times Magazine, and The Washington Post.
In 2002, he published a book (co-written with political scientist Ruy Teixeira) arguing that Democrats would retake control of American politics, thanks in part to growing support from minorities and well-educated professionals. The title, The Emerging Democratic Majority, was a deliberate echo of Kevin Phillips' 1969 classic, The Emerging Republican Majority. The book was named one of the year's best by The Economist magazine.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 32 reviews
August 23, 2014
This is an excellent book on the origins of the Israel-Palestine conflict, the various intellectual strands of Zionism that helped bring it about, and the initial ascent of the "Israel Lobby" that has gained so much attention in recent years.
The book first begins by describing the origins of the Zionist movement and its protagonists. Its worth noting that Zionism has never been a monolith and in the past there was a diversity of opinion regarding what the goals of Zionism should be and what view should be taken of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs. People like Asher Ginsberg and Judah Magnes were sensitive to Palestinian rights and advocated binationalism or the creation of a "Jewish Vatican" instead of a Jewish state.
Unfortunately with time these strands lost out to the violent, proudly colonialist views of Ben Gurion, Weizmann and Ze'ev Jabotinsky. It is stunning to read today how baldly they expressed their colonialism and racism in propagating their cause, and it is lays bare what an essentially colonial enterprise Zionism, in practice, has always been at its core.
The book also discussed the series of events whereby American Zionists pressured Truman into recognizing their state. Truman comes off particularly poorly, as someone who was simultaneously oblivious, passionate, and malleable to the threats and pressure of Zionists - despite his own repeatedly stated belief in an equitable solution for Palestinian Arabs. He ended up giving in to maximalist Zionist demands he didn't truly believe in because it simply became the path of least resistance; a pattern which repeats itself today.
This is a great work of history and a worthy contribution to a changing dialogue on Israel. The author makes a compelling case that Israel is the last colonial power on Earth, and while denied by its apologists today its founders practically reveled in that fact.
The blow-by-blow of Truman's interactions with Zionist groups in the run-up to the recognition of the state dragged just a little bit, but for the most part this was a page turner which I recommend without hesitation.
The book first begins by describing the origins of the Zionist movement and its protagonists. Its worth noting that Zionism has never been a monolith and in the past there was a diversity of opinion regarding what the goals of Zionism should be and what view should be taken of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs. People like Asher Ginsberg and Judah Magnes were sensitive to Palestinian rights and advocated binationalism or the creation of a "Jewish Vatican" instead of a Jewish state.
Unfortunately with time these strands lost out to the violent, proudly colonialist views of Ben Gurion, Weizmann and Ze'ev Jabotinsky. It is stunning to read today how baldly they expressed their colonialism and racism in propagating their cause, and it is lays bare what an essentially colonial enterprise Zionism, in practice, has always been at its core.
The book also discussed the series of events whereby American Zionists pressured Truman into recognizing their state. Truman comes off particularly poorly, as someone who was simultaneously oblivious, passionate, and malleable to the threats and pressure of Zionists - despite his own repeatedly stated belief in an equitable solution for Palestinian Arabs. He ended up giving in to maximalist Zionist demands he didn't truly believe in because it simply became the path of least resistance; a pattern which repeats itself today.
This is a great work of history and a worthy contribution to a changing dialogue on Israel. The author makes a compelling case that Israel is the last colonial power on Earth, and while denied by its apologists today its founders practically reveled in that fact.
The blow-by-blow of Truman's interactions with Zionist groups in the run-up to the recognition of the state dragged just a little bit, but for the most part this was a page turner which I recommend without hesitation.
April 15, 2025
I want to start off by saying that I think this book is terribly mistitled; it makes it seem like President Truman is at the center of this exposition, as well as apparently the history of the Arab/Israeli conflict at large, but I find neither to be true, not entirely. If anything, this book is primarily about Zionists, both in the US and elsewhere, and the efforts they took during the first half of the twentieth century to imagine, lobby for, and eventually create the modern state of Israel - to the clear detriment and subjugation of the Palestinian Arabs who already inhabited the region then and who continue to do so to this day. That is an incredibly important and timely subject, and I do think this book does a great job at laying down a clear history of the Zionist movement, as morally bankrupt as it often was/is in terms of its behavior and rationale through the years. But in the end, it’s a history of politicking, and that can be rather dry; it’s certainly not the most engaging way to approach what is clearly an enormously complex subject. And for some reason, great effort is often made to show the paths that led to historic moments (like Truman’s winning election) for the book to then quickly move on from those moments once they’ve been realized. It’s almost as if the author wanted to give you all the facts but didn’t seem all that interested in helping the reader interpret them, at least not until the end. Suffice it to say, I liked the book, but it wouldn’t be the first one on the topic I’d recommend, at least not to just any casual reader on the subject.
April 17, 2014
“Genesis: Truman, American Jews and the Origins of the Arab/Israeli Conflict,” by John Judis (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014). Although the ultimate focus of the book is the three or four years between the end of WWII and the foundation of the state of Israel, the very important first half is devoted to the century or so before that: who lived in Palestine (the vast majority Arabs, a small number of Jews); the origin of Zionism, which was seen as a colonialist move based on European imperialism; the relations between Arab, Jew and Brit up to WWII. One core argument is that there were two strains of Zionism: one which focused entirely on creating a Jewish state and paid no attention to the previous occupants, and a second, smaller but intellectually powerful movement that understood there were other people on the land, and wanted to create a spiritual and intellectual homeland for Jews within a larger Arab population. The two sides sparred, but the Jewish state Zionists won, especially after the Balfour declaration. He considers the declaration to have been a serious mistake; among other things, it did not provide political rights to the Palestinians. There was tension with the Arabs pretty much from the beginning. The Zionists were buying the best land, their population was growing, they were throwing their weight around. But the Arabs were also completely intransigent—Judis needs to speculate intensely to see glimmers of openings for the development of any peaceful relationship. The Zionists set out to create a state within a state. Very importantly, they wanted the Jews to be economically independent, and so only hired Jewish workers, Jewish farmers, Jewish factories, etc. They shut the Arabs out. The British thought it was possible to make a peaceful settlement; the Zionists didn’t really care, as long as they created a Jewish state. He documents Arab atrocities, including the Hebron massacre among non-Zionist Jews in the city. In the period right after WWI, the Arabs in the area thought they could create a greater Syria, including Lebanon, Palestine and Syria proper. But there never was a successful, unified Palestinian or Arab movement. Within Palestine itself two clans fought with one another for control. They did not develop institutions the way the Jews did. The British put down a massive Arab rebellion from 1936-1939, which killed off most of the leaders. The Arabs turned toward the Nazis as a way to rid themselves of the British and the Zionists. Then the book turns to American Jewry and the growth of American Zionism as a movement and a political lobbying force. By the time Truman became president, American Zionists were very well organized, well funded, deeply connected within the administration. Whenever Truman attempts to create a reasonable plan with equal place for Arab and Jew, the Zionists mounted great political pressure on him. Truman, concentrating on Europe and the growing Cold War, did not focus on the Mideast much, and he vacillated, contradicted himself, gave off different messages. Time and again the Zionists made him back down. (Of course, the Arabs messed things up for themselves by refusing to participate in the debate at all. The recognition of Israel by the US was a close-run thing. Judis also makes it clear that the Israelis were much better armed and organized as a military and political force than either the Palestinians or the Arab armies. The Palestinians did strike first, but they were completely outfought by the Israelis, who took advantage of a civilian exodus to drive the Palestinians out of their lands. Judis brings the chronology up to Obama, who runs into the same problems Truman did---largely that any real attempt at an even-handed treatment of the two sides is quashed by the still-powerful American Zionist lobby. Judis does not see much hope for the future. He says over and over that the Zionists “screwed” the Arabs out of their land, that Israel is a colonial power. He does accept and argue for the continued existence of Israel as a Jewish state, but he puts a great deal of the onus of continuing problems on Israel and American Zionists. He points out that American liberals, concerned with civil rights and equality, ignored their own principles in supporting the creation of Israel and its treatment of the Palestinians.
http://www.amazon.com/Genesis-America...
August 30, 2014
Does a splendid job of outlining the history, but the narrative is long and boring. Learned a lot, but at a very slow pace.
June 3, 2014
This is a solid overview of the pressures Harry Truman felt from American Zionists, and especially one substrand within them, to not only support a "homeland" for Jews in Palestine, but, to call for an end of the British League of Nations-era mandate there, to reject a federated state (whether permanent or a transitional structure) and support an immediately independent state of Israel.
As background, Judis starts with the formation of Zionist movements in Europe in the late 1800s, and distinguishes between different ones and differing philosophies. From there, he goes to the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which tangled with the Sykes-Picot Agreement of the year before. He notes this was one of the key causes of later problems.
Another was that most Zionists either, following descriptions of the likes of Mark Twain, thought Palestine was largely unoccupied, or following the thinking of European colonial powers in Africa, thought their increasing presence would civilize, enlighten and financially better the Arabs — attitudes still prevalent today, of course.
I thought the book could have used a bit more documentation of some of the political pressures Truman felt. It does mention a third-party candidate, Jewish, winning a special election for a NYC Congressional seat, and his affiliation with Henry Wallace's Progressive movement, but I would have liked to see even more like that. Similarly, since Judis mentions later presidents, a few more detailed incidents with all of them, not just Obama, would have been nice.
But, there's nothing factually wrong here. Nor can anybody who doesn't contribute to AIPAC quarrel with the reasoning.
As for Truman? Judis doesn't use the word "fault" very often, but he does make clear that the buck didn't often stop at his desk on formation of Israel issues.
As background, Judis starts with the formation of Zionist movements in Europe in the late 1800s, and distinguishes between different ones and differing philosophies. From there, he goes to the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which tangled with the Sykes-Picot Agreement of the year before. He notes this was one of the key causes of later problems.
Another was that most Zionists either, following descriptions of the likes of Mark Twain, thought Palestine was largely unoccupied, or following the thinking of European colonial powers in Africa, thought their increasing presence would civilize, enlighten and financially better the Arabs — attitudes still prevalent today, of course.
I thought the book could have used a bit more documentation of some of the political pressures Truman felt. It does mention a third-party candidate, Jewish, winning a special election for a NYC Congressional seat, and his affiliation with Henry Wallace's Progressive movement, but I would have liked to see even more like that. Similarly, since Judis mentions later presidents, a few more detailed incidents with all of them, not just Obama, would have been nice.
But, there's nothing factually wrong here. Nor can anybody who doesn't contribute to AIPAC quarrel with the reasoning.
As for Truman? Judis doesn't use the word "fault" very often, but he does make clear that the buck didn't often stop at his desk on formation of Israel issues.
January 16, 2025
John Judis has written an important study of the circumstances surrounding the founding the state of modern Day Israel but the book goes well beyond what is suggested by the title: Genesis: Truman, American Jews, and the Origins of the Arab/Israeli Conflict.
Part 1 deals with the origins of Zionism including the backdrop in Eastern Europe that led to the movement, the Balfour Declaration and its implications, and the origins of the British Mandate. For me, this was the least interesting part of the book since I have read probably a half dozen books that deal with this that are much more detailed than this. That said, Judis does an excellent job of presenting both the Zionist and Palestinian perspective as seen by the people in the region at the time, while hitting on the most critical events in a short 130 pages or so.
Part 2 turns to “The Paradox of American Zionism,” as it initially emerged under the auspices of Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis and then confronted the more militant political Zionism embodied by Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver. This was fascinating and not something I have read much about. The contradictions with American Zionists are fascinating - socially liberal democrats who had fought for civil rights, women’s suffrage etc for a lifetime but for the Palestinians in Israel, they are “willfully ignorant”.
In Part 3, Judis turns to the Truman administration as it confronted the legacy of World War II, the Holocaust, and calls for a Jewish state in Palestine set against Palestinian resistance and initial British hopes of retaining possession of the area.
Judis identifies with binationalism, the Zionist movement associated with Judah Magnes, Martin Buber, and Henrietta Szold. Zionist binationalism, never a potent force, backed a Jewish presence in Palestine but called for recognizing Palestinian rights as well. When discussing the period 1947–48, Judis supports a revised partition plan that would have given Palestinians more territory than allotted by the 1947 United Nations (UN) plan. Although various Arab League countries and some Palestinian leaders were willing to entertain such ideas, Grand Mufti Haj Amin al-Husayni's influence still prevailed among Palestinians, and Arab leaders mistrusted each other's intentions; thus they rejected any compromise. In his analysis of the differences between liberal Zionism, as embodied by Brandeis and Rabbi Stephen Wise, and militant American Zionism, Judis evaluates them with respect to their approaches to the American public and politicians. Neither camp considered the Palestinians as having any rights; Palestinians were equivalent to American Indians, inferior peoples whose concerns were minimal when compared to those of whites. Judis indicts American liberal Zionists on this matter, accusing them of having a double standard where concern for the less fortunate could apply in Western countries but not to non-Westerners
Judis's detailed treatment of American Zionist debates and factional disputes is itself a contribution to scholarship, especially for those who have concentrated more on American policies on Palestine and Zionism from the perspective of presidential declarations and State Department documents.
This book leads to a more nuanced assessment of President Truman with regards to Israel relative to other books I have read. According to Judis, Truman did not accept the idea that an independent Jewish state should exist in part or all of Palestine. He considered this idea detrimental to American interests, which included but were not limited to oil, on the grounds of both regional stability and with respect to Cold War issues that were clearly emerging in 1947.
Truman, however, invariably caved to American Jewish lobbying, often inspired and directed by the Jewish Agency; Moshe Shertok (later to be Moshe Sharett, first foreign minister and second prime minister of Israel) was frequently in Washington consulting with American Zionists as to what steps should be taken to lobby Truman. Judis details how Truman's capitulations to such pressures were accompanied by bitter complaints about such lobbying. His sudden changes of direction left State Department and military advisors stunned. Additionally, the British government felt a sense of betrayal, notably when Truman announced on Yom Kippur, 1946, that he approved the transfer of 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine without consulting London, thus endangering the very Morrison-Grady plan he supposedly favored. He did this because of upcoming congressional elections in November of that year. Judis argues that Truman's belated encouragement of American pressure to help pass the UN partition plan in November 1947 was taken on the recommendation of advisors such as David Niles and Clark Clifford with a view toward Truman's presidential prospects in the 1948 campaign. Judis skewers Clifford's later recollections of the period where he denied that politics played any role in Truman's decision making on Palestine, as did Truman in his memoir.
Judis concludes with a brief afterword titled “Obama and the Truman Precedent,” in which he describes how pro-Israeli lobbying and influence in Congress seek to trump American policy considerations today as they did for Truman.
It is a tragedy, Israel and its lobby have such power in the US and in the long run it has unequivocally hindered any chance of peace between the Jews and Arabs in the region. I say this as an American Jew whose family’s blood has been spilled in the fight for the state of Israel. Something has to change so the cycle of violence has a chance to end once and for all.
Part 1 deals with the origins of Zionism including the backdrop in Eastern Europe that led to the movement, the Balfour Declaration and its implications, and the origins of the British Mandate. For me, this was the least interesting part of the book since I have read probably a half dozen books that deal with this that are much more detailed than this. That said, Judis does an excellent job of presenting both the Zionist and Palestinian perspective as seen by the people in the region at the time, while hitting on the most critical events in a short 130 pages or so.
Part 2 turns to “The Paradox of American Zionism,” as it initially emerged under the auspices of Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis and then confronted the more militant political Zionism embodied by Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver. This was fascinating and not something I have read much about. The contradictions with American Zionists are fascinating - socially liberal democrats who had fought for civil rights, women’s suffrage etc for a lifetime but for the Palestinians in Israel, they are “willfully ignorant”.
In Part 3, Judis turns to the Truman administration as it confronted the legacy of World War II, the Holocaust, and calls for a Jewish state in Palestine set against Palestinian resistance and initial British hopes of retaining possession of the area.
Judis identifies with binationalism, the Zionist movement associated with Judah Magnes, Martin Buber, and Henrietta Szold. Zionist binationalism, never a potent force, backed a Jewish presence in Palestine but called for recognizing Palestinian rights as well. When discussing the period 1947–48, Judis supports a revised partition plan that would have given Palestinians more territory than allotted by the 1947 United Nations (UN) plan. Although various Arab League countries and some Palestinian leaders were willing to entertain such ideas, Grand Mufti Haj Amin al-Husayni's influence still prevailed among Palestinians, and Arab leaders mistrusted each other's intentions; thus they rejected any compromise. In his analysis of the differences between liberal Zionism, as embodied by Brandeis and Rabbi Stephen Wise, and militant American Zionism, Judis evaluates them with respect to their approaches to the American public and politicians. Neither camp considered the Palestinians as having any rights; Palestinians were equivalent to American Indians, inferior peoples whose concerns were minimal when compared to those of whites. Judis indicts American liberal Zionists on this matter, accusing them of having a double standard where concern for the less fortunate could apply in Western countries but not to non-Westerners
Judis's detailed treatment of American Zionist debates and factional disputes is itself a contribution to scholarship, especially for those who have concentrated more on American policies on Palestine and Zionism from the perspective of presidential declarations and State Department documents.
This book leads to a more nuanced assessment of President Truman with regards to Israel relative to other books I have read. According to Judis, Truman did not accept the idea that an independent Jewish state should exist in part or all of Palestine. He considered this idea detrimental to American interests, which included but were not limited to oil, on the grounds of both regional stability and with respect to Cold War issues that were clearly emerging in 1947.
Truman, however, invariably caved to American Jewish lobbying, often inspired and directed by the Jewish Agency; Moshe Shertok (later to be Moshe Sharett, first foreign minister and second prime minister of Israel) was frequently in Washington consulting with American Zionists as to what steps should be taken to lobby Truman. Judis details how Truman's capitulations to such pressures were accompanied by bitter complaints about such lobbying. His sudden changes of direction left State Department and military advisors stunned. Additionally, the British government felt a sense of betrayal, notably when Truman announced on Yom Kippur, 1946, that he approved the transfer of 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine without consulting London, thus endangering the very Morrison-Grady plan he supposedly favored. He did this because of upcoming congressional elections in November of that year. Judis argues that Truman's belated encouragement of American pressure to help pass the UN partition plan in November 1947 was taken on the recommendation of advisors such as David Niles and Clark Clifford with a view toward Truman's presidential prospects in the 1948 campaign. Judis skewers Clifford's later recollections of the period where he denied that politics played any role in Truman's decision making on Palestine, as did Truman in his memoir.
Judis concludes with a brief afterword titled “Obama and the Truman Precedent,” in which he describes how pro-Israeli lobbying and influence in Congress seek to trump American policy considerations today as they did for Truman.
It is a tragedy, Israel and its lobby have such power in the US and in the long run it has unequivocally hindered any chance of peace between the Jews and Arabs in the region. I say this as an American Jew whose family’s blood has been spilled in the fight for the state of Israel. Something has to change so the cycle of violence has a chance to end once and for all.
August 22, 2025
Incredibly well researched and draws upon a bevy of primary source material. Levin’s positionality is fascinating—Levin was drawn to Israel in the 70s after being disillusioned with America’s involvement in Vietnam in the 60s, only to later become staunchly anti Zionist after further digging.
October 29, 2020
This was a hard book to get through, way above my pay grade! However, the book was enlightening. I admit to bias towards Israel due to biblical exegesis and sympathy for the Jewish state because of the Holocaust. But tha author has shown us the perspectives of the Palestinians too. A true conundrum.
January 8, 2024
Robust - if not slightly tedious - history.
July 13, 2025
Great history of the Israeli/ Palestine conflict for someone like me who was very uneducated on the topic. This was a lot more readable than I was expecting it to be, and it had a good pace throughout so I never felt bored for long periods.
One complaint I have is that with the amount of “characters” who appear in this story, the author doesn’t remind you who some of the smaller players are often enough. I found myself not recognizing people who’d been introduced earlier in the book, because they were just referred to by their last name without any title. Small gripe, but wanted to note.
With how prevalent this conflict is in American politics, and it’s uniqueness among other foreign policy issues, I recommend this as a book to all Americans, so that the conversations we have can be based in logic, reason, empathy, and a knowledge of history. Thank you John Judis!
One complaint I have is that with the amount of “characters” who appear in this story, the author doesn’t remind you who some of the smaller players are often enough. I found myself not recognizing people who’d been introduced earlier in the book, because they were just referred to by their last name without any title. Small gripe, but wanted to note.
With how prevalent this conflict is in American politics, and it’s uniqueness among other foreign policy issues, I recommend this as a book to all Americans, so that the conversations we have can be based in logic, reason, empathy, and a knowledge of history. Thank you John Judis!
September 26, 2024
this book felt like reading a tragedy given the current state of the israel-palestine conflict (the genocide of palestinians). judis does a great job of giving extensive background into the origins of zionism, american zionism, and how the conflict in palestine began. any historical monograph, of course, will have an argument, however judis does a very good job of remaining largely impartial. it is truly a complex history and one that is hard to evaluate, especially retroactively. one thing that is clear—palestinians deserve freedom and a chance to live without constant oppression and suffering.
read for school, truman life & presidency.
read for school, truman life & presidency.
January 14, 2025
في أواخر القرن التاسع عشر، وسط أجواء من التوترات القومية والعنصرية في أوروبا، ظهرت الصهيونية كحركة تسعى إلى إعادة تعريف المصير اليهودي. كان تيودور هرتزل هو أول من قدّم رؤية سياسية واضحة لهذه الفكرة، داعيًا إلى إنشاء وطن قومي لليهود في فلسطين. لكن الصهيونية لم تكن اتجاهًا موحدًا؛ ففي حين ركّز هرتزل على الدبلوماسية مع القوى الاستعمارية، كان آحاد هاعام يدعو إلى بناء مركز روحي وثقافي في فلسطين، فيما أصر آرون ديفيد جوردون على أن الارتباط بالأرض والعمل فيها هو السبيل لإحياء الكرامة اليهودية.
هذان الاتجاهان مسيطران بشكل تام على سردية جون.ب. جوديس عبر كتابه كله وهو يحكي عبر سردٍ طويل وممتع حقيقة كيف انتقلت الدولة اليهودية من مجرّد فكرة إلى أرض الواقع مع ما صاحب ذلك من نزاعات مسلّحة وحروب مع الفلسطينين ومع العرب، ثم هو يخصص الثلث الأخير من كتابه لفهم وتوضيح موقف الرئيس الأميركي ترومان في دعم الصهيونية والاعتراف بالدولة اليهودية بمجرّد قيامها، وما تعرّض له من ضغوط صهيونية، و اعتراضات من مستشاريه.
أهم ما في الكتاب بتصوري هو رصد دور. بريطانيا والولايات المتحدة في قيام دولة إسرائيل المزعومة، إن أحد أبرز العوامل التي ساهمت في تأجيج الصراع هو استمرار الدعم البريطاني للمشروع الصهيوني، رغم وعود بريطانيا المتكررة بمعالجة مطالب العرب. كانت السلطات البريطانية ترى في اليهود حليفًا استراتيجيًا لتحقيق مصالحها في المنطقة، خصوصًا في ظل مخاوفها من صعود الحركات القومية العربية وانتشار النفوذ الألماني في الشرق الأوسط خلال ثلاثينيات القرن العشرين. كان يُنظر إلى إنشاء إسرائيل بوصفها " دولة عازلة" بين مصر وبلاد الشام التي كانت فلسطين جزء منها.
ومن هنا اندلعت ثورة 1936-1939 كإحدى أبرز محاولات العرب للضغط على بريطانيا لإيقاف الهجرة اليهودية، كانت نقطة تحوّل كبرى، حيث جمعت بين الإضرابات العامة والتمرد المسلح ضد السلطات البريطانية والمستوطنين. كما يشير الكاتب، افتقرت الثورة إلى التنظيم العسكري القوي والإمدادات، مما جعلها عرضة للقمع الوحشي من قبل البريطانيين.
يُلاحظ أنّ بريطانيا، التي كانت تحاول لعب دور الوسيط، أصبحت غير قادرة على احتواء هذا الصراع المتصاعد. وبينما استمرت في محاولاتها لإيجاد حلول، مثل إصدار الكتاب الأبيض عام 1939 لتقليص الهجرة اليهودية، كانت هذه الإجراءات تأتي متأخرة وغير كافية لوقف التدهور. مع ضغوط الصهيونيين على الجانب البريطاني لسرعة إنشاء الدولة اليهودية، ولاشك أن كثيرًا من القادة البريطانيين مثل بلفور و هربرت صموئيل وغيرهم كانوا صهاينة وتصيغ أفكارهم مفاهيم توراتية، لكنهم في لحظة ما، وجدوا أن قيام الدولة اليهودية لن يكون يسيرًا، ويحتاج الأمر لمزيد من الوقت، لكن الصهاينة مثل بن جوريون وحاييم وايزمان و جابوتنسكي انطلقوا في الضغط على البريطانيين بكل عنف.
مع اقتراب الحرب العالمية الثانية، أصبح واضحًا أن فلسطين تقف على أعتاب مرحلة جديدة، حيث بدأت القوى العالمية في إعادة رسم خريطة المنطقة، تاركة وراءها إرثًا من الانقسامات والصراعات التي لا تزال مستمرة حتى اليوم.
يسلط الكتاب الضوء على الدور المحوري الذي لعبته الولايات المتحدة في دعم المشروع الصهيوني، خاصة مع تطور الحركة الصهيونية الأمريكية من مجرد حركة تضامن ثقافي وروحي إلى قوة سياسية مؤثرة داخل الولايات المتحدة. يرصد جون.ب. جوديس كيف بدأت هذه الحركة في بداياتها كجزء من موجة الهجرة اليهودية الكبرى من أوروبا، قبل أن تتحول إلى عامل رئيس في السياسة الأمريكية تجاه فلسطين.فيوضح أن أصول الصهيونية الأمريكية تعود إلى أواخر القرن التاسع عشر، حيث تأثرت بشكل كبير بالأفكار الصهيونية التي صاغها تيودور هرتزل وآحاد هاعام.
مع ذلك، كان المجتمع اليهودي في الولايات المتحدة في تلك الفترة منقسمًا حول فكرة الصهيونية. فبينما كان اليهود الأوروبيون يدعمون بقوة إقامة وطن قومي لليهود في فلسطين، كان العديد من اليهود الأمريكيين الأثرياء، وخاصة أولئك الذين اندمجوا في النخبة الأمريكية، يرون في الصهيونية تهديدًا لمكانتهم في مجتمع ينظر إلى اليهود كأقلية دينية لا قومية.
يبرز الكتاب الدور الذي لعبته الحرب العالمية الأولى في تغيير مواقف العديد من اليهود الأمريكيين تجاه الصهيونية. فمع تصاعد موجات معاداة السامية في أوروبا وتزايد الهجرة اليهودية إلى أمريكا، بدأ الشعور بضرورة وجود وطن قومي لليهود يكتسب زخمًا داخل المجتمع اليهودي. في هذه الفترة، تأسست منظمات مثل اتحاد الصهاينة الأمريكيين والمنظمة الصهيونية الأمريكية، التي بدأت تضغط على الحكومة الأمريكية لدعم الصهيونية سياسيًا وماليًا.
كانت إحدى الشخصيات البارزة في هذا السياق هي لويس برانديز، القاضي في المحكمة العليا الأمريكية، الذي أصبح رمزًا للصهيونية الأمريكية وقد لعب دورًا حاسمًا في إعادة تشكيل الصهيونية كقضية أمريكية، حيث ربطها بالقيم الليبرالية الأمريكية مثل الحرية والمساواة.
تطورت الصهيونية الأمريكية إلى قوة سياسية حاسمة، حيث أصبحت قادرة على التأثير في قرارات الحكومة الأمريكية، خاصة بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية. هذا التأثير سيلعب دورًا محوريًا في المراحل اللاحقة من الصراع في فلسطين، مما يعكس العلاقة المتشابكة بين المصالح الأمريكية والصهيونية. يرى الكاتب أن برانديز ودائرته لعبوا دورًا محوريًا في دمج الصهيونية مع الخطاب الليبرالي الأمريكي، مما جعلها جزءًا من السياسة الأمريكية في فترة ما بين الحربين العالميتين.
يركز الكتاب على دور أبا هيلل سيلفر، أحد أبرز القادة الصهاينة الأمريكيين في منتصف القرن العشرين، الذي ساهم بشكل حاسم في تحويل الصهيونية الأمريكية إلى قوة ضغط سياسية فعّالة. كان أحد أهم إنجازات سيلفر كان قدرته على كسب دعم الكونغرس الأمريكي. استخدم نفوذه لتشجيع إصدار قرارات تدعم إنشاء وطن قومي لليهود، كما استغل نفوذ جماعته للضغط على الرئيس الأمريكي هاري ترومان لاتخاذ مواقف داعمة للص��يونية.
الدور المحوري الذي لعبه الرئيس الأمريكي هاري ترومان في دعم المشروع الصهيوني كان في اللحظات الحاسمة التي سبقت وأعقبت إعلان قيام دولة إسرائيل. كان ترومان في البداية مترددًا بشأن دعم إقامة دولة يهودية في فلسطين.تعرض ترومان لضغوط شديدة من الجماعات الصهيونية الأمريكية، التي كانت قد بنت شبكة قوية من التأثير السياسي والإعلامي، بقيادة شخصيات مثل أبا هيلل سيلفر. كما كان الحزب الديمقراطي حريصًا على كسب أصوات اليهود الأمريكيين في الانتخابات المقبلة، مما جعل القضية الصهيونية مسألة سياسية داخلية حساسة.
في عام 1948، عندما أعلن دافيد بن جوريون قيام دولة إسرائيل، كان ترومان أول رئيس يعترف بالدولة الجديدة، بعد دقائق فقط من إعلانها. يوضح الكتاب أن هذا القرار لم يكن مجرد تعبير عن دعم أخلاقي، بل كان أيضًا خطوة محسوبة لتعزيز نفوذ الولايات المتحدة في الشرق الأوسط وضمان بقاء إسرائيل حليفًا استراتيجيًا في المنطقة.
يناقش الكتاب الدور الحاسم الذي لعبه ناحوم غولدمان، أحد أبرز القادة الصهاينة في منتصف القرن العشرين، في دفع المشروع الصهيوني نحو قبول خطة تقسيم فلسطين كحل عملي لإقامة دولة يهودية. لعب غولدمان دورًا رئيسًا في كسب الدعم الدولي لخطة التقسيم. عمل مع قيادات الحركة الصهيونية، مثل دافيد بن جوريون، على التأثير في الولايات المتحدة والأمم المتحدة لتأييد الخطة. استخدم غولدمان مهاراته الدبلوماسية وعلاقاته الدولية لإقناع القوى الكبرى، خاصة الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد السوفيتي، بأن تقسيم فلسطين هو الحل الوحيد لتجنب صراع شامل في المنطقة.
في نهاية الكتاب يركّز المؤلف على مأساة الفلسطينيين بعد النكبة عام 1948، ويذكر أن النكبة كانت أيضًا لحظة ولادة لوعي سياسي جديد بين الفلسطينيين. بدأت تظهر حركات مقاومة صغيرة في المخيمات، تهدف إلى استعادة الأرض والدفاع عن الحقوق الفلسطينية. كما بدأ الجيل الجديد من اللاجئين يدرك أن استعادة فلسطين لن تكون ممكنة دون تنظيم سياسي مستقل للفلسطينيين، مما مهد الطريق لاحقًا لظهور منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية وحركات المقاومة.
لقد أسس دور ترومان في دعم الصهاينة لتحالف طويل الأمد بين الولايات المتحدة وإسرائيل. بالنهاية الكتاب غني بالتحليل يقدّم رؤية شاملة ومتوازنة لجذور الصراع العربي-الإسرائيلي.
هذان الاتجاهان مسيطران بشكل تام على سردية جون.ب. جوديس عبر كتابه كله وهو يحكي عبر سردٍ طويل وممتع حقيقة كيف انتقلت الدولة اليهودية من مجرّد فكرة إلى أرض الواقع مع ما صاحب ذلك من نزاعات مسلّحة وحروب مع الفلسطينين ومع العرب، ثم هو يخصص الثلث الأخير من كتابه لفهم وتوضيح موقف الرئيس الأميركي ترومان في دعم الصهيونية والاعتراف بالدولة اليهودية بمجرّد قيامها، وما تعرّض له من ضغوط صهيونية، و اعتراضات من مستشاريه.
أهم ما في الكتاب بتصوري هو رصد دور. بريطانيا والولايات المتحدة في قيام دولة إسرائيل المزعومة، إن أحد أبرز العوامل التي ساهمت في تأجيج الصراع هو استمرار الدعم البريطاني للمشروع الصهيوني، رغم وعود بريطانيا المتكررة بمعالجة مطالب العرب. كانت السلطات البريطانية ترى في اليهود حليفًا استراتيجيًا لتحقيق مصالحها في المنطقة، خصوصًا في ظل مخاوفها من صعود الحركات القومية العربية وانتشار النفوذ الألماني في الشرق الأوسط خلال ثلاثينيات القرن العشرين. كان يُنظر إلى إنشاء إسرائيل بوصفها " دولة عازلة" بين مصر وبلاد الشام التي كانت فلسطين جزء منها.
ومن هنا اندلعت ثورة 1936-1939 كإحدى أبرز محاولات العرب للضغط على بريطانيا لإيقاف الهجرة اليهودية، كانت نقطة تحوّل كبرى، حيث جمعت بين الإضرابات العامة والتمرد المسلح ضد السلطات البريطانية والمستوطنين. كما يشير الكاتب، افتقرت الثورة إلى التنظيم العسكري القوي والإمدادات، مما جعلها عرضة للقمع الوحشي من قبل البريطانيين.
يُلاحظ أنّ بريطانيا، التي كانت تحاول لعب دور الوسيط، أصبحت غير قادرة على احتواء هذا الصراع المتصاعد. وبينما استمرت في محاولاتها لإيجاد حلول، مثل إصدار الكتاب الأبيض عام 1939 لتقليص الهجرة اليهودية، كانت هذه الإجراءات تأتي متأخرة وغير كافية لوقف التدهور. مع ضغوط الصهيونيين على الجانب البريطاني لسرعة إنشاء الدولة اليهودية، ولاشك أن كثيرًا من القادة البريطانيين مثل بلفور و هربرت صموئيل وغيرهم كانوا صهاينة وتصيغ أفكارهم مفاهيم توراتية، لكنهم في لحظة ما، وجدوا أن قيام الدولة اليهودية لن يكون يسيرًا، ويحتاج الأمر لمزيد من الوقت، لكن الصهاينة مثل بن جوريون وحاييم وايزمان و جابوتنسكي انطلقوا في الضغط على البريطانيين بكل عنف.
مع اقتراب الحرب العالمية الثانية، أصبح واضحًا أن فلسطين تقف على أعتاب مرحلة جديدة، حيث بدأت القوى العالمية في إعادة رسم خريطة المنطقة، تاركة وراءها إرثًا من الانقسامات والصراعات التي لا تزال مستمرة حتى اليوم.
يسلط الكتاب الضوء على الدور المحوري الذي لعبته الولايات المتحدة في دعم المشروع الصهيوني، خاصة مع تطور الحركة الصهيونية الأمريكية من مجرد حركة تضامن ثقافي وروحي إلى قوة سياسية مؤثرة داخل الولايات المتحدة. يرصد جون.ب. جوديس كيف بدأت هذه الحركة في بداياتها كجزء من موجة الهجرة اليهودية الكبرى من أوروبا، قبل أن تتحول إلى عامل رئيس في السياسة الأمريكية تجاه فلسطين.فيوضح أن أصول الصهيونية الأمريكية تعود إلى أواخر القرن التاسع عشر، حيث تأثرت بشكل كبير بالأفكار الصهيونية التي صاغها تيودور هرتزل وآحاد هاعام.
مع ذلك، كان المجتمع اليهودي في الولايات المتحدة في تلك الفترة منقسمًا حول فكرة الصهيونية. فبينما كان اليهود الأوروبيون يدعمون بقوة إقامة وطن قومي لليهود في فلسطين، كان العديد من اليهود الأمريكيين الأثرياء، وخاصة أولئك الذين اندمجوا في النخبة الأمريكية، يرون في الصهيونية تهديدًا لمكانتهم في مجتمع ينظر إلى اليهود كأقلية دينية لا قومية.
يبرز الكتاب الدور الذي لعبته الحرب العالمية الأولى في تغيير مواقف العديد من اليهود الأمريكيين تجاه الصهيونية. فمع تصاعد موجات معاداة السامية في أوروبا وتزايد الهجرة اليهودية إلى أمريكا، بدأ الشعور بضرورة وجود وطن قومي لليهود يكتسب زخمًا داخل المجتمع اليهودي. في هذه الفترة، تأسست منظمات مثل اتحاد الصهاينة الأمريكيين والمنظمة الصهيونية الأمريكية، التي بدأت تضغط على الحكومة الأمريكية لدعم الصهيونية سياسيًا وماليًا.
كانت إحدى الشخصيات البارزة في هذا السياق هي لويس برانديز، القاضي في المحكمة العليا الأمريكية، الذي أصبح رمزًا للصهيونية الأمريكية وقد لعب دورًا حاسمًا في إعادة تشكيل الصهيونية كقضية أمريكية، حيث ربطها بالقيم الليبرالية الأمريكية مثل الحرية والمساواة.
تطورت الصهيونية الأمريكية إلى قوة سياسية حاسمة، حيث أصبحت قادرة على التأثير في قرارات الحكومة الأمريكية، خاصة بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية. هذا التأثير سيلعب دورًا محوريًا في المراحل اللاحقة من الصراع في فلسطين، مما يعكس العلاقة المتشابكة بين المصالح الأمريكية والصهيونية. يرى الكاتب أن برانديز ودائرته لعبوا دورًا محوريًا في دمج الصهيونية مع الخطاب الليبرالي الأمريكي، مما جعلها جزءًا من السياسة الأمريكية في فترة ما بين الحربين العالميتين.
يركز الكتاب على دور أبا هيلل سيلفر، أحد أبرز القادة الصهاينة الأمريكيين في منتصف القرن العشرين، الذي ساهم بشكل حاسم في تحويل الصهيونية الأمريكية إلى قوة ضغط سياسية فعّالة. كان أحد أهم إنجازات سيلفر كان قدرته على كسب دعم الكونغرس الأمريكي. استخدم نفوذه لتشجيع إصدار قرارات تدعم إنشاء وطن قومي لليهود، كما استغل نفوذ جماعته للضغط على الرئيس الأمريكي هاري ترومان لاتخاذ مواقف داعمة للص��يونية.
الدور المحوري الذي لعبه الرئيس الأمريكي هاري ترومان في دعم المشروع الصهيوني كان في اللحظات الحاسمة التي سبقت وأعقبت إعلان قيام دولة إسرائيل. كان ترومان في البداية مترددًا بشأن دعم إقامة دولة يهودية في فلسطين.تعرض ترومان لضغوط شديدة من الجماعات الصهيونية الأمريكية، التي كانت قد بنت شبكة قوية من التأثير السياسي والإعلامي، بقيادة شخصيات مثل أبا هيلل سيلفر. كما كان الحزب الديمقراطي حريصًا على كسب أصوات اليهود الأمريكيين في الانتخابات المقبلة، مما جعل القضية الصهيونية مسألة سياسية داخلية حساسة.
في عام 1948، عندما أعلن دافيد بن جوريون قيام دولة إسرائيل، كان ترومان أول رئيس يعترف بالدولة الجديدة، بعد دقائق فقط من إعلانها. يوضح الكتاب أن هذا القرار لم يكن مجرد تعبير عن دعم أخلاقي، بل كان أيضًا خطوة محسوبة لتعزيز نفوذ الولايات المتحدة في الشرق الأوسط وضمان بقاء إسرائيل حليفًا استراتيجيًا في المنطقة.
يناقش الكتاب الدور الحاسم الذي لعبه ناحوم غولدمان، أحد أبرز القادة الصهاينة في منتصف القرن العشرين، في دفع المشروع الصهيوني نحو قبول خطة تقسيم فلسطين كحل عملي لإقامة دولة يهودية. لعب غولدمان دورًا رئيسًا في كسب الدعم الدولي لخطة التقسيم. عمل مع قيادات الحركة الصهيونية، مثل دافيد بن جوريون، على التأثير في الولايات المتحدة والأمم المتحدة لتأييد الخطة. استخدم غولدمان مهاراته الدبلوماسية وعلاقاته الدولية لإقناع القوى الكبرى، خاصة الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد السوفيتي، بأن تقسيم فلسطين هو الحل الوحيد لتجنب صراع شامل في المنطقة.
في نهاية الكتاب يركّز المؤلف على مأساة الفلسطينيين بعد النكبة عام 1948، ويذكر أن النكبة كانت أيضًا لحظة ولادة لوعي سياسي جديد بين الفلسطينيين. بدأت تظهر حركات مقاومة صغيرة في المخيمات، تهدف إلى استعادة الأرض والدفاع عن الحقوق الفلسطينية. كما بدأ الجيل الجديد من اللاجئين يدرك أن استعادة فلسطين لن تكون ممكنة دون تنظيم سياسي مستقل للفلسطينيين، مما مهد الطريق لاحقًا لظهور منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية وحركات المقاومة.
لقد أسس دور ترومان في دعم الصهاينة لتحالف طويل الأمد بين الولايات المتحدة وإسرائيل. بالنهاية الكتاب غني بالتحليل يقدّم رؤية شاملة ومتوازنة لجذور الصراع العربي-الإسرائيلي.
January 30, 2016
Lucidly written but not without flaws, Genesis explores the role of American politics in the early years of the Israel/Palestine conflict. American Zionism, it argues, was largely social and humanitarian in nature, rooted in Reform Judaism, and essentially different from its European variety. The role of Truman and American Jews (particularly notable personages such as Louis Brandeis and Abba Hillel Silver) is not really discussed until roughly 130 pages in. The first section lays out the role of the British in creating the conditions that the Americans found themselves in after WWII. Truman's vulnerability to domestic politics is cited as a major factor in successive American governments' alignment with Israel vis-a-vis its Arab inhabitants. But Judis also recognizes that the American leaders who have variously funded Israel and pushed or induced the Israelis and Palestinians to the negotiating table were and remain outsiders, often (deliberately or not) filtering their perceptions of the situation through the filter of domestic concerns. Genesis touches on issues of justice but is non-polemical. At a time when many relatively well-informed readers still take an uncritical outlook of American policies assumed to be "default " positions, a reading of relatively recent history becomes essential from time to time.
May 20, 2014
President Truman, preoccupied with the end of WWII and beginning of the Cold War has to also deal with the issue of a Jewish State in Palestine. Being a Jeffersonian Democrat, Truman believes no state should be comprised of only one religion. He tries to engineer a single state in which both Jews and Palestinians can live and govern side by side. Events leading up to the 1948 establishment of Israel make this impossible. This book is a well-researched and well-written account of the history of events in Palestine and the politics of both Britain and the US. No one looks good. Arabs are leaderless and against each other; Zionists ignore the Arabs living in Palestine; Britain, through the Balfour Declaration and other related moves, causes all kinds of difficulties for everyone; Truman is not the decisive "buck stops here" president he's supposed to have been. The book ends with hope that something will be done to finally bring peace to the area but even that hope seems dim. It will take leaders from the US and Europe who can withstand the political pressures from all sides to force the parties to negotiate in good faith. Like I said, the hope dims.
January 22, 2015
This is one of the best written histories of the conflict that I've read. It's very easy to follow and a good read, although it may feel somewhat long/repetitive if you already know a fair bit about the conflict. For example, it takes a lot of chapters to get up to the time of Truman, which is where Judis has the most interesting insights.
At the same time, I am not sure that I entirely agreed with Judis' characterization of the moral wrongness of the various actors. He seems determined to also explicitly pass judgement, which on the one hand I admire for being at least forthright with his opinions, but on the other hand is somewhat frustrating because it feels like to endorse this book I have to endorse all of his his opinions. Nevertheless, I do recommend it, because I think it's an important perspective, even if it's one I don't entirely agree with.
Ultimately, this is a very good book on the history of US-Israel relations, but do not let it be your only book on the conflict.
At the same time, I am not sure that I entirely agreed with Judis' characterization of the moral wrongness of the various actors. He seems determined to also explicitly pass judgement, which on the one hand I admire for being at least forthright with his opinions, but on the other hand is somewhat frustrating because it feels like to endorse this book I have to endorse all of his his opinions. Nevertheless, I do recommend it, because I think it's an important perspective, even if it's one I don't entirely agree with.
Ultimately, this is a very good book on the history of US-Israel relations, but do not let it be your only book on the conflict.
August 5, 2016
3.5 stars. This book wasn't exactly what I expected, but I enjoyed it. I thought it would focus a lot more on Truman and his actions regarding the Israel/Palestine conflict, but that only made up the last third of the book. Judis provided a lot of great background on the origins of the conflict and has a short afterword on what has been done (or not, actually) between Truman's time and now. If you want an intro to the conflict that is an interesting read and fairly easy to follow, I'd recommend this book
February 8, 2015
This book presents a detailed look at the founding of Israel, the politics behind the choices made and the mistakes as well as crimes committed by all those involved. It is impossible to understand the intransigence of the current state of affairs without the knowledge of how we reached this point. This book provides you with that knowledge, and left me very pessimistic about the possibility of improvement any time soon.
January 24, 2018
Somewhat lugubrious overview of the origins of the current Israeli/Palestine conflict focusing on the early days of Zionism and then the powerful lobbyists that pushed Truman, against his better judgment, to recognize the state of Israel without a plan to resettle the Arab refugees caused by the six day war. Definitely slants liberal but gives enough concrete instances where that slant is justified.
November 3, 2023
Glad I read this thoroughly researched, detailed history of the Isreali-Palestinian conflict. I'm definitely better informed now.
December 1, 2023
As I write this, Israel and Hamas are at war in Gaza after the brutal October 7, 2023 attack on Israeli civilians by Hamas. Thousands of civilians have died and there is a humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Israel continues to occupy the West Bank, as it has since 1967, taking more land as the years go by in order to establish settlements that now have hundreds of thousands of Israelis living in the West Bank. Peace and a final resolution of the Israel - Palestinian conflict seem further away than ever.
I picked up this book about the creation of Israel in 1947 some time back and this seemed like a good time to read it. When one reviews the history it becomes clearer that the long history of conflict in Palestine was inevitable. As the author recounts in this excellent book, there were two unusual aspects to the creation of Israel - the establishment of a democracy as a home for members of a particular religious group and the establishment of a Jewish state on land that was already occupied by hundreds of thousands of non-Jews who had been there for centuries. With Jews constituting a small minority in Palestine, far outnumbered by the Arabs, how could a new nation be both a democracy and a Jewish state? And, given the long history of persecution on the Jews, culminating in the mass murders of the Holocaust, how could Jews without their own country feel safe as a minority anywhere in the world?
The book recounts the history of the Zionism movement, and its acceleration after World War II. It is a study in contradictions. At a time when the European imperialists were setting their colonies free, a Jewish state was created by essentially colonizing Palestine. Jews who had had their own property confiscated in Europe took over Arab lands and expelled their owners. Other Arab countries failed to support Palestinian Arabs because they wanted their own pieces of the pie. Jews who were the victims of terror engaged in terrorism themselves. Some of those terrorists later obtained powerful posts in Israel, including multiple prime ministers.
The author spends a lot of time and space showing how Zionists in the United States pressured the Truman Administration to support the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Truman certainly had his misgivings. He did not favor establishing a nation founded on religion and he did not favor depriving Palestinians of their rights as citizens on land that they occupied when another group sought to move in. Slowly, however, based primarily on domestic political considerations (fear of losing the 1948 Presidential election), Truman gave in to the pressure.
And so it remain today. The issue of Palestinian rights was not addressed in the 1940s and remains unaddressed today. The pro-Israel lobby exercised much influence in Truman's time and it continues to do so today. Republicans now perceive that the Jewish vote, which has historically gone to the Democrats, is now up for grabs. As a result, the parties in the US now outdo one another in expressing support for Israel, now matter how inhumane it is toward the Palestinians in the areas that it occupies. As was the case in the 1930s and 1940s, the Palestinian Arabs continue to be their own worst enemies when it comes to obtaining international support. They consistently fail to produce any respected political leadership and their tactics always favor murdering innocent civilians, leaving them perpetually in pariah status on the international stage.
There seems to be little that can be done to improve the situation. Certainly, after the Holocaust, the need to establish a home for Jews was compelling. At the same time, one can understand why the Palestinians would object to their land being taken for that purpose. In order to understand why things are as they are today, it is important to take account of the history and this book is a valuable source. I highly recommend it.
In an afterword, the author uses events during the Obama Administration to show that the relentless pressure of the pro-Israel lobby has not changed at all since Truman's time. The US continues to support Israel on virtually every issue and it provides generous amounts of aid, much of it military, without imposing any conditions on its use. I read a quote today from Benjamin Netanyahu that sums it up nicely: "I know what America is. America is a thing that you can move very easily." As the book shows, that has been the case for a long time.
I picked up this book about the creation of Israel in 1947 some time back and this seemed like a good time to read it. When one reviews the history it becomes clearer that the long history of conflict in Palestine was inevitable. As the author recounts in this excellent book, there were two unusual aspects to the creation of Israel - the establishment of a democracy as a home for members of a particular religious group and the establishment of a Jewish state on land that was already occupied by hundreds of thousands of non-Jews who had been there for centuries. With Jews constituting a small minority in Palestine, far outnumbered by the Arabs, how could a new nation be both a democracy and a Jewish state? And, given the long history of persecution on the Jews, culminating in the mass murders of the Holocaust, how could Jews without their own country feel safe as a minority anywhere in the world?
The book recounts the history of the Zionism movement, and its acceleration after World War II. It is a study in contradictions. At a time when the European imperialists were setting their colonies free, a Jewish state was created by essentially colonizing Palestine. Jews who had had their own property confiscated in Europe took over Arab lands and expelled their owners. Other Arab countries failed to support Palestinian Arabs because they wanted their own pieces of the pie. Jews who were the victims of terror engaged in terrorism themselves. Some of those terrorists later obtained powerful posts in Israel, including multiple prime ministers.
The author spends a lot of time and space showing how Zionists in the United States pressured the Truman Administration to support the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Truman certainly had his misgivings. He did not favor establishing a nation founded on religion and he did not favor depriving Palestinians of their rights as citizens on land that they occupied when another group sought to move in. Slowly, however, based primarily on domestic political considerations (fear of losing the 1948 Presidential election), Truman gave in to the pressure.
And so it remain today. The issue of Palestinian rights was not addressed in the 1940s and remains unaddressed today. The pro-Israel lobby exercised much influence in Truman's time and it continues to do so today. Republicans now perceive that the Jewish vote, which has historically gone to the Democrats, is now up for grabs. As a result, the parties in the US now outdo one another in expressing support for Israel, now matter how inhumane it is toward the Palestinians in the areas that it occupies. As was the case in the 1930s and 1940s, the Palestinian Arabs continue to be their own worst enemies when it comes to obtaining international support. They consistently fail to produce any respected political leadership and their tactics always favor murdering innocent civilians, leaving them perpetually in pariah status on the international stage.
There seems to be little that can be done to improve the situation. Certainly, after the Holocaust, the need to establish a home for Jews was compelling. At the same time, one can understand why the Palestinians would object to their land being taken for that purpose. In order to understand why things are as they are today, it is important to take account of the history and this book is a valuable source. I highly recommend it.
In an afterword, the author uses events during the Obama Administration to show that the relentless pressure of the pro-Israel lobby has not changed at all since Truman's time. The US continues to support Israel on virtually every issue and it provides generous amounts of aid, much of it military, without imposing any conditions on its use. I read a quote today from Benjamin Netanyahu that sums it up nicely: "I know what America is. America is a thing that you can move very easily." As the book shows, that has been the case for a long time.
October 11, 2025
I thought this was outstanding, and I'm a little surprised this book isn't a bigger deal. It's a really helpful and balanced look at the roots of the US-Israeli alliance and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Judis has a few main argument. One is that for all the complexity of this conflict, and the many parties on both sides that started it and have exacerbated it, there is still a central fact: without widespread Jewish immigration to Palestine and the determination of the majority of the Zionist leadership to create an exclusively (or nearly so) Jewish state there, this conflict would not exist. Now, you may believe the pursuit of a Jewish state is a worthwhile objective (I do, more or less) given the persecution of the Jews before and after the Holocaust. But Zionism, even the liberal variants thereof, was never really an inclusive form of nationalism that would have been ok with a binational or federated state. At most steps in this book, the Zionist leadership vehemently opposed such a setup. Of course, ARab nationalism was also exclusionary and hostile to the Jews, but the salient point is that Palestine was basically their land, and the existing peoples of a territory have a right to be exclusionary.
Zionism reflected the exclusive form of nationalism that dominated Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. From Herzl to Weizmann to Brandeis to Silver to Ben-Gurion and so on, ZIonists assumed that Arabs were an undeveloped and fungible people, meaning that they could be transported anywhere in the ARab world and take root, while Jews needed and deserved their own homeland as a persecuted and more advanced people. Jews did not seize their foothold in Palestine by force initially, but British support via the Balfour Declaration was crucial for giving them the foothold that they would later transform into a state.
So there's a bit of moral clarity in this book: for all the suffering that Jews have endured, and for all of their valid reasons to want a state, Arabs deserve to feel screwed, even before the 1948 War lead to the cleansing of Palestine of most of its Arab population (in another very murky war that neither side "started" but the Israelis certainly used to expand their territory and expel Arabs). Judis emphasizes that the Arabs had their own flaws too: divided and extremist leadership, Arab states that also wanted to control Palestine, riots and near-pogroms that intensified, and general disorganization. I would add a failure to consider compromises, even ones that kind of suck for the Arabs, as each compromise refused (up to Camp David in 2000) only led to more regression for the Pal cause and suffering for Palestinians.
The second main argument is about Truman. Judis punctures the myth that Truman wanted a Jewish state and orchestrated it with great intentionality. In fact, he hadn't thought much about Israel before becoming President. He was a Christian, but he was generally skeptical of the idea of a country founded on a religion (any religion). He understood at some level that the Arab Palestinians were getting screwed and, as the State Dept argued, that US influence among the Arab nations would suffer if the US was too partial to the Israelis. Finally Truman deeply resented the constant pressure of the Zionist lobby, which threatened to undermine his bid for the presidency (especially in NY state) by telling the American public that he was against Jewish interests.
Ultimately, Truman's support for partition and recognition of Israel were about his own drift and incompetence plus the impact of domestic politics. He became angry and disengaged, failing to direct a coherent policy as events changed rapidly on the ground. He stumbled his way into support for Israel, in spite of his sense that this was wrong, in large part because he wasn't willing to take the political hit of challenging the Zionist lobby. That's a trend that has stayed with US-Israeli relations for the last 75 years.
This book is very fair-minded but also critical of the Zionist project in compelling ways. Even liberal Zionists were not very liberal when it came to the treatment of Palestinians. I'm reading this at a time when I've almost totally lost faith in the state of Israel, in the midst of the horrific war in Gaza. This book sharpened my understanding of this tragic history while also further convincing me that neither US values nor interests are enhanced by unconditional support for Israel.
Judis has a few main argument. One is that for all the complexity of this conflict, and the many parties on both sides that started it and have exacerbated it, there is still a central fact: without widespread Jewish immigration to Palestine and the determination of the majority of the Zionist leadership to create an exclusively (or nearly so) Jewish state there, this conflict would not exist. Now, you may believe the pursuit of a Jewish state is a worthwhile objective (I do, more or less) given the persecution of the Jews before and after the Holocaust. But Zionism, even the liberal variants thereof, was never really an inclusive form of nationalism that would have been ok with a binational or federated state. At most steps in this book, the Zionist leadership vehemently opposed such a setup. Of course, ARab nationalism was also exclusionary and hostile to the Jews, but the salient point is that Palestine was basically their land, and the existing peoples of a territory have a right to be exclusionary.
Zionism reflected the exclusive form of nationalism that dominated Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. From Herzl to Weizmann to Brandeis to Silver to Ben-Gurion and so on, ZIonists assumed that Arabs were an undeveloped and fungible people, meaning that they could be transported anywhere in the ARab world and take root, while Jews needed and deserved their own homeland as a persecuted and more advanced people. Jews did not seize their foothold in Palestine by force initially, but British support via the Balfour Declaration was crucial for giving them the foothold that they would later transform into a state.
So there's a bit of moral clarity in this book: for all the suffering that Jews have endured, and for all of their valid reasons to want a state, Arabs deserve to feel screwed, even before the 1948 War lead to the cleansing of Palestine of most of its Arab population (in another very murky war that neither side "started" but the Israelis certainly used to expand their territory and expel Arabs). Judis emphasizes that the Arabs had their own flaws too: divided and extremist leadership, Arab states that also wanted to control Palestine, riots and near-pogroms that intensified, and general disorganization. I would add a failure to consider compromises, even ones that kind of suck for the Arabs, as each compromise refused (up to Camp David in 2000) only led to more regression for the Pal cause and suffering for Palestinians.
The second main argument is about Truman. Judis punctures the myth that Truman wanted a Jewish state and orchestrated it with great intentionality. In fact, he hadn't thought much about Israel before becoming President. He was a Christian, but he was generally skeptical of the idea of a country founded on a religion (any religion). He understood at some level that the Arab Palestinians were getting screwed and, as the State Dept argued, that US influence among the Arab nations would suffer if the US was too partial to the Israelis. Finally Truman deeply resented the constant pressure of the Zionist lobby, which threatened to undermine his bid for the presidency (especially in NY state) by telling the American public that he was against Jewish interests.
Ultimately, Truman's support for partition and recognition of Israel were about his own drift and incompetence plus the impact of domestic politics. He became angry and disengaged, failing to direct a coherent policy as events changed rapidly on the ground. He stumbled his way into support for Israel, in spite of his sense that this was wrong, in large part because he wasn't willing to take the political hit of challenging the Zionist lobby. That's a trend that has stayed with US-Israeli relations for the last 75 years.
This book is very fair-minded but also critical of the Zionist project in compelling ways. Even liberal Zionists were not very liberal when it came to the treatment of Palestinians. I'm reading this at a time when I've almost totally lost faith in the state of Israel, in the midst of the horrific war in Gaza. This book sharpened my understanding of this tragic history while also further convincing me that neither US values nor interests are enhanced by unconditional support for Israel.
October 4, 2021
What happens when the morally right answer is not politically right? This has been the dilemma for generations on the matter of Zionism.
This is a well-researched book objectively written by an American Jew covering the genesis of Zionism and how Israel came to take its form today.
To start with, the true statehood of Palestine was always in question as it was passed from the Ottomans to the British post World War I as part of the Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain and France. The Zionist movement was formed with the rise anti-Semitism to find a home for the Jewish people. The Zionist secured an early win in the Balfour Declaration in 1917, signifying British support for establishing Jewish home in Palestine.
Generally, there are two camps within the Zionists - one which recognises the rights of Palestinian Arabs who have settled in the region for generations and the other downplays the Arabs’ presence with single minded focus to carve out a Jewish state in Palestine.
With a mix of ignorance, fanaticism and even downright racism, the latter group prevailed. As Hitler’s atrocities during World War II, with the likes of Auschwitz, came to fore, the call for a home for a Jewish state began to ring louder.
This is when the American Zionist group took up the call and also the lead from their weary British counterparts. Harry Truman was in the White House faced by a group of powerful Jewish New Yorkers. This is where the tussle between the moral and politics against the backdrop of the Cold War.
Truman’s administration recognised the rights of the Arab Palestinian population, which outnumbered the Jewish population. The administration initially worked with the Zionists and offered compromises such as creation of a combined Arab/Jew state, land partitions or even other lands like Uganda but fell onto the deaf ears of the Zionists who demanded nothing else but a Jewish state. Truman, whose own presidential election was under threat, understood the need to win over the Jewish votes. As a result, he crumbled under the intense pressures from the lobbyists and could do little to steer the discussion toward an equitable outcome. It didn’t help that the Arabs lacked unity and clarity of what they want as negotiations ensued.
With Balfour Declaration coming to an end in 1948, the British declared that they will move out thereafter. Hence the resolution of the Palestinian conflict became even more pressing. The international community under the new flag of United Nations came up with a partition plan for the two parties. The plan was not well received in the Arab world and violence began to escalate. More importantly, the partition plan was not sound from enforcement perspective. The British just wanted to get out and the Americans and Soviets find not want to get involved militarily. Hence, there was a good chance that the only way to settle the score was through war.
As the UN Partition Plan came to life, true enough the Arab world marched against the newly created state in the first Arab-Israeli War. Israeli military, under Ben Gurion, was much more organised compared to the Arab side which lacked unity and conviction despite superiority in numbers. In fact, some of the Arab countries were after pieces of Palestine themselves for example Jordan on Transjordan and Egypt on Negev. As a result, Israel won the war soundly.
After the win, Israel had more land than allotted as part of UN Partition Plan. Despite calls to return to the original partition, Truman and the British did not have the political will but to accept the new status quo.
With that, the Zionists got what they wanted. Israel, as a Jewish state, was finally formed, but at what cost? Hundreds of thousands of homeless Palestinian Arab refugees were scattered across the region. Also, on American involvement, Truman is often credited with the creation of Israel but this book illustrates how narrative bent the truth.
The author inserted an apt biblical verse in the book for us reflect upon - “For what profit is it to a man if he gains the whole world, and loses his own soul?”Matt 16:26
This is a well-researched book objectively written by an American Jew covering the genesis of Zionism and how Israel came to take its form today.
To start with, the true statehood of Palestine was always in question as it was passed from the Ottomans to the British post World War I as part of the Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain and France. The Zionist movement was formed with the rise anti-Semitism to find a home for the Jewish people. The Zionist secured an early win in the Balfour Declaration in 1917, signifying British support for establishing Jewish home in Palestine.
Generally, there are two camps within the Zionists - one which recognises the rights of Palestinian Arabs who have settled in the region for generations and the other downplays the Arabs’ presence with single minded focus to carve out a Jewish state in Palestine.
With a mix of ignorance, fanaticism and even downright racism, the latter group prevailed. As Hitler’s atrocities during World War II, with the likes of Auschwitz, came to fore, the call for a home for a Jewish state began to ring louder.
This is when the American Zionist group took up the call and also the lead from their weary British counterparts. Harry Truman was in the White House faced by a group of powerful Jewish New Yorkers. This is where the tussle between the moral and politics against the backdrop of the Cold War.
Truman’s administration recognised the rights of the Arab Palestinian population, which outnumbered the Jewish population. The administration initially worked with the Zionists and offered compromises such as creation of a combined Arab/Jew state, land partitions or even other lands like Uganda but fell onto the deaf ears of the Zionists who demanded nothing else but a Jewish state. Truman, whose own presidential election was under threat, understood the need to win over the Jewish votes. As a result, he crumbled under the intense pressures from the lobbyists and could do little to steer the discussion toward an equitable outcome. It didn’t help that the Arabs lacked unity and clarity of what they want as negotiations ensued.
With Balfour Declaration coming to an end in 1948, the British declared that they will move out thereafter. Hence the resolution of the Palestinian conflict became even more pressing. The international community under the new flag of United Nations came up with a partition plan for the two parties. The plan was not well received in the Arab world and violence began to escalate. More importantly, the partition plan was not sound from enforcement perspective. The British just wanted to get out and the Americans and Soviets find not want to get involved militarily. Hence, there was a good chance that the only way to settle the score was through war.
As the UN Partition Plan came to life, true enough the Arab world marched against the newly created state in the first Arab-Israeli War. Israeli military, under Ben Gurion, was much more organised compared to the Arab side which lacked unity and conviction despite superiority in numbers. In fact, some of the Arab countries were after pieces of Palestine themselves for example Jordan on Transjordan and Egypt on Negev. As a result, Israel won the war soundly.
After the win, Israel had more land than allotted as part of UN Partition Plan. Despite calls to return to the original partition, Truman and the British did not have the political will but to accept the new status quo.
With that, the Zionists got what they wanted. Israel, as a Jewish state, was finally formed, but at what cost? Hundreds of thousands of homeless Palestinian Arab refugees were scattered across the region. Also, on American involvement, Truman is often credited with the creation of Israel but this book illustrates how narrative bent the truth.
The author inserted an apt biblical verse in the book for us reflect upon - “For what profit is it to a man if he gains the whole world, and loses his own soul?”Matt 16:26
Read
March 27, 2024This is a good, solid history of the birth of Israel but it has some of the weaknesses of a history written by a journalist rather than a professional historian. That is to say, it gives a lot of information without necessarily a clear and broad historical perspective or interpretation. Plus, Judis does not follow through on some of the ideas that he purports to want to examine in his introductory sections. For example, he clearly states his thesis that the formation of Israel was pursued without due regard for the interests of the Palestinian Arab population and devotes a lot of space to imply that some earlier ideas for the Jewish state, such as one that would have set up a religious/spiritual community in Palestine rather than a full-fledged nation, might have been preferable as opposed to the more secular, conventional nation that it became. But he does not explore the inherent paradox of this idea in the fact that creating a community based on a religion is bound to be exclusionary of other faiths, and thus might be more prone to conflict with Arab neighbors than a cosmopolitan, secular state on the model of the USA, open to all Jews but also to others. It seems to me that the most religious aspects of Israel have caused the most problems (e.g., the Jewish zealots who base their beliefs on the Bible and thus think the Palestinians deserve no land rights in Israel).
In like manner, Judis also leaves some other concepts hanging. He states that the early Zionists thought that the Arabs would not be overly upset at their loss of territory in Palestine since they were "fungible", i.e., could live anywhere in the vast surrounding Arab lands. Indeed, if modern-day Israel is about the size of New Jersey, moving from there to another country would be like moving from New Jersey to New York, or Pennsylvania, or Delaware or any other neighboring state with the same or similar climate, land, language, culture, customs, religion, etc. Yet, Judis does not examine the validity pro or con of this Zionist attitude at all and how it comported with the attitudes of the local Arabs. He just states it and moves on. It seems to me to be a crucial omission.
The title of the book also promises to focus on Truman's actions and how they shaped the future of Israel. But Truman only comes into the story about two-thirds through the book, and there is no overall assessment of how his vacillating attitudes towards the Jewish state affected its future other
than to say that succeeding US presidents were also vacillating.
So, overall, a good and highly informative book, but not really one with great insights and a little frustrating in the end.
In like manner, Judis also leaves some other concepts hanging. He states that the early Zionists thought that the Arabs would not be overly upset at their loss of territory in Palestine since they were "fungible", i.e., could live anywhere in the vast surrounding Arab lands. Indeed, if modern-day Israel is about the size of New Jersey, moving from there to another country would be like moving from New Jersey to New York, or Pennsylvania, or Delaware or any other neighboring state with the same or similar climate, land, language, culture, customs, religion, etc. Yet, Judis does not examine the validity pro or con of this Zionist attitude at all and how it comported with the attitudes of the local Arabs. He just states it and moves on. It seems to me to be a crucial omission.
The title of the book also promises to focus on Truman's actions and how they shaped the future of Israel. But Truman only comes into the story about two-thirds through the book, and there is no overall assessment of how his vacillating attitudes towards the Jewish state affected its future other
than to say that succeeding US presidents were also vacillating.
So, overall, a good and highly informative book, but not really one with great insights and a little frustrating in the end.
August 11, 2025
Well-researched, this book investigates the history of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism, with a large focus on the State Department of Harry S. Truman during the crucial years of Israel's formation between 1947 and 1949. It uses secondary sources from both Israeli and Palestinian perspectives, and is balanced and open-minded towards the Palestinian side of this conflict, dispelling Zionist myths while explaining the context of both nationalisms.
December 13, 2020
To me it depends on the writer as to whose side you take in this conflict, if any. Unfortunately, money and power are the main ingredients to get what you want in the world. Most leaders lie and compromise their values to get power or money, or both. It is shameful and I feel so helpless at times that nothing is sacred. I do believe everyone gets their due in the long run.
July 4, 2021
Amazing book. Gives excellent insight into the modern history of Jews in Palestine from the 1880's to the end of the 1948 war with a brief summary of USA policy on Israel/Palestine.
Really shows you the complexity of the situation.
Really shows you the complexity of the situation.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
July 20, 2014
An essential read--the fascinating history of the tensions over what Israel would be. A Jewish spiritual center, like the Vatican? A federation of Arab and Jewish states? Or the nation-state it became? All three had strong and serious proponents, Truman supporting the Federation option because he feared theocracy. Whether his fears were borne out is left for the reader to decide, but this book is essential history for anyone interested in how the current Middle East came to pass. Of especial interest are the sections on how inter-Arab dissension led to repeated losses of the chance for a strong Arab state-the Grand Mufti and his family were opposed by other prominent Arab families; the Jordanians wanted to simply take over Arab Palestine for themselves...recommended.
April 6, 2016
Very insightful, but I have to admit that the author seems a bit biased towards the Palestinian cause. One thing we must all not forget is that all residents, Jew & Arab alike, were Palestinians at one time as that was the name given by the British during their mandate. Arabs just chose to keep it after Israel's independence. It's also obvious the British could have done a much better job of managing the country during the mandate.
June 11, 2015
A wonderfully informative and well-written book. Anyone interested in recent American diplomatic history and/or the Arab-Israeli conflict should read this book. John Judis has done an exhaustive amount of research, and his careful, well-reasoned argument is a welcome respite from the emotional harangues we too often hear when this subject is discussed. Cannot recommend this highly enough.
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October 30, 2013PW
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