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The Rise and Fall of the British Army, 1975–2025
A new study of a critical period in the history of the British Army .
The last half century has seen society, technology, the character of conflict and the British Army itself all change greatly. From a low point in the 1970s, the Army's war fighting capability increased in the 1980s in the face of a prospective war with the Soviet Union. This capability was then tested on operations from Kuwait in 1991 through to Afghanistan in 2001 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
There followed two decades of descent from this high plateau of military achievement. Mistakes made in Iraq and Afghanistan led to a decline in support for military deployments. Cuts to defence funding and botched equipment procurements also meant the British Army of 2021 was only half the size of that of 1970, and with much key fighting equipment either obsolete or approaching obsolescence.
Ben Barry served in the Army from 1975 to 2010, often in key staff appointments, and has worked closely with the Army in the following decade. This new study draws not only on his personal experience, but also on a very wide range of written sources complemented by interviews to provide material new to the public domain and also make new judgements that often challenge the existing narratives.
The last half century has seen society, technology, the character of conflict and the British Army itself all change greatly. From a low point in the 1970s, the Army's war fighting capability increased in the 1980s in the face of a prospective war with the Soviet Union. This capability was then tested on operations from Kuwait in 1991 through to Afghanistan in 2001 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
There followed two decades of descent from this high plateau of military achievement. Mistakes made in Iraq and Afghanistan led to a decline in support for military deployments. Cuts to defence funding and botched equipment procurements also meant the British Army of 2021 was only half the size of that of 1970, and with much key fighting equipment either obsolete or approaching obsolescence.
Ben Barry served in the Army from 1975 to 2010, often in key staff appointments, and has worked closely with the Army in the following decade. This new study draws not only on his personal experience, but also on a very wide range of written sources complemented by interviews to provide material new to the public domain and also make new judgements that often challenge the existing narratives.
496 pages, Hardcover
Published November 18, 2025
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
July 14, 2026
I thought this book was OK. It provides a decent account of the life and times of the British Army between the specified years, but it leaves a lot unsaid with some pitfalls along the way.
Let's get one big problem out of the way first: this book was not properly edited. This takes the form of sentences repeating already discussed subjects, incorrect grammar, some descriptions of military items being confused for others, and in some cases misspelled words. It is regrettable that a book which appears to have undergone a lot of research should feel so rushed.
Aside from that, I do not think the book's account of Britain's ground operations were that bad. I found the chapters on Cold War strategy and the readiness of the British Army of the Rhine to be interesting as they showed how Britain intended on actually blunting a potential Warsaw Pact offensive before any bombs were dropped. This included studying earlier conflicts such as the Second World War for potential changes in military doctrine as well as making use of new technologies (i.e. modern antitank weapons) or the lack thereof (i.e. Infantry Fighting Vehicles in the 70s/early 80s). A chapter was dedicated to the army's operations in Northern Ireland, which the author describes as shaky at first yet improving later on (I will let someone else be the judge of that, though I guess the army was technically successful). Northern Ireland was supposedly beneficial for the army by providing units throughout the decades a place where they could practice cohesion and learn to handle stressful environments in a low-intensity conflict but where one could still potentially face the threat of being shot or bombed. The author may have been biased in this area, but he depicts the British army being more willing to take decisive action than other forces as part of peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and the like.
While I think this book does a good job in describing how the British Army rose in capability only to drastically fall from grace, it only scratches the surface of why exactly this is so. Being a national institution of some pride and significance compared to the militaries of some other countries, its health has been indicative of the status of the country itself, and has only become more ailing as time marches on.
An example of one of these unsaid national problems I have already mentioned in an update, the chronic financial woes of the country. State spending in Britain is approaching 50% of the GDP and yet the government has no money to spend on increasing military capacity either through recruitment, training or procurement. Plans to reform the military and change its footing according to the operational reality of current geopolitics and its own tactical readiness keeps getting pushed back farther while the global situation deteriorates. This book has informed me that in recent years there has been reports of military families failing to receive the medical care owed to them despite the government spending incredible amounts of money on the National Health Service (who integrated the military hospital system in the 1990s). How can this be so? Because Britain has no cash. It is broke and in debt and has no other means of increasing revenue in ways that will not lead to disastrous consequences in the future. So the government's job has been to shuffle around a dwindling pool of resources to maintain a state of normalcy for the past decade or two, with the military typically receiving the shaft for it. Tony Blair's decision to join the war in Iraq and Afghanistan partly hid the fact that the British military was coasting off a high point of military readiness and excess resources after the end of the Cold War, with the result being that the military had an ever-decreasing stock to draw from for the actual occupation of said countries (because once again, Britain had no money). In the current day, Britain would have to send nearly everything to support one brigade in the event of an actual war somewhere else in the world, leaving the homeland dangerously unprotected (and given the current political situation I would not find it unlikely that someone would take advantage of that).
Another example: Britain has no industry. Britain is phasing out its Warrior infantry fighting vehicles and not replacing them with any other IFV, instead choosing to rely on Boxer armoured vehicles. No other military both active or inactive is choosing to do anything similar. Why can't Britain make new IFVs and instead chooses to rely on lighter armed and armoured vehicles that are not even from Britain as they are produced by Rheinmetall? Because Britain no longer has the industry to produce things for itself. This coincides with the problem of having no cash because without things to produce, Britain has nothing to sell, and so cannot gain the money to fund the military and build its own weapons. It is frustrating because the people serving in the military are not all that bad, many are very skilled and competent, and yet they fall prey to the many characteristics of Britain's national decline.
So what can actually be done to fix Britain's Army? The author of this book lists several positive actions the army can take, but it cannot do anything itself to rectify some of the national problems affecting it. What would actually be needed is a rapid change in the country's political leadership, the priorities and focus of the people and their representatives, and the direction of industry and economic thinking. But with the current people in charge or soon to be in charge, that seems unlikely to happen.
Let's get one big problem out of the way first: this book was not properly edited. This takes the form of sentences repeating already discussed subjects, incorrect grammar, some descriptions of military items being confused for others, and in some cases misspelled words. It is regrettable that a book which appears to have undergone a lot of research should feel so rushed.
Aside from that, I do not think the book's account of Britain's ground operations were that bad. I found the chapters on Cold War strategy and the readiness of the British Army of the Rhine to be interesting as they showed how Britain intended on actually blunting a potential Warsaw Pact offensive before any bombs were dropped. This included studying earlier conflicts such as the Second World War for potential changes in military doctrine as well as making use of new technologies (i.e. modern antitank weapons) or the lack thereof (i.e. Infantry Fighting Vehicles in the 70s/early 80s). A chapter was dedicated to the army's operations in Northern Ireland, which the author describes as shaky at first yet improving later on (I will let someone else be the judge of that, though I guess the army was technically successful). Northern Ireland was supposedly beneficial for the army by providing units throughout the decades a place where they could practice cohesion and learn to handle stressful environments in a low-intensity conflict but where one could still potentially face the threat of being shot or bombed. The author may have been biased in this area, but he depicts the British army being more willing to take decisive action than other forces as part of peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and the like.
While I think this book does a good job in describing how the British Army rose in capability only to drastically fall from grace, it only scratches the surface of why exactly this is so. Being a national institution of some pride and significance compared to the militaries of some other countries, its health has been indicative of the status of the country itself, and has only become more ailing as time marches on.
An example of one of these unsaid national problems I have already mentioned in an update, the chronic financial woes of the country. State spending in Britain is approaching 50% of the GDP and yet the government has no money to spend on increasing military capacity either through recruitment, training or procurement. Plans to reform the military and change its footing according to the operational reality of current geopolitics and its own tactical readiness keeps getting pushed back farther while the global situation deteriorates. This book has informed me that in recent years there has been reports of military families failing to receive the medical care owed to them despite the government spending incredible amounts of money on the National Health Service (who integrated the military hospital system in the 1990s). How can this be so? Because Britain has no cash. It is broke and in debt and has no other means of increasing revenue in ways that will not lead to disastrous consequences in the future. So the government's job has been to shuffle around a dwindling pool of resources to maintain a state of normalcy for the past decade or two, with the military typically receiving the shaft for it. Tony Blair's decision to join the war in Iraq and Afghanistan partly hid the fact that the British military was coasting off a high point of military readiness and excess resources after the end of the Cold War, with the result being that the military had an ever-decreasing stock to draw from for the actual occupation of said countries (because once again, Britain had no money). In the current day, Britain would have to send nearly everything to support one brigade in the event of an actual war somewhere else in the world, leaving the homeland dangerously unprotected (and given the current political situation I would not find it unlikely that someone would take advantage of that).
Another example: Britain has no industry. Britain is phasing out its Warrior infantry fighting vehicles and not replacing them with any other IFV, instead choosing to rely on Boxer armoured vehicles. No other military both active or inactive is choosing to do anything similar. Why can't Britain make new IFVs and instead chooses to rely on lighter armed and armoured vehicles that are not even from Britain as they are produced by Rheinmetall? Because Britain no longer has the industry to produce things for itself. This coincides with the problem of having no cash because without things to produce, Britain has nothing to sell, and so cannot gain the money to fund the military and build its own weapons. It is frustrating because the people serving in the military are not all that bad, many are very skilled and competent, and yet they fall prey to the many characteristics of Britain's national decline.
So what can actually be done to fix Britain's Army? The author of this book lists several positive actions the army can take, but it cannot do anything itself to rectify some of the national problems affecting it. What would actually be needed is a rapid change in the country's political leadership, the priorities and focus of the people and their representatives, and the direction of industry and economic thinking. But with the current people in charge or soon to be in charge, that seems unlikely to happen.
April 21, 2026
An exceptionally detailed and sobering assessment of the British armies modern history. The operations, technologies, tactics and defense reviews are all catelogued and analysed in extensive and interesting detail. An excellent read.
July 2, 2026
An interesting read with a well organized and cogent argument. Marred by multiple copy editing errors: repeated paragraphs, poor punctuation, and repeated sentences. In my opinion, Osprey publishing is not adequately supporting this author’s effort.
July 17, 2026
Fundamentally important to understanding the state of the Army today and how we got here.
July 13, 2026
I really wanted to like this book.
What was promised was an in depth study of the British Army that would look into what had happened and why over the last 50 years, exploring historical exercises like battles as if they had actually happened to assess the performance of the army.
This is not what I received.
Firstly, the author was failed by Osprey. This book was clearly not proofread by the publisher. Names are misspelt literally on the same line, sentences are formatted in ways that make them a struggle to read, paragraphs are duplicated, equipment is either described wrong/not what it is. The sentence structure makes this book a chore to read, and frankly needed another draft. Osprey clearly didn’t support the author enough.
Secondly, the book is filled with detail but never touches background. It covers the what but never the why. The thinking behind decisions is unusually not covered. This book is great at telling you all the little details but never the rationale behind them, which I feel is the biggest weakness of this book. There is little to no analysis of why things happened and the results of them, which leads to the book feeling very surface level. The author has confused amount of information with depth.
Third, large parts of the book are author experiences. The author claims to be “only occasionally drawing on personal perspectives” but in truth you’ll struggle to go a few pages without being told something from his own eyes. This may be an attempt to give a ground view to events, but it makes the book feel like an autobiography - something the author says they want to avoid. It feels more like the book is following the authors career, which is stated is not the point of the book.
The author also claims to be identifying failures within the army, but the only negative criticism is saved for ministers and the treasury. The book rarely touches on failures of military leadership, and the closer to the present the book gets the less and less you’ll hear about the thinking at the top of the army. Again, it talks about what the effects of decisions are but never why they were taken beyond “the treasury cut funding”. Why were these cuts made instead of others? What was the thinking behind the trade offs made? Never explained. It comes across as very apologist of the army, and in doing so barely talks about the decision making at the top.
I would not recommend this book. It is very surface level, frustrating to read (I blame Osprey for that, not the author) and lacking in the sort of information that it promises to give, added to the (relatively) high price.
What was promised was an in depth study of the British Army that would look into what had happened and why over the last 50 years, exploring historical exercises like battles as if they had actually happened to assess the performance of the army.
This is not what I received.
Firstly, the author was failed by Osprey. This book was clearly not proofread by the publisher. Names are misspelt literally on the same line, sentences are formatted in ways that make them a struggle to read, paragraphs are duplicated, equipment is either described wrong/not what it is. The sentence structure makes this book a chore to read, and frankly needed another draft. Osprey clearly didn’t support the author enough.
Secondly, the book is filled with detail but never touches background. It covers the what but never the why. The thinking behind decisions is unusually not covered. This book is great at telling you all the little details but never the rationale behind them, which I feel is the biggest weakness of this book. There is little to no analysis of why things happened and the results of them, which leads to the book feeling very surface level. The author has confused amount of information with depth.
Third, large parts of the book are author experiences. The author claims to be “only occasionally drawing on personal perspectives” but in truth you’ll struggle to go a few pages without being told something from his own eyes. This may be an attempt to give a ground view to events, but it makes the book feel like an autobiography - something the author says they want to avoid. It feels more like the book is following the authors career, which is stated is not the point of the book.
The author also claims to be identifying failures within the army, but the only negative criticism is saved for ministers and the treasury. The book rarely touches on failures of military leadership, and the closer to the present the book gets the less and less you’ll hear about the thinking at the top of the army. Again, it talks about what the effects of decisions are but never why they were taken beyond “the treasury cut funding”. Why were these cuts made instead of others? What was the thinking behind the trade offs made? Never explained. It comes across as very apologist of the army, and in doing so barely talks about the decision making at the top.
I would not recommend this book. It is very surface level, frustrating to read (I blame Osprey for that, not the author) and lacking in the sort of information that it promises to give, added to the (relatively) high price.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews