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Osprey Air Campaign #56
New Guinea 1942–43: Halting the last Japanese advance
Lavishly illustrated, this book studies the role of airpower in the New Guinea battles of 1942–43, as the Allies checked and halted Japan's last significant offensives.
Mark Stille and John Rogers offer a new history of a previously neglected part of the South Pacific air war - the battles over New Guinea and the waters around it. The first of two books on the subject, drawing on Japanese, American and Australian sources, it details operations from March 1942 until May 1943, which saw the Allies stop the last Japanese efforts to expand their faltering empire.
Allied air operations focused on denying the Japanese the use of the sea to send reinforcements to New Guinea, during the battles for Buna and Gona, the unsuccessful and little-known Japanese invasion at Milne Bay, and the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in which a major Japanese effort to move troops to New Guinea was crushed by air power. While the Japanese had over-extended and lost operational focus, the Allies were successful in interdicting sea movement of Japanese forces to New Guinea. However, immature tactics meant air power was largely ineffective supporting their ground campaign.
Packed with photos, superb original battlescenes, 3D diagrams and maps, this book explains the roles of Japanese and Allied air power in the crucial battle of New Guinea.
Mark Stille and John Rogers offer a new history of a previously neglected part of the South Pacific air war - the battles over New Guinea and the waters around it. The first of two books on the subject, drawing on Japanese, American and Australian sources, it details operations from March 1942 until May 1943, which saw the Allies stop the last Japanese efforts to expand their faltering empire.
Allied air operations focused on denying the Japanese the use of the sea to send reinforcements to New Guinea, during the battles for Buna and Gona, the unsuccessful and little-known Japanese invasion at Milne Bay, and the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in which a major Japanese effort to move troops to New Guinea was crushed by air power. While the Japanese had over-extended and lost operational focus, the Allies were successful in interdicting sea movement of Japanese forces to New Guinea. However, immature tactics meant air power was largely ineffective supporting their ground campaign.
Packed with photos, superb original battlescenes, 3D diagrams and maps, this book explains the roles of Japanese and Allied air power in the crucial battle of New Guinea.
- GenresWorld War II
96 pages, Paperback
First published September 25, 2025
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September 21, 2025
Many historians highlight turning points that determine how campaigns are won and lost. But some, if not most, campaigns do not fit that model. They are attritional, with their outcomes dependent on resource allocation and a myriad of small victories and setbacks. The air campaign over New Guinea in 1942 seems to fit the latter model. Mark Stille and John Rogers narrate the events of that campaign and analyse its conduct and the reasons for Allied success and Japanese failure.
In early 1942, Japan still has imperial conquest on its mind. Control of Papua New Guinea formed an important part of the imperial strategy. The Allies needed New Guinea to defend Australia. For both of them, distance and environment presented tactical headaches. Stille surveys the respective capabilities of both sides. For the Japanese, both the navy and army air forces would be involved in the fighting. Their main warplane was the famous, or infamous, Zero. The Allies opened with an aerial disadvantage. The Australians in particular had very little to play with, and the US prioritized Europe, reducing their effectiveness in the Pacific. Stille notes that both would improve through 1942. The campaign objectives come next, with a deeper dive into the strategies of both sides. Then we are into the narrative of the campaign.
Even while still consolidating its gains, Japan moved aggressively to reduce Port Moresby in January 1942. The opening engagements favoured the Japanese, with the Zeros dominating the skies. Spurious raiding from both sides turned into a battle of attrition from April. That did not favour the Japanese with more US forces coming on tap. Along the way, Stille connects his narrative to the broader strategic situation; for example, he considers the effects of the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese invasion of Buna, and the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. Ultimately, the Allied superiority in logistics and tactical innovations turned the tide against the Japanese. Stille concludes that the Japanese contributed to their own demise, so much so that their defeat almost appeared inevitable.
New Guinea 1942-43 is an action-packed and informative introduction to the air war in that part of the Pacific theatre during a crucial phase in the war. Stille and Rogers clearly know their stuff, and their text is accompanied by many illuminating maps, photographs, and illustrations. My only criticism is that that the text needed a final edit: the alternative plan of reducing the font to fit all the text into the format did not help this reviewer’s aging eyes. Nevertheless, anyone interested in aerial warfare and the Pacific theatre will undoubtedly enjoy this book.
In early 1942, Japan still has imperial conquest on its mind. Control of Papua New Guinea formed an important part of the imperial strategy. The Allies needed New Guinea to defend Australia. For both of them, distance and environment presented tactical headaches. Stille surveys the respective capabilities of both sides. For the Japanese, both the navy and army air forces would be involved in the fighting. Their main warplane was the famous, or infamous, Zero. The Allies opened with an aerial disadvantage. The Australians in particular had very little to play with, and the US prioritized Europe, reducing their effectiveness in the Pacific. Stille notes that both would improve through 1942. The campaign objectives come next, with a deeper dive into the strategies of both sides. Then we are into the narrative of the campaign.
Even while still consolidating its gains, Japan moved aggressively to reduce Port Moresby in January 1942. The opening engagements favoured the Japanese, with the Zeros dominating the skies. Spurious raiding from both sides turned into a battle of attrition from April. That did not favour the Japanese with more US forces coming on tap. Along the way, Stille connects his narrative to the broader strategic situation; for example, he considers the effects of the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese invasion of Buna, and the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. Ultimately, the Allied superiority in logistics and tactical innovations turned the tide against the Japanese. Stille concludes that the Japanese contributed to their own demise, so much so that their defeat almost appeared inevitable.
New Guinea 1942-43 is an action-packed and informative introduction to the air war in that part of the Pacific theatre during a crucial phase in the war. Stille and Rogers clearly know their stuff, and their text is accompanied by many illuminating maps, photographs, and illustrations. My only criticism is that that the text needed a final edit: the alternative plan of reducing the font to fit all the text into the format did not help this reviewer’s aging eyes. Nevertheless, anyone interested in aerial warfare and the Pacific theatre will undoubtedly enjoy this book.
Displaying 1 of 1 review