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The Far Reaches: Phenomenology, Ethics, and Social Renewal in Central Europe
When future historians chronicle the twentieth century, they will see phenomenology as one of the preeminent social and ethical philosophies of its age. The phenomenological movement not only produced systematic reflection on common moral concerns such as distinguishing right from wrong and explaining the status of values; it also called on philosophy to renew European societies facing crisis, an aim that inspired thinkers in interwar Europe as well as later communist bloc dissidents. Despite this legacy, phenomenology continues to be largely discounted as esoteric and solipsistic, the last gasp of a Cartesian dream to base knowledge on the isolated rational mind. Intellectual histories tend to cite Husserl's epistemological influence on philosophies like existentialism and deconstruction without considering his social or ethical imprint. And while a few recent scholars have begun to note phenomenology's wider ethical resonance, especially in French social thought, its image as stubbornly academic continues to hold sway. The Far Reaches challenges that image by tracing the first history of phenomenological ethics and social thought in Central Europe, from its founders Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl through its reception in East Central Europe by dissident thinkers such as Jan Patočka, Karol Wojtyła (Pope John Paul II), and Václav Havel.
- GenresPhilosophy
359 pages, Hardcover
First published July 30, 2014
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August 2, 2026
In this interesting book, Gubser argues against the popular view that phenomenology has been a narrowly epistemological or theoretical philosophical movement, and thus apolitical or a-ethical; on the contrary, he demonstrates not only that social concerns were developed within phenomenology, but that these were built into it from the beginning, enabling it to shape and drive various dissident movements in the 20th century.
To do this, he discusses Brentano's and Husserl's lofty ethico-political pronouncements, usually neglected by scholars, showing how phenomenology, as descriptive psychology, could provide an intuitive basis for absolute values and rationalism, which was then made central to Scheler's project. These three figures provide the basis for subsequent phenomenologists, whom the rest of the book documents: Reinach, Pfänder, Ingarden, Stein, Hildebrand, Kolnai, Masaryk, Patočka, Havel, Wojtyła (Pope John Paul II), Tischner, and several other minor figures.
A few key motifs recur throughout phenomenological literature, which then determines the rhetoric. The three main themes Gubser identifies are (1) value absolutism (2) communal solidarity and (3) personalism. A fourth that could be added is the valorization of and commitment to truth/reason (albeit a revised notion of reason), which animates (1) especially. Put together, these "planks" could be leveraged in several ways in 20th century Europe: To critique scientism, which ran the danger of stripping lived experience of its significance; to advocate new forms of intersubjectivity that avoided the extremes of individualism and collectivism; to defend the value and rights of individuals, whose dignity was transcendent; to combat the forces of relativism, skepticism, and nihilism, which threatened to do away with all values, reinforcing a common humanity; and to resist totalitarian states, whether Nazi, Communist, or neoliberal, which degraded humans, undermined truth, and replaced lived experience with abstract, technocratic bureaucracies. Charter 77, in particular, embodied all of these strains, and contributed to the Czech Republic's liberation.
The only real flaw with phenomenology's social enterprise, in Gubser's estimate, is its tendency toward "democratic backsliding," so to speak: Despite its pluralist, democratic, open premises, phenomenology more often than not arrives at hierarchical, authoritarian, closed conclusions. This derives from its combination of essentialism, absolutism, and rationalism. Basically, from its very founding, in Brentano's and Husserl's writings, phenomenology had been quite Platonic: The philosopher-king is rebranded as the philosopher-visionary—for Brentano, the ugly-sounding psychognost, and for Husserl, the philosoher-functionary. Gubser notes how a couple phenomenologists—namely, Heidegger, Hildebrand, and perhaps Sartre—ended up supporting authoritarian regimes; but the fact of the matter is, most supported liberal or progressive governments, even if in writing they suggested or preferred more aristocratic arrangements. Therefore, it's not so simple to say that phenomenology has an internal orientation toward authoritarianism. It's very ambiguous, as can be seen in the fascinating relationship between it and religious faith, too. In other words, from the fact that someone is a phenomenologist, one cannot deduce their politics; nonetheless, it involves various socio-ethical commitments, which can go either way. It's also important, Gubser stresses, not to assume the contrary—that phenomenology is liberal, since in many cases phenomenologists hoped for something post-liberal.
There is, however, one error, in the introduction, that I'm surprised got past the editor(s): Gubser, discussing constitutional analysis, says that "consciousness (noema) shaped, or constituted, the perception and meaning of its intended objects (noemata). Reality, he [Husserl] insisted, had both subjective and objective dimensions" (16). He then "clarifies" this in a footnote: "To be clear, the noema and noemata were both aspects of subjective experience. The noema designated the subjective act of perception, noemata the object as perceived by the subject" (233n24). In fact, a conscious, subjective act is a noesis, the plural being noeses. This is a rather minor error, and I'm not sure if he did not know this or, knowing it, he simply made a typo, which the editor(s) failed to catch. In the grand scheme of things, it's negligible, but you'd think that in a specialized book on phenomenology something like this would be recognized and corrected.
Overall, a good, interesting book, although I stopped taking notes during the second half.
To do this, he discusses Brentano's and Husserl's lofty ethico-political pronouncements, usually neglected by scholars, showing how phenomenology, as descriptive psychology, could provide an intuitive basis for absolute values and rationalism, which was then made central to Scheler's project. These three figures provide the basis for subsequent phenomenologists, whom the rest of the book documents: Reinach, Pfänder, Ingarden, Stein, Hildebrand, Kolnai, Masaryk, Patočka, Havel, Wojtyła (Pope John Paul II), Tischner, and several other minor figures.
A few key motifs recur throughout phenomenological literature, which then determines the rhetoric. The three main themes Gubser identifies are (1) value absolutism (2) communal solidarity and (3) personalism. A fourth that could be added is the valorization of and commitment to truth/reason (albeit a revised notion of reason), which animates (1) especially. Put together, these "planks" could be leveraged in several ways in 20th century Europe: To critique scientism, which ran the danger of stripping lived experience of its significance; to advocate new forms of intersubjectivity that avoided the extremes of individualism and collectivism; to defend the value and rights of individuals, whose dignity was transcendent; to combat the forces of relativism, skepticism, and nihilism, which threatened to do away with all values, reinforcing a common humanity; and to resist totalitarian states, whether Nazi, Communist, or neoliberal, which degraded humans, undermined truth, and replaced lived experience with abstract, technocratic bureaucracies. Charter 77, in particular, embodied all of these strains, and contributed to the Czech Republic's liberation.
The only real flaw with phenomenology's social enterprise, in Gubser's estimate, is its tendency toward "democratic backsliding," so to speak: Despite its pluralist, democratic, open premises, phenomenology more often than not arrives at hierarchical, authoritarian, closed conclusions. This derives from its combination of essentialism, absolutism, and rationalism. Basically, from its very founding, in Brentano's and Husserl's writings, phenomenology had been quite Platonic: The philosopher-king is rebranded as the philosopher-visionary—for Brentano, the ugly-sounding psychognost, and for Husserl, the philosoher-functionary. Gubser notes how a couple phenomenologists—namely, Heidegger, Hildebrand, and perhaps Sartre—ended up supporting authoritarian regimes; but the fact of the matter is, most supported liberal or progressive governments, even if in writing they suggested or preferred more aristocratic arrangements. Therefore, it's not so simple to say that phenomenology has an internal orientation toward authoritarianism. It's very ambiguous, as can be seen in the fascinating relationship between it and religious faith, too. In other words, from the fact that someone is a phenomenologist, one cannot deduce their politics; nonetheless, it involves various socio-ethical commitments, which can go either way. It's also important, Gubser stresses, not to assume the contrary—that phenomenology is liberal, since in many cases phenomenologists hoped for something post-liberal.
There is, however, one error, in the introduction, that I'm surprised got past the editor(s): Gubser, discussing constitutional analysis, says that "consciousness (noema) shaped, or constituted, the perception and meaning of its intended objects (noemata). Reality, he [Husserl] insisted, had both subjective and objective dimensions" (16). He then "clarifies" this in a footnote: "To be clear, the noema and noemata were both aspects of subjective experience. The noema designated the subjective act of perception, noemata the object as perceived by the subject" (233n24). In fact, a conscious, subjective act is a noesis, the plural being noeses. This is a rather minor error, and I'm not sure if he did not know this or, knowing it, he simply made a typo, which the editor(s) failed to catch. In the grand scheme of things, it's negligible, but you'd think that in a specialized book on phenomenology something like this would be recognized and corrected.
Overall, a good, interesting book, although I stopped taking notes during the second half.
Displaying 1 of 1 review