A really worthwhile and uncommon work. I have a lot of scattered thoughts on this but here's a blurb I scribbled down quickly after finishing:
Smith takes up the task initiated in Melville’s poem “The Portent” of theorizing John Brown not as a religious fanatic nor a freedom fighter but as weird. John Brown is a touchstone that scrambles the usual logic of both law and ethics— the later makes the basis of judgment universalizable moral obligations (deontology) or evaluative weighing of consequences that assumes an immanent frame of cause and effect. The former, which seems to be more of the emphasis of the book, is only ever authentically granted it status by an external sovereignty.
For Smith, Brown is exceptional in both cases. His actions cannot be justified by the consequences/principles (murder can never be made right, even if for redemptive means) and the law of the day permitted the practices Brown murdered against. Smith borrows heavily from Benjamin, and primary his notion of ‘divine violence,’ most clearly defined on pg. 72: ‘Divine violence is the way justice manifests itself in this world.’ DV is manifest as a negative presence that is law-destroying. It breaks the grip of the present order to open space for politics (where, for Schmitt, DV performs a sacred violence in the state of exception which grounds or renews a social order.) This also opens up practical reasoning to better and more complete deliberation.
Smith does a great job directly modeling what this kind of deliberation looks like in thinking through the politics of pardon. John Brown, in the end, is a ‘great criminal’ who, like Samson, lost himself in the rubble of his own righteous but flawed tactics. For Smith, Brown was not right for what he did, but ought to be pardoned and seen as a Robert E. Lee kind of figure. He uses Agamben to situate the space of the exception to the law in and through Benjamin and Adorno’s messianic history (and, of course, Christianity.) Even in our contemporary political hellscape we have executive perogative that makes pardon possible. He wants to see this function more integrated into our political and legal reasoning, and calls for reparations from slavery.
In the end, I found this book to be a perfect on ramp for thinking about a lot of really cool stuff. I don’t think I buy the entire vision Smith is articulating—one that I believe basically reinstates the liberal democratic state form onto itself. He’s brilliantly critical of state violence in chapter two, but the language of the critique remains positive and within the tradition of the status quo, that, for me, was founded and remains undergirded by mythic violence:
“For when an act of violence founds the authority that establishes the laws, institutions, customs, and characters that constitute a political order, that founding violence continues to radiate throughout the order.” (Pg. 136)
Is this not still true of the regime of power we continue to live under? Does expanding pardon really deal with the vestiges of the same institutions that John Brown resisted? Should John Brown really still be marked as a criminal, if even a great one?