A spellbinding narrative history of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and its devastating consequences by the Sunday Times bestselling author of Lawrence in Arabia.
'The most compelling account yet of the revolution in Iran... Outstanding' Eugene Rogan, author of The Fall of the Ottomans
‘A must-read for anyone looking to understand the origins of the Middle East’s most dangerous regime’ Joby Warrick, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of Black Flags
'Thrilling... the gold standard account of the Shah’s fall... An epic and heart-breaking tragedy' Azadeh Moaveni, author of Guest House for Young Widows
Before the revolution, the Shah of Iran seemed invincible. The world watched in awe as he commanded a huge army and oversaw an economy awash with billions of dollars of oil revenues. The regime’s secret police had crushed communist opposition and the Shah appeared to have bought off the conservative Muslim clergy inside the country. On the international stage, Iran had become an invaluable ally to the West during the Cold War.
But village streets spoke of a different country – people derided the Shah as an American lackey and blamed him for economic inequality, for spending recklessly on lavish parties and for ignoring the Muslim majority. When a volcanic religious revolution erupted, led by a fiery cleric named Ayatollah Khomeini, the Shah was forced off the throne and into exile. How did it all go so wrong?
Brilliantly brought to life by the Sunday Times bestselling author Scott Anderson, this gripping behind-the-scenes narrative reveals how the Iranian Revolution was as world-shattering an event as the French and Russian revolutions, and how its repercussions are still felt around the world today. In the Middle East, in India, in Southeast Asia, and now in Europe and the United States, the hatred of economically-marginalized, religiously-fervent masses for a wealthy secular elite has led to violence and upheaval – and Iran was the template.
Praise for King of ‘A masterfully told account…A must-read’ Steve Coll, Pulitzer Prize winning author of Ghost Wars
‘Delivers remarkable new insights into one of history’s least understood upheavals’ Kim Ghattas, author of Black Wave
'Thrilling and fully authoritative' Azadeh Moaveni, award-winning author of Lipstick Jihad and Guest House for Young Widows
'Important and riveting' Sebastian Junger, bestselling author of In My Time of Dying and Tribe
Scott Anderson is a veteran war correspondent who has reported from Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, Northern Ireland, Chechnya, Sudan, Bosnia, El Salvador, and many other strife-torn countries. He is a contributing writer for The New York Times Magazine, and his work has also appeared in Vanity Fair, Esquire, Harper's and Outside.
I'm going to regret this review, but here goes: I am furious at this book and can’t go on reading it. It’s a DNF after reading approximately 200 pages. This book may be interesting for a non-Iranian, but for me who was born and raised in Iran and knows the events and their 'when and why and who and where', this book was not ‘it’!
First off, when writing about a historical event, do some research about the country, her history, culture, customs and psychology of the people of the country you're writing about.
For example, you should know that in Iran we have had arbitrary rule for ages. Meaning, from the start, in Persia there had been kings and those kings had been revered and obeyed like gods. The Shah wasn’t even comparable to your Carter. You are comparing a president with a king? Really? He was the king with certain duties and very specific understanding of how to behave as a king, inheriting what he had been taught. Meaning, when someone was in his presence, that someone should be standing until invited to be seated. The same goes for every royal country. There are etiquettes to be observed. I’m sure you couldn’t just barge in the Oval Office and high-five Trump and sit your ass down without leave? So, the criticisms directed at Shah about his behavior is uncalled for. By the way, just so you know, Shah was an extremely introvert person, hence his not mingling. Jesus Christ!
Secondly, that’s Shahbanu Farah to you, not just Farah, like you’re talking about a pet puppy. And, you are still at it, criticizing her for caring for her country?? She does charity work and your tone implies that she’s doing it for show? Shah crowns her as Queen, not because of his arrogance, but because he wants her to be an example for the downtrodden women of Iran, to show them that 'yes, they can too! Iran had never seen a woman become a queen until then. The wives of the kings used to be confined in the harems. But I digress...
Thirdly, don’t rely on some minister’s diary entries. You are basing your opinion of Shah and what went on behind closed doors using a third person’s perspective who for all we know wrote a bunch of lies in his diary to suit his narrative. And at the same time you are bashing the Queen’s own memoir, telling us without shame that she lied or exaggerated?
Right at the beginning you ask us ‘why didn’t the US support Shah and prevent his downfall. Well if you don’t know why, then you have no business writing a 700 page book. But I will tell you why your country and your revered Carter didn’t back Shah. It was because Shah didn’t want to give free oil and concessions to other countries anymore. Shah was striving to become independent. That's why. He had to go, so another puppet regime would do whatever your country demanded. And Shah went, because if he stayed, there would have been bloodshed and he didn’t want that. You portray Shah as some kind of a ninny who didn’t know shit. Shah knew shit, the only thing he did wrong was trusting the wrong people. He was a dreamer, a patriot and an idealist and those traits cost him his country.
An excerpt to show what kind of a history book this is. Notice the “In all likelihood… probably…just as probable…” ?
"In all likelihood, that morning’s meeting of the two men followed the same general pattern as the hundreds that had preceded it. The shah had probably been reading from one of the stacks of papers on his desk with his oversized, black-rimmed bifocals when Alam entered. It’s just as probable that he neither spoke nor looked up as his minister approached, but instead absently raised his right hand from the desk to let it hover in the air. Drawing up at the shah’s side, Alam would have executed a deep bow, then taken the proffered hand and, while kissing it, whispered a prayer for the continued health and safety of the man known as the King of Kings, Light of the Aryans, Shadow of God on Earth. This incantation complete, Alam would have then rounded the desk, careful not to show his back to the monarch while doing so, to stand on its opposite side. Because their meeting that April morning was scheduled to be brief, perhaps a mere twenty minutes, the court minister probably remained standing for the duration."
I am sorry for my rant and grammatical errors if they are any.
I was excited for King of Kings: The Iranian Revolution by Scott Anderson. Unfortunately, Iran became rather topical recently, but I was most enticed by the fact that I knew very little about the entire story.
Turns out, apparently the shah, his government, and the Carter administration had the same problem.
First things first, I have to praise Scott Anderson's work making this narrative understandable. The Iranian Revolution did not follow the same ramp up and culmination like many of the other revolutions of history. As an American, I have Lexington and Concord as the flashpoint where the shot heard round the world served as the final explosion of the tension which had built to a climax. Scholars may argue some of the finer points, but it started there.
Iran? It was more like a boiling pot of water. There were a few overflows here and there, but then a cooling period. Then a few more overflows. Then the whole thing overflowed while many government officials stood there and said, "I didn't realize the pot was boiling."
Anderson masterfully makes this all understandable. There are dozens of people vital to the story or sometimes only vital to one part of the story. The author finds a way to make each character stick in your head and present them as full individuals who often have tragic tunnel vision. Anderson has to play with the timelines a bit which is necessary but can feel almost overwhelming. Luckily, being overwhelmed helps you imagine what it was like to actually be there.
I also appreciate that Anderson is willing to call people out when necessary. He never paints any particular person as fully good or evil. These are people who are complex. However, when they make (or fail to make) a boneheaded decision, I like when the author confirms that what you just read is a head-scratcher. To put it another way, he's not interested in villainizing his characters, but a dumb move is a dumb move, and it needs to be acknowledged.
I highly recommend this one especially if you are unfamiliar with the subject.
(This book was provided as an advance reader copy by Doubleday Books.)
The Shah, whose people for millennia revered him and his role as "Light of the Aryans" and "Shadow of God on Earth", begins his day with courtiers kissing his hand and following age-old ceremonial rituals. His closest confidant, Asadollah Alam, serves as diplomat and family therapist, shuttling between quarreling royals.
Meanwhile, George Braswell, a Baptist missionary, teaches comparative religion in Tehran and somehow wanders into secret prayer sessions where cassette tapes of Ayatollah Khomeini blare revolutionary sermons in tinny audio.
By the 1970s, oil money floods the country faster than it can be spent. The Persepolis coronation celebration becomes the pinnacle of extravagance. Worldly guests dine on quail eggs stuffed with caviar beneath a glittering tent city pitched in the desert. The Shah imports 250 Mercedes sedans to ferry dignitaries across the wasteland. Foreign observers sip champagne while ignoring the early tremors of revolt.
Urban wealth sits beside rural deprivation, and state-approved mosques begin to sound suspiciously like political rallies in clerical robes. By the time strikes and demonstrations take hold, Washington is still issuing memos calling Iran "an island of stability".
The Shah appears to the poor to be dithering in gilded palaces, issuing contradictory orders. All the while, his treacherous secret police frantically "disappear" the evidence of their corruption, bribery, and other misdeeds through mass document shredding. The Americans, when not busy misreading the streets, are preoccupied with oil prices and Middle Eastern war and peace theater starring Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin.
The palace walls close in. Ministers resign, and foreign allies tire of pretending the emperor's wardrobe contains clothing. All the while, Khomeini sits in exile, protected by oblivious international governments, with the patience of a cat at a mouse hole, his cassette tapes multiplying like underground bootlegs. Inside Iran, ministers jostle for survival while the Immortals, the Shah's supposedly loyal guard, look less immortal by the hour. And then it all blows up.
By the time oil prices in the US begin to skyrocket, the Carter administration is mired in contradiction. Cyrus Vance tells reporters that America will "support any Iranian government restoring order while the reform process continues", a remark the Shah interprets as proof of Washington's wavering. Ambassador William Sullivan writes that thousands of young men rage through Tehran as soldiers stand by or flee.
Inside the White House, conflicting telegrams and mixed assurances convince the monarch that his allies have abandoned him. According to this book, historians later found that, amid the smoke and the shouting, neither the Shah nor the Americans had any true comprehension of the Iranian street.
On the night of August 19, 1978, Khomeini's terrorist arsonists, opposing Western influence, individual thinking, art, and free expression, locked the doors of the Rex Cinema in Abadan and set it ablaze while a full house watched The Deer. The fire spread so fast that fire trucks arrived to find the walls glowing red and the exits sealed. Four hundred and seventy-seven people were burned alive. Within hours, the government blamed Islamic radicals, while clerical leaders calmly declared it a secret police plot.
The confusion turned the charred theater into a national shrine. Across Iran, mourners filled the streets carrying black banners and portraits of the dead, chanting that the Shah had murdered his own people. The regime's statements contradicted one another, and the public stopped believing any of them. Anderson writes that the smell of smoke from Abadan drifted across the country and never truly lifted.
As the protests swelled into millions, the Shah grew gaunt and indecisive, whispering to his ministers that he felt abandoned by God. His speeches wavered between apology and denial, his authority dissolving faster than his health. Khomeini, still in exile near Paris, held daily press conferences from a modest house where journalists lined the street and revolutionary tapes were copied by the thousands.
When the army's loyalty began to crack, generals met in secret to discuss neutrality, and the prime minister confessed that "the government no longer governs". The Shah boarded his plane on a winter morning, waving weakly to an empty tarmac. Two weeks later, Khomeini stepped off another plane in Tehran to a crowd so vast that his car could not move through it, and the soldiers who had once fired on demonstrators now stood quietly with their rifles lowered.
The assault on the American embassy on November 4, 1979, created an ordeal that lasted 444 days. Carter's instinct was to pursue calm negotiation, signaling that the safety of the hostages outweighed retribution. Khomeini, seeing this restraint, declared, "The Americans can't do a damned thing." As months dragged on, American audiences tuned nightly to Nightline to hear the day count, while Carter's approval ratings plunged from the high 50s into political oblivion.
Operation Eagle Claw, the daring rescue attempt, ended in a desert fireball that killed eight servicemen and left the administration looking both tragic and inept. In Tehran, Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali paraded the charred remains of the Americans before cameras. When the ordeal ended, it coincided precisely with Ronald Reagan's inauguration. The hostages were lifted from Tehran as Carter watched from the sidelines. Many cursed him to his face.
The aftermath resembles a hangover with no cure: proxy wars, religious militancy exported worldwide, and decades of geopolitical bungling by every party involved. The same fools who confused class disparity with jihadist morality are still marching in Western streets, waving the Ayatollah's slogans against the very values they hold dear and the freedoms that protect them.
This is a very New York Times kind of book. It shamelessly projects smug Manhattan self-righteous values onto a millenia old noble and gallant civilization. Opinions are presented as facts. Omissions are carefully chosen. The Carter doctrine is given a far too lenient treatment. The insane Jihadi barbarism is excused, accepted and forgiven as inevitable and logical. Wealth, money and oil are the presented as the source of all evil.
Scott Anderson has written the kind of history that reads like a royal soap opera in which everyone is overdressed, overarmed, and underqualified. Hubris, delusion, betrayal, and catastrophic miscalculation converge until the order collapses.
Nevertheless, it is a crucially important period in world history for the unititiated to ponder. A cautionary tale to Western leaders who once gave refuge to Khomeini and are repeating the same mistakes with his ideological monstrous descendants.
I was drawn to read Scott Anderson's King of Kings after reading Ben Macintyre's The Siege. The 444-day American hostage crisis in Tehran was mentioned in the book as the simultaneous hostage situation and rescue efforts at the Iranian embassy in London were described by Macintyre. What in the world is going in with Iran at this point of modern history? And for me, I wondered about Iran's overall history.
Anderson does a phenomenal job in taking all of the intricate details with the players, the politics, and the actions and shapes them into an understandable and linear timeline.
America aligned itself with Iran as the country was deemed the most stable in the Middle East at the time. America traded armaments for oil. Iran had a large established army, the fifth largest in the world. Within Iran, murmurings were coming to surface of a desire to overthrow the Shah and establish a government that would end up being theocratic in nature. The United States was so obsessed with preventing the spread of Communism that the Carter administration and other government agencies and higher-ups failed to see until it was too late the dangers of a takeover by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the men he placed in charge after the Shahanshah and his family departed the country.
Anderson does extensive research and offers a deep-dive into how all of this happened. He was in Washington at the Ellipse reporting on the protests when Shah Pahlavi came to Washington, D.C. in November of 1977. He interviews those who are still with us, including the late Shah Pahlavi's wife, Farah.
Step by step analysis of how Iranian Revolution came to be: king who lost touch with his people. One bad U.S. policy after another; Nixon and Kissinger using Iran as Cold War pawn, helping it build 5th biggest army in world for its oil, Carter admin. continuing same mistakes and bungling hostage crises, led to Carter's election defeat, takeover by a fundamentalist cleric. The consequences of which we're still dealing with to this day.
As an Iranian girl, I grew up hearing one account of life under the Shah’s regime at home, while being taught a completely different one in school. Between that and the endless conspiracy theories that circulated, I’ve always wondered how the truth of that era actually unfolded. King of the Kings is a tactful, balanced, and deeply engaging account of the events, the mistakes, and the key players that shaped the revolution and led to its ultimate outcome. It also examines its aftermath, the ignorance and miscalculations that plagued the U.S. government, and how those errors helped shape key international conflicts that still echo today. The writing is exquisite, well-researched, captivating, and masterfully told. I truly could not put it down. A must-read for anyone seeking to understand not only this pivotal chapter in Iran’s history, but its lasting impact on the world.
Once you accept that Scott Anderson has chosen to cast the Iranian revolution largely as a story of American foreign policy failure, his account is completely absorbing, even thrilling at times. What surprised just about everyone at the time (even the revolutionaries) was how quickly things fell apart in Iran once the first cracks started showing. Between the speed of the revolution, the slowness of the Shah’s decision-making and the stubbornness behind American denial (e.g., not listening to the Farsi speaking diplomats who sensed how bad things were), one leaves the book with a very clear picture of the Shah’s fall.
Despite my initial statement, Anderson does manage to cover the revolution from the perspective of the Americans, the palace (even managing to extensively interview the Shah’s widow), and the revolutionaries; it’s just that his priorities (and perhaps his access) are in that order. The detail is incredible until the Shah falls, but I wanted a bit more insight into how the hardcore Islamists managed to seize the revolution from the moderates.
Overall, this is an outstanding account that makes us feel as though we are there. Thanks to Doubleday and Netgalley for providing a pre-publication egalley in exchange for an honest review.
Ultimately Scott Anderson argues a compelling thesis: the success of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was aided and abetted, if not the direct result of, hubristic and surprisingly low-information administrative cultures in both the Shah’s government and the U.S. state department. Anderson‘s laser-focus on the staff of the U.S. embassy in Tehran in the 70s, members of the Carter administration, the Shah himself, and a handful of leading figures in the revolutionary vanguard (from moderates like Ebrahim Yazdi who wanted an Islamist democracy to inveterate theocrat Ruhollah Khomeini) results in a propulsive, often cringe inducing, history.
Anderson argues his particular thesis very convincingly. However, if you are looking for a comprehensive overview of the Iranian Revolution or if you’re particularly interested in how Iranian people experienced and drove these upheavals then you will have to read elsewhere. In my opinion, this definitely shouldn’t be the only book anyone reads about Iran or its Revolution.
With all that said, I do have one more critique that is simultaneously a bit pedantic and absolutely fundamental. When discussing the contemporary significance of this book, Anderson claims that the Iranian Revolution “poses a chief complicating factor in Western efforts… to temper Israel’s devastating military offensive in Gaza” (page xvii). The term you are looking for is GENOCIDE, Mr. Anderson. To be fair, I read an ARC of this text so I hold out hope that a correction was made before publication or will be in future editions.
A highly sympathetic but not uncritical portrayal (he thinks Andrew Cooper overdoes it) anchored on interviews with former Pahlavi players in exile, including a SAVAT officer and not least the Shahbanou herself.
Anderson offers an admirably thorough and stirring history of Iran under the rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi up to the time of Pahlavi's death in 1980. While Pahlavi is the centerpiece of the book the author goes into sufficient detail about other prominent Iranians and Americans to provide a good sense of the era.
Pahlavi makes an interesting subject due to his complexities and contradictions. Thoughtful and intelligent yet indecisive and prone to decision paralysis. A staunch ally of the US but a leader in the OPEC decision to raise oil prices and jam up the US economy. A seemingly progressive human rights advocate who was accused of massive abuse. I wish there had been some background about Pahlavi's religiosity or lack of it. I don't know whether he was strictly secular, a devout worshiper or something in between. I don't think him being one thing or the other would have changed the outcome but in a story about a revolution led by a religious leader I would have liked to have known where the shah fit in. (Although it's clear to me Khomeini was content to steamroll anyone in his path regardless of anything at all.)
Overall a very good book that I'd recommend to most. One essential element to enjoy the book is a very strong interest in the subject matter. The writing is very good but some of the chapters are occasionally dense. Two things I didn't particularly like were the author's gratuitously harsh comments about the people in the book. They added nothing and made the author seem like a spiteful bully. If the comments were funny I'd have a different opinion but his characterizations just felt mean-spirited and like an attempt to put his thumb on the scale to sway reader opinions. The other annoyance was his extreme use of dashes to create parenthetical asides; maybe half of the book.
⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️ 5 Stars — A Riveting Look at a Troubled Chapter in History
King of Kings by Scott Anderson is a terrific read — gripping, enlightening, and paced so well that it never feels overwhelming. I’ve been enjoying reading about major global events that took place when I was a kid, and America’s complicated relationship with Iran and the Shah is one I’ve long wanted to understand better. I can still recall snippets of the Iran hostage crisis from my youth, but Anderson connects those hazy memories to a clear, compelling narrative that helped me finally see the bigger picture.
Just like when I read Midnight in Chernobyl, I found myself fascinated by the way history can be both distant and personal at the same time. That same feeling of “I vaguely remember this happening… but I never knew the whole story” kept coming back as I turned the pages. There’s something powerful about learning the truth behind the headlines you grew up with.
Anderson does a deep dive into the foreign policy errors of the era — but without ever burying the reader in irrelevant details. Every piece of information feels purposeful and tied to the broader consequences that still echo in our world today. It’s smart, balanced storytelling that keeps you fully engaged.
I won’t go into specifics — that’s not my style on Goodreads, and I’m not one for spoilers. But I will say this: if you’re interested in modern Middle Eastern history, U.S. diplomacy, or simply a well-crafted historical narrative, this book is absolutely worth your time. I gained new knowledge and made meaningful connections to memories from my childhood.
This book is essentially half narrative history of the Iranian Revolution and half a history of how the US was blindsided by this pivotal turning point in Middle Eastern history, with a key ally being replaced with a militantly anti-American theocracy that lasts to the present day. The US made a number of crucial mistakes: first not recognizing the massive discontent with the shah's regime among the Iranian people, then putting faith in the shah's ability to crush the uprising, then finally (and perhaps most crucially) misreading the intentions of the main opposition figure, Ayatollah Khomeini. I came away from this book with a grudging respect for Khomeini as a political tactician: he played his cards extremely well at all turns, knowing exactly what he wanted (Islamist theocracy) and getting it. He held firm on his main demand for the shah's abdication when others in the opposition were willing to cut a deal and preserve the monarchy, while also duping the Americans into believing an Islamist Iran would be better for US interests than a communist Iran (never a serious prospect, but Khomeini learned from Iranian American sources that a Soviet-aligned Iran was Washington's main concern). He even duped his moderate, Western-educated advisers into believing that he would be a spiritual mentor to the revolution and gently guide it to democracy from the outside. Of course, the quick march of events in 1979, culminating in the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran that November (swiftly endorsed by the ayatollah) and ratification of an Islamist constitution in December, confirmed what Khomeini really wanted.
Where was the US in all of this? Supporting the status quo (Iran was the single largest purchaser of American weapons in the final years of the shah's reign) and being blind to events in a country that was a key ally in the region (President Carter infamously toasted the Shah at a New Year Eve's dinner in 1977 that he was beloved by his people, in other words on the very eve of the revolution). Despite having a large embassy staffed with hundreds of employees and one of the largest CIA stations in the world, there was a massive amount of ignorance about Iran: few of the Americans stationed there travelled outside the capital, often living a bubble-like existence behind fortified compounds and shopping at specialty stores with American-stocked goods; even fewer spoke Farsi. Few probably understood the history of US-Iranian relations (particularly US support for the 1953 coup that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh). The end result of this ignorance was President Carter making the fateful decision in October 1979 to admit the shah into the US for medical treatment, gravely underestimating the impact this would have on the Iranian population. Student militants just weeks later stormed the US embassy and took its personnel hostage, sparking a 444 day crisis that destroyed Carter's presidency and set the stage for the mutual antagonism that persists between these two nations. Hopefully a new chapter in US-Iranian relations can be written soon.
I found myself struggling to explain not simply why this book was so good but also why I found the story of the overthrow of the Shah (or the Shahenshah as he is usually referred to in this book which while it is/was his correct title was not one remember being used in Western media when he was still 'Shahenshah') and the Iranian revolution both relevant but also difficult to explain. So I am will begin with some personal recollections which you will find under the heading 'Preface' but if you would prefer only my 'Review' I suggest scrolling down until it appears under that heading.
PREFACE:
I was born in 1958 and can very clearly remember reading the account in the National Geographic of the Shah's coronation in 1967 though it was the tiny figure of the barely seven year old crown prince Reza Pahlavi which captured my attention. It was over forty years later that I thought again about the little crown prince of Iran - specifically in 2011 at the funeral of an obscure former MEP, Otto von Habsburg, who can be seen in newsreels from 1916 as the little crown prince at the coronation of his father as the last King of Hungary. I couldn't help thinking that when Reza Pahlavi eventually dies his funeral is unlikely secure as many minutes of TV coverage as Otto von Habsburg's received hours (six hours in Austria and other former Habsburg lands).
I make the point not because I wish to praise or bury either Habsburg or Pahlavi or dynasties or their heirs, I am no monarchist, but oddly enough the contrast between the coronations Otto and Reza played a part in, down to the outfits each boy wore, tells so much (see: https://film.iwmcollections.org.uk/re... for the Habsburg coronation [this an excerpt from a 1 hour 10 minute documentary made at the time by Michael Curtiz who went on to make Casablanca amongst other films] and https://vimeo.com/751365745 for the Shahenshah's coronation). The 1916 coronation of the last King of Hungary is many things but it is 100% real. The Shahenshah's 1967 extravaganza is utterly unreal - an elaborate theatrical farce in which the little crown prince looks terrified that he is going to be beaten if he makes a mistake and the shahenshah and shahbanou look like beauty pageant winners decked out in over the top cubic zirconia tiaras. Let me make it clear everything to do with the Pahlavi's look ersatz, pseudo, bogus, noveaux, of being unsure of themselves.
This air of absurdist disconnect from reality was there in the Pahlavi court with its ocean of officials, including ministers, appearing in the sort of court dress last seen under the Ottoman's at the Dolmabahçe Palace and reached its pinnacle at the mad 1971 party thrown for 2,500 years of the Persian Empire (see: the wonderful film 'Decadence and Downfall In Iran: The Greatest Party In History' at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dWxwt...). It was obvious to me watching the coronation at ten and the 2,500 'anniversary' party at 13 that the Shah was lacking in confidence and conviction - who crowns themselves after thirty years on the throne? Who celebrates 2,500 years of an empire when your dynasty is barely fifty years old? - a man who is weak and desperate for reassurance. In an earlier biography of the shah I was astounded by how often and long this 'absolute' monarch spent chatting with the American and British ambassadors and asking them to say he was doing the right thing. The Shahenshah was, to quote that wise and prescient Irisman Oscar Wilde, the ultimate 'Sphinx without a secret'.
REVIEW
I've said enough about the Shah and his role, or really lack of a role, in causing what happened in Iran in 1979. If you have read de Tocqueville there is nothing surprising in the demise of the Shah's 'empire', what the book helps make clear is that the shah was always '...as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal (1 Corinthians 13:1, KJV)' because he was always Ozymandias (see my footnote *1 below) a man with unlimited hubris, dictatorial powers, delusions of grandeur ans a massive military budget to spend. Unfortunately he was 'enabled' by a man who throughout the last third of the 20th centuries was responsible for more evil deeds than any other, Henry Kissinger, in his determination to be the Jewish Metternich.
It is amazing what harm a weak man, like the shah, backed by an unscrupulous monster, like Kissinger, can do.
What is even more fascinating is how the various departments of the United States co-operated with the Shah of Iran to ensure that neither of them knew what was going on in Iran. Although the limitations revealed are often said to relate to the pre internet social media world I am inclined to believe that the old adage 'Junk in Junk out' still holds true as well as the problem of getting the right information to the right people at the right time has not changed one iota by social media.
Like all books which look forensically at how any bureaucracy fails to communicate with itself 'King of Kings' will provide no succour to those looking for the dark hand of conspiracy in history. It is good to be reminded how history is more often decided by jealousy and career worries as those dedicated to doing the right thing. 'King of Kings' is essential reading by anyone who doesn't realise how a seasoned bureaucrat can destroy a rival by placing a key document in a 'slow' channel and thus ensure it will only be read long after its usefulness has past.
I should make clear that this is a history of the Iranian revolution from the American point of view - of 'how did we miss' or 'how did we get things' so wrong? This is not a history of the Iranian revolution told from an Iranian perspective and as long as that is borne in mind it is useful. But when the history of Iran during the Pahlavi years with full access to the archives it may be surprising how little real control the Shahenshah had over events. This book will help explain why America made such a mess of its involvement in Iran but will not tell you why Iran ended up where it is today.
*1 "My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings; 'Look on my Works, ye Mighty, and despair!', Nothing beside remains. Round the decay, Of that colossal Wreck, boundless and bare, The lone and level sands stretch far away." from the poem 'Ozymandias' by Percy Bysshe Shelley.
The author did an excellent job of reporting and analyzing the entirely sad, but probably not preventable history of Iran in the 20th century, and the amateurish, arrogant, unforgivable way the United States meddled in this country's affairs, which made things even worse. The book reads like a thriller, another tribute to the excellent writing style of Mr. Anderson. As foolish and prideful and harsh as the Shah could be, Khomeini was far worse. As far as I am concerned, he was a butcher, a war criminal and a heartless, evil man, no fit to be considered a religious leader.
I don’t know enough about the Iranian Revolution to say how accurate this is, but it seemed like a sufficient summary of events and Anderson did a good job of weaving together the different threads of what happened. I do think that, as a journalist, he editorialized too much, and adopted a very patronizing tone when things seemed inevitable to him—as Mr Lucker once told us “Everything in history seems inevitable because it already happened”—so I think he could have used some more historical humility. Additionally, he had some weird Orientalist undertones that were outdated. In summary, it’s probably a pretty good introduction to events told in a fast-paced way, but readers should supplement it with other narratives.
George Costanza would have loved working for the US embassy in Iran in the 1970s, which should tell you all you need to know about the quality of our diplomatic efforts
Scott Anderson has taken a maelstrom of events and produced a coherent narrative of a dramatic period in history. I dimly remember the Iranian revolution. I absorbed superficial knowledge of the event itself from vague newspaper articles and television broadcasts. This book, rich with Iranian history, Shia culture, and growing discontent with the reign of a powerful monarch, brought the events of history into sharp focus.
The revolution ushered in a radical Shiite theocracy and toppled an important American ally. Beginning with the Nixon administration the United States had been supplying the Shah of Iran with armaments in exchange for a bountiful supply of oil. Iran was a stable ally in an unstable region of the world. It had the world's fifth largest military and an omnipresent secret police. As political violence began to take hold the administration of Jimmy Carter failed to identify a threat despite plenty of warning from its own insiders. The regime was in deep trouble for a long time. Washington naively believed that zealous Shiite mullahs would somehow evolve into moderates. Whether it was hubris, incompetence, or a myopic fear of Communism above all other threats, the United States failed to take reasonable action. As a result Iran today is a rogue state on the verge of obtaining nuclear weapons.
This is a thoroughly researched account of the Shah's reign starting in the 1950's when he succeeded his father. The author spoke to many, many primary sources from the State Dept, CIA, NSA, the White House staff, and members of the Shah's administration, as well as opposition figures. Pretty much the only person he was unable to speak to was the late Ayatollah Khomeini himself!
It was eye-opening that the Shah (the self-proclaimed king of kings, or "shahanshah") reigned as a dictator for decades, yet because he surrounded himself with sycophants -- yes men-- he was completely out of touch with his people and also was indecisive and disinclined to take responsibility for decisions, foisting them upon others.
The refusal, or disinclination, of the State Dept, the CIA, and the NSA to credit any intel that predicted his fall stemmed from their dependence upon Iran as an arms sales customer and as a supplier of oil. Their myopic obsession with the Communist threat from Russia prevented them from giving a realistic weight to the dangers posed by the militant and extremely conservative mullahs-- i.e. Khomeini-- and when it was imminent they were unprepared.
All in all, this book is another page turner by the excellent historian, Scott Anderson.
I recently read a new book on the 1979 Iranian revolution that struck me as methodologically flawed. The historiography of the Pahlavi era typically relies on just a few interviews to construct entire narratives. Anderson's book follows this pattern, interviewing Farah Pahlavi and Nourbakhsh (Yazdi's son-in-law), which noticeably shapes his perspective.
While the sections on Iran and the Pahlavi court offer nothing novel, the accounts of White House and American embassy activities are compelling. The text builds its narrative from conversations with select individuals rather than direct interviews.
The book reveals remarkable chaos in American foreign policy: the Pentagon, State Department, and National Security Advisor operated independently, often withholding information from each other. Ambassador Sullivan, despite his previous competence, performed poorly during this crisis.
Two key takeaways: the problematic reliance of Iranian revolution historiography on limited interviews, and the surprising disarray within American diplomatic operations despite the country's global stature.
This book is not a history book. It reads like a tale, and relies on the diary of the minister of the Shah's imperial court, some interviews, and on anecdotal "he said she said "accounts.
Scott Anderson’s King of Kings is one of those histories that reads with the momentum of a novel while never losing its analytical edge. Centered on the collapse of the Shah’s regime and the Iranian Revolution of 1979, it is as much a study in political blindness—both Iranian and American—as it is a portrait of power curdling into isolation.
I was in my first year of university when the revolution unfolded, and at the time I understood almost nothing about its causes or consequences beyond the nightly news. Reading this now, decades later, was unexpectedly personal. I was attending Texas Tech University in Lubbock, just down the road from Reese Air Force Base, where Crown Prince Reza was completing pilot training. When his training ended, he could not return home and instead joined his family in exile. At the same time, Texas Tech had a significant population of Iranian students, many of whom I encountered regularly—especially through university tae kwon do classes. Then, almost overnight, they were simply gone. At the time, I didn’t fully grasp why.
Anderson supplies the context I lacked then, with astonishing clarity. The Shah emerges as a tragic, almost Shakespearean figure: vain, insecure, increasingly detached from the reality of his own country, and catastrophically misjudged by his American allies. Equally damning is Anderson’s account of U.S. policy failures—wishful thinking, strategic arrogance, and a persistent refusal to listen to the few voices who actually understood Iran from the inside.
What makes King of Kings so compelling is Anderson’s ability to braid high-level geopolitics with intimate human portraits, showing how ideology, fear, religion, and miscalculation converged into a revolution that reshaped the modern world. His argument that the Iranian Revolution was as consequential as the French or Russian revolutions feels persuasive, especially given how often its template has been repeated since.
Fascinating, sobering, and meticulously researched, King of Kings is not just a history of Iran’s past, but a warning about how easily power can misread the societies it seeks to control—and how enduring the consequences of that blindness can be.
What do you mean on the eve of the revolution Iran was the country with the largest American expat community and no one at the State Department tasked with analysis of the country’s politics spoke Farsi?!?!!!!!!!! How did everyone let ambassador Sullivan get away with his analysis that Khomeni would be good for American interests in the region????? Why did no one independently translate what khomeni was saying in France, allowing his own personal translators to deliberately change his rhetoric for the foreign press????? AAAAAHHHH!!!!!!!
Thank you to Libro.fm and PRH for the Advance copy.
Excellent deep dive into the causes of the Iranian revolution and the U.S.’ involvement. I think political history written by journalists is generally more interesting. This reads, in many ways, like a story. There were some odd pacing choices—pieces of information revealed that would have recontexualized earlier interactions—and it felt sort of sympathetic to the Shah (I don’t know if I would go that far myself). But generally, there was a lot to learn, and it contextualizes today’s political climate in a way I think a lot of people are missing.
I really enjoyed this account of the Iranian Revolution after reading some historical fiction about this time period in Iran a couple of months ago. This book is told through an American lens that gave me more perspective on current US/Iran relations and recent headlines between the two countries. It is an introduction to the Iranian revolution that I would recommend to anyone interested in learning about how the Islamic state came to be.
Good book on the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79. I knew very little about the event, but I found it very interesting in Anderson’s recounting. It is a little slow to get going but the 2nd half is really good.
After reading it, it does seem like the revolution had broader effects in the region in that time period, and as such is more important than I may have previously thought. If you’re a fan of the history of international relations/politics and religion in the Middle East, you’ll enjoy this book. That’s not to say it’s not a story without interesting characters; Anderson does a great job describing the lives and attitudes of the most important personalities involved in the revolution as well.
I've only ever read small snippets or watched 5 minute YouTube videos on the Pahlavi rule and Iranian Revolution, so it was nice to dig into something more substantial.
It's both surprising and somehow still shocking to hear about just how inept the US government was in the years leading up to the Iranian revolution.
I'm taking a good chunk of this with a grain of salt, since it is written by an American and however objective the author may be, I can imagine there are cultural blindspots which may have skewed the retelling of certain historical events.