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The Power Elite
First published in 1956, The Power Elite stands as a contemporary classic of social science and social criticism. C. Wright Mills examines and critiques the organization of power in the United States, calling attention to three firmly interlocked prongs of the military, corporate, and political elite. The Power Elite can be read as a good account of what was taking place in America at the time it was written, but its underlying question of whether America is as democratic in practice as it is in theory continues to matter very much today.
What The Power Elite informed readers of in 1956 was how much the organization of power in America had changed during their lifetimes, and Alan Wolfe's astute afterword to this new edition brings us up to date, illustrating how much more has changed since then. Wolfe sorts out what is helpful in Mills' book and which of his predictions have not come to bear, laying out the radical changes in American capitalism, from intense global competition and the collapse of communism to rapid technological transformations and ever changing consumer tastes. The Power Elite has stimulated generations of readers to think about the kind of society they have and the kind of society they might want, and deserves to be read by every new generation.
What The Power Elite informed readers of in 1956 was how much the organization of power in America had changed during their lifetimes, and Alan Wolfe's astute afterword to this new edition brings us up to date, illustrating how much more has changed since then. Wolfe sorts out what is helpful in Mills' book and which of his predictions have not come to bear, laying out the radical changes in American capitalism, from intense global competition and the collapse of communism to rapid technological transformations and ever changing consumer tastes. The Power Elite has stimulated generations of readers to think about the kind of society they have and the kind of society they might want, and deserves to be read by every new generation.
448 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1956
307 people are currently reading
8187 people want to read
About the author
C. Wright Mills
50 books276 followersCharles Wright Mills was an American sociologist and a professor of sociology at Columbia University from 1946 until his death in 1962. Mills published widely in both popular and intellectual journals, and is remembered for several books, such as
The Power Elite
,
White Collar: The American Middle Classes
and
The Sociological Imagination
.
Mills was concerned with the responsibilities of intellectuals in post–World War II society, and he advocated public and political engagement over disinterested observation. One of Mills's biographers, Daniel Geary, writes that Mills's writings had a "particularly significant impact on New Left social movements of the 1960s era." It was Mills who popularized the term "New Left" in the U.S., in a 1960 open letter "Letter to the New Left".
Mills was concerned with the responsibilities of intellectuals in post–World War II society, and he advocated public and political engagement over disinterested observation. One of Mills's biographers, Daniel Geary, writes that Mills's writings had a "particularly significant impact on New Left social movements of the 1960s era." It was Mills who popularized the term "New Left" in the U.S., in a 1960 open letter "Letter to the New Left".
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October 26, 2017
This is a book that has remained in print for 60 years – so, it clearly has had something to say to the world about how power in America works.
I want to focus mostly on the last chapter of this book – but to do that I need to quickly point to some ideas from earlier in the book. Chiefly, the thesis here is that in the United States power has developed in a way that can’t be adequately compared with other countries. For instance, in Europe the local bourgeoisie were literally the middle class – that is, even as they grew in wealth and power, there was always an aristocracy that even today retains some of its power – even if this is perhaps increasingly only symbolic. The capitalist in Europe has often remained somewhat outside ‘the establishment’ proper – a favourite story of mine being something I read about two Tory MPs in England (real blue bloods) humiliating a new-money Tory MP by asking where he had bought his furniture. I read this with a kind of bewilderment until the writer pointed out that ‘real class’ doesn’t buy furniture, they inherit it. If you aren’t part of the aristocracy you always remain ‘new money’. As such, they were also considered (and possibly even considered themselves) as uncouth and boorish and this meant that it was possible for society to have what Mills refers to as true conservatives – something he considered impossible in America – since European conservatives could look back with longing to a time when feudal lords ruled – you know, as Browning could have a Duke say:
“as if she ranked
My gift of a nine-hundred-years-old name
With anybody's gift.”
But in America even old money was never really all that old and new money – even if considered crass and indecorous – often came in such large quantities that treating the ‘Nouveau Riche’ with contempt became almost impossible.
Success and money in the United States have long been synonymous. But what is important to consider here is the idea that this lack of connection with a truly conservative past means that there are limited ways for one to assert one’s superiority – so, money becomes central. When Trump says he couldn’t even consider having poor people in positions in his government he is speaking to this vision of what success means.
I’m going to quote in full a key footnote Mills gives in the chapter called ‘The Power Elite’. He starts off by saying that he uses the term ‘the power elite’ rather than ruling class for a reason. The footnote then explains:
'Ruling class' is a badly loaded phrase. 'Class' is an economic term; 'rule' a political one. The phrase, 'ruling class,' thus contains the theory that an economic class rules politically. That short-cut theory may or may not at times be true, but we do not want to carry that one rather simple theory about in the terms that we use to define our problems; we wish to state the theories explicitly, using terms of more precise and unilateral meaning. Specifically, the phrase 'ruling class,' in its common political connotations, does not allow enough autonomy to the political order and its agents, and it says nothing about the military as such. It should be clear to the reader by now that we do not accept as adequate the simple view that high economic men unilaterally make all decisions of national consequence. We hold that such a simple view of 'economic determinism' must be elaborated by 'political determinism' and 'military determinism'; that the higher agents of each of these three domains now often have a noticeable degree of autonomy; and that only in the often intricate ways of coalition do they make up and carry through the most important decisions. Those are the major reasons we prefer 'power elite' to 'ruling class' as a characterizing phrase for the higher circles when we consider them in terms of power. (page 277)
The fact Mills translated Weber into English seems particularly relevant here. However, Mills also stresses that all descriptions of power are ultimately characterisations – these characterisations might have some power at helping us to make sense of what we are seeing, but they can never be more than simplifications. Early in the book he gives thumbnail sketches of what a president looks like (how old they are likely to be, what their career path might have been) and then does this also for businessmen, generals and so on.
Key to Mills’ ideas here are that power in the US is exercised by a three-pronged ‘elite’. It isn’t that the economic class does not have power – far from it – nor is it simply that the economic class shares power with the political and military classes in the US – the relationships and connections between the three are much more complicated. And while these were increasingly coming from the same strata of society in the 1950s, there were still differences that needed to be understood and accounted for. And not just that, but there were also ‘myths’ that gathered around these three power elites and these myths (or stereotypes – in the original sense by Lippmann – as intellectual frames created by the media to help the masses see the world in ways that support the existing structures) rarely related to the lived reality of these classes.
The most interesting instance Mills gives is of the capitalist who, the myth tells us, needs to be ‘self-made’. Mills runs the numbers and shows that hardly any of the very rich in his day were actually self-made and that the political structure doesn’t really allow for ‘self-made’ to be even possible – that is, even if your parents were bums who made a living pimping in LA and you eventually became a billionaire, it wasn’t ‘you’ that became a billionaire, but rather that those already at the top saw something in you that meant they welcomed you into their world. Not only did they welcome you because of the qualities they saw in you, and therefore helped you get to where you are – but you also probably moulded your own personality to fit with what they rewarded and punished. As much as we love to think of ourselves as individuals, we belong in and to societies and those societies mould and shape us in ways we are often quite unaware of. That we like to claim personal responsibility for our success and failure doesn’t in any way mean we have such power.
This notion that power is shaped by the habits and preferences of those already in power is the central concern of the last chapter which I think could nearly be read on its own. The chapter is called ‘The Higher Immorality’ – and it is a tour through the ways in which the power elite are able to insulate themselves from the concerns of ‘the people’ while making decisions supposedly in the name of the people. An example given is that of the production of atomic weapons which has been undertaken “without any genuine public debate, and the facts needed to engage in that debate intelligently have been officially hidden, distorted and even lied about” (p355). He could hardly be more disparaging about the ‘intellectual capabilities’ of our rulers, as he says, “George Washington in 1783 relaxed with Voltaire's 'letters' and Locke's 'On Human Understanding'; Eisenhower read cowboy tales and detective stories.” (p.350) – the powerful do make decisions and they are made in a world where ‘Public relations displace reasoned argument” (p.355).
The best of this chapter is when he performs a mental experiment where he asks us to construct two lines of people – one of the most knowledgeable and the other of most powerful in our society. As he makes clear, there would be few people who would appear on both lines – something he claims would have much more likely been the case when the US experiment started in the eighteenth century. However, this has a seriously interesting point. We like to think that ‘smart’ equals ‘money’ or ‘power’ – and if Trump has served one purpose in life, it is to disprove that equivalence. We believe this so much that we ask smart people, as he says somewhere here, ‘well, if you are so smart, how come you aren’t rich?’ But surely the fact we can also say, ‘if you are so powerful, how come you are so dumb?’ ought to be more reason for concern. As Mills says, “The man of knowledge has not become a philosopher king; but he has often become a consultant, and moreover a consultant to a man who is neither king-like nor philosophical”. And then, “Like most others in this society, the man of knowledge is himself dependent for his livelihood upon the job, which nowadays is a prime sanction of thought control” (p.353).
In fact, it is even worse, because “Nowadays what we are up against is precisely the absence of mind of any sort as a public force; what we are up against is a disinterest in and a fear of knowledge that might have liberating public relevance” (p.356).
The other line up that would be just as interesting is between the most powerful people in society and those with the most celebrity. Again, these lists would hardly intersect – but that is because real celebrity is held by people of virtually no power other than the “power of distraction” (p.360). And this plays out in important ways in our society too. That the very powerful often like to hide should be of real concern to us.
The afterword to this sets out to show how much has changed since Mills’ time and how many of his conclusions don’t continue to stand – but I think this book provides a clearer picture of our world than is often available from much more recent discussions.
I want to focus mostly on the last chapter of this book – but to do that I need to quickly point to some ideas from earlier in the book. Chiefly, the thesis here is that in the United States power has developed in a way that can’t be adequately compared with other countries. For instance, in Europe the local bourgeoisie were literally the middle class – that is, even as they grew in wealth and power, there was always an aristocracy that even today retains some of its power – even if this is perhaps increasingly only symbolic. The capitalist in Europe has often remained somewhat outside ‘the establishment’ proper – a favourite story of mine being something I read about two Tory MPs in England (real blue bloods) humiliating a new-money Tory MP by asking where he had bought his furniture. I read this with a kind of bewilderment until the writer pointed out that ‘real class’ doesn’t buy furniture, they inherit it. If you aren’t part of the aristocracy you always remain ‘new money’. As such, they were also considered (and possibly even considered themselves) as uncouth and boorish and this meant that it was possible for society to have what Mills refers to as true conservatives – something he considered impossible in America – since European conservatives could look back with longing to a time when feudal lords ruled – you know, as Browning could have a Duke say:
“as if she ranked
My gift of a nine-hundred-years-old name
With anybody's gift.”
But in America even old money was never really all that old and new money – even if considered crass and indecorous – often came in such large quantities that treating the ‘Nouveau Riche’ with contempt became almost impossible.
Success and money in the United States have long been synonymous. But what is important to consider here is the idea that this lack of connection with a truly conservative past means that there are limited ways for one to assert one’s superiority – so, money becomes central. When Trump says he couldn’t even consider having poor people in positions in his government he is speaking to this vision of what success means.
I’m going to quote in full a key footnote Mills gives in the chapter called ‘The Power Elite’. He starts off by saying that he uses the term ‘the power elite’ rather than ruling class for a reason. The footnote then explains:
'Ruling class' is a badly loaded phrase. 'Class' is an economic term; 'rule' a political one. The phrase, 'ruling class,' thus contains the theory that an economic class rules politically. That short-cut theory may or may not at times be true, but we do not want to carry that one rather simple theory about in the terms that we use to define our problems; we wish to state the theories explicitly, using terms of more precise and unilateral meaning. Specifically, the phrase 'ruling class,' in its common political connotations, does not allow enough autonomy to the political order and its agents, and it says nothing about the military as such. It should be clear to the reader by now that we do not accept as adequate the simple view that high economic men unilaterally make all decisions of national consequence. We hold that such a simple view of 'economic determinism' must be elaborated by 'political determinism' and 'military determinism'; that the higher agents of each of these three domains now often have a noticeable degree of autonomy; and that only in the often intricate ways of coalition do they make up and carry through the most important decisions. Those are the major reasons we prefer 'power elite' to 'ruling class' as a characterizing phrase for the higher circles when we consider them in terms of power. (page 277)
The fact Mills translated Weber into English seems particularly relevant here. However, Mills also stresses that all descriptions of power are ultimately characterisations – these characterisations might have some power at helping us to make sense of what we are seeing, but they can never be more than simplifications. Early in the book he gives thumbnail sketches of what a president looks like (how old they are likely to be, what their career path might have been) and then does this also for businessmen, generals and so on.
Key to Mills’ ideas here are that power in the US is exercised by a three-pronged ‘elite’. It isn’t that the economic class does not have power – far from it – nor is it simply that the economic class shares power with the political and military classes in the US – the relationships and connections between the three are much more complicated. And while these were increasingly coming from the same strata of society in the 1950s, there were still differences that needed to be understood and accounted for. And not just that, but there were also ‘myths’ that gathered around these three power elites and these myths (or stereotypes – in the original sense by Lippmann – as intellectual frames created by the media to help the masses see the world in ways that support the existing structures) rarely related to the lived reality of these classes.
The most interesting instance Mills gives is of the capitalist who, the myth tells us, needs to be ‘self-made’. Mills runs the numbers and shows that hardly any of the very rich in his day were actually self-made and that the political structure doesn’t really allow for ‘self-made’ to be even possible – that is, even if your parents were bums who made a living pimping in LA and you eventually became a billionaire, it wasn’t ‘you’ that became a billionaire, but rather that those already at the top saw something in you that meant they welcomed you into their world. Not only did they welcome you because of the qualities they saw in you, and therefore helped you get to where you are – but you also probably moulded your own personality to fit with what they rewarded and punished. As much as we love to think of ourselves as individuals, we belong in and to societies and those societies mould and shape us in ways we are often quite unaware of. That we like to claim personal responsibility for our success and failure doesn’t in any way mean we have such power.
This notion that power is shaped by the habits and preferences of those already in power is the central concern of the last chapter which I think could nearly be read on its own. The chapter is called ‘The Higher Immorality’ – and it is a tour through the ways in which the power elite are able to insulate themselves from the concerns of ‘the people’ while making decisions supposedly in the name of the people. An example given is that of the production of atomic weapons which has been undertaken “without any genuine public debate, and the facts needed to engage in that debate intelligently have been officially hidden, distorted and even lied about” (p355). He could hardly be more disparaging about the ‘intellectual capabilities’ of our rulers, as he says, “George Washington in 1783 relaxed with Voltaire's 'letters' and Locke's 'On Human Understanding'; Eisenhower read cowboy tales and detective stories.” (p.350) – the powerful do make decisions and they are made in a world where ‘Public relations displace reasoned argument” (p.355).
The best of this chapter is when he performs a mental experiment where he asks us to construct two lines of people – one of the most knowledgeable and the other of most powerful in our society. As he makes clear, there would be few people who would appear on both lines – something he claims would have much more likely been the case when the US experiment started in the eighteenth century. However, this has a seriously interesting point. We like to think that ‘smart’ equals ‘money’ or ‘power’ – and if Trump has served one purpose in life, it is to disprove that equivalence. We believe this so much that we ask smart people, as he says somewhere here, ‘well, if you are so smart, how come you aren’t rich?’ But surely the fact we can also say, ‘if you are so powerful, how come you are so dumb?’ ought to be more reason for concern. As Mills says, “The man of knowledge has not become a philosopher king; but he has often become a consultant, and moreover a consultant to a man who is neither king-like nor philosophical”. And then, “Like most others in this society, the man of knowledge is himself dependent for his livelihood upon the job, which nowadays is a prime sanction of thought control” (p.353).
In fact, it is even worse, because “Nowadays what we are up against is precisely the absence of mind of any sort as a public force; what we are up against is a disinterest in and a fear of knowledge that might have liberating public relevance” (p.356).
The other line up that would be just as interesting is between the most powerful people in society and those with the most celebrity. Again, these lists would hardly intersect – but that is because real celebrity is held by people of virtually no power other than the “power of distraction” (p.360). And this plays out in important ways in our society too. That the very powerful often like to hide should be of real concern to us.
The afterword to this sets out to show how much has changed since Mills’ time and how many of his conclusions don’t continue to stand – but I think this book provides a clearer picture of our world than is often available from much more recent discussions.
August 14, 2022
A Dark Portrait
UPDATE: I am very excited to say that a spiritual sequel to this book has been published in 2018. It has received overwhelming praise from the likes of Noam Chomsky and Abby Martin for carrying forward C. Wright Mills tradition of studying the ruling classes as a social network. The difference now being that said classes have become transnational, something Mills had not yet seen, but has been theorised as becoming the new paradigm for twenty years. The Book is called Giants: The Global Power Elite and has been written Peter Philip's. I look forward to reading it this January 2019
□□□
I put quite a bit of thought into how I would compose this review, and I hope that the final edit does some justice in covering the dense topic Mills decided to tackle decades ago.
Since the election of Trump back in November, reports have been made on how George Orwell's novel '1984' has skyrocketed in sales everywhere, and how people are looking for information to best understand a totalitarian state (perhaps as ruled through inverted means - see Sheldon Wolin). While I have no intention of detracting from what an incredible novel 1984 is - not to mention the positive impact Orwell's views on the world bought to the literary tradition - I do, however, wish to present a book that I think should be sitting right next to the above mentioned. If Americans wish to understand their present reality, then they must look into the past. A dystopian fiction set in the United Kingdom will only provide so much in bringing truth to the curious, something I think Orwell would concur with, seeing as he didn't write 1984 to be a hand guide. Especially if said guide is to be applied to any and every country that flirts with totalitarianism.
If any comparison could be made between these two texts, it would be that the reader may feel like the character of Winston, opening up the 'Manifesto Of The Brotherhood' for the first time. With chapters titled in such a powerful manner (see chapter breakdown below), it was hard not to feel as though I was peering into a forbidden novel banned from common distribution.
What C. Wright Mills presents in the pages of The Power Elite is a critique of the United States post World War II, as its leaders were beginning to ramp up imperialistic plans to dominate the world economically, militarily and politically. He spotted a terrifying trend beginning to appear in the institutions of the day, and made the brave move to call it for what it was; abuse of power. He was criticised for this, and many of his peers thought it the ramblings of a man bitter with the society that surrounded him. However, as mentioned by Alan Wolfe in the books afterward, The Power Elite has stood the test of time - informing people about power and the dangers of its consolidation - whereas other sociological texts from the period have fallen through the trap doors of history into obscurity. I will admit, this is not an easy book to read. Despite its rather modest 361 page length, it took me a good two months to reach the final sentence (not to mention the time taken between paragraphs digesting and re-reading topics discussed [see chapter eleven below for an example of difficult theories discussed by Mills]). However, any book worth its salt is worth the time taken to complete it.
I would also like to mention that I agree with other reviews on Goodreads that this demands an update. Perhaps a consolidated version, with a new introduction and afterward would be preferable to what is available right now.
I could proceed further, and deliver a detailed explanation of how much is covered by Mills. Yet, I believe a different approach is required to inform the reader of the importance of this subject (and to hopefully persuade the same reader to make a purchase of this book). As such, below are a selection of quotes that stood out to me during my readthrough, giving the potential reader examples of the kind of content Mills discusses. I believe this will be effective in understanding what Mills was on to, in his own words, and realising how relevant it is to contemporary America today. Feel free to pick and choose a quote if the chapter title interests you, I feel trying to read all of them would take some time otherwise. I found Chapter 13 especially illuminating.
1. THE HIGHER CIRCLES
"By the power elite, we refer to those political, economic, and military circles which as an intricate set of overlapping cliques share decisions having at least national consequences. In so far as national events are decided, the power elite are those who decide them"
2. LOCAL SOCIETY
"It is to the metropolitan upper classes that the local society of the smaller cities looks; its newer members with open admiration, its older, with less open admiration. What good is it to show a horse or a dog in a small city of 1000,000 population, even if you could, when you know that THE Show will be in New York next fall? More seriously, what prestige is there in a $50,000 local deal, however financially convenient, when you know that in Chicago, only 175 miles away, men are turning over $500,000?"
3. METROPOLITAN 400
"Almost everywhere in America, the metropolitan upper classes have in common, more or less, race, religion, and nativity. Even if they are not of long family descent, they are uniformly of longer American origin than the underlying population. . .
. . .In many cities—New York for example—there are several rather than one metropolitan 400. This fact, however, does not mean that the big-city upper classes do not exist, but rather that in such cities the status stucture is more elaborate than in those with more uni- fied societies. That there are social feuds between competing status centers does not destroy the status hierarchy."
4. THE CELEBRITIES
"But what are the celebrities? The celebrities are The Names that need no further identification. Those who know them so far exceed those of whom they know as to require no exact computation. Wherever the celebrities go, they are recognized, and moreover, recognized with some excitement and awe. Whatever they do has publicity value. More or less continuously, over a period of time, they are the material for the media of communication and entertainment. And, when that time ends as it must and the celebrity still lives as he may from time to time it may be asked, 'Remember him?' That is what celebrity means."
5. THE VERY RICH
"The major economic fact about the very rich is the fact of the accumulation of advantages: those who have great wealth are in a dozen strategic positions to make it yield further wealth. Sixty five per cent of the very richest people in America today are involved in enterprises which their families have passed on to them or are simply living as rentiers on the huge returns from such properties. The remaining 35 per cent are playing the higher economic game more actively, if no more daringly, than those who used to be called entrepreneurs but who in later day capitalism are more accurately called the economic politicians of the corpo- rate world."
6. THE CHEIF EXECUTIVES
"These executives, it is held, are responsible for the refrigerator in the kitchen and the automobile in the garage as well as all the planes and bombs that now guard Americans from instant peril. All of them, or nearly all, have come up from the bottom of the ladder; they are either farm boys who have now made good in the big city, or poor immigrants who have come to America and now enjoy the dream of success it allows. Full of the know-how that made America great; efficient, straightforward, honest, the chief executives, it is often said, ought really to be allowed to run the government, for if only such men were in charge there would be no waste, no corruption, no infiltration. Dirty politics, in short, would become clean business."
7. THE CORPORATE RICH
"But it is not so much by direct campaign contributions that the wealthy exert political power. And it is not so much the very rich as the corporate executives the corporate reorganizes of the big propertied class who have translated the power of property into political use. As the corporate world has become more intricately involved in the political order, these executives have become intimately associated with the politicians, and especially with the key 'politicians' who form the political directorate of the United States government."
8. THE WARLORDS
"For the first time in American history, men in authority are talking about an 'emergency' without a foreseeable end. During modern times, and especially in the United States, men had come to look upon history as a peaceful continuum interrupted by war. But now, the American elite does not have any real image of peace other than as an uneasy interlude existing precariously by virtue of the balance of mutual fright. The only seriously accepted plan for 'peace' is the fully loaded pistol. In short, war or a high state of war preparedness is felt to be the normal and seemingly per- manent condition of the United States."
9. THE MILITARY ASCENDANCY
"From the standpoint of the party politician, a well-trained general or admiral is an excellent legitimator of policies, for his careful use often makes it possible to lift the policy 'above politics,' which is to say above political debate and into the realm of administration, where, as statesman Dulles said in support of General Eisenhower for President, there are needed men with the capacity for making grave decisions."
10. THE POLITICAL DIRECTORATE
"A small group of men are now in charge of the executive decisions made in the name of the United States of America. These fifty-odd men of the executive branch of the government include the President, the Vice President, and the members of the cabinet; the head men of the major departments and bureaus, agencies and commissions, and the members of the Executive Office of the President, including the White House staff."
11. THE THEORY OF BALANCE
"Those who profit by the general framework of the status quo can afford more easily than those who are dissatisfied under it to entertain such views as the mechanics of social change. Moreover, 'in most fields . . . only one interest is organized, none is, or some of the major ones are not.' In these cases, to speak, as Mr. David Truman does, of 'unorganized interests' is merely to
use another word for what used to be called 'the public,' a conception we shall presently examine."
12. THE POWER ELITE
"In so far as the structural clue to the power elite today lies in the political order, that clue is the decline of politics as genuine and public debate of alternative decisions with nationally responsible and policy coherent parties and with autonomous organizations connecting the lower and middle levels of power with the top levels of decision. America is now in considerable part more a formal political democracy than a democratic social structure, and even the formal political mechanics are weak."
13. THE MASS SOCIETY
"From almost any angle of vision that we might assume, when we look upon the public, we realize that we have moved a considerable distance along the road to the mass society. At the end of that road there is totalitarianism, as in Nazi Germany or in Communist Russia. We are not yet at that end. In the United States today, media markets are not entirely ascendant over primary publics. But surely we can see that many aspects of the public fife of our times are more the features of a mass society than of a community of publics."
14. THE CONSERVATIVE MOOD
"The greatest problem of the spokesmen for an American conservatism is simply to locate the set of people whose interests the conservative ideology would serve, and who, in turn, would accept it. Classic conservativism has required the spell of tradition among such surviving elements of pre-industrial societies as an aristocracy of noble men, a peasantry, a petty-bourgeoisie with guild inheritances; and these are precisely what America has never had. For in America, the bourgeoisie has been pre- dominant from its beginnings—in class, in status, and in power. In America, there has not been and there can be no conservative ideology of the classic type."
15. THE HIGHER IMMORALITY
"The higher circles in America today contain, on the one hand, the laughing, erotic, dazzling glamour of the professional celebrity, and, on the other, the prestige aura of power,might and wealth. These two pinnacles are not unrelated. The power elite is not so noticeable as the celebrities,and often does not want to be; the 'power' of the professional celebrity is the power of distraction. America as a national public is indeed possessed of a strange set of idols. The professionals, in the main, are either glossy little animals or frivolous clowns; the men of power, in the main, rarely seem to be models of representative men."
UPDATE: I am very excited to say that a spiritual sequel to this book has been published in 2018. It has received overwhelming praise from the likes of Noam Chomsky and Abby Martin for carrying forward C. Wright Mills tradition of studying the ruling classes as a social network. The difference now being that said classes have become transnational, something Mills had not yet seen, but has been theorised as becoming the new paradigm for twenty years. The Book is called Giants: The Global Power Elite and has been written Peter Philip's. I look forward to reading it this January 2019
□□□
I put quite a bit of thought into how I would compose this review, and I hope that the final edit does some justice in covering the dense topic Mills decided to tackle decades ago.
Since the election of Trump back in November, reports have been made on how George Orwell's novel '1984' has skyrocketed in sales everywhere, and how people are looking for information to best understand a totalitarian state (perhaps as ruled through inverted means - see Sheldon Wolin). While I have no intention of detracting from what an incredible novel 1984 is - not to mention the positive impact Orwell's views on the world bought to the literary tradition - I do, however, wish to present a book that I think should be sitting right next to the above mentioned. If Americans wish to understand their present reality, then they must look into the past. A dystopian fiction set in the United Kingdom will only provide so much in bringing truth to the curious, something I think Orwell would concur with, seeing as he didn't write 1984 to be a hand guide. Especially if said guide is to be applied to any and every country that flirts with totalitarianism.
If any comparison could be made between these two texts, it would be that the reader may feel like the character of Winston, opening up the 'Manifesto Of The Brotherhood' for the first time. With chapters titled in such a powerful manner (see chapter breakdown below), it was hard not to feel as though I was peering into a forbidden novel banned from common distribution.
What C. Wright Mills presents in the pages of The Power Elite is a critique of the United States post World War II, as its leaders were beginning to ramp up imperialistic plans to dominate the world economically, militarily and politically. He spotted a terrifying trend beginning to appear in the institutions of the day, and made the brave move to call it for what it was; abuse of power. He was criticised for this, and many of his peers thought it the ramblings of a man bitter with the society that surrounded him. However, as mentioned by Alan Wolfe in the books afterward, The Power Elite has stood the test of time - informing people about power and the dangers of its consolidation - whereas other sociological texts from the period have fallen through the trap doors of history into obscurity. I will admit, this is not an easy book to read. Despite its rather modest 361 page length, it took me a good two months to reach the final sentence (not to mention the time taken between paragraphs digesting and re-reading topics discussed [see chapter eleven below for an example of difficult theories discussed by Mills]). However, any book worth its salt is worth the time taken to complete it.
I would also like to mention that I agree with other reviews on Goodreads that this demands an update. Perhaps a consolidated version, with a new introduction and afterward would be preferable to what is available right now.
I could proceed further, and deliver a detailed explanation of how much is covered by Mills. Yet, I believe a different approach is required to inform the reader of the importance of this subject (and to hopefully persuade the same reader to make a purchase of this book). As such, below are a selection of quotes that stood out to me during my readthrough, giving the potential reader examples of the kind of content Mills discusses. I believe this will be effective in understanding what Mills was on to, in his own words, and realising how relevant it is to contemporary America today. Feel free to pick and choose a quote if the chapter title interests you, I feel trying to read all of them would take some time otherwise. I found Chapter 13 especially illuminating.
1. THE HIGHER CIRCLES
"By the power elite, we refer to those political, economic, and military circles which as an intricate set of overlapping cliques share decisions having at least national consequences. In so far as national events are decided, the power elite are those who decide them"
2. LOCAL SOCIETY
"It is to the metropolitan upper classes that the local society of the smaller cities looks; its newer members with open admiration, its older, with less open admiration. What good is it to show a horse or a dog in a small city of 1000,000 population, even if you could, when you know that THE Show will be in New York next fall? More seriously, what prestige is there in a $50,000 local deal, however financially convenient, when you know that in Chicago, only 175 miles away, men are turning over $500,000?"
3. METROPOLITAN 400
"Almost everywhere in America, the metropolitan upper classes have in common, more or less, race, religion, and nativity. Even if they are not of long family descent, they are uniformly of longer American origin than the underlying population. . .
. . .In many cities—New York for example—there are several rather than one metropolitan 400. This fact, however, does not mean that the big-city upper classes do not exist, but rather that in such cities the status stucture is more elaborate than in those with more uni- fied societies. That there are social feuds between competing status centers does not destroy the status hierarchy."
4. THE CELEBRITIES
"But what are the celebrities? The celebrities are The Names that need no further identification. Those who know them so far exceed those of whom they know as to require no exact computation. Wherever the celebrities go, they are recognized, and moreover, recognized with some excitement and awe. Whatever they do has publicity value. More or less continuously, over a period of time, they are the material for the media of communication and entertainment. And, when that time ends as it must and the celebrity still lives as he may from time to time it may be asked, 'Remember him?' That is what celebrity means."
5. THE VERY RICH
"The major economic fact about the very rich is the fact of the accumulation of advantages: those who have great wealth are in a dozen strategic positions to make it yield further wealth. Sixty five per cent of the very richest people in America today are involved in enterprises which their families have passed on to them or are simply living as rentiers on the huge returns from such properties. The remaining 35 per cent are playing the higher economic game more actively, if no more daringly, than those who used to be called entrepreneurs but who in later day capitalism are more accurately called the economic politicians of the corpo- rate world."
6. THE CHEIF EXECUTIVES
"These executives, it is held, are responsible for the refrigerator in the kitchen and the automobile in the garage as well as all the planes and bombs that now guard Americans from instant peril. All of them, or nearly all, have come up from the bottom of the ladder; they are either farm boys who have now made good in the big city, or poor immigrants who have come to America and now enjoy the dream of success it allows. Full of the know-how that made America great; efficient, straightforward, honest, the chief executives, it is often said, ought really to be allowed to run the government, for if only such men were in charge there would be no waste, no corruption, no infiltration. Dirty politics, in short, would become clean business."
7. THE CORPORATE RICH
"But it is not so much by direct campaign contributions that the wealthy exert political power. And it is not so much the very rich as the corporate executives the corporate reorganizes of the big propertied class who have translated the power of property into political use. As the corporate world has become more intricately involved in the political order, these executives have become intimately associated with the politicians, and especially with the key 'politicians' who form the political directorate of the United States government."
8. THE WARLORDS
"For the first time in American history, men in authority are talking about an 'emergency' without a foreseeable end. During modern times, and especially in the United States, men had come to look upon history as a peaceful continuum interrupted by war. But now, the American elite does not have any real image of peace other than as an uneasy interlude existing precariously by virtue of the balance of mutual fright. The only seriously accepted plan for 'peace' is the fully loaded pistol. In short, war or a high state of war preparedness is felt to be the normal and seemingly per- manent condition of the United States."
9. THE MILITARY ASCENDANCY
"From the standpoint of the party politician, a well-trained general or admiral is an excellent legitimator of policies, for his careful use often makes it possible to lift the policy 'above politics,' which is to say above political debate and into the realm of administration, where, as statesman Dulles said in support of General Eisenhower for President, there are needed men with the capacity for making grave decisions."
10. THE POLITICAL DIRECTORATE
"A small group of men are now in charge of the executive decisions made in the name of the United States of America. These fifty-odd men of the executive branch of the government include the President, the Vice President, and the members of the cabinet; the head men of the major departments and bureaus, agencies and commissions, and the members of the Executive Office of the President, including the White House staff."
11. THE THEORY OF BALANCE
"Those who profit by the general framework of the status quo can afford more easily than those who are dissatisfied under it to entertain such views as the mechanics of social change. Moreover, 'in most fields . . . only one interest is organized, none is, or some of the major ones are not.' In these cases, to speak, as Mr. David Truman does, of 'unorganized interests' is merely to
use another word for what used to be called 'the public,' a conception we shall presently examine."
12. THE POWER ELITE
"In so far as the structural clue to the power elite today lies in the political order, that clue is the decline of politics as genuine and public debate of alternative decisions with nationally responsible and policy coherent parties and with autonomous organizations connecting the lower and middle levels of power with the top levels of decision. America is now in considerable part more a formal political democracy than a democratic social structure, and even the formal political mechanics are weak."
13. THE MASS SOCIETY
"From almost any angle of vision that we might assume, when we look upon the public, we realize that we have moved a considerable distance along the road to the mass society. At the end of that road there is totalitarianism, as in Nazi Germany or in Communist Russia. We are not yet at that end. In the United States today, media markets are not entirely ascendant over primary publics. But surely we can see that many aspects of the public fife of our times are more the features of a mass society than of a community of publics."
14. THE CONSERVATIVE MOOD
"The greatest problem of the spokesmen for an American conservatism is simply to locate the set of people whose interests the conservative ideology would serve, and who, in turn, would accept it. Classic conservativism has required the spell of tradition among such surviving elements of pre-industrial societies as an aristocracy of noble men, a peasantry, a petty-bourgeoisie with guild inheritances; and these are precisely what America has never had. For in America, the bourgeoisie has been pre- dominant from its beginnings—in class, in status, and in power. In America, there has not been and there can be no conservative ideology of the classic type."
15. THE HIGHER IMMORALITY
"The higher circles in America today contain, on the one hand, the laughing, erotic, dazzling glamour of the professional celebrity, and, on the other, the prestige aura of power,might and wealth. These two pinnacles are not unrelated. The power elite is not so noticeable as the celebrities,and often does not want to be; the 'power' of the professional celebrity is the power of distraction. America as a national public is indeed possessed of a strange set of idols. The professionals, in the main, are either glossy little animals or frivolous clowns; the men of power, in the main, rarely seem to be models of representative men."
September 7, 2013
A quote that should make you read The Power Elite:
"On the one hand, there is the increased scale and centralization of the structure of decision; and, on the other, the increasingly narrow sorting men into milieu. From both sides, there is the increased dependence upon the formal media of communication, including those of education itself. But the man in the mass does not gain a transcending view from these media; instead he gets his experience stereotyped, and then he gets sunk further by that experience. He cannot detach himself in order to observe, much less to evaluate, what he is experiencing, much less what he is not experiencing. Rather than that internal discussion we call reflection, he is accompanied through his life-experience with a sort of unconscious, echoing monologue. He has no projects of his own: he fulfills the routines that exist. He does not transcend whatever he is at any moment, because he does not, he cannot, transcend his daily milieu. He is not truly aware of his own daily experience and of its actual standards: he drifts, he fulfills habits, his behavior a result of a planless mixture of the confused standards and the uncriticized expectation that he has taken over from others whom he no longer really knows or trusts, if indeed he ever really did."
This book is still relevant today. It was written in 1956, which provides an interesting angle for Mills' insights. The introduction to the book is interesting, before it dissolves into a long-winded tale of how private schools create an entirely private and impenetrable class of Elite Americans.
That part is boring, I'll admit. Yet the last third of the book is absolutely essential reading. If anything, pick it up to read "The Power Elite" and "Mass Society" chapters. Mills speaks about the tangle of military-industrial complex from the roots and I think it's profoundly important to trace that growth from where Mills was to where we are now.
"On the one hand, there is the increased scale and centralization of the structure of decision; and, on the other, the increasingly narrow sorting men into milieu. From both sides, there is the increased dependence upon the formal media of communication, including those of education itself. But the man in the mass does not gain a transcending view from these media; instead he gets his experience stereotyped, and then he gets sunk further by that experience. He cannot detach himself in order to observe, much less to evaluate, what he is experiencing, much less what he is not experiencing. Rather than that internal discussion we call reflection, he is accompanied through his life-experience with a sort of unconscious, echoing monologue. He has no projects of his own: he fulfills the routines that exist. He does not transcend whatever he is at any moment, because he does not, he cannot, transcend his daily milieu. He is not truly aware of his own daily experience and of its actual standards: he drifts, he fulfills habits, his behavior a result of a planless mixture of the confused standards and the uncriticized expectation that he has taken over from others whom he no longer really knows or trusts, if indeed he ever really did."
This book is still relevant today. It was written in 1956, which provides an interesting angle for Mills' insights. The introduction to the book is interesting, before it dissolves into a long-winded tale of how private schools create an entirely private and impenetrable class of Elite Americans.
That part is boring, I'll admit. Yet the last third of the book is absolutely essential reading. If anything, pick it up to read "The Power Elite" and "Mass Society" chapters. Mills speaks about the tangle of military-industrial complex from the roots and I think it's profoundly important to trace that growth from where Mills was to where we are now.
May 5, 2016
This book had a profound influence on me and on my generation. I read it no later than 1969, but may have read it as early as 1967. In any case, all of my older, political friends had read it and encouraged me to read it.
Basically, Mills argues that the USA is owned and operated by a very small portion of its population, acting behind the institutional smokescreen of representative politics and elections which they subtantially finance and control. So far as I recall, his major emphasis is in demonstrating how the important players migrate between government and the large corporations, representing the interests of their class in both domains.
Now this seem old hat, obvious, but to many teenagers, and adults, in the fifties and sixties, it came as a shocking revelation. Also, because Mills was homegrown and because he was vocally critical of Marxist theory, this book was very important in establishing the independent identity of the American New Left of the sixties and early seventies.
Basically, Mills argues that the USA is owned and operated by a very small portion of its population, acting behind the institutional smokescreen of representative politics and elections which they subtantially finance and control. So far as I recall, his major emphasis is in demonstrating how the important players migrate between government and the large corporations, representing the interests of their class in both domains.
Now this seem old hat, obvious, but to many teenagers, and adults, in the fifties and sixties, it came as a shocking revelation. Also, because Mills was homegrown and because he was vocally critical of Marxist theory, this book was very important in establishing the independent identity of the American New Left of the sixties and early seventies.
Read
December 22, 2022Mills' assertions hardly seem groundbreaking today: that the elite in America don't constitute anything resembling a meritocracy, that power and wealth reproduce power and wealth, that many institutions of society form a smokescreen for said reproduction of power and wealth. I mean, this seems so common sense because Mills said it with precision and detail – the average working American would probably be able to say the same thing, just less eloquently. Granted, the world has changed a lot since the postwar consensus years in which Mills was writing – there is still a power elite, but it is organized on quite different terms than Mills had imagined, even if the Ivy League remains as much of an old boys' club as ever, even if now there are more women and minorities who become old boys (come to think of it, Sheryl Sandberg would be pretty much an ideal platonic form of a modern-day power elite, and her dubious ascent is entirely different from one Mills would have predicted). But the crux is still correct, and there's a reason this is a classic of sociology.
January 15, 2019
Just a note for future me (& friends).
Whilst almost finishing this read, a local sociologist (Dr Azhar) talk about Sociological Imagination when he saw me reading this; thus making it to be part of Mills/sociology 'compulsory' reading.
Whilst almost finishing this read, a local sociologist (Dr Azhar) talk about Sociological Imagination when he saw me reading this; thus making it to be part of Mills/sociology 'compulsory' reading.
July 19, 2018
C. Wright Mills wrote this landmark volume sixty-one years ago, but the problems he confronted have not disappeared, but merely altered. In this decade as well as the late Fifties, it seems when one pursues American power to see who holds it, the ability to wield power becomes more diffuse -- but suddenly more concentrated once out of popular (or direct-political) control. Today we live in a world in which American business people, like the companies they helm, are as apt to go international (or even multinational) once they feel domestic restrictions, such as tax regulations, have become too onerous. The malfeasance of financiers in the credit-swap default was legendary; yet somehow the worst offenders continue to escape prosecution.
Prior to the Petraeus scandal, little was made of the fact that high military officers could spend their careers fighting their way upward in rank, often to enjoy "rock star" lifestyles as generals with high visibility, hearty partying, even mistresses -- yet nonetheless keep their power despite moral concerns, by bypassing the chain-of-command and appealing directly to the American people if necessary. (This happened in 1952 when Richard Nixon went on TV to give his infamous "Checkers" speech, a power runaround of which Mills was well aware.) Once out of the line of fire (literally), the brass can retire from the Armed Forces and then semi-retire to low-burden teaching loads at large State universities, where they can write (or co-write) books about history, military strategy or current affairs. Media people, too, enjoy as much visibility as movie stars, even if most of them lack the raffishness of real and metaphoric "rock stars." But they can switch careers in midlife, too -- we are now living with a real-estate investor who became an NBC reality-show host and last year, President of the USA, without sloughing off some of the properties the law claims he should.
Of course, C. Wright Mills wrote this book in an era in which newspapers, not TV, set the public agenda, and visual-recognition and popularity or "image" did not reign as supreme as it does now. This book is imperative reading to political-science majors and others with an interest in public policy to see what the base that was built upon to get us where we are now -- you might even understand how the "Power Elite" tends to insulate itself from allegations of abuse and opportunistic career-switching. I know this book is still often assigned in college courses, and that cheers me. It reads well, too, even in an era of media-made celebrity "politicians."
Prior to the Petraeus scandal, little was made of the fact that high military officers could spend their careers fighting their way upward in rank, often to enjoy "rock star" lifestyles as generals with high visibility, hearty partying, even mistresses -- yet nonetheless keep their power despite moral concerns, by bypassing the chain-of-command and appealing directly to the American people if necessary. (This happened in 1952 when Richard Nixon went on TV to give his infamous "Checkers" speech, a power runaround of which Mills was well aware.) Once out of the line of fire (literally), the brass can retire from the Armed Forces and then semi-retire to low-burden teaching loads at large State universities, where they can write (or co-write) books about history, military strategy or current affairs. Media people, too, enjoy as much visibility as movie stars, even if most of them lack the raffishness of real and metaphoric "rock stars." But they can switch careers in midlife, too -- we are now living with a real-estate investor who became an NBC reality-show host and last year, President of the USA, without sloughing off some of the properties the law claims he should.
Of course, C. Wright Mills wrote this book in an era in which newspapers, not TV, set the public agenda, and visual-recognition and popularity or "image" did not reign as supreme as it does now. This book is imperative reading to political-science majors and others with an interest in public policy to see what the base that was built upon to get us where we are now -- you might even understand how the "Power Elite" tends to insulate itself from allegations of abuse and opportunistic career-switching. I know this book is still often assigned in college courses, and that cheers me. It reads well, too, even in an era of media-made celebrity "politicians."
December 14, 2023
First published in 1956, The Power Elite stands as a contemporary classic of social science and social criticism. C. Wright Mills examines and critiques the organization of power in the United States, calling attention to three firmly interlocked prongs of power: the military, corporate, and political elite. The Power Elite can be read as a good account of what was taking place in America at the time it was written, but its underlying question of whether America is as democratic in practice as it is in theory continues to matter very much today.
What The Power Elite informed readers of in 1956 was how much the organization of power in America had changed during their lifetimes, and Alan Wolfe's astute afterword to this new edition brings us up to date, illustrating how much more has changed since then. Wolfe sorts out what is helpful in Mills' book and which of his predictions have not come to bear, laying out the radical changes in American capitalism, from intense global competition and the collapse of communism to rapid technological transformations and ever changing consumer tastes. The Power Elite has stimulated generations of readers to think about the kind of society they have and the kind of society they might want, and deserves to be read by every new generation.
The above paragraphs were stolen from the information published about the book as a part of Goodreads. The book was originally published in 1956 and the brief criticism and review of the book that is included at the end of both the audible and e-book that I used was written in about 1998. As an indication of the lasting belief of the importance of this book, the audible version was not recorded until 2019.
Although I was a child during the beginning parts that this book covers, I felt that listening to the book was a reliving of how I remembered my experience growing up in a white suburb of Detroit Michigan. I thought the authors description of the temperature of the Times in the 1950s was very accurate. On the other hand the reflection on the meaning of the book that is appended to the book in the late 20th century possibly shows how much things have changed in the period 2000 to 2020. In the late 20th century the commentator thought Mills had kind of missed the point particularly about the military and talked as if the military had its job cut out in getting its way. As a person who was extremely involved in anti-militarism work in the 1980s particularly, I think this commentator kind of missed the point of what was happening with the military domination in the United States.
I am pretty much a strong supporter of the fact that there is a strong elite in the country that is making the decisions often behind closed doors. It is not exactly that things are done in secret as people stand outside the closed doors and kind of know what is happening but don’t really seem to get how to do much about it.
I found this book interesting as a retrospective view of a period of time that is often neglected in history. Eisenhower built the interstate highways and warrant of the military industrial complex. Both of had a major impact in the years that followed. I thought the one failure of this book was that it offered no suggestions about what people should do to overcome what Mills was suggesting was happening and would continue increasingly to happen.
What The Power Elite informed readers of in 1956 was how much the organization of power in America had changed during their lifetimes, and Alan Wolfe's astute afterword to this new edition brings us up to date, illustrating how much more has changed since then. Wolfe sorts out what is helpful in Mills' book and which of his predictions have not come to bear, laying out the radical changes in American capitalism, from intense global competition and the collapse of communism to rapid technological transformations and ever changing consumer tastes. The Power Elite has stimulated generations of readers to think about the kind of society they have and the kind of society they might want, and deserves to be read by every new generation.
The above paragraphs were stolen from the information published about the book as a part of Goodreads. The book was originally published in 1956 and the brief criticism and review of the book that is included at the end of both the audible and e-book that I used was written in about 1998. As an indication of the lasting belief of the importance of this book, the audible version was not recorded until 2019.
Although I was a child during the beginning parts that this book covers, I felt that listening to the book was a reliving of how I remembered my experience growing up in a white suburb of Detroit Michigan. I thought the authors description of the temperature of the Times in the 1950s was very accurate. On the other hand the reflection on the meaning of the book that is appended to the book in the late 20th century possibly shows how much things have changed in the period 2000 to 2020. In the late 20th century the commentator thought Mills had kind of missed the point particularly about the military and talked as if the military had its job cut out in getting its way. As a person who was extremely involved in anti-militarism work in the 1980s particularly, I think this commentator kind of missed the point of what was happening with the military domination in the United States.
I am pretty much a strong supporter of the fact that there is a strong elite in the country that is making the decisions often behind closed doors. It is not exactly that things are done in secret as people stand outside the closed doors and kind of know what is happening but don’t really seem to get how to do much about it.
I found this book interesting as a retrospective view of a period of time that is often neglected in history. Eisenhower built the interstate highways and warrant of the military industrial complex. Both of had a major impact in the years that followed. I thought the one failure of this book was that it offered no suggestions about what people should do to overcome what Mills was suggesting was happening and would continue increasingly to happen.
April 17, 2015
I read this book for my dissertation. It was fascinating. The author has a way with words. Basically this is the dude who invented The Man. Though his rants today might sound like the ramblings of any anti-elite stoner at a party, back in the day this was mind-blowing stuff. If you can put yourself in that headspace when you read the book it's pretty good, humorous, and insightful.
July 23, 2024
The term elite in its most general sense refers to those positions in society which are the summits of key social structure i.e., the higher positions in government, economy, politics, religion, etc. Pareto says, the word 'elite' implies superiority. He believes, 'elites' are the people, who, if awarded marks, will have the highest indices in their branch of activity.
For some, elites, are the decision-makers of the society, whose power is not subject to control by any other body in the society. Thus, the term elites refer to members of a top stratum, holding high status in the community. These members know one another and while making decisions, take one another into confidence, despite the fact that they mayor may not be knit together by strong group feelings, ethics or style.
The term elite is a relative one; it is relative to the community, and high status and sense of group are themselves relative attributes. The term 'elite' has been defined from various dimensions by different theorists. Vilfredo Pareto defines it as "people in a society who possess, in marked degree, qualities of intelligence, character, skill and capacity of whatever kind". Parry Geriant defines elites as "small minorities who appear to play an exceptionally influential part in political and social affairs".
Coming to C. Wright Mills, he defines it when he says that "elite is composed of men who have the most of what there is to have money, power and prestige who are able to realize their will, even if others resist it, whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary people and who are in positions to make decisions having major consequences". Elites are also defined as those minorities which are set apart from the rest of the society by their pre-eminence in one or more spheres of distribution of various privileges and benefits.
To Mills, power elites are those who make decisions of national significance. They include the "corporate rich," who are a kind of blend of the "very rich" and the chief executives of big business corporations; the important political heads, primarily the "fifty-odd men" at the top of the executive branch of the national government; and the top military leaders. None of the labor leaders, to whom the author mentioned in his 1948 study as the "new men of power," are included. Mills clarifies that while some labour leaders were members of the power elite in Roosevelt's administration, beginning with Truman's Fair Deal no labor leader can expect to be a member of the power elite.
This modern classic, penned in 1956, is divided into 15 chapters:
1. The Higher Circles
2. Local Society
3. Metropolitan 400
4. The Celebrities
5. The Very Rich
6. The Chief Executives
7. The Corporate Rich
8. The Warlords
9. The Military Ascendancy
10. The Political Directorate
11. The Theory of Balance
12. The Power Elite
13. The Mass Society
14. The Conservative Mood
15. The Higher Immorality
The implications and insinuations of this book are simply stupendous. Let us sum them up pointwise:
1) The emergence of politically new and economically developed nations has been one of the major features of change since the Second World War.
2) The social and economic development in these countries have been possible through the large-scale economic programmes, often government sponsored and government encouraged.
3) In the newly emerging nations, elites of various kinds are relatively in short supply. There are comparatively few persons possessing highly differentiated technical and professional skills and often there are few indigenous entrepreneurs, who think and act in terms of large-scale innovative operations, either in or out of government.
4) It is a fact that in the new and developing nations elites assume more importance by their sheer scarcity than in the older and more developed countries.
5) Even though small in numbers it is they, who lead and facilitate change, or oppose and hinder new developments. Their talents and initiative are crucial in getting new ideas accepted in the society, yet their function is also to maintain a continuity with the past and to preserve social integration.
6) They are the mediators and communicators, interest articulators and aggregators, creators and disseminators of culture, preservers of values, change leaders and standard makers of the general population.
7) The development of indigenous leaders having adequate training and experience assumes importance in the backdrop of the transformation of the former political dependencies into new states.
8) Political changes formally transferred political power from an old colonial elite, to an emergent elite. Planned economic and social change makes demand for new. skills and talents, and requires new personnel possessing these qualities.
To conclude, the social composition of elites is often linked to the political, economic and social developments in the newly emerging nations. Increased governmental functions, the democratization of the local self government institutions, new patterns of elite recruitment and socialization, the changing modes of interest articulation and aggregation, economic development, increased social welfare and educational opportunity, the spread of national citizenship and other developments change the social characteristic of elites.
This change affects the direction, tempo and content of future political, economic and social changes.
A classic and hence most recommended.
For some, elites, are the decision-makers of the society, whose power is not subject to control by any other body in the society. Thus, the term elites refer to members of a top stratum, holding high status in the community. These members know one another and while making decisions, take one another into confidence, despite the fact that they mayor may not be knit together by strong group feelings, ethics or style.
The term elite is a relative one; it is relative to the community, and high status and sense of group are themselves relative attributes. The term 'elite' has been defined from various dimensions by different theorists. Vilfredo Pareto defines it as "people in a society who possess, in marked degree, qualities of intelligence, character, skill and capacity of whatever kind". Parry Geriant defines elites as "small minorities who appear to play an exceptionally influential part in political and social affairs".
Coming to C. Wright Mills, he defines it when he says that "elite is composed of men who have the most of what there is to have money, power and prestige who are able to realize their will, even if others resist it, whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary people and who are in positions to make decisions having major consequences". Elites are also defined as those minorities which are set apart from the rest of the society by their pre-eminence in one or more spheres of distribution of various privileges and benefits.
To Mills, power elites are those who make decisions of national significance. They include the "corporate rich," who are a kind of blend of the "very rich" and the chief executives of big business corporations; the important political heads, primarily the "fifty-odd men" at the top of the executive branch of the national government; and the top military leaders. None of the labor leaders, to whom the author mentioned in his 1948 study as the "new men of power," are included. Mills clarifies that while some labour leaders were members of the power elite in Roosevelt's administration, beginning with Truman's Fair Deal no labor leader can expect to be a member of the power elite.
This modern classic, penned in 1956, is divided into 15 chapters:
1. The Higher Circles
2. Local Society
3. Metropolitan 400
4. The Celebrities
5. The Very Rich
6. The Chief Executives
7. The Corporate Rich
8. The Warlords
9. The Military Ascendancy
10. The Political Directorate
11. The Theory of Balance
12. The Power Elite
13. The Mass Society
14. The Conservative Mood
15. The Higher Immorality
The implications and insinuations of this book are simply stupendous. Let us sum them up pointwise:
1) The emergence of politically new and economically developed nations has been one of the major features of change since the Second World War.
2) The social and economic development in these countries have been possible through the large-scale economic programmes, often government sponsored and government encouraged.
3) In the newly emerging nations, elites of various kinds are relatively in short supply. There are comparatively few persons possessing highly differentiated technical and professional skills and often there are few indigenous entrepreneurs, who think and act in terms of large-scale innovative operations, either in or out of government.
4) It is a fact that in the new and developing nations elites assume more importance by their sheer scarcity than in the older and more developed countries.
5) Even though small in numbers it is they, who lead and facilitate change, or oppose and hinder new developments. Their talents and initiative are crucial in getting new ideas accepted in the society, yet their function is also to maintain a continuity with the past and to preserve social integration.
6) They are the mediators and communicators, interest articulators and aggregators, creators and disseminators of culture, preservers of values, change leaders and standard makers of the general population.
7) The development of indigenous leaders having adequate training and experience assumes importance in the backdrop of the transformation of the former political dependencies into new states.
8) Political changes formally transferred political power from an old colonial elite, to an emergent elite. Planned economic and social change makes demand for new. skills and talents, and requires new personnel possessing these qualities.
To conclude, the social composition of elites is often linked to the political, economic and social developments in the newly emerging nations. Increased governmental functions, the democratization of the local self government institutions, new patterns of elite recruitment and socialization, the changing modes of interest articulation and aggregation, economic development, increased social welfare and educational opportunity, the spread of national citizenship and other developments change the social characteristic of elites.
This change affects the direction, tempo and content of future political, economic and social changes.
A classic and hence most recommended.
November 11, 2025
C. Wright Mills’ The Power Elite (1956) remains one of the seminal works of twentieth-century sociology, notable for its trenchant critique of the concentration of power in modern American society. Written at the height of the Cold War and during the consolidation of U.S. global influence, the book offered a penetrating sociological analysis of the interlocking institutions that Mills argued dominated American life—politics, the military, and the corporate economy. In doing so, Mills provided a framework for understanding elite formation, structural power, and the erosion of democratic pluralism, themes that continue to resonate in contemporary analyses of governance, globalization, and inequality.
Mills’ central thesis is that a relatively small and cohesive group of individuals occupies commanding positions within the most powerful institutions of modern society, thereby constituting a “power elite.” This elite, he argues, is not simply a collection of wealthy individuals or political officeholders, but an interconnected stratum whose members share common backgrounds, interests, and outlooks. Through overlapping networks of education, socialization, and institutional mobility—most prominently among corporate boardrooms, the Pentagon, and political leadership—these elites form a self-reinforcing class that makes decisions with profound consequences for national and global affairs.
The book’s analysis is grounded in a sociological approach that synthesizes historical and structural perspectives. Mills rejects both the complacent pluralism of mid-century American political science and the reductionism of Marxist class theory. Against pluralists such as Robert Dahl, who emphasized the dispersal of power across competing interest groups, Mills contends that decision-making is in fact highly centralized. Yet unlike orthodox Marxists, Mills does not attribute this solely to economic ownership. Instead, he locates the power elite within a constellation of institutional hierarchies that transcend simple class distinctions, encompassing military and bureaucratic elites alongside corporate magnates. His analysis, therefore, prefigures later theories of the “military-industrial complex” and the technocratic state.
Stylistically, The Power Elite is distinguished by its rhetorical force and moral urgency. Mills writes not merely as an analyst but as a public intellectual committed to reviving what he calls the “sociological imagination”—the capacity to link individual experience with structural transformation. He warns that the centralization of power leads to an increasingly passive and manipulated public, producing what he terms the “mass society,” in which citizens are spectators rather than participants in political life. The book thus carries both empirical and normative dimensions: it is at once a sociological diagnosis and a democratic lament.
Critics at the time of publication accused Mills of exaggeration and of underestimating countervailing centers of power. Mainstream sociologists such as Talcott Parsons dismissed his work as polemical rather than rigorously theoretical. However, subsequent decades have largely vindicated Mills’ insights. His emphasis on institutional interlocks anticipated empirical studies of elite networks and corporate interdependence, while his critique of the fusion of military, corporate, and governmental authority proved prescient in light of Vietnam, the expansion of the national security state, and the globalization of corporate capitalism. Contemporary scholarship in political sociology, critical theory, and political economy continues to draw upon Mills’ conceptual vocabulary.
In retrospect, The Power Elite stands as a foundational text in the sociology of power. Its enduring relevance lies in its insistence that democracy cannot be understood apart from the institutional structures that shape decision-making and constrain public participation. Mills’ analysis transcends its immediate Cold War context to offer a more general account of how elites maintain dominance in ostensibly democratic societies. While subsequent empirical research has refined or qualified his claims, the conceptual clarity and moral conviction of Mills’ argument continue to inspire sociologists, political theorists, and historians concerned with the relationship between power, institutions, and democracy.
The Power Elite remains a work of profound intellectual and political significance. It combines empirical observation, theoretical synthesis, and moral critique in a way that few sociological texts have matched. Its enduring message—that democratic life depends upon vigilance against the concentration of institutional power—ensures its place as a classic not only of sociology but of modern political thought.
GPT
Mills’ central thesis is that a relatively small and cohesive group of individuals occupies commanding positions within the most powerful institutions of modern society, thereby constituting a “power elite.” This elite, he argues, is not simply a collection of wealthy individuals or political officeholders, but an interconnected stratum whose members share common backgrounds, interests, and outlooks. Through overlapping networks of education, socialization, and institutional mobility—most prominently among corporate boardrooms, the Pentagon, and political leadership—these elites form a self-reinforcing class that makes decisions with profound consequences for national and global affairs.
The book’s analysis is grounded in a sociological approach that synthesizes historical and structural perspectives. Mills rejects both the complacent pluralism of mid-century American political science and the reductionism of Marxist class theory. Against pluralists such as Robert Dahl, who emphasized the dispersal of power across competing interest groups, Mills contends that decision-making is in fact highly centralized. Yet unlike orthodox Marxists, Mills does not attribute this solely to economic ownership. Instead, he locates the power elite within a constellation of institutional hierarchies that transcend simple class distinctions, encompassing military and bureaucratic elites alongside corporate magnates. His analysis, therefore, prefigures later theories of the “military-industrial complex” and the technocratic state.
Stylistically, The Power Elite is distinguished by its rhetorical force and moral urgency. Mills writes not merely as an analyst but as a public intellectual committed to reviving what he calls the “sociological imagination”—the capacity to link individual experience with structural transformation. He warns that the centralization of power leads to an increasingly passive and manipulated public, producing what he terms the “mass society,” in which citizens are spectators rather than participants in political life. The book thus carries both empirical and normative dimensions: it is at once a sociological diagnosis and a democratic lament.
Critics at the time of publication accused Mills of exaggeration and of underestimating countervailing centers of power. Mainstream sociologists such as Talcott Parsons dismissed his work as polemical rather than rigorously theoretical. However, subsequent decades have largely vindicated Mills’ insights. His emphasis on institutional interlocks anticipated empirical studies of elite networks and corporate interdependence, while his critique of the fusion of military, corporate, and governmental authority proved prescient in light of Vietnam, the expansion of the national security state, and the globalization of corporate capitalism. Contemporary scholarship in political sociology, critical theory, and political economy continues to draw upon Mills’ conceptual vocabulary.
In retrospect, The Power Elite stands as a foundational text in the sociology of power. Its enduring relevance lies in its insistence that democracy cannot be understood apart from the institutional structures that shape decision-making and constrain public participation. Mills’ analysis transcends its immediate Cold War context to offer a more general account of how elites maintain dominance in ostensibly democratic societies. While subsequent empirical research has refined or qualified his claims, the conceptual clarity and moral conviction of Mills’ argument continue to inspire sociologists, political theorists, and historians concerned with the relationship between power, institutions, and democracy.
The Power Elite remains a work of profound intellectual and political significance. It combines empirical observation, theoretical synthesis, and moral critique in a way that few sociological texts have matched. Its enduring message—that democratic life depends upon vigilance against the concentration of institutional power—ensures its place as a classic not only of sociology but of modern political thought.
GPT
June 3, 2015
Review title: Needs a real new edition
The "new edition" of this edition of this 1950's social science classic is nothing more than a reprint with a short 15-page critical essay from 2000 tacked on the end. What it really needs is a real and extensive updating to be read as anything other than a work limited by and to the time and place of its creation.
I first read The Power Elite as a student of history and government in the late 1970s, when much of the criticism and commentary that Mills aimed at the economic, political, and military elites he saw leading the country remained valid. These three groups of leaders made up the "power elite", replacing the leadership classes of aristocracy, nobility, royalty, philosophy, and property that in other times and geographies provided a tight-knit, disconnected, closed, and enforced (through arms and law) leadership class. In the America of mid-Twentieth century, this new power elite managed its three spheres of influence through social ties (Mills stresses the role of educational institutions like boarding schools and Ivy League universities), family ties, and corporate-government ties. It was a leadership group without formal boundaries or legal authority, growing and refreshing through knowledge and efficiency, and tied to its "mass society" (Mills's term) through public relations, marketing, and political campaigning.
For the time, Mills was mostly right, but my how times have changed! Mills missed and failed to predict huge shifts in the economic and political landscape of the world:
The big box explosion--the Walmartification of America that emptied out Main Street, which in Mills's analysis was both the source and the subject of the power elite. No longer. Corporate America is now global, and America's Main Street is only a consumer, not a provider of talent and direction.
The entrepreneurial explosion--the hardware, software, and services that didn't exist then have now provided an outlet for that talent and direction that is no longer "elite" but far more powerful. What would Mills say about an Apple corporation that now has the highest aggregate stock valuation in the U.S.?
The globalization explosion-Mills never envisioned the global economy as it exists today. Corporations are no longer just international but globally managed, financed, and staffed. While this change has had positive (lower prices, new markets) and negative (lowered wages and standards of living in the U.S.) benefits, the power elite as Mills wrote no longer exists.
The security explosion-even the 2000 afterward was written before the defining event of the new century, which heralded a new societal, economic, and military reality that reshaped governing, governance, and the response of the governed.
The media implosion-Mills relied on the power of an increasingly centralized media to control and manage the sheep-lead public he posited, a power which indeed amplified and controlled public opinion for the next few decades until the disenfranchised (Nixon's "Silent majority") had grown disenchanted with their lack of voice, and broadcasting had become narrowcasting.
The social network explosion--The technology-enabled voice which roared has already played roles in toppling governments and shaping and amplifying the no longer silent majority.
The point is not that Mills was wrong then, but that the world has changed so much that he is no longer right now. Updating the theory would take a major update throughout, not just a tacked-on critical essay. It might be time.
The "new edition" of this edition of this 1950's social science classic is nothing more than a reprint with a short 15-page critical essay from 2000 tacked on the end. What it really needs is a real and extensive updating to be read as anything other than a work limited by and to the time and place of its creation.
I first read The Power Elite as a student of history and government in the late 1970s, when much of the criticism and commentary that Mills aimed at the economic, political, and military elites he saw leading the country remained valid. These three groups of leaders made up the "power elite", replacing the leadership classes of aristocracy, nobility, royalty, philosophy, and property that in other times and geographies provided a tight-knit, disconnected, closed, and enforced (through arms and law) leadership class. In the America of mid-Twentieth century, this new power elite managed its three spheres of influence through social ties (Mills stresses the role of educational institutions like boarding schools and Ivy League universities), family ties, and corporate-government ties. It was a leadership group without formal boundaries or legal authority, growing and refreshing through knowledge and efficiency, and tied to its "mass society" (Mills's term) through public relations, marketing, and political campaigning.
For the time, Mills was mostly right, but my how times have changed! Mills missed and failed to predict huge shifts in the economic and political landscape of the world:
The big box explosion--the Walmartification of America that emptied out Main Street, which in Mills's analysis was both the source and the subject of the power elite. No longer. Corporate America is now global, and America's Main Street is only a consumer, not a provider of talent and direction.
The entrepreneurial explosion--the hardware, software, and services that didn't exist then have now provided an outlet for that talent and direction that is no longer "elite" but far more powerful. What would Mills say about an Apple corporation that now has the highest aggregate stock valuation in the U.S.?
The globalization explosion-Mills never envisioned the global economy as it exists today. Corporations are no longer just international but globally managed, financed, and staffed. While this change has had positive (lower prices, new markets) and negative (lowered wages and standards of living in the U.S.) benefits, the power elite as Mills wrote no longer exists.
The security explosion-even the 2000 afterward was written before the defining event of the new century, which heralded a new societal, economic, and military reality that reshaped governing, governance, and the response of the governed.
The media implosion-Mills relied on the power of an increasingly centralized media to control and manage the sheep-lead public he posited, a power which indeed amplified and controlled public opinion for the next few decades until the disenfranchised (Nixon's "Silent majority") had grown disenchanted with their lack of voice, and broadcasting had become narrowcasting.
The social network explosion--The technology-enabled voice which roared has already played roles in toppling governments and shaping and amplifying the no longer silent majority.
The point is not that Mills was wrong then, but that the world has changed so much that he is no longer right now. Updating the theory would take a major update throughout, not just a tacked-on critical essay. It might be time.
April 10, 2010
First published in 1956, this was a classic in sociology at the time. The focus of this book? The American power elite, of whom Mills says (Page 3): "The power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences." In this volume, Mills seeks to identify the power elite of the United
States at the time.
He notes a variety of venues from which the power elite comes. Among these: local society (small city elites), the Metropolitan 400 (big city upper class), celebrities, the very rich, the chief executives, the corporate rich, and the warlords. He speaks in some detail of the "military ascendancy" and "the political directorate." These various groups interact with one another, furthering their interests, shaping decisions that affect Americans' lives.
A book of its time, somewhat simplistic in its outlining of the elite, but--nonetheless--a classic. This work inspired much research and commentary. It is somewhat dated now (not surprising, given its age), but is still of historical interest.
States at the time.
He notes a variety of venues from which the power elite comes. Among these: local society (small city elites), the Metropolitan 400 (big city upper class), celebrities, the very rich, the chief executives, the corporate rich, and the warlords. He speaks in some detail of the "military ascendancy" and "the political directorate." These various groups interact with one another, furthering their interests, shaping decisions that affect Americans' lives.
A book of its time, somewhat simplistic in its outlining of the elite, but--nonetheless--a classic. This work inspired much research and commentary. It is somewhat dated now (not surprising, given its age), but is still of historical interest.
February 12, 2012
Not as good as I had hoped, it's more in the line of: "I assemble this information so as to inspire action by the downtrodden masses." It was interesting to me how much political influence he ascribed to the Military, which I don't entirely trust, even given the era the book is analyzing (early Cold War).
The problem for Mills is:
1. Our elite is incompetent
2. Our elite is not democratic enough
Now, there are situations in which both propositions could hold, but as a general rule, and despite their both being fundamentals goals of American internal and foreign politics to this day, they are generally incompatible, or negatively correlated elite qualities.
I am no longer able to comprehend the mindset which believes that simply pointing out power differentials is, in itself, an argument for anything.
The problem for Mills is:
1. Our elite is incompetent
2. Our elite is not democratic enough
Now, there are situations in which both propositions could hold, but as a general rule, and despite their both being fundamentals goals of American internal and foreign politics to this day, they are generally incompatible, or negatively correlated elite qualities.
I am no longer able to comprehend the mindset which believes that simply pointing out power differentials is, in itself, an argument for anything.
April 17, 2020
More like 2.5 rounded up... but that's mostly because I really didn't like the writing style.
This book read like a college lecture - a dull one. It was dry and did NOT draw me in. Also, not its fault, but the material was out of date - I would love to see a more modern spin on this concept. Too bored by this to even write a good review.
This book read like a college lecture - a dull one. It was dry and did NOT draw me in. Also, not its fault, but the material was out of date - I would love to see a more modern spin on this concept. Too bored by this to even write a good review.
December 4, 2020
Mills divides mid-20th century into three categories: the elite, the masses, and the rest. The elite are those from the upper echelons of the corporate, military, and political world. By the power elite, Mills means those whose decisions have “at least national consequences.” They rule the affairs of the USA and have no effective, counter power. (1)
The power elite are substantially intertwined. They move from one power center to the other. They groom their successors from the Ivy League schools, but that credential alone is not sufficient. To be initiated into the elite circles, one has to comport oneself in the right way, which means, certainly, dress, manner, lifestyle, which includes marrying the “all-American girl” (2), and being associated with and supported by the “synthetic celebrities” (3). But it especially means to conform to the implicit and explicit norms of those who hold the power of selection. Once in, apostasy is not tolerated, and one must be ever-mindful of the boundary that sets themselves apart from those who are, unlike themselves, a non-elite (4). Those from the outside find it hard to crack the code for entry into the elite circles.
The non-elite are the masses and those in the middle. As for the masses, well there’s not much to note other than they serve as appendages for the elite – voters to support the interests of the political types, soldier pawns to serve the interests of the military, and consumers who buy what the corporate elite sells. (5) Those in the middle are an unwitting lot. They are those who believe that they have a role to play. They believe that their world is one that operates in accordance with the Theory of Balance. They naively adhere to the central premise of a liberal democracy: no one is in control - it's the unseen hand for the economy, checks and balances in government, and all is well. While academics and pundits think about these things, they are wannabe elites, but they are, really, irrelevant.
Mills is not at all keen about his world. He wants the world of Washington, Adams and Jefferson. These gents read Voltaire and Locke. Ike, instead, read about cowboys and detectives. The corporate elite are not readers. They pretty much pay attention only to the bottom line. “Did they make money?” If not, why not?” This is a “higher immorality.” Getting and keeping money matter. Everything else is secondary. And, unlike the old aristocrats, what it takes to get to the top is the selling of the self in everyday life. It is a severely hallow, unsophisticated self. (6)
While much of Mills is right on target regarding the superficiality of modern life, his central themes are overdone. Yes, Washington, Adams and Jefferson were outstanding leaders for their time, but they were, nevertheless, elites who shaped the masses in foundational ways. So what if Ike, a most consequential military leader of the 20th century, liked to read cowboy and detective books? Let him take a breather from the responsibilities his world thrust upon him. And it’s a mistake to look at these interwoven wholes as, substantially, monolithic. They compete against each other, vigorously, and have different perspectives and worldviews. As tenuous as it might seem, and as much as the masses might seem to be mobbish, and as much as voters are manipulated, democracy on voting days can and does exert a tremendous amount of counter power. While some suck up to celebrity, many do not and they don’t engage in the power games of the elite. Instead, they want nothing but to have an ordinary, comfortable life, filled for the most part with honesty and decency.
Mills wants to return to a Golden Age where power was diffuse and where eliteness was truly, earned, but I suspect that this reflects a robust imagination. In all ages, power is concentrated. Eliteness is natural. While the scale is different, the underlying drivers remain substantially the same. The founding fathers of this country had outsized influence and every organization selects its own members. While there’s a difference between the aristocrats and the nouveau riche, it’s more about taste than conspicuousness. It’s hard to say that Newport, R.I. isn’t conspicuous. And between Mills’ Golden Age and now, mass – media and society – expresses what always has been there. Only the scale is vastly different.
It’s odd reading Mills. He is a very good writer, yet there’s a certain droning, boring quality about his style, as if he knows he’s good, but doesn’t know when to pull back on the reins.
(1) Mills makes a distinction between “ruling” and “class.” The former, he writes, “is a badly loaded phrase. ‘Class’ is an economic term; ‘rule’ a political one. The phrase, ‘ruling class,’ thus contains the theory that an economic class rules politically,” which is not his position.
(2) “The terms of her competition are quite clear: her professional stance is the stance of the woman for whom a haughty kind of unconquerable eroticism has become a way of life. It is the expensive look of an expensive woman who feels herself to be expensive. She has the look of a girl who knows her fate rests quite fully - even exclusively – upon the effect of her look upon a certain type of man….This is the queen – the all American girl – who, whether she be debutante or fashion model or professional entertainer, sets the images of appearance and conduct which are imitated down the national hierarchy of glamour, to the girls carefully trained and selected for the commercial display of erotic promise….The model’s money does not add up to much. But the men she meets have money, and her tastes quickly become expensive. The men she meets control careers, and she wants a career. She is of, but not solidly in, the world of breakfasts at noon and the long lunch. The all-American girl sits at the top of café society, and café society, we must remember, is a profitable set of businesses, supported by executives on expense accounts.”
(3) “The movie stars and the Broadway actress, the crooners and the TV clowns, are celebrities because of what they do on and to these media. They are celebrated because they are displayed as celebrities. If they are not thus celebrated, in due time – often very short – they lose their jobs. In them, the panic for status has become a professional craving: their very large image of self is dependent upon publicity, and they need increasing does of it. Often they seem to have celebrity and nothing else. Rather than being celebrated because they occupy positions of prestige, they occupy positions of prestige because they are celebrated. The basis of the celebration – in a strange and intricate way – is at once personal and synthetic: it is their Talent – which seems to mean their appearance value and their skill combined into what is known as A Personality.”
(4) New York City, Mill writes, sets the standard for eliteness and cities in the Midwest “ape those in the East.”
(5) While this Mill quote is not about advertising per se, it nevertheless pertains: “Among those whom Americans honor none is so ubiquitous as the young girl. It is as if Americans had undertaken to paint a continuing national portrait of the girls as Queen. Everywhere one looks there is this glossy little animal, sometimes quite young and sometimes a little older, but always imagined, always pictured as The Girl. She sells beer and she sells books, cigarettes , and clothes; every night she is on the TV screen, and every week on every other page of the magazines, and at the movies too there she is.”
(6) Mills writes that “’the most important single factor, the effective personality,’ which ‘commands attention by charm,’ and ‘radiates self-confidence.’ In this ‘new way of life,’ one must smile often and be a good listener talk in terms of the other man’s interests and make the other feel important – and one must do all this sincerely. Personal relations, in short have become part of ‘public relations,’ a sacrifice of selfhood on a personality market, to the sole end of individual success in the corporate way of life.” Along the same line, Mill thinks that Veblen does not make the right distinction between old wealth and new wealth. “The Theory of the Leisure Class, is not the theory of the leisure class. I is a theory of a particular element of the upper classes in one period of the history of one nation. It is an account of the status struggle between new and old wealth and, in particular, it is an examination of the nouveau riche, so much in evidence in Veblen’s formative time, the America of the latter half of the nineteenth century, of the Vanderbilts, Goulds, and Harrimans, of Saratoga Springs and Newport, of the glitter and the gold….In depicting the higher style of American life, Veblen – like the actors of whom he writes – seems to confuse aristocratic and bourgeois traits.”
The power elite are substantially intertwined. They move from one power center to the other. They groom their successors from the Ivy League schools, but that credential alone is not sufficient. To be initiated into the elite circles, one has to comport oneself in the right way, which means, certainly, dress, manner, lifestyle, which includes marrying the “all-American girl” (2), and being associated with and supported by the “synthetic celebrities” (3). But it especially means to conform to the implicit and explicit norms of those who hold the power of selection. Once in, apostasy is not tolerated, and one must be ever-mindful of the boundary that sets themselves apart from those who are, unlike themselves, a non-elite (4). Those from the outside find it hard to crack the code for entry into the elite circles.
The non-elite are the masses and those in the middle. As for the masses, well there’s not much to note other than they serve as appendages for the elite – voters to support the interests of the political types, soldier pawns to serve the interests of the military, and consumers who buy what the corporate elite sells. (5) Those in the middle are an unwitting lot. They are those who believe that they have a role to play. They believe that their world is one that operates in accordance with the Theory of Balance. They naively adhere to the central premise of a liberal democracy: no one is in control - it's the unseen hand for the economy, checks and balances in government, and all is well. While academics and pundits think about these things, they are wannabe elites, but they are, really, irrelevant.
Mills is not at all keen about his world. He wants the world of Washington, Adams and Jefferson. These gents read Voltaire and Locke. Ike, instead, read about cowboys and detectives. The corporate elite are not readers. They pretty much pay attention only to the bottom line. “Did they make money?” If not, why not?” This is a “higher immorality.” Getting and keeping money matter. Everything else is secondary. And, unlike the old aristocrats, what it takes to get to the top is the selling of the self in everyday life. It is a severely hallow, unsophisticated self. (6)
While much of Mills is right on target regarding the superficiality of modern life, his central themes are overdone. Yes, Washington, Adams and Jefferson were outstanding leaders for their time, but they were, nevertheless, elites who shaped the masses in foundational ways. So what if Ike, a most consequential military leader of the 20th century, liked to read cowboy and detective books? Let him take a breather from the responsibilities his world thrust upon him. And it’s a mistake to look at these interwoven wholes as, substantially, monolithic. They compete against each other, vigorously, and have different perspectives and worldviews. As tenuous as it might seem, and as much as the masses might seem to be mobbish, and as much as voters are manipulated, democracy on voting days can and does exert a tremendous amount of counter power. While some suck up to celebrity, many do not and they don’t engage in the power games of the elite. Instead, they want nothing but to have an ordinary, comfortable life, filled for the most part with honesty and decency.
Mills wants to return to a Golden Age where power was diffuse and where eliteness was truly, earned, but I suspect that this reflects a robust imagination. In all ages, power is concentrated. Eliteness is natural. While the scale is different, the underlying drivers remain substantially the same. The founding fathers of this country had outsized influence and every organization selects its own members. While there’s a difference between the aristocrats and the nouveau riche, it’s more about taste than conspicuousness. It’s hard to say that Newport, R.I. isn’t conspicuous. And between Mills’ Golden Age and now, mass – media and society – expresses what always has been there. Only the scale is vastly different.
It’s odd reading Mills. He is a very good writer, yet there’s a certain droning, boring quality about his style, as if he knows he’s good, but doesn’t know when to pull back on the reins.
(1) Mills makes a distinction between “ruling” and “class.” The former, he writes, “is a badly loaded phrase. ‘Class’ is an economic term; ‘rule’ a political one. The phrase, ‘ruling class,’ thus contains the theory that an economic class rules politically,” which is not his position.
(2) “The terms of her competition are quite clear: her professional stance is the stance of the woman for whom a haughty kind of unconquerable eroticism has become a way of life. It is the expensive look of an expensive woman who feels herself to be expensive. She has the look of a girl who knows her fate rests quite fully - even exclusively – upon the effect of her look upon a certain type of man….This is the queen – the all American girl – who, whether she be debutante or fashion model or professional entertainer, sets the images of appearance and conduct which are imitated down the national hierarchy of glamour, to the girls carefully trained and selected for the commercial display of erotic promise….The model’s money does not add up to much. But the men she meets have money, and her tastes quickly become expensive. The men she meets control careers, and she wants a career. She is of, but not solidly in, the world of breakfasts at noon and the long lunch. The all-American girl sits at the top of café society, and café society, we must remember, is a profitable set of businesses, supported by executives on expense accounts.”
(3) “The movie stars and the Broadway actress, the crooners and the TV clowns, are celebrities because of what they do on and to these media. They are celebrated because they are displayed as celebrities. If they are not thus celebrated, in due time – often very short – they lose their jobs. In them, the panic for status has become a professional craving: their very large image of self is dependent upon publicity, and they need increasing does of it. Often they seem to have celebrity and nothing else. Rather than being celebrated because they occupy positions of prestige, they occupy positions of prestige because they are celebrated. The basis of the celebration – in a strange and intricate way – is at once personal and synthetic: it is their Talent – which seems to mean their appearance value and their skill combined into what is known as A Personality.”
(4) New York City, Mill writes, sets the standard for eliteness and cities in the Midwest “ape those in the East.”
(5) While this Mill quote is not about advertising per se, it nevertheless pertains: “Among those whom Americans honor none is so ubiquitous as the young girl. It is as if Americans had undertaken to paint a continuing national portrait of the girls as Queen. Everywhere one looks there is this glossy little animal, sometimes quite young and sometimes a little older, but always imagined, always pictured as The Girl. She sells beer and she sells books, cigarettes , and clothes; every night she is on the TV screen, and every week on every other page of the magazines, and at the movies too there she is.”
(6) Mills writes that “’the most important single factor, the effective personality,’ which ‘commands attention by charm,’ and ‘radiates self-confidence.’ In this ‘new way of life,’ one must smile often and be a good listener talk in terms of the other man’s interests and make the other feel important – and one must do all this sincerely. Personal relations, in short have become part of ‘public relations,’ a sacrifice of selfhood on a personality market, to the sole end of individual success in the corporate way of life.” Along the same line, Mill thinks that Veblen does not make the right distinction between old wealth and new wealth. “The Theory of the Leisure Class, is not the theory of the leisure class. I is a theory of a particular element of the upper classes in one period of the history of one nation. It is an account of the status struggle between new and old wealth and, in particular, it is an examination of the nouveau riche, so much in evidence in Veblen’s formative time, the America of the latter half of the nineteenth century, of the Vanderbilts, Goulds, and Harrimans, of Saratoga Springs and Newport, of the glitter and the gold….In depicting the higher style of American life, Veblen – like the actors of whom he writes – seems to confuse aristocratic and bourgeois traits.”
March 2, 2018
But not all men are ordinary, some men come to occupy positions in American society from which they can look down upon, so to speak, and by their decisions mightily affect, the everyday worlds of ordinary men and women. They are not made by their jobs; they set up and break down jobs for thousands of others; they are not confined by simple family responsibilities; they can escape. They may live in many hotels and houses, but they are bound by no one community. What Jacob Burckhardt said of ‘great men,’ most Americans might well say of their elite: ‘They are all that we are not.’
If we took the one hundred most powerful men in America, the one hundred wealthiest, and the one hundred most celebrated away from the institutional positions they now occupy, away from their resources of men and women and money, away from the media of mass communication that are now focused upon them—then they would be powerless and poor and uncelebrated. For power is not of a man. Wealth does not center in the person of the wealthy. Celebrity is not inherent in any personality. To be celebrated, to be wealthy, to have power requires access to major institutions.
More generally, American men of power tend, by convention, to deny that they are powerful. No American runs for office in order to rule or even govern, but only to serve; he does not become a bureaucrat or even an official, but a public servant. And nowadays, as I have already pointed out, such postures have become standard features of the public-relations programs of all men of power.
If we took the one hundred most powerful men in America, the one hundred wealthiest, and the one hundred most celebrated away from the institutional positions they now occupy, away from their resources of men and women and money, away from the media of mass communication that are now focused upon them—then they would be powerless and poor and uncelebrated. For power is not of a man. Wealth does not center in the person of the wealthy. Celebrity is not inherent in any personality. To be celebrated, to be wealthy, to have power requires access to major institutions.
More generally, American men of power tend, by convention, to deny that they are powerful. No American runs for office in order to rule or even govern, but only to serve; he does not become a bureaucrat or even an official, but a public servant. And nowadays, as I have already pointed out, such postures have become standard features of the public-relations programs of all men of power.
October 4, 2025
جامعۀ تودهوار / Mass Society در واقع فقط فصل سیزدهم کتاب The Power Elite از سی. رایت میلزه. نسخۀ کاملش هنوز به فارسی ترجمه نشده. من این فصل در واقع دوبار خوندهم، یکبار به انگلیسی و یکبار هم به فارسی (همین ترجمه).
مدعای میلز در این فصل اینه که جمع دموکراتیک در آمریکا رو به زواله و یه جامعۀ تودهدار ظهور کرده. معتقده رسانههای گروهی در دست افراد محدودیه و تفاوت نسبت گویندگان عقاید و گیرندگانش انقد زیاده که امکان پاسخدهی بسیار کمه. و عملاً ارادهی سیاسی و دموکراتیک جمع مخدوش شده. رسانههای گروهی نهتنها اندیشه و رفتار مردم رو «دستکاری» و «تجربۀ» مردم رو «هدایت» میکنن بلکه باعث بروز یک نوع «بیسوادی روانی جمعی» شدهن. میلز جامعۀ تودهوار رو یه جامعۀ مادرشهری میدونه. مادرشهر انسانها رو در محیطها و قالبهای محدود زندانی میکنه. امکان مباحثه و تدقیق در ایدههای جدید از بین میره و انسانها در مادرشهر فقط پذیرای افراد و عقایدی شبیه به خودشونن.
سی. رایت میلز متأسفانه خیلی زود، در ۴۵ سالگی و در سال ۱۹۶۲، از دنیا رفت و هیچوقت نتونست عصر همهگیری اینترنت رو ببینه. شاید مهمترین چیزی که باعث بشه این کتاب -با اینکه هنوز مهمه- اثری قدیمی باشه و به خیلی مسائل امروزیتر نتونه پاسخ بده، همینه. مسئلهی نویسنده «رسانه» و «ارتباط» بود و خب الآن اینترنت یه انقلاب بنیانفکن در این زمینهست که تمامی مناسبات ارتباطی، سیاسی، اجتماعی، و روانی رو دگرگون کرده.
پ.ن: این رو هم بگم که هرجا کلمهی جمع اومده معادل public در انگلیسیست.
مدعای میلز در این فصل اینه که جمع دموکراتیک در آمریکا رو به زواله و یه جامعۀ تودهدار ظهور کرده. معتقده رسانههای گروهی در دست افراد محدودیه و تفاوت نسبت گویندگان عقاید و گیرندگانش انقد زیاده که امکان پاسخدهی بسیار کمه. و عملاً ارادهی سیاسی و دموکراتیک جمع مخدوش شده. رسانههای گروهی نهتنها اندیشه و رفتار مردم رو «دستکاری» و «تجربۀ» مردم رو «هدایت» میکنن بلکه باعث بروز یک نوع «بیسوادی روانی جمعی» شدهن. میلز جامعۀ تودهوار رو یه جامعۀ مادرشهری میدونه. مادرشهر انسانها رو در محیطها و قالبهای محدود زندانی میکنه. امکان مباحثه و تدقیق در ایدههای جدید از بین میره و انسانها در مادرشهر فقط پذیرای افراد و عقایدی شبیه به خودشونن.
سی. رایت میلز متأسفانه خیلی زود، در ۴۵ سالگی و در سال ۱۹۶۲، از دنیا رفت و هیچوقت نتونست عصر همهگیری اینترنت رو ببینه. شاید مهمترین چیزی که باعث بشه این کتاب -با اینکه هنوز مهمه- اثری قدیمی باشه و به خیلی مسائل امروزیتر نتونه پاسخ بده، همینه. مسئلهی نویسنده «رسانه» و «ارتباط» بود و خب الآن اینترنت یه انقلاب بنیانفکن در این زمینهست که تمامی مناسبات ارتباطی، سیاسی، اجتماعی، و روانی رو دگرگون کرده.
پ.ن: این رو هم بگم که هرجا کلمهی جمع اومده معادل public در انگلیسیست.
March 2, 2020
At the beginning of the book, the discussion of traditional elites seemed dated. After that, a number of descriptions of changes to the corporations and political structures sounded like shifts I had thought took place in the last 45 years. But then as I continued with the book, it began to seem long and my mind drifted more than usual when reading. I wouldn't say the writing style is academic, but the last 60 pages (over 10% of the book) is acknowledgements and notes.
The book may give some readers a perspective by seeing a 1950's view, but there can be a question of what does and doesn't apply as much today. From my perspective, it seemed Mills looked at the powerful and decision-makers in an official capacity (corporate executives, government officials and military leaders.) He explains how these people tend to come from privileged backgrounds and they tend to associate with others of privilege. I can see that this may result in these officials generally seeing eye-to-eye with the super-rich. (And I understand the super-rich don't all see things exactly the same.) But Mills doesn't view power as coming from large stockholders and the Board of Directors to corporate executives, or otherwise the super-rich applying their power to those in official capacities when they see reason to. Mills says the amount of campaign money in the 1950's didn't indicate much financial influence, and perhaps that was true and has changed since. It would be interesting to see what Mills would conclude today.
Mills presents a case for an increasing role of military leaders in power. I'm more inclined to view the post-WWII US expanding its "sphere of influence" to the globe for similar reasons as its earlier expansionism. The fact that existing elites depended on the military to accomplish their goals did give the military more bargaining power. But what was the primary influence here? The military could ask for more, but how much would they have gotten if pork-barrel politicians and military contractors didn't also lobby to get those extra projects? In recent years, I've heard of cases where the Pentagon budget had items which the military didn't ask for and said weren't needed.
US expansionism and militarism didn't start in 1945. Before that, it bought Florida, the Louisiana Purchase, Alaska and US Virgin Islands. Waged war on native peoples. Seized the western territories via the Mexican-American War. Annexed Hawaii from the natives (with help of sugar companies.) "Gunboat diplomacy" with Japan. Took Puerto Rico and the Phillipines via the Spanish-American War. Considered a "54-40 or Fight" war with Canada. The Monroe Doctrine and such spheres of influence claims. The Marines intervened "From the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli." That's all before Mills says the military became part of the power elite. I ask: how much was the military the dog wagging the civilian government "tail," or the other way around? History suggests that global aspiration was there all along.
Mills objects to the idea of a "ruling class" as a simplification. And that's true in some ways. Different billionaires acquire their money from different industries, companies and locations, therefore billionaires have policy differences. Billionaires don't want discriminatory laws that could affect them, but some let politicians enact discrimination laws so conservative politicians will be re-elected or because those discriminatory laws help hold down wages. Billionaires may differ on the best way to reach their common goals. There's no upper class which agrees on everything and directly implements those agreed-on policies. But does saying the general pattern in our society is that the wealthy call the shots and get what they want to a greater degree than other segments of society give a basic concept of how to anticipate events? It's not absolute power, but it's the most fundamental power.
Perhaps, the kind of person who pushes himself up to the top corporate, political or military posts generally is inclined to act in a way favorable to the rich. Then, in general, billionaires have limited need to intervene in these areas. When exceptions arise, certain billionaires use their influence. This isn't a "ruling class" in the sense of the wealthy micro-managing every decision.
Mills argues that in Thomas Jefferson's day, personal fortunes weren't as large and a nation's wealth was dispersed between more people, and this limited the corrupting power of money. Perhaps, some shift occurred. But in Jefferson's day, only 6% of Americans were allowed to vote - and even then the 1% kept more power via the Electoral College, selection of US Senators by state legislatures, etc. Voting restrictions specifically excluded those who weren't affluent. Slavery existed - and although "all men are created equal," new born babies of slave women weren't treated as equal to non-slaves. Land was seized from native peoples. At the Constitutional Convention, slaveholders insisted slaves were neither people nor property for tax purposes. While under the Articles of Confederation slave states didn't count slaves in determining state legislature districts, at the Constitutional Convention they demanded at least some of the slaves be counted in determining Congressional districts. This doesn't sound like a highly moral good-old-days to me.
The book may give some readers a perspective by seeing a 1950's view, but there can be a question of what does and doesn't apply as much today. From my perspective, it seemed Mills looked at the powerful and decision-makers in an official capacity (corporate executives, government officials and military leaders.) He explains how these people tend to come from privileged backgrounds and they tend to associate with others of privilege. I can see that this may result in these officials generally seeing eye-to-eye with the super-rich. (And I understand the super-rich don't all see things exactly the same.) But Mills doesn't view power as coming from large stockholders and the Board of Directors to corporate executives, or otherwise the super-rich applying their power to those in official capacities when they see reason to. Mills says the amount of campaign money in the 1950's didn't indicate much financial influence, and perhaps that was true and has changed since. It would be interesting to see what Mills would conclude today.
Mills presents a case for an increasing role of military leaders in power. I'm more inclined to view the post-WWII US expanding its "sphere of influence" to the globe for similar reasons as its earlier expansionism. The fact that existing elites depended on the military to accomplish their goals did give the military more bargaining power. But what was the primary influence here? The military could ask for more, but how much would they have gotten if pork-barrel politicians and military contractors didn't also lobby to get those extra projects? In recent years, I've heard of cases where the Pentagon budget had items which the military didn't ask for and said weren't needed.
US expansionism and militarism didn't start in 1945. Before that, it bought Florida, the Louisiana Purchase, Alaska and US Virgin Islands. Waged war on native peoples. Seized the western territories via the Mexican-American War. Annexed Hawaii from the natives (with help of sugar companies.) "Gunboat diplomacy" with Japan. Took Puerto Rico and the Phillipines via the Spanish-American War. Considered a "54-40 or Fight" war with Canada. The Monroe Doctrine and such spheres of influence claims. The Marines intervened "From the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli." That's all before Mills says the military became part of the power elite. I ask: how much was the military the dog wagging the civilian government "tail," or the other way around? History suggests that global aspiration was there all along.
Mills objects to the idea of a "ruling class" as a simplification. And that's true in some ways. Different billionaires acquire their money from different industries, companies and locations, therefore billionaires have policy differences. Billionaires don't want discriminatory laws that could affect them, but some let politicians enact discrimination laws so conservative politicians will be re-elected or because those discriminatory laws help hold down wages. Billionaires may differ on the best way to reach their common goals. There's no upper class which agrees on everything and directly implements those agreed-on policies. But does saying the general pattern in our society is that the wealthy call the shots and get what they want to a greater degree than other segments of society give a basic concept of how to anticipate events? It's not absolute power, but it's the most fundamental power.
Perhaps, the kind of person who pushes himself up to the top corporate, political or military posts generally is inclined to act in a way favorable to the rich. Then, in general, billionaires have limited need to intervene in these areas. When exceptions arise, certain billionaires use their influence. This isn't a "ruling class" in the sense of the wealthy micro-managing every decision.
Mills argues that in Thomas Jefferson's day, personal fortunes weren't as large and a nation's wealth was dispersed between more people, and this limited the corrupting power of money. Perhaps, some shift occurred. But in Jefferson's day, only 6% of Americans were allowed to vote - and even then the 1% kept more power via the Electoral College, selection of US Senators by state legislatures, etc. Voting restrictions specifically excluded those who weren't affluent. Slavery existed - and although "all men are created equal," new born babies of slave women weren't treated as equal to non-slaves. Land was seized from native peoples. At the Constitutional Convention, slaveholders insisted slaves were neither people nor property for tax purposes. While under the Articles of Confederation slave states didn't count slaves in determining state legislature districts, at the Constitutional Convention they demanded at least some of the slaves be counted in determining Congressional districts. This doesn't sound like a highly moral good-old-days to me.
October 31, 2020
Although the author seems a little self-satisfied at times in my opinion, this is still a really interesting look at power in America - especially considering how much, or how little, things have changed since its publication over 60 years ago.
November 11, 2021
I thought it was a very interesting piece of writing about power in the US. Its analysis though outdated is still relevant in most places in the world. It also almost explains ' Trump '.
April 15, 2023
Dated and many insights are not generalizable.
July 24, 2016
One of the better books on the subject. Classic text of sociology from the 1950's that still holds true (more or less) today.
Describes the inner circles of power in America in the post-war world with rare insight for the time. Of particular interest is the logic of the mutual exclusive re-enforcement of “right” based solely on money. Common rhetoric now, yet novel then.
Was thinking the other day along these lines why more wealth tends to exclude less wealth.
Why is the person with more money the near universal object of envy or added respect or attention (even for those who have humanistic or religious reasons to think otherwise)?
Someone who lives well, happy, free, intelligent, with no unnecessary manufactured desires & every need satisfied is not necessarily worse off than the man with tens of billions.
Yet, the mystique of the man with wealth who excludes everyone but those of similar means typically lends itself toward top-appraisal socially rather than the contented middle or even upper-middle classes.
At the root of the magnetic enchantment of wealth is, I think, a deep seated insecurity nearly universal to human nature throughout history.
The security of private ownership is typically protected (without coercion) by an agreed upon (or unspoken) understanding amongst those who have more money to band together socially in order to protect what is held privately from those who have less.
Those with less are typically more prone to betray or transgress the sanctity of the property of those with more, either by political, social, or (more fundamentally) violent means.
This is deeply embedded in history, no doubt.
Even when the potential for transgression is remote or when wealth is culturally given to social charity for benevolent reasons, the instinct to emphasize the overarching right of wealth remains universal in human consciousness.
Many who have wealth might think it crass to say that wealth is the key to social status, yet historically this seems to be the case.
The insecurity of non-propertied persons tends toward the desire to take what others have or to at least de-emphasize the importance of having an elite excess above needs.
The insecurity of elite propertied persons tends toward the fear of loss from the jealous mob with the means of seizure. A common trope now to be sure, but novel in Mills' day.
Naturally, the best way to protect what one has is to associate with others who have likewise.
“Right” to determine what is “right” by means of wealth is often based on the exclusion of the those who question why having more stuff is always better than having less in terms of preference for social power.
Mills writes, for instance, that the upper-middle loves talking about "status relations".
Likewise, the sports team with the best players loves talking about sports to the disgust of everyone else.
Whereas the middle is terrified to even think that social status is important (while knowing full-well what lies behind the taboo).
The “rich-out-of-sight” have no insecurity about money whatsoever making the question moot for the most part.
Moreover, the “rich-out-of-sight” have this in common with the working class who have no upward aspiration to begin with & therefore no real status anxiety other than the honest meeting of basic material needs.
From this often derives the typical “reverse snobbery” that tends to afflict the traditional middle classes historically, i.e. mockery of every petty assertion of “right” other than the absolute right of property set by the very top of the pyramid.
In Mill's time this was not popularly advertised. Now however this kind of thing is drummed into the popular consciousness by cultural Marxist propaganda ad nausea to the point where any middle class pretension has been reviled ruthlessly in arts & media.
One of the better lines in the book is the typical attitude by the so-called “power elite” toward those who advocate some other social measure than money (for example, intelligence) “if you're so smart then why aren't you rich?”.
Another related theme discussed by Mills is the way in which success is measured by money, then more money is gained from success.
In other words:
Why should we accept so & so for this coveted prize, position, honor, office, spoil, etc.?
Because he is successful.
How do we know he is successful?
He makes a lot of money.
O.K. lets accept him.
Then of course the successful person who has a lot of money will make more which will of course lead to more spoils.
That's where, Mill's believes, the whole elitist enterprise comes from or fundamentally sustains itself.
This is all very duh or banal by today's standards to be sure.
Nevertheless, the book is chock full of interesting social history about the way in which the world is hopelessly structured toward an irrational system of control or governance by brute property, for whatever its worth.
Well worth the read however.
Describes the inner circles of power in America in the post-war world with rare insight for the time. Of particular interest is the logic of the mutual exclusive re-enforcement of “right” based solely on money. Common rhetoric now, yet novel then.
Was thinking the other day along these lines why more wealth tends to exclude less wealth.
Why is the person with more money the near universal object of envy or added respect or attention (even for those who have humanistic or religious reasons to think otherwise)?
Someone who lives well, happy, free, intelligent, with no unnecessary manufactured desires & every need satisfied is not necessarily worse off than the man with tens of billions.
Yet, the mystique of the man with wealth who excludes everyone but those of similar means typically lends itself toward top-appraisal socially rather than the contented middle or even upper-middle classes.
At the root of the magnetic enchantment of wealth is, I think, a deep seated insecurity nearly universal to human nature throughout history.
The security of private ownership is typically protected (without coercion) by an agreed upon (or unspoken) understanding amongst those who have more money to band together socially in order to protect what is held privately from those who have less.
Those with less are typically more prone to betray or transgress the sanctity of the property of those with more, either by political, social, or (more fundamentally) violent means.
This is deeply embedded in history, no doubt.
Even when the potential for transgression is remote or when wealth is culturally given to social charity for benevolent reasons, the instinct to emphasize the overarching right of wealth remains universal in human consciousness.
Many who have wealth might think it crass to say that wealth is the key to social status, yet historically this seems to be the case.
The insecurity of non-propertied persons tends toward the desire to take what others have or to at least de-emphasize the importance of having an elite excess above needs.
The insecurity of elite propertied persons tends toward the fear of loss from the jealous mob with the means of seizure. A common trope now to be sure, but novel in Mills' day.
Naturally, the best way to protect what one has is to associate with others who have likewise.
“Right” to determine what is “right” by means of wealth is often based on the exclusion of the those who question why having more stuff is always better than having less in terms of preference for social power.
Mills writes, for instance, that the upper-middle loves talking about "status relations".
Likewise, the sports team with the best players loves talking about sports to the disgust of everyone else.
Whereas the middle is terrified to even think that social status is important (while knowing full-well what lies behind the taboo).
The “rich-out-of-sight” have no insecurity about money whatsoever making the question moot for the most part.
Moreover, the “rich-out-of-sight” have this in common with the working class who have no upward aspiration to begin with & therefore no real status anxiety other than the honest meeting of basic material needs.
From this often derives the typical “reverse snobbery” that tends to afflict the traditional middle classes historically, i.e. mockery of every petty assertion of “right” other than the absolute right of property set by the very top of the pyramid.
In Mill's time this was not popularly advertised. Now however this kind of thing is drummed into the popular consciousness by cultural Marxist propaganda ad nausea to the point where any middle class pretension has been reviled ruthlessly in arts & media.
One of the better lines in the book is the typical attitude by the so-called “power elite” toward those who advocate some other social measure than money (for example, intelligence) “if you're so smart then why aren't you rich?”.
Another related theme discussed by Mills is the way in which success is measured by money, then more money is gained from success.
In other words:
Why should we accept so & so for this coveted prize, position, honor, office, spoil, etc.?
Because he is successful.
How do we know he is successful?
He makes a lot of money.
O.K. lets accept him.
Then of course the successful person who has a lot of money will make more which will of course lead to more spoils.
That's where, Mill's believes, the whole elitist enterprise comes from or fundamentally sustains itself.
This is all very duh or banal by today's standards to be sure.
Nevertheless, the book is chock full of interesting social history about the way in which the world is hopelessly structured toward an irrational system of control or governance by brute property, for whatever its worth.
Well worth the read however.
February 14, 2025
The Mighty Powerfool
kicking myself for not deciding to become a damned intellectual
kicking myself for not deciding to become a damned intellectual
June 21, 2012
I just picked this book up on a whim, cynically imagining that, even after 56 years, it may have some salience to the current American political structure. I was not disappointed. Or rather, I was, if only in our body electorate.
Having just finished watching the Zeitgeist Trilogy, perhaps I was primed for a work that many may consider a conspiratorial treatise. I won't deny that I was seeking independent verification of my own hypotheses, but I would be open to reading a counterpoint to this work, so long as it was as thoroughly researched and annotated as Mr Mills' book.
As this book was written during the Eisenhower administration, it is interesting to note that Ike himself warned us of what he termed "the military-industrial complex". Mills makes mention of this coming calamity throughout the book. With the recent Citizens United ruling, the power inherent in the corporations and the very wealthy is more potent than even Mills could have imagined.
The particular parallels between Mills' 1956 America and today are too numerous to mention, but I will note a few of them here:
Here, a denunciation of the legislative body (remember, this is 1956, imagine the trend continuing down to the current congress):
And this, before the advent of the 24-hour news cycle:
The most salient features for me were Mills' treatment of the Celebrity and of mass society's desire for distraction from the political process (all in an era before reality TV and social media).
This all boils down to a dubious future for Jeffersonian democracy.
Having just finished watching the Zeitgeist Trilogy, perhaps I was primed for a work that many may consider a conspiratorial treatise. I won't deny that I was seeking independent verification of my own hypotheses, but I would be open to reading a counterpoint to this work, so long as it was as thoroughly researched and annotated as Mr Mills' book.
As this book was written during the Eisenhower administration, it is interesting to note that Ike himself warned us of what he termed "the military-industrial complex". Mills makes mention of this coming calamity throughout the book. With the recent Citizens United ruling, the power inherent in the corporations and the very wealthy is more potent than even Mills could have imagined.
The particular parallels between Mills' 1956 America and today are too numerous to mention, but I will note a few of them here:
...the structural clue of the power elite today lies in the economic order...the economy is at once a permanent-war economy and a private-corporation economy. American capitalism is now in considerable part a military capitalism, and the most important relation of the big corporation to the state rests on the coincidence of interests between military and corporate needs...
Here, a denunciation of the legislative body (remember, this is 1956, imagine the trend continuing down to the current congress):
In the first and second decades of the [twentieth] century, only a few bills were presented...these bills were considered during the ample time between committee study and their debate on the floor. Debate was of importance and was carried on before a sizable audience in the chamber. Legislation took up most of the member's time and attention. Today hundreds of bills are considered at each session; and since it would be impossible for members even to read them all-or a tenth of them-they have come to rely upon the committees who report the bills. There is little debate and what there is often occurs before an emptied chamber...While legislation goes through the assembly line, the Congressmen are busy in their offices, administering a small staff which runs errands for constituents and mails printed and typed matter to them.
And this, before the advent of the 24-hour news cycle:
...so long as the media are not entirely monopolized, the individual can play one medium off against another...[but] do people compare reports on public events or policies...? The answer is: generally no, very few do: (I) We know that people tend strongly to select those media which carry contents with which they already agree...no one seems to search out such counter-statements as may be found in alternative media offerings... (II) This idea of playing one medium off against another assumes that the media really have varying contents...this is not widely true...they compete more in terms of variations on a few standardized themes than of clashing issues.
The most salient features for me were Mills' treatment of the Celebrity and of mass society's desire for distraction from the political process (all in an era before reality TV and social media).
This all boils down to a dubious future for Jeffersonian democracy.
May 28, 2025
This one pulls the curtain—and names the guys smoking cigars behind it.
Mills wasn’t theorizing—he was straight-up exposing the real ruling trinity of post-WWII America: the corporate elite, the military top brass, and political figureheads—all shaking hands behind closed doors. His big bomb? Democracy is a stage show, and the real decisions are made in boardrooms, war rooms, and country clubs.
Just boring, well-dressed men with Ivy League ties and interlocking board seats, quietly running the show. It’s less 007 and more LinkedIn Illuminati.
Mills hands you the blueprint of how these elites rotate through power positions (CEO one day, defense secretary the next), keeping it all “legal” while locking out the public from real influence.
Structure Breakdown & Intellectual Roots:
1. Owners (Game designers):
• Inspired by: Elite Theory (Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto), C. Wright Mills (“The Power Elite”), and modern oligarchic control models.
• These are the families, banking dynasties, or transgenerational capital holders (think Rothschild, Rockefellers, BlackRock/Vanguard boardrooms, BIS).
• They create the rules (laws, economics, culture narratives).
2. Players (Rule-followers with awareness):
• A nod to technocrats, intelligence agencies, military-industrial strategists.
• Often from groups like the Council on Foreign Relations, Trilateral Commission, or Chatham House—they know the meta-game.
• The Pope? He’d fit here if you believe he’s a geopolitical chess master and not just spiritual fluff.
3. Assistants to the Players:
• Think bureaucrats, technicians, academics, or mid-tier management.
• Often compared to what Orwell might call “Outer Party” members.
• Smart enough to execute, not powerful enough to decide.
4. Figures (Managed puppets):
• Politicians, presidents, media darlings…
• They’re actors playing on a stage built by others. Shakespeare nailed it: “All the world’s a stage…”
Key takeaway: You’re not in the room. You’re not even in the building.
And those “leaders” you vote for? They’re just approved useful idiots.
Verdict: Sharp, relentless, and still 100% relevant.
If you read this and still think politicians run the show, you probably clap when the plane lands.
Mills wasn’t theorizing—he was straight-up exposing the real ruling trinity of post-WWII America: the corporate elite, the military top brass, and political figureheads—all shaking hands behind closed doors. His big bomb? Democracy is a stage show, and the real decisions are made in boardrooms, war rooms, and country clubs.
Just boring, well-dressed men with Ivy League ties and interlocking board seats, quietly running the show. It’s less 007 and more LinkedIn Illuminati.
Mills hands you the blueprint of how these elites rotate through power positions (CEO one day, defense secretary the next), keeping it all “legal” while locking out the public from real influence.
Structure Breakdown & Intellectual Roots:
1. Owners (Game designers):
• Inspired by: Elite Theory (Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto), C. Wright Mills (“The Power Elite”), and modern oligarchic control models.
• These are the families, banking dynasties, or transgenerational capital holders (think Rothschild, Rockefellers, BlackRock/Vanguard boardrooms, BIS).
• They create the rules (laws, economics, culture narratives).
2. Players (Rule-followers with awareness):
• A nod to technocrats, intelligence agencies, military-industrial strategists.
• Often from groups like the Council on Foreign Relations, Trilateral Commission, or Chatham House—they know the meta-game.
• The Pope? He’d fit here if you believe he’s a geopolitical chess master and not just spiritual fluff.
3. Assistants to the Players:
• Think bureaucrats, technicians, academics, or mid-tier management.
• Often compared to what Orwell might call “Outer Party” members.
• Smart enough to execute, not powerful enough to decide.
4. Figures (Managed puppets):
• Politicians, presidents, media darlings…
• They’re actors playing on a stage built by others. Shakespeare nailed it: “All the world’s a stage…”
Key takeaway: You’re not in the room. You’re not even in the building.
And those “leaders” you vote for? They’re just approved useful idiots.
Verdict: Sharp, relentless, and still 100% relevant.
If you read this and still think politicians run the show, you probably clap when the plane lands.
April 27, 2015
Though it did take the better part of three months to read, I consider it excellent. Mills' writing is top-notch, and the topic is well-explored. It may not be the most heartening read, and the temptation is to call it dated, but it is roughly as applicable as the day it was published. Have a taste:
"It is in this context of material prosperity, with the demagogic right setting the tone of public sensibility; the more sophisticated conservatives silently achieving established power in a largely undebated victory, with liberal ideas made official in the 'thirties, now stolen and banalized by alien use; with liberal hopes carefully adjusted to mere rhetoric by thirty years of rhetorical victory; with radicalism deflated and radical hope stoned to death by thirty years of defeat – it is in this context that the conservative mood has set in among the observant scholars. Among them there is no demand and no dissent, and no opposition to the monstrous decisions that are being made without deep or widespread debate, often with no debate at all. There is no opposition to the undemocratically impudent manner in which policies of high military and civilian authority are simply turned out as facts accomplished. There is no opposition to public mindlessness in all its forms nor to all those forces and men that would further it. But above all – among men of knowledge there is little or no opposition to the divorce of knowledge from power, of sensibilities from men of power, no opposition to the divorce of mind from reality. Contemporary men of power, accordingly, are able to command without any ideological cloak, political decisions occur without benefit of political discussion or political ideas, and the higher circles of America have come to be the embodiment of the American system of organized irresponsibility."
"It is in this context of material prosperity, with the demagogic right setting the tone of public sensibility; the more sophisticated conservatives silently achieving established power in a largely undebated victory, with liberal ideas made official in the 'thirties, now stolen and banalized by alien use; with liberal hopes carefully adjusted to mere rhetoric by thirty years of rhetorical victory; with radicalism deflated and radical hope stoned to death by thirty years of defeat – it is in this context that the conservative mood has set in among the observant scholars. Among them there is no demand and no dissent, and no opposition to the monstrous decisions that are being made without deep or widespread debate, often with no debate at all. There is no opposition to the undemocratically impudent manner in which policies of high military and civilian authority are simply turned out as facts accomplished. There is no opposition to public mindlessness in all its forms nor to all those forces and men that would further it. But above all – among men of knowledge there is little or no opposition to the divorce of knowledge from power, of sensibilities from men of power, no opposition to the divorce of mind from reality. Contemporary men of power, accordingly, are able to command without any ideological cloak, political decisions occur without benefit of political discussion or political ideas, and the higher circles of America have come to be the embodiment of the American system of organized irresponsibility."
November 8, 2022
In this book, the history of the permanent atmosphere of the American war economy is traced back to its roots in the Revolutionary War, when the generalship of the patriarchs was affirmed by a public who desired their religious freedom, which was embodied in the right to bear arms. Mills explains how the founding of the leading universities of this country is related to the business executives who carry out the orders of the warlords even down to today. The fact that, in the 21st century, the billionaire has replaced the millionaire as the most striking example of the individual with unlimited money and unending property, constitutes an indictment of the fact that the power of caring for the children of God has all but disappeared in an illiterate and culturally impoverished society that has been arranged by bureaucrats and diplomats with a mediocre education. What Mills makes most strikingly clear is the fact that today the war economy is implicitly tied to the problems on the home front. Meanwhile, the architects of war, disguised as publicly traded companies on the stock market, find themselves most threatened by the proposal of the advent of a time of peace and prosperity for all of humanity. Writing nearly a decade before the Kennedy assassination, Mills was clearly ahead of his time, theorizing about warning of the coming triumph over peace by the military mode of life.. Three stars.
February 20, 2009
Much of what Mills covers has already seen light in some other works I have read (Media Monopoly by Bagdikian and most of Chomsky). This does not dilute his message, if anything other publications reinforce and illuminate the basis of this sociological classic, supported with good data. I agree with the afterword by Alan Wolfe except that I believe that Mills in his social criticism (the last half of the book) was not incorrect in calling the bureaucratization of and resulting mindless decisions by the military, political, and corporate elites. Mills does not necessarily need to be in their shoes to describe how they act and what motivates their decisions. Wolfe does not acknowledge that what Mills attempts to elucidate is the potential for problems of self-analysis if one is in said milieu.
February 5, 2017
Published in 1956, Mill's book is a primer for understanding the corporate capitalist society we have today. This trailblazing work presented concepts that continue to be relevant today - interlocking directorates in corporations, the revolving door between corporations and the government agencies that exist to oversee them so they obey the rule of law, and the triumvirate of corporate, military, and high government agencies that run our society. He also looked at old money families and how they remain powerful and influential. In short, this is a book for us, the 99%, about the world of the 1% and how they dominate. According to Gore Vidal, Benjamin Franklin believed that our little experiment in self-government would, within two hundred years, devolve into some form of tyranny. Mills' book helps to explain how this has happened.
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