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The Grand Chess Board: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives
American foreign policy and power, and national security.
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First published October 9, 1997
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About the author
Zbigniew Brzeziński
80 books350 followersZbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski was a Polish-American political scientist, geostrategist, and statesman who served as United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981. Known for his hawkish foreign policy at a time when the Democratic Party was increasingly dovish, he is a foreign policy realist and considered by some to be the Democrats' response to Republican realist Henry Kissinger.
Major foreign policy events during his term of office included the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China (and the severing of ties with the Republic of China), the signing of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), the brokering of the Camp David Accords, the transition of Iran to an anti-Western Islamic state, encouraging reform in Eastern Europe, emphasizing human rights in U.S. foreign policy, the arming of the mujaheddin in Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet-friendly Afghan government, increase the probability of Soviet invasion and later entanglement in a Vietnam-style war, and later to counter the Soviet invasion, and the signing of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties relinquishing U.S. control of the Panama Canal after 1999.
He was a professor of American foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and a member of various boards and councils. He appeared frequently as an expert on the PBS program The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer.
Major foreign policy events during his term of office included the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China (and the severing of ties with the Republic of China), the signing of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), the brokering of the Camp David Accords, the transition of Iran to an anti-Western Islamic state, encouraging reform in Eastern Europe, emphasizing human rights in U.S. foreign policy, the arming of the mujaheddin in Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet-friendly Afghan government, increase the probability of Soviet invasion and later entanglement in a Vietnam-style war, and later to counter the Soviet invasion, and the signing of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties relinquishing U.S. control of the Panama Canal after 1999.
He was a professor of American foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and a member of various boards and councils. He appeared frequently as an expert on the PBS program The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer.
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July 27, 2009
Zbigniew Brzezinski is a technocrat on the same plain as a Henry Kissinger. He has been National Security Adviser, Started the Trilateral Commission with David Rockefeller and he was responsible for arming Afghanistan to fight the Russians which has fueled the extreme fundamentalism we are experiencing today. He was a mentor to Obama and has advised presidents on foreign policy for the last 30 years. He has direct contact with top politicians and the big money international bankers (Rockefeller etc.) To sum up, he is a man of influence. So when I picked up this book that he authored in 1997, I was certainly paying attention to what he had to say as I knew it was directly relevant to not only American politics, but to the world as a whole. The story of this book, as the title may very well give away, is support for American supremacy in establishing world governmental unions. By expanding on organizations such as the EU, NATO, NAFTA and so forth, he feels the world can be broken down into geopolitical unions mostly focused on the Eurasian Chessboard, consisting of the west, south, east and middle space (yes, he makes a map of this on pg 34). The most fascinating thing to me about this book was how well described and explained his theories and conclusions were. This is a very smart man with seemingly endless knowledge about foreign history, policy and affairs. He is very precise and straightforward about his views, which I must admit, make so much sense that if you are in support of the American, European and Pacific Unions (in which America leads the way, of course)and the end of democracy to strengthen economies, which in theory therefore increases the standard of living for the people, you will love this book. I, on the other hand, am not in support of breaking down borders and sacrificing nationality to a higher supragovernmental authority. Therefore, I found it to be rather disturbing that such a man of influence had so greatly thought out how we could accomplish just that. I find it fascinating, but not at all surprising, that he would view the world as a game of chess. And just like chess, every move is a set up for the next several moves to come in a far reaching strategy over time, like ten year increments, furthering the objective of checkmate. This book left me a rather depressed because I know his connections to people and organizations such as the CFR, that are pushing the same Global Governance Programs that have several members in the current administration now touting the same talk of "governments can no longer handle the problems of the world alone" that every politician from Hillary Clinton to Gordon Brown are spouting off as if we just now came to this conclusion. This book, The Grand Chessboard is over 10 years old and after reading it, the following quote especially, it occurred to me more than ever that world events don't come about by happenstance.
Favorite Quote: "It is also a fact that America is too democratic at home to be autocratic abroad. This limits the use of America's power, especially its capacity for military intimidation. Never before has a populist democracy attained international supremacy. But the pursuit of power is not a goal that commands popular passion, except in conditions of a sudden threat or challenge to the public's sense of domestic well-being. The economic self-denial (that is, defense spending) and the human sacrifice (casualties even among professional soldiers) required in the effort are uncongenial to democratic instinct. Democracy is inimical to imperial globalization."
(inimical means unfriendly/unfavorable)
Favorite Quote: "It is also a fact that America is too democratic at home to be autocratic abroad. This limits the use of America's power, especially its capacity for military intimidation. Never before has a populist democracy attained international supremacy. But the pursuit of power is not a goal that commands popular passion, except in conditions of a sudden threat or challenge to the public's sense of domestic well-being. The economic self-denial (that is, defense spending) and the human sacrifice (casualties even among professional soldiers) required in the effort are uncongenial to democratic instinct. Democracy is inimical to imperial globalization."
(inimical means unfriendly/unfavorable)
September 2, 2021
I rate 5 for must of his geostrategic analyses and predictions, though I completely disagree on some others. But it is indeed interesting to read this book and think about his intricate explanations on how the main political "chess" players see each others.
I rate ZERO for his blind propaganda of what he calls "democratic world", or "pluralistic values", and the argument that US main goal is to spread it through out the world.
Brzezinski argues that, in order to maintain global political stability, U.S. must remain an hegemonic super power, an the only one.
In fact, the very opposite is truth. For the U.S. (to continue) to dominate the world politically, and be the single hegemonic power, it must continue to do whatever it takes to achieve its goals, independently of the fact that most of US international maneuvers bring chaos and terror to democratic states (Chile 80's, Iran 50's, etc), provoke instability, incite nonexistent ethnic conflicts, not to mention the full scale wars/invasions based on faked intelligentsia (Afghanistan, Iraq, etc).
The ultimate US goal, obviously, is not to spread democratic values (as Brzezinski pretends to believe), is to dominate the world. What for? good question...
Do you want an example? Easy, check his visit to the mujaheddin terrorists sponsored by the US to destroy communist Afghanistan:
https://nomadicthoughts.blogs.sapo.pt...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uhFle...
I rate ZERO for his blind propaganda of what he calls "democratic world", or "pluralistic values", and the argument that US main goal is to spread it through out the world.
Brzezinski argues that, in order to maintain global political stability, U.S. must remain an hegemonic super power, an the only one.
In fact, the very opposite is truth. For the U.S. (to continue) to dominate the world politically, and be the single hegemonic power, it must continue to do whatever it takes to achieve its goals, independently of the fact that most of US international maneuvers bring chaos and terror to democratic states (Chile 80's, Iran 50's, etc), provoke instability, incite nonexistent ethnic conflicts, not to mention the full scale wars/invasions based on faked intelligentsia (Afghanistan, Iraq, etc).
The ultimate US goal, obviously, is not to spread democratic values (as Brzezinski pretends to believe), is to dominate the world. What for? good question...
Do you want an example? Easy, check his visit to the mujaheddin terrorists sponsored by the US to destroy communist Afghanistan:
https://nomadicthoughts.blogs.sapo.pt...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uhFle...
September 1, 2014
“I once asked my colleague, (Zbigniew) Brzezinski, that if everyone was allied with us, who were we organized against? My question surprised him, because I think that Brzezinski remains caught up in Cold War strategy even after the demise of the Soviet Union. In Cold War thinking it was important to have the upper hand or else be at risk of being eliminated as a player. The importance of prevailing became all consuming, and this consuming drive survived the Soviet collapse. Prevailing over others is the only foreign policy that Washington knows.”
-Paul Craig Roberts
Before getting into a deconstruction of The Grand Chessboard, it’s important to first take a step back and provide some perspective on who Zbigniew Brzezinski is and why his worldview is particularly relevant to understand at this point in time.
Brzezinski was born in Warsaw, Poland in 1928 but his paternal family reportedly originated from Galicia, which was once considered eastern Poland but is now part of Ukraine. His father was a Polish diplomat who served in Germany from 1931 to 1935 and then served in the Soviet Union from 1936 to 1938 in the midst of Stalin’s Great Purge. He was stationed in Canada when both Germany and the Soviet Union invaded Poland in 1939. Poland was later placed in the Soviet sphere of influence at the conclusion of WWII; hence, the Brzezinski family remained in Canada.
Brzezinski earned a Master’s Degree from McGill University in Montreal with a focus on the Soviet Union, followed by a PhD at Harvard with a focus on the Russian Revolution, and the leadership of Lenin and Stalin. He became an academic at Harvard and then Columbia University where he taught and mentored Madeleine Albright. He served as an advisor to the Kennedy presidential campaign and later supported Johnson. He was a member of the State Department’s Council of Policy Planning from 1966 – 1968, then worked on Hubert Humphrey’s presidential campaign in 1968. In 1973, he helped establish the Trilateral Commission with David Rockefeller. Based on ideas Brzezinski spelled out in an article he published in Foreign Affairs in 1970, the Trilateral Commission was to be the organizational foundation of a club of developed nations that included Europe, Japan and the U.S. to balance world power away from the Soviet Union and China. The club held annual meetings that included the elites of Europe, Japan, and the U.S., along with bigwigs in world trade, international banking and the establishment media.
Throughout the Cold War, Brzezinski supported a policy of engagement with Eastern Europe, including dissidents, believing that divisions within Eastern Europe would destabilize the Soviet Union and hasten its breakup along national lines. He gave little to no support for any rapprochement with the Soviet Union and opposed Charles De Gaulle’s vision of a Eurasian project of “Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.”
Brzezinski’s highest position of power was as National Security Advisor in the Carter administration. Touted as the Democratic Party’s counterpoint to Henry Kissinger (and implicitly Kissinger’s détente approach toward the USSR), his aggressive anti-Russian views often clashed with those of Carter’s Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, who was in the realist camp and opposed Brzezinski’s desire to strengthen ties to China while keeping the Soviet Union at a distance. He and others in the administration argued that such “triangulation” could lead to dangerous and unnecessary perceptions of aggression toward the Soviet Union.
During his tenure, Brzezinski was the architect of the plan to goad the Soviet Union into its own “Vietnam” quagmire by arming and supporting Islamic mujahedeen against the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan. The plan, with the assistance of the Pakistan intelligence service, was put into place toward the end of Carter’s presidency and in 1979, the Soviet Union, in fact, responded as Brzezinski had hoped, embarking on a decade-long war in the nation that is not called the “graveyard of empires” for nothing.
When the French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur interviewed Brzezinski in 1998, he admitted that while he was national security advisor, he played a major role in setting the Afghanistan trap for the Soviet Union to get bogged down in a war. He also reiterated that he had no regrets about the policy, underscoring the fact that he does indeed see the nations and peoples of the world as pieces on a strategic game board with no regard for the resulting death of thousands, demolition of a country or blowback toward his own adopted country. A pertinent excerpt of the exchange follows:
Le Nouvel Observateur: Former CIA director, Robert Gates, says in his memoirs: the American secret services assisted Afghan mujahedeen six months before the Soviet invasion. By that time, you were President Carter’s advisor and you played a key role on this. Do you confirm it?
Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of the story, the CIA began to assist mujahedeen in the year 1980, that is, after the invasion of the Soviet army against Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the truth that remained secret until today is quite different: it was on July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed his first order on the secret assistance to Kabul’s pro-Soviet regime opponents. That day I wrote a memorandum to the President in which I told him that that assistance would cause the Soviet intervention (…) we did not force the Russian intervention, we just, conscientiously, increased the intervention possibilities.
NO: When the Soviets justified their intervention by affirming they were fighting against a secret American interference nobody believed them, though they were telling the truth. Don’t you regret it?
B: Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. Its objective was to lead the Russian to the Afghan trap, and you want me to regret it? The very same day the Soviets crossed the Afghan border I wrote the following to President Carter: “This is our chance to give Russia its Viet Nam.”
NO: Aren’t you sorry either for favoring Islamic fundamentalism and providing weapons and consultancies to future terrorists?
B: What is the most important thing when you look at world history, the Taliban or the fall of the Soviet empire? Some excited Islamists or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?
It is clear from the opening pages of The Grand Chessboard that Brzezinski is obsessed with imperialism and cannot conceive of a world that is not organized under empire – whether it is the competing regional empires of old or the rise of one global empire as reflected by the U.S. after the Soviet Union’s exit from the world stage. He even repeats the common historical fallacy that "hegemony is as old as mankind." If he had even a cursory familiarity with anthropology or pre-recorded history, he would know that throughout the vast majority of humanity’s experience, mankind lived in small, relatively egalitarian units of hunter-gatherers. Empire and its attendant effects, such as hegemony, hierarchical social structure, and war only emerged around 10 – 13,000 years ago, roughly coinciding with the widespread adoption of agricultural settlement.
(Continue reading this review at http://natyliesbaldwin.com/2014/08/br...)
-Paul Craig Roberts
Before getting into a deconstruction of The Grand Chessboard, it’s important to first take a step back and provide some perspective on who Zbigniew Brzezinski is and why his worldview is particularly relevant to understand at this point in time.
Brzezinski was born in Warsaw, Poland in 1928 but his paternal family reportedly originated from Galicia, which was once considered eastern Poland but is now part of Ukraine. His father was a Polish diplomat who served in Germany from 1931 to 1935 and then served in the Soviet Union from 1936 to 1938 in the midst of Stalin’s Great Purge. He was stationed in Canada when both Germany and the Soviet Union invaded Poland in 1939. Poland was later placed in the Soviet sphere of influence at the conclusion of WWII; hence, the Brzezinski family remained in Canada.
Brzezinski earned a Master’s Degree from McGill University in Montreal with a focus on the Soviet Union, followed by a PhD at Harvard with a focus on the Russian Revolution, and the leadership of Lenin and Stalin. He became an academic at Harvard and then Columbia University where he taught and mentored Madeleine Albright. He served as an advisor to the Kennedy presidential campaign and later supported Johnson. He was a member of the State Department’s Council of Policy Planning from 1966 – 1968, then worked on Hubert Humphrey’s presidential campaign in 1968. In 1973, he helped establish the Trilateral Commission with David Rockefeller. Based on ideas Brzezinski spelled out in an article he published in Foreign Affairs in 1970, the Trilateral Commission was to be the organizational foundation of a club of developed nations that included Europe, Japan and the U.S. to balance world power away from the Soviet Union and China. The club held annual meetings that included the elites of Europe, Japan, and the U.S., along with bigwigs in world trade, international banking and the establishment media.
Throughout the Cold War, Brzezinski supported a policy of engagement with Eastern Europe, including dissidents, believing that divisions within Eastern Europe would destabilize the Soviet Union and hasten its breakup along national lines. He gave little to no support for any rapprochement with the Soviet Union and opposed Charles De Gaulle’s vision of a Eurasian project of “Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.”
Brzezinski’s highest position of power was as National Security Advisor in the Carter administration. Touted as the Democratic Party’s counterpoint to Henry Kissinger (and implicitly Kissinger’s détente approach toward the USSR), his aggressive anti-Russian views often clashed with those of Carter’s Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, who was in the realist camp and opposed Brzezinski’s desire to strengthen ties to China while keeping the Soviet Union at a distance. He and others in the administration argued that such “triangulation” could lead to dangerous and unnecessary perceptions of aggression toward the Soviet Union.
During his tenure, Brzezinski was the architect of the plan to goad the Soviet Union into its own “Vietnam” quagmire by arming and supporting Islamic mujahedeen against the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan. The plan, with the assistance of the Pakistan intelligence service, was put into place toward the end of Carter’s presidency and in 1979, the Soviet Union, in fact, responded as Brzezinski had hoped, embarking on a decade-long war in the nation that is not called the “graveyard of empires” for nothing.
When the French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur interviewed Brzezinski in 1998, he admitted that while he was national security advisor, he played a major role in setting the Afghanistan trap for the Soviet Union to get bogged down in a war. He also reiterated that he had no regrets about the policy, underscoring the fact that he does indeed see the nations and peoples of the world as pieces on a strategic game board with no regard for the resulting death of thousands, demolition of a country or blowback toward his own adopted country. A pertinent excerpt of the exchange follows:
Le Nouvel Observateur: Former CIA director, Robert Gates, says in his memoirs: the American secret services assisted Afghan mujahedeen six months before the Soviet invasion. By that time, you were President Carter’s advisor and you played a key role on this. Do you confirm it?
Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of the story, the CIA began to assist mujahedeen in the year 1980, that is, after the invasion of the Soviet army against Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the truth that remained secret until today is quite different: it was on July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed his first order on the secret assistance to Kabul’s pro-Soviet regime opponents. That day I wrote a memorandum to the President in which I told him that that assistance would cause the Soviet intervention (…) we did not force the Russian intervention, we just, conscientiously, increased the intervention possibilities.
NO: When the Soviets justified their intervention by affirming they were fighting against a secret American interference nobody believed them, though they were telling the truth. Don’t you regret it?
B: Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. Its objective was to lead the Russian to the Afghan trap, and you want me to regret it? The very same day the Soviets crossed the Afghan border I wrote the following to President Carter: “This is our chance to give Russia its Viet Nam.”
NO: Aren’t you sorry either for favoring Islamic fundamentalism and providing weapons and consultancies to future terrorists?
B: What is the most important thing when you look at world history, the Taliban or the fall of the Soviet empire? Some excited Islamists or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?
It is clear from the opening pages of The Grand Chessboard that Brzezinski is obsessed with imperialism and cannot conceive of a world that is not organized under empire – whether it is the competing regional empires of old or the rise of one global empire as reflected by the U.S. after the Soviet Union’s exit from the world stage. He even repeats the common historical fallacy that "hegemony is as old as mankind." If he had even a cursory familiarity with anthropology or pre-recorded history, he would know that throughout the vast majority of humanity’s experience, mankind lived in small, relatively egalitarian units of hunter-gatherers. Empire and its attendant effects, such as hegemony, hierarchical social structure, and war only emerged around 10 – 13,000 years ago, roughly coinciding with the widespread adoption of agricultural settlement.
(Continue reading this review at http://natyliesbaldwin.com/2014/08/br...)
July 26, 2011
Scholastic masturbation: his argument starts that America is the first 'truly' global power somehow discounting Britain in any geostrategic calculus. He talks about Poland so much that he even says South Korea is the 'Poland' of Asia. This gives an idea of how a few distant academics at the top make policy and develop a truly screwed worldview.
That said, it was an eye opener and I'm actually more likely to believe conspiracy theories now.
That said, it was an eye opener and I'm actually more likely to believe conspiracy theories now.
September 19, 2014
Brzezinski, the evil genius, lays out clearly and unambiguously the plans by the American empire to achieve world domination by conquering the Eurasian land mass. Along with the Project for a New American Century, this is the most forthright declaration of the United States's drive to control the planet and eliminate any and all challengers, whether it be for resources or territory. If you want to understand what is behind all of the wars of the 20th and 21st centuries, read this book. Brzezinski is not at all reticent in his explication of the foreign policies of American empire since the end of World War I, when the U.S. took over from Britain the title of World Hegemon. With this book as background, the motivations for the policies of regime change in Syria, Libya, Georgia, the purpose of the declaration of the "war on terror", the backing of the fascist coup in Ukraine, the Balkan and Gulf wars, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the overthrow of secular governments and the stirring up of sectarian violence are made clear. I believe this book to be a must-read for everyone who is concerned with the fate of the world.
June 28, 2023
"Bedient man sich einer Terminologie, die an das brutalere Zeitalter der alten Weltreiche gemahnt, so lauten die drei großen Imperative imperialer Geostrategie: Absprachen zwischen den Vasallen zu verhindern und ihre Abhängigkeit in Fragen der Sicherheit zu bewahren, die tributpflichtigen Staaten fügsam zu halten und zu schützen und dafür zu sorgen, dass die »Barbarenvölker« sich nicht zusammenschließen." schreibt Brzezinski im Vorwort. Und es wäre nicht Brzezinski, wenn er es trotz des Hinweises auf eine vergangene Terminologie nicht genauso meinen würde.
Überraschend offenherzig äußert sich der ehemalige Sicherheitsberater mehrerer amerikanischer Präsidenten über den "american exceptionalism" und die daraus folgende Pflicht zur weltweiten Durchsetzung amerikanischer Interessen zum Wohlergehen der Menschheit. Das Buch erschien zwar schon 1996, ist aber mit seiner hellsichtigen und brillianten Analyse der politischen Verhältnisse trotzdem ein Schlüsselwerk, wenn man die heutigen Konflikte, ganz besonders, aber nicht nur um die Ukraine, wirklich verstehen will.
Überraschend offenherzig äußert sich der ehemalige Sicherheitsberater mehrerer amerikanischer Präsidenten über den "american exceptionalism" und die daraus folgende Pflicht zur weltweiten Durchsetzung amerikanischer Interessen zum Wohlergehen der Menschheit. Das Buch erschien zwar schon 1996, ist aber mit seiner hellsichtigen und brillianten Analyse der politischen Verhältnisse trotzdem ein Schlüsselwerk, wenn man die heutigen Konflikte, ganz besonders, aber nicht nur um die Ukraine, wirklich verstehen will.
May 10, 2022
What can one say? A thoughtful, erudite and interesting analysis of how the US can maintain and expand its global hegemony - because that will be good for the peoples of both the US and the rest of the world. In other words, a strategic guide for imperialism, with all the ideological shallowness and implicit racism this implies. Nonetheless, an important book that I'd recommend people to read.
October 14, 2008
This is the most coherent, eloquently written overview of the geopolitical and socioeconomic state of the world. Written in 1997 by Zbigniew Brzezinski, an esteemed professor of international relations, former National Security Advisor, and co-founder of the Trilateral Commission.
Its general theme is that America is the first, and likely the last truly global power. America, he says, has a 20 to 30 year window of opportunity to assert control of the world stage, specifically through the strategic domination of Central Eurasia, which contains most of the world's "strategic resources," and is the major area of political unrest and violence. If this is not done, he says, there is the danger of choas and anarchy.
I'll let him explain:
"... the three grand imperatives of geo-strategy are to prevent collusion and maintain security dependance among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together."
"The pursuit of power and especially the economic costs and human sacrifice that the exercise of such power often requires are not generally congenial to democratic instincts. Democratization is inimical to imperial mobilization."
"Moreover, as America becomes an increasingly multicultural society, it may find it more difficult to fashion a consensus on foreign policy issues, except in the circumstances of a truly massive and widely perceived direct external threat."
Its general theme is that America is the first, and likely the last truly global power. America, he says, has a 20 to 30 year window of opportunity to assert control of the world stage, specifically through the strategic domination of Central Eurasia, which contains most of the world's "strategic resources," and is the major area of political unrest and violence. If this is not done, he says, there is the danger of choas and anarchy.
I'll let him explain:
"... the three grand imperatives of geo-strategy are to prevent collusion and maintain security dependance among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together."
"The pursuit of power and especially the economic costs and human sacrifice that the exercise of such power often requires are not generally congenial to democratic instincts. Democratization is inimical to imperial mobilization."
"Moreover, as America becomes an increasingly multicultural society, it may find it more difficult to fashion a consensus on foreign policy issues, except in the circumstances of a truly massive and widely perceived direct external threat."
June 3, 2017
Clear, concise, explanatory, written with a sure hand. I enjoyed every minute of it.
September 26, 2024
What I found valuable about this book is how Brzezinski breaks down big geopolitical strategies into simple, understandable terms. His insights into how countries like Russia and China fit into the global chess game are thought-provoking and relevant, even today.
While I appreciated the depth of knowledge, it wasn't always an easy read. It’s informative, but I felt it lacked the energy and storytelling that makes these kinds of topics easier to connect with.
July 8, 2016
In chess, everything is strategy. The positioning of each piece in a certain space means and specific function as part of the mayor strategy and final goal. In The Grand Chessboard by Zbiniew Brezinski, introduces us to the complicated concepts of geopolitical and geostrategic. Every country requires an special and very complicated diplomatic relation regarding a military conflict, economical opportunity or situation, ethnic interactions etc. between countries. In the book the author explains that diplomatic relations are like a grand chessboard, with each space as a country, in this case America and their geostrategic.One side gains, is other side lost. American diplomacy is a very strategic one and very proactive when it comes to economical or military terms. The author describes the concept "Geopolitical Pivot" which consists of establishing direct and solid diplomatic relations with a country not for their power or motivation, but rather, from their sensitive location and from the consequences of their potentially vulnerable condition for the behavior of geostrategic players. A great example is the current situation in Ukraine with Russia.
The book was written in 1998, must of the political descriptions of the countries mentioned in the book are relatively similar from today's actual international affairs with the countries mentioned. The narrative is simple to read and to understand. The author manages to explain the concepts in a simple and thorough form. I highly recommend this book because it helps and gives you great insight in how to understand in a more expanded perception in today's world affairs, especially if you want to understand the current situation in Ukraine.
The book was written in 1998, must of the political descriptions of the countries mentioned in the book are relatively similar from today's actual international affairs with the countries mentioned. The narrative is simple to read and to understand. The author manages to explain the concepts in a simple and thorough form. I highly recommend this book because it helps and gives you great insight in how to understand in a more expanded perception in today's world affairs, especially if you want to understand the current situation in Ukraine.
January 28, 2012
Too often I'm presented with an analysis of foreign policy that depicts ideology or religion as a driving factor in global politics. Can we really maintain that the states are at war in the Middle East for the sake of its people, and the abstract ideal of "democracy"? That the vast power structure of the United States military apparatus, with its attendant logistics and support, representing a million and a half personnel should be brought to bear out of a selfless allegiance to ideology, at great cost to its nation?
Even an analysis that focuses on the personality or acumen of particular world leaders is myopic, ignoring as it does the vast institutional machinery and history that underlie the ascension of any president or general. I suspect that the reality is closer to bare, calculated self-interest on the part of nation-states — a "Realpolitik" stance that develops over generations and is much larger than any one person or event.
Brzezinski was National Security Advisor in the Carter administration, and has remained in the close circle of Washington insiders ever since. I trust that his analysis, irrespective of its accuracy, reflects the attitudes and beliefs of the power structure that ultimately sets the goals of our foreign policy. Thus, his particular agenda did not get in the way of my learning about the considerations that shape the "grand chessboard" of global hegemony.
Regardless of the personality of our sitting president, these geopolitical truths do not change. Likewise, the imperatives necessitated by a strategy of global imperialism are not subject to the particular politics of the currently popular party. And indeed, a broad survey of American history shows a consistent adherence to a set of policies intended simply to entrench and widen our influence, regardless of the prevailing public sentiment or politics.
Although Brzezinski wrote this book in '97, it remains relevant for understanding our immediate history. His style is concise and dry, resembling a high-level summary. It's a good and quick read, and I think, fairly important.
Even an analysis that focuses on the personality or acumen of particular world leaders is myopic, ignoring as it does the vast institutional machinery and history that underlie the ascension of any president or general. I suspect that the reality is closer to bare, calculated self-interest on the part of nation-states — a "Realpolitik" stance that develops over generations and is much larger than any one person or event.
Brzezinski was National Security Advisor in the Carter administration, and has remained in the close circle of Washington insiders ever since. I trust that his analysis, irrespective of its accuracy, reflects the attitudes and beliefs of the power structure that ultimately sets the goals of our foreign policy. Thus, his particular agenda did not get in the way of my learning about the considerations that shape the "grand chessboard" of global hegemony.
Regardless of the personality of our sitting president, these geopolitical truths do not change. Likewise, the imperatives necessitated by a strategy of global imperialism are not subject to the particular politics of the currently popular party. And indeed, a broad survey of American history shows a consistent adherence to a set of policies intended simply to entrench and widen our influence, regardless of the prevailing public sentiment or politics.
Although Brzezinski wrote this book in '97, it remains relevant for understanding our immediate history. His style is concise and dry, resembling a high-level summary. It's a good and quick read, and I think, fairly important.
March 27, 2024
Na plus: wyjaśnienie szczególnej roli Ukrainy jako "sworznia politycznego" i tego, że Rosja nie będzie nigdy prawdziwym mocarstwem bez posiadania Ukrainy. Po upływie 25 lat od wydania książki te słowa są jeszcze bardziej aktualne, zwłaszcza patrząc na inwazję Rosji na Ukrainę.
Na minus: dużo nawoływania do dialogu z Iranem czy Chinami na rzecz rozwiązywania globalnych problemów, co było moim zdaniem zbyt optymistyczne z perspektywy czasu. Ponadto słowa o tym, że Chiny nie będą nigdy mocarstwem światowym i że poprzez wspieranie finansowe i polityczne państw niedemokratycznych typu Rosja czy Chiny zdołamy je być może zdemokratyzować, okazały się nietrafione.
Na minus: dużo nawoływania do dialogu z Iranem czy Chinami na rzecz rozwiązywania globalnych problemów, co było moim zdaniem zbyt optymistyczne z perspektywy czasu. Ponadto słowa o tym, że Chiny nie będą nigdy mocarstwem światowym i że poprzez wspieranie finansowe i polityczne państw niedemokratycznych typu Rosja czy Chiny zdołamy je być może zdemokratyzować, okazały się nietrafione.
April 16, 2024
Libro fundamental de geopolítica para entender el mundo actúal
October 18, 2009
امريكا هي اول امبراطورية تحكم عالما بهذا الحجم، وهي يجب ان تكمل رسالتها الانسانية لتكون الحاكم الصارخ ، ولن تفعل ذلك مادام هنالك لاعبون صغار ىخرون يزعجونها في في العالم الأوراسي .. كاني بزينغيو بريجنسكي يريد ان يصل بقارئه الى هذه النتيجة في كتابه.. أحجار على رقعة الشطرنج
يلخص فيها لأهم امبراطوريات التاريخ وسبل سيطرتها حتى يصل الى امريكا ماضيا وحاضرا وما يتوقعه وينصح به مستقبلا
أفكار ليس من الحكمة تجاوزها وهي تصدر عن مستشار الامن القومي الامريكي
كثيرا ما خطرت على بالي اثناء القراءة رائعة جورج اورويل "1984" فهل نتصور ان زمن اوشانيا الاورويلية ورقعة أورواسيا البريجنسكية قد بزغ .. ما مصيرنا لو بقينا بهذه السلبية...
يلخص فيها لأهم امبراطوريات التاريخ وسبل سيطرتها حتى يصل الى امريكا ماضيا وحاضرا وما يتوقعه وينصح به مستقبلا
أفكار ليس من الحكمة تجاوزها وهي تصدر عن مستشار الامن القومي الامريكي
كثيرا ما خطرت على بالي اثناء القراءة رائعة جورج اورويل "1984" فهل نتصور ان زمن اوشانيا الاورويلية ورقعة أورواسيا البريجنسكية قد بزغ .. ما مصيرنا لو بقينا بهذه السلبية...
April 18, 2024
Цікава праця, написана ще в 90х, але актуальна й досі. Найбільше вразило те, як точно деякі події в майбутньому зміг передбачити Збіґнєв Бжезінський. Хоча в дечому все ж трохи помилився, наприклад, щодо Китаю й Індії. Також він дещо переоцінив населення росії (навіть народом їх назвати язик не повернеться), маю на увазі його якості. Але термін, яким він називає росію, дуже влучно її характеризує - "чорна діра".
February 17, 2022
This book is an incredible tool in understanding current geopolitical processes, happening between the USA, the EU, China and russia. It becomes clearer why certain countries are so eager in maintaining spheres of influences in regions, 1000 km away from their borders.
November 29, 2020
A classic book by Zbigniew Brzezinski about American geopolitical strategy towards the Eurasian continent – which he calls a ‘grand chessboard’. The book was written in 1997, however it feels like it was written yesterday as it gives answers to many questions about current events: from Brexit and the future of the EU to the foreign policy of Russia and China.
Of course, Brzezinski’s presupposition that America is a superior state and thus has to exercise a global hegemony across the globe is questionable, to say the least. However, the geopolitical and historical analysis that he performs is of top quality, making the book relevant even in 20 years since the publication.
Below are some interesting thoughts regarding the Eurasian geopolitics:
– First, Brzezinski outlines an interesting and accurate classification of ‘geopolitical players’ and ‘geopolitical pivots’. Geopolitical players are powerful countries, many of which used to be empires in the past and still hold imperial aspirations to some extent. France, Russia and China are the examples. What’s interesting to note is that not all countries that have a potential of becoming geopolitical players have an ambition to do so. For instance, UK prefers a role of a ‘retired’ state that used to be strong in the past, but now only wishes to be left alone. Same with Japan – which has a potential to be the most influential Asian state, however it doesn’t have such ambition, preferring to focus on its internal affairs and domestic market instead.
– ‘Geopolitical pivots’, according to Brzezinski, are regions and territories that are crucial for other states to assert their geopolitical influence on. Such regions in Eurasia include Turkey, Iran, Ukraine and Azerbaijan (which sheds some light on many recent events, such as the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 or the 2020 conflict in Nagorno Karabakh). Internal conflicts on the territories of these ‘geopolitical pivots’ – such as territorial disputes, ethnic or religious conflicts – can be misused by stronger political players to make a geopolitical shift in the entire region to their own benefit.
European Union
– The book was written when the EU was only starting to form. Already then, Brzezinski was criticizing the overall ‘lack of a common idea’ that could unite European countries in the future. In 2020 – when anti-EU sentiment is especially strong, this lack of a common idea is serious as never before. What is for sure is that the EU cannot exist without its two founding states – France and Germany. Brzezinski notes that these two countries have very different reasons to be in the EU. France still has an imperial ambition, and wants to restore its past glory. Germany, in turn, seeks for a ‘redemption’ – a forgiveness for the tragic events of the past century. The only way for Germany to assert its influence is to act on behalf of the EU as a whole: obviously, Germany cannot say that its intention is to become a strong national state (that would just sound weird given the past circumstances), however Germany can do the same by acting through the EU.
– Apart from that, the book has a few interesting paragraphs about the UK: its initial hesitance to join the EU and its doubt that such a union can ever be successful.
As Brzezinski writes, already in 1955, British councils at the European Commission meetings were expressing the following doubts regarding a potential formation of the European Union:
‘The treaty which you’re discussing has no chance of being agreed; if it was agreed, it would have no chance of being applied. And if it was applied, it would be totally unacceptable to Britain… au revoir et bonne chance.’
I guess those people who took Brexit as a surprise in 2016 were simply not aware of this long history of UK skepticism towards the Union.
Russia
– The chapter about Russia and its options for a future geopolitical strategy is written very well. Brzezinski calls Russia and its territory a ‘black hole’ on the map or a ‘great void’ (which sounds like a pretty accurate description to me – as a Russian citizen). According to Brzezinski, as of 1997 Russia had four options for a future geopolitical strategy, three of which were unrealistic and only one was a single viable alternative.
1) The first option for Russia is to become an equal strategic partner of the US, a power as strong as America itself that could be treated as an equal partner. Unfortunately, this turned out to be unrealistic – after the fall of the Soviet Union Russia found itself in a deep crisis, both social and economic, which made it a weak partner that nobody really wished to have.
2) The second option is to create a ‘Eurasian Union’ similar to the EU, that would unite Russia, Eastern Europe and the Central Asian states. This option is faulty too – the EU model implies a union of equal states, however in Eurasian region this is almost impossible, as any union would inevitably be centred around the largest and most powerful economy of the region – Russia – and resemble a reincarnation of the Russian empire rather than the EU.
3) The third option for Russia is to create an anti-US alliance with other countries that don’t accept the US hegemony: China and Iran; first – as the most populous and fast-developing Asian economy, second – as the most militarized and powerful Middle Eastern state. Unfortunately, such alliance has also proven to be unrealistic: neither Iran nor China would treat Russia as a potential partner that could be more beneficial to them than the US, especially in terms of foreign investments and access to Western technologies.
4) Hence, the last and the only feasible alternative for Russia, according to Brzezinski, is to look towards the direction of the EU and strive to become more of a Western, modernized and democratic country – a similar process that Turkey has undergone after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately, a critical moment in the 90s when Russia was seriously considering such a possibility, and had a chance to become a part of NATO was missed due to a short-term hesitation on American side. Soon after that, it was already too late, as the Russian sentiment towards the EU and the US has forever changed. Now, the only option is to wait until a few generations of Russian political elite pass, in order for this possibility to become feasible again.
In the end, Brzezinski writes:
‘It should become more evident to the Russian political elite that Russian first priority is to modernize itself rather than to engage in a futile effort to regain its former status as a global power.’
Unfortunately, seems like this is exactly what has happened after 1997. And instead of the fourth strategy, Russia has clearly chosen the second and third ones.
– Again, a special importance in the book is given to Ukraine as a ‘geopolitical pivot’ that the Russian status depends on. According to Brzezinski, with having Ukraine under control, Russia could strive to become a real Eurasian pan-Slavic power. On the contrary, without Ukraine, Russia could only form an alliance with Asian countries of Central Asia and lose its influence over the European part of Eurasia. Therefore, the status of Ukraine is particularly important and its control is pivotal (which was clearly proven in 2014).
As Brzezinski writes:
‘If Moscow regains control over Ukraine, with its 52 million people and major resources as well as its access to the Black Sea, Russia automatically regains the wherewithal to become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia.’
Central Asia
– A chapter about Central Asia is very interesting too. One important thing to consider when trying to understand current sentiments of many Central Asian countries is their imperial legacy. People of modern Turkey, Iran or even Uzbekistan consider themselves successors if Ottoman, Persian and Tamerlane empires, respectively. Therefore, it’s hard for them to accept a role of a ‘vassal’ of another stronger state. As these countries are inherently unstable, Brzezinski gives them the status of ‘geopolitical pivots’ that could potentially change the state of political affairs in the whole region. The case of Turkey in particular has a lot of similarities to Russia: another post-imperial state torn apart between a lure of becoming a member of the EU and a possibility of playing a leading role in restoring an empire that could potentially unite the Islamic world.
– As for the Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Brzezinski gives a lot of interesting historical details that led to the current position of these countries in Eurasian politics. After collapse of the Russian empire, Central Asian states fell under a strong control of the Soviet Union. How? First, Soviet Union preferred to split the region into 5 different republics rather than to establish one single republic of ‘Turkistan’ – to avoid formation of a large single entity that could become its future rival. Second, there was a need to draw borders of the new Central Asian Soviet republics upon the Soviet Union formation, and Soviet cartographers drew these borders in a rather arbitrary way, making sure that the new republics would be comprised of multiple ethnic groups and hence – be inherently unstable. Third, the Soviets undermined the national identity of the new republics: as an atheist state, Soviet Union suppressed their possible identification with the Islamic world.
Now, when the Soviet Union has collapsed and Central Asian republics got an independent status, Russia continues to exercise control over them through the CIS (remember second strategy for the Russian foreign policy proposed by Brzezinski?). The main pillar of control is the redirection of all decision-making to Russia. As long as all transportation routes and oil pipelines from Central Asia are directed through Moscow, the true independence of the region is far from real. But, even without Moscow’s influence, there’re other countries aspiring to exercise control over Central Asia: Turkey, Iran and China being top candidates on the list. Hence, the role of the US, writes Brzezinski in a rather predictable way, is to spread its control even into this region.
The obvious weakness of Brzezinski’s theories unsurprisingly comes from his failure to account for the fact that the world has changed, and that the post-modernist political philosophy has become the new mainstream. There’s no philosophical basis to justify the fact that liberal democracy of American type is an ultimate political virtue that has to be spread to all other regions of the world. Neither that it bears a universal set of values that would be universally true and equally relevant to all civilizations: either Russian, Chinese or Iranian.
As the American philosopher Richard Rorty once said towards his fellow colleagues fighting for establishing a democracy in South America:
‘Philosophy cannot find or justify the truth of your arguments against military dictators and for human rights. There are no such arguments. You can fight rhetorically, argue as you like for freedom and progress, but you cannot justify it philosophically’
Similar way, there’s no justification for America’s self-proclaimed status of the global political and cultural leader, as its own truths lack a universal foundation – they’re inherently subjective and, from the philosophical standpoint, no better or worse than the values of other cultures – cultures which would rather choose to be left alone than to absorb the American way of life.
Of course, Brzezinski’s presupposition that America is a superior state and thus has to exercise a global hegemony across the globe is questionable, to say the least. However, the geopolitical and historical analysis that he performs is of top quality, making the book relevant even in 20 years since the publication.
Below are some interesting thoughts regarding the Eurasian geopolitics:
– First, Brzezinski outlines an interesting and accurate classification of ‘geopolitical players’ and ‘geopolitical pivots’. Geopolitical players are powerful countries, many of which used to be empires in the past and still hold imperial aspirations to some extent. France, Russia and China are the examples. What’s interesting to note is that not all countries that have a potential of becoming geopolitical players have an ambition to do so. For instance, UK prefers a role of a ‘retired’ state that used to be strong in the past, but now only wishes to be left alone. Same with Japan – which has a potential to be the most influential Asian state, however it doesn’t have such ambition, preferring to focus on its internal affairs and domestic market instead.
– ‘Geopolitical pivots’, according to Brzezinski, are regions and territories that are crucial for other states to assert their geopolitical influence on. Such regions in Eurasia include Turkey, Iran, Ukraine and Azerbaijan (which sheds some light on many recent events, such as the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 or the 2020 conflict in Nagorno Karabakh). Internal conflicts on the territories of these ‘geopolitical pivots’ – such as territorial disputes, ethnic or religious conflicts – can be misused by stronger political players to make a geopolitical shift in the entire region to their own benefit.
European Union
– The book was written when the EU was only starting to form. Already then, Brzezinski was criticizing the overall ‘lack of a common idea’ that could unite European countries in the future. In 2020 – when anti-EU sentiment is especially strong, this lack of a common idea is serious as never before. What is for sure is that the EU cannot exist without its two founding states – France and Germany. Brzezinski notes that these two countries have very different reasons to be in the EU. France still has an imperial ambition, and wants to restore its past glory. Germany, in turn, seeks for a ‘redemption’ – a forgiveness for the tragic events of the past century. The only way for Germany to assert its influence is to act on behalf of the EU as a whole: obviously, Germany cannot say that its intention is to become a strong national state (that would just sound weird given the past circumstances), however Germany can do the same by acting through the EU.
– Apart from that, the book has a few interesting paragraphs about the UK: its initial hesitance to join the EU and its doubt that such a union can ever be successful.
As Brzezinski writes, already in 1955, British councils at the European Commission meetings were expressing the following doubts regarding a potential formation of the European Union:
‘The treaty which you’re discussing has no chance of being agreed; if it was agreed, it would have no chance of being applied. And if it was applied, it would be totally unacceptable to Britain… au revoir et bonne chance.’
I guess those people who took Brexit as a surprise in 2016 were simply not aware of this long history of UK skepticism towards the Union.
Russia
– The chapter about Russia and its options for a future geopolitical strategy is written very well. Brzezinski calls Russia and its territory a ‘black hole’ on the map or a ‘great void’ (which sounds like a pretty accurate description to me – as a Russian citizen). According to Brzezinski, as of 1997 Russia had four options for a future geopolitical strategy, three of which were unrealistic and only one was a single viable alternative.
1) The first option for Russia is to become an equal strategic partner of the US, a power as strong as America itself that could be treated as an equal partner. Unfortunately, this turned out to be unrealistic – after the fall of the Soviet Union Russia found itself in a deep crisis, both social and economic, which made it a weak partner that nobody really wished to have.
2) The second option is to create a ‘Eurasian Union’ similar to the EU, that would unite Russia, Eastern Europe and the Central Asian states. This option is faulty too – the EU model implies a union of equal states, however in Eurasian region this is almost impossible, as any union would inevitably be centred around the largest and most powerful economy of the region – Russia – and resemble a reincarnation of the Russian empire rather than the EU.
3) The third option for Russia is to create an anti-US alliance with other countries that don’t accept the US hegemony: China and Iran; first – as the most populous and fast-developing Asian economy, second – as the most militarized and powerful Middle Eastern state. Unfortunately, such alliance has also proven to be unrealistic: neither Iran nor China would treat Russia as a potential partner that could be more beneficial to them than the US, especially in terms of foreign investments and access to Western technologies.
4) Hence, the last and the only feasible alternative for Russia, according to Brzezinski, is to look towards the direction of the EU and strive to become more of a Western, modernized and democratic country – a similar process that Turkey has undergone after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately, a critical moment in the 90s when Russia was seriously considering such a possibility, and had a chance to become a part of NATO was missed due to a short-term hesitation on American side. Soon after that, it was already too late, as the Russian sentiment towards the EU and the US has forever changed. Now, the only option is to wait until a few generations of Russian political elite pass, in order for this possibility to become feasible again.
In the end, Brzezinski writes:
‘It should become more evident to the Russian political elite that Russian first priority is to modernize itself rather than to engage in a futile effort to regain its former status as a global power.’
Unfortunately, seems like this is exactly what has happened after 1997. And instead of the fourth strategy, Russia has clearly chosen the second and third ones.
– Again, a special importance in the book is given to Ukraine as a ‘geopolitical pivot’ that the Russian status depends on. According to Brzezinski, with having Ukraine under control, Russia could strive to become a real Eurasian pan-Slavic power. On the contrary, without Ukraine, Russia could only form an alliance with Asian countries of Central Asia and lose its influence over the European part of Eurasia. Therefore, the status of Ukraine is particularly important and its control is pivotal (which was clearly proven in 2014).
As Brzezinski writes:
‘If Moscow regains control over Ukraine, with its 52 million people and major resources as well as its access to the Black Sea, Russia automatically regains the wherewithal to become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia.’
Central Asia
– A chapter about Central Asia is very interesting too. One important thing to consider when trying to understand current sentiments of many Central Asian countries is their imperial legacy. People of modern Turkey, Iran or even Uzbekistan consider themselves successors if Ottoman, Persian and Tamerlane empires, respectively. Therefore, it’s hard for them to accept a role of a ‘vassal’ of another stronger state. As these countries are inherently unstable, Brzezinski gives them the status of ‘geopolitical pivots’ that could potentially change the state of political affairs in the whole region. The case of Turkey in particular has a lot of similarities to Russia: another post-imperial state torn apart between a lure of becoming a member of the EU and a possibility of playing a leading role in restoring an empire that could potentially unite the Islamic world.
– As for the Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Brzezinski gives a lot of interesting historical details that led to the current position of these countries in Eurasian politics. After collapse of the Russian empire, Central Asian states fell under a strong control of the Soviet Union. How? First, Soviet Union preferred to split the region into 5 different republics rather than to establish one single republic of ‘Turkistan’ – to avoid formation of a large single entity that could become its future rival. Second, there was a need to draw borders of the new Central Asian Soviet republics upon the Soviet Union formation, and Soviet cartographers drew these borders in a rather arbitrary way, making sure that the new republics would be comprised of multiple ethnic groups and hence – be inherently unstable. Third, the Soviets undermined the national identity of the new republics: as an atheist state, Soviet Union suppressed their possible identification with the Islamic world.
Now, when the Soviet Union has collapsed and Central Asian republics got an independent status, Russia continues to exercise control over them through the CIS (remember second strategy for the Russian foreign policy proposed by Brzezinski?). The main pillar of control is the redirection of all decision-making to Russia. As long as all transportation routes and oil pipelines from Central Asia are directed through Moscow, the true independence of the region is far from real. But, even without Moscow’s influence, there’re other countries aspiring to exercise control over Central Asia: Turkey, Iran and China being top candidates on the list. Hence, the role of the US, writes Brzezinski in a rather predictable way, is to spread its control even into this region.
The obvious weakness of Brzezinski’s theories unsurprisingly comes from his failure to account for the fact that the world has changed, and that the post-modernist political philosophy has become the new mainstream. There’s no philosophical basis to justify the fact that liberal democracy of American type is an ultimate political virtue that has to be spread to all other regions of the world. Neither that it bears a universal set of values that would be universally true and equally relevant to all civilizations: either Russian, Chinese or Iranian.
As the American philosopher Richard Rorty once said towards his fellow colleagues fighting for establishing a democracy in South America:
‘Philosophy cannot find or justify the truth of your arguments against military dictators and for human rights. There are no such arguments. You can fight rhetorically, argue as you like for freedom and progress, but you cannot justify it philosophically’
Similar way, there’s no justification for America’s self-proclaimed status of the global political and cultural leader, as its own truths lack a universal foundation – they’re inherently subjective and, from the philosophical standpoint, no better or worse than the values of other cultures – cultures which would rather choose to be left alone than to absorb the American way of life.
May 4, 2021
Κολλημένος ελαφρώς στον Ψυχρό Πόλεμο αλλά με ενδιαφέρουσες επισημάνσεις. 3.5/5
August 7, 2024
Цю книгу варто було б прочитати хоча б років 10 тому , бо написана вона вже майже 30 років назад. Якщо дивитись на неї зараз то всі коаліціі доволі очевидні : Китай-росія-іран проти Америки. Чи загострення конфліктів на кордонах Вірменія-Азербайджан чи Україна-росія, але автор все це прописав ще в 1996му. Якщо оцінювати це з тих років то те що він пише не є таким очевидним але наголошує задуматись. Думаю в вищах щаблях влади це і так ясно : хто кого має стримувати і з ким обєднуватись на найближчі 20-30 років.Але в 96му ще ні Польща ні країни Балтики не були ні в НАТО ні в ЄС а автор оголошував що за 10 років це ймовірно станеться. Так і сталось. Про Україну він прогнозує обережніше. Так великі надії у нього на 2005-10 роки і що демократичні зміни перевернуть країну. Не вийшло а хто винен ми всі знаємо. Про визнання росією українських кордонів як суверенних він говорить вже тоді двояко і в тому контексті що поки не ясно чи відмовиться росія від своїх імперських зазіханок. Якби я то читав в 2010му я б сказав : Діду випий таблетки.Але в 96му ще не було путіна а розвал союзу був доконаним фактом а якщо уважно читати книгу то ясно що пріорітети і сфери інтересів були намічені давним давно і за 30-50 років вони глобаль��о не поміняються.
May 10, 2015
Автор по полочкам, разложил политическую обстановку сил ещё в 1998 году, которая осталась актуальной до сих пор.
Мало того, автор называет всё своими именами. Он заглядывает в историю государств, её географию, культурную жизнь, технологический прогресс, развития науки и уровень образования, а также вслух анализирует возможные противостояния между государствами, блоками и прочими объединениями. Он даёт очень хорошие советы для политиков, государственных деятелей и военных для понимания политической обстановки и принятия правильных решений в их деятельности.
Особенно интересно было узнать достаточно много подробностей про столь важную роль Украины в политике между Россией, США и Европой, а также о сосредоточенном внимании всего мира на странах Каспийского и Тихоокеанского региона, а также таких странах как Турция, Китай, Япония, Франция, Великобритания и Германия.
С автором очень сложно не согласиться, рекомендую!
Мало того, автор называет всё своими именами. Он заглядывает в историю государств, её географию, культурную жизнь, технологический прогресс, развития науки и уровень образования, а также вслух анализирует возможные противостояния между государствами, блоками и прочими объединениями. Он даёт очень хорошие советы для политиков, государственных деятелей и военных для понимания политической обстановки и принятия правильных решений в их деятельности.
Особенно интересно было узнать достаточно много подробностей про столь важную роль Украины в политике между Россией, США и Европой, а также о сосредоточенном внимании всего мира на странах Каспийского и Тихоокеанского региона, а также таких странах как Турция, Китай, Япония, Франция, Великобритания и Германия.
С автором очень сложно не согласиться, рекомендую!
September 21, 2015
Spellbinding stuff.
This WhiteHouse insider lays it all out.
World domination is like a big game of chess. Eurasia - from Lisbon across to Vladivostok is the game board. It's where the money, resources and people are. To rule the world you've got to rule this area. The problem for the US is that it isn't in the field of play. It's across the pond feeling left out.
So the plan was that you take two "gateway" islands on either side of Eurasia and work your way in. On the East it's Japan. To the west it's the UK.
Riveting. Dark. Illuminating. A little frightening. It reeks of truthful confession.
Those crazy neo-cons!
This WhiteHouse insider lays it all out.
World domination is like a big game of chess. Eurasia - from Lisbon across to Vladivostok is the game board. It's where the money, resources and people are. To rule the world you've got to rule this area. The problem for the US is that it isn't in the field of play. It's across the pond feeling left out.
So the plan was that you take two "gateway" islands on either side of Eurasia and work your way in. On the East it's Japan. To the west it's the UK.
Riveting. Dark. Illuminating. A little frightening. It reeks of truthful confession.
Those crazy neo-cons!
June 13, 2025
Bàn cờ lớn - Zbigniew Brzezinski
Được xuất bản năm 1997 nên có lẽ về mặt thời sự thì mình không đánh gia cao. Tuy nhiên đây vẫn là cuốn có sự dự báo khá đúng cho tới thời điểm hiện tại cũng là cuốn cho thấy chiến lược đối ngoại của nước Mỹ đối với các nước sau chiến tranh Lạnh để luôn đảm bảo vị thế siêu cường của mình.
“"Bàn cờ lớn" thể hiện tầm nhìn địa chiến lược táo bạo và khiêu khích của Brzezinski dành cho sự ưu việt của nước Mỹ trong thế kỷ 21. Điểm trọng tâm trong phân tích của ông là việc thực thi quyền lực trên lục địa Á-Âu, nơi tập trung phần lớn dân số, tài nguyên thiên nhiên và hoạt động kinh tế của toàn cầu.”
Được xuất bản năm 1997 nên có lẽ về mặt thời sự thì mình không đánh gia cao. Tuy nhiên đây vẫn là cuốn có sự dự báo khá đúng cho tới thời điểm hiện tại cũng là cuốn cho thấy chiến lược đối ngoại của nước Mỹ đối với các nước sau chiến tranh Lạnh để luôn đảm bảo vị thế siêu cường của mình.
“"Bàn cờ lớn" thể hiện tầm nhìn địa chiến lược táo bạo và khiêu khích của Brzezinski dành cho sự ưu việt của nước Mỹ trong thế kỷ 21. Điểm trọng tâm trong phân tích của ông là việc thực thi quyền lực trên lục địa Á-Âu, nơi tập trung phần lớn dân số, tài nguyên thiên nhiên và hoạt động kinh tế của toàn cầu.”
February 24, 2014
If you want to acquire knowledge about Eurasia, it is an imperative to read this masterpiece from Brzezinsky. He possesses a deep comprehension of Countries and meticulously presents to us the reason behind every geopolitical decision in a lucid and coherent form of writing. He also offers his own prognosis on critical decision that a country will undertake in the future which is interesting. Considering this book was written in 1994 and that we are currently in 2014, i'm stupefied by the accuracy in which he performed them but also elated that I learned from one of the best.
February 20, 2016
one should appreciate the candor of texts like this, where the imperialist objectives are openly expressed.
made famous several years after its composition by the bush regime's seeming attempt to effect its basic recommendations.
made famous several years after its composition by the bush regime's seeming attempt to effect its basic recommendations.
April 20, 2024
Книга була видана у 1997 році, той і актуальної інформації тут нема. Але, цікаво дізнаватись деталі минулого, які оминули мене, та ставки на майбутнє, які справдились, або ні.
May 21, 2017
Unbelievably, though published only 20 years ago, The Grand Chessboard seems dated. It predates 9/11 and Vladimir Putin's rise to leadership in Russia, and the years following those events have moved at warp speed and left some of Brzezinski's visions for the future undermined. The American primacy is at the core of his vision, as his title indicates, but he does write that our global hegemony is limited.
Of primary interest to me was his long section on our relations with China and Asia. They are our principal challenge. How we balance our relations with adversary China and ally Japan will determine how well we can live as partners in a Pacific community. A conflict with China, if we allow ourselves to slip into one, will be disastrous for both countries, militarily and economically, but military involvement in other parts of the world would steepen America's decline. Brzezinski writes at length about the end of British primacy occurring during the time of the long European instability in the 20th century.
The Asian corner of Brzezinski's chessboard looked pretty much as I expected. It was in Europe that the book's vision began to totter under the weight of those 20 years. He advocated an expansion of NATO eastward to the borders of Russia. A realistic goal, he says, would be for the U. S. and Europe to encourage Russia's democratic and economic recovery so that it can safely relate to and be included in the larger Euro-Atlantic system. As I say, the book was published before Putin and his aggressive program to restore Russia to the ranks of great powers.
And it was written before 9/11, the American kneejerk response in Iraq, and the Arab Spring, and so before the political upheaval in the Middle East began to impact Europe. Brzezinski is one of those political scientists who believes the Eurasian landmass the most important real estate on the planet and, presumably, though I don't remember him saying so, the Indian Ocean the most strategic body of water. So I read with interest his treatment of the area he calls the Eurasian Balkans: Central Asia and parts of South Asia, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Generally the book has useful maps and here they're particularly helpful in illustrating this pivot point and some of the pressures existing in the region as Russia tries to exert influence southward and China courts Pakistan and Iran to outflank India. Written 4 years before our involvement in Afghanistan began, this strategic shuffle probably helps to explain our continued presence there. Recent events have made us think of North Africa and the Middle East as a tinderbox, but it may be that Central Asia burns just as brightly. I wasn't aware of these strategic concerns, so these were probably the books's most interesting pages for me.
It's unfortunate that events have outpaced Brzezinski's ideas. His general path outlined for America in Asia might still be applicable, but events in other regions of Eurasia don't match his vision. An Epilogue written in 2016 for this edition failed, in my opinion, to catch up. He's still an insightful and influential thinker on the subject. I'd be interested in his most recent insight.
Of primary interest to me was his long section on our relations with China and Asia. They are our principal challenge. How we balance our relations with adversary China and ally Japan will determine how well we can live as partners in a Pacific community. A conflict with China, if we allow ourselves to slip into one, will be disastrous for both countries, militarily and economically, but military involvement in other parts of the world would steepen America's decline. Brzezinski writes at length about the end of British primacy occurring during the time of the long European instability in the 20th century.
The Asian corner of Brzezinski's chessboard looked pretty much as I expected. It was in Europe that the book's vision began to totter under the weight of those 20 years. He advocated an expansion of NATO eastward to the borders of Russia. A realistic goal, he says, would be for the U. S. and Europe to encourage Russia's democratic and economic recovery so that it can safely relate to and be included in the larger Euro-Atlantic system. As I say, the book was published before Putin and his aggressive program to restore Russia to the ranks of great powers.
And it was written before 9/11, the American kneejerk response in Iraq, and the Arab Spring, and so before the political upheaval in the Middle East began to impact Europe. Brzezinski is one of those political scientists who believes the Eurasian landmass the most important real estate on the planet and, presumably, though I don't remember him saying so, the Indian Ocean the most strategic body of water. So I read with interest his treatment of the area he calls the Eurasian Balkans: Central Asia and parts of South Asia, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Generally the book has useful maps and here they're particularly helpful in illustrating this pivot point and some of the pressures existing in the region as Russia tries to exert influence southward and China courts Pakistan and Iran to outflank India. Written 4 years before our involvement in Afghanistan began, this strategic shuffle probably helps to explain our continued presence there. Recent events have made us think of North Africa and the Middle East as a tinderbox, but it may be that Central Asia burns just as brightly. I wasn't aware of these strategic concerns, so these were probably the books's most interesting pages for me.
It's unfortunate that events have outpaced Brzezinski's ideas. His general path outlined for America in Asia might still be applicable, but events in other regions of Eurasia don't match his vision. An Epilogue written in 2016 for this edition failed, in my opinion, to catch up. He's still an insightful and influential thinker on the subject. I'd be interested in his most recent insight.
October 11, 2019
Húszéves geopolitikai szakkönyvek esetében fennáll a veszély, hogy olyanok lesznek, mint holmi fura múzeumi tárgyak, amiknek már a funkcióját sem tudjuk pontosan – mint egy kurbli, teszem azt. Vagy egy vonalas telefon. Brzezinski könyve szerencsére nem ilyen – egyfelől mert könnyen olvasható, és látszik, írója nem volt rest elmerülni az Amerikán kívüli világ külpolitikai irataiban. (Külön értéke, hogy bővebben beszél az ún „eurázsiai Balkánról”, az Oroszország, Törökország, Kína és Irán által körbezárt közép-ázsiai régióról, amit a legtöbb elemző hanyagolni szokott – ő viszont ebben látja egész Eurázsia stabilitásának kulcsát.) Másfelől meg (mint minden valamire való geopolitikai munka) nem esik abba a hibába, hogy puszta jóslatgyűjteményként funkcionál, hanem stratégiai célokat vázol fel, amiket jól körvonalazott stratégiai érdekek köré épít – a stratégiai érdek pedig időtálló dolog… az megint más kérdés, hogy egyes államvezetők összetévesztik-e a saját személyes érdekükkel, vagy sem.
Én magam Brzezinskit nem tartom olyan egyértelműen Amerika-központúnak. Igaz ugyan, hogy az USA monopolisztikus hatalmi státuszából indul ki, amit mindenképpen üdvözítőbbnek tart, mint sok egyéb lehetőséget – ugyanakkor ez a hatalmi státusz tényszerűen VAN, ebből kell kiindulni. Tegyük még hozzá, hogy A nagy sakktábla egyik világosan kimondott célja, hogy Amerikát kvázi felkészítse arra az időszakra, amikor már kénytelen lesz megosztani hatalmát a felemelkedő államokkal – mert pontosan látja, hogy az USA hegemóniája a jövőben már korántsem lesz egyértelmű, és okos dolog volna ezt a bizonytalan jövőbe való átmenetet minél zökkenőmentesebben levezetni, hogy puhára essünk. Arról nem is beszélve, hogy Brzezinski egész elméletének kulcsa, hogy az USA-nak dolga van Eurázsiában: neki kell okos politikával segíteni az egyensúly létrehozásában és megőrzésében a számtalan szemben álló érdek között – ez teljesen elüt a gyakran izolációra törekvő amerikai irányvonalaktól.
Hasznos kis könyv – nem pusztán felidézi a húsz évvel ezelőtti politikai frontvonalakat, hanem a mai napig érvényes, vállalható célokat határoz meg. Talán lesz még olyan épeszű elnök Amerikában, aki leporolja kicsit ezeket.
Én magam Brzezinskit nem tartom olyan egyértelműen Amerika-központúnak. Igaz ugyan, hogy az USA monopolisztikus hatalmi státuszából indul ki, amit mindenképpen üdvözítőbbnek tart, mint sok egyéb lehetőséget – ugyanakkor ez a hatalmi státusz tényszerűen VAN, ebből kell kiindulni. Tegyük még hozzá, hogy A nagy sakktábla egyik világosan kimondott célja, hogy Amerikát kvázi felkészítse arra az időszakra, amikor már kénytelen lesz megosztani hatalmát a felemelkedő államokkal – mert pontosan látja, hogy az USA hegemóniája a jövőben már korántsem lesz egyértelmű, és okos dolog volna ezt a bizonytalan jövőbe való átmenetet minél zökkenőmentesebben levezetni, hogy puhára essünk. Arról nem is beszélve, hogy Brzezinski egész elméletének kulcsa, hogy az USA-nak dolga van Eurázsiában: neki kell okos politikával segíteni az egyensúly létrehozásában és megőrzésében a számtalan szemben álló érdek között – ez teljesen elüt a gyakran izolációra törekvő amerikai irányvonalaktól.
Hasznos kis könyv – nem pusztán felidézi a húsz évvel ezelőtti politikai frontvonalakat, hanem a mai napig érvényes, vállalható célokat határoz meg. Talán lesz még olyan épeszű elnök Amerikában, aki leporolja kicsit ezeket.
August 11, 2022
I honestly think it was a pretty in-depth overview of the world as seen by the position of the USA. There are parts that don't really stand up to scrutiny, like the idea that there would be international anarchy if the US were not the global hegemon but I felt that many of the arguments were based on geographical and demographic realities.
The book is older, yet some of the predictions of the flashpoints and how they would play out are still very relevant. Certainly concerning Ukraine, Taiwan and the United Kingdom's struggle with irrelevance are still today's issues.
The book is older, yet some of the predictions of the flashpoints and how they would play out are still very relevant. Certainly concerning Ukraine, Taiwan and the United Kingdom's struggle with irrelevance are still today's issues.
August 18, 2024
Je lis les rétroactions du livre et ne suis pas étonné des critiques (assez classiques en sciences sociales- faciles aussi). On accuse Brzezinski de « technocrate », de « servir les intérêts américains » (propagande).
Nonobstant ses intérêts et ses positions défendues liées à l’Amérique, la lecture qu’il impose de la géostratégie mondiale est tout à fait intéressante- et force est de constaté qu’elle a bien vieillie. Quelques éléments de cette position :
- Son attitude politique semble celle d’un certain réalisme (le moindre mal ?) : dans un monde dominé historiquement par des logiques impériales, l’Amérique est le premier empire « global » depuis la naissance des Empires. De surcroît, le premier empire démocratique, qui défend (toutes proportions gardées, évidemment) les droits de l’Homme par ses institutions/logiques politiques. Pour Brzezinski, le rôle des États-Unis est donc de préserver son hégémonie mondiale et de favoriser l’harmonie du monde, par l’imposition d’une idéologie libérale.
- L’Amérique domine par le biais d’institutions (OTAN, ONU, etc.) et de vieilles alliances qui lui fournit, indirectement (soft power), une domination sur le monde (i.e. Japon). Cette domination se voit bouleversée en cette fin de siècle.
- Deux puissances sérieuses, vers la fin des années 1990, menacent cette hégémonie : Russie + Chine. Cette dernière est beaucoup plus menacante que la première, alors que le colosse aux pieds d’argile est aux prises avec un « parapluie » qu’est l’OTAN et l’UE.
- L’auteur évalue les possibilités d’alliance (Chine, Inde, Russie par exemple) et constate de quelles manières ce serait dévastateur pour l’harmonie mondiale. Oups.
Écartons les critiques idéologiques et quasi aveugles (à saveur idéalistes) : ce livre est un tremplin formidable vers le monde de la géostratégie. On comprend rapidement les manières de réfléchir des stratèges politiques. Il est plus aisé de lire le monde et les décisions politiques qui sont prises par la suite. Par ailleurs, d’un point de vue personnel, la lecture de cet ouvrage raffermit l’une de mes positions : les Empires ne cesseront pas d’exister. Pensons et agissons en conséquence (réalisme).
PS 2 : qu’est-ce que je donnerais pour lire son constat sur les plus récentes années !
Nonobstant ses intérêts et ses positions défendues liées à l’Amérique, la lecture qu’il impose de la géostratégie mondiale est tout à fait intéressante- et force est de constaté qu’elle a bien vieillie. Quelques éléments de cette position :
- Son attitude politique semble celle d’un certain réalisme (le moindre mal ?) : dans un monde dominé historiquement par des logiques impériales, l’Amérique est le premier empire « global » depuis la naissance des Empires. De surcroît, le premier empire démocratique, qui défend (toutes proportions gardées, évidemment) les droits de l’Homme par ses institutions/logiques politiques. Pour Brzezinski, le rôle des États-Unis est donc de préserver son hégémonie mondiale et de favoriser l’harmonie du monde, par l’imposition d’une idéologie libérale.
- L’Amérique domine par le biais d’institutions (OTAN, ONU, etc.) et de vieilles alliances qui lui fournit, indirectement (soft power), une domination sur le monde (i.e. Japon). Cette domination se voit bouleversée en cette fin de siècle.
- Deux puissances sérieuses, vers la fin des années 1990, menacent cette hégémonie : Russie + Chine. Cette dernière est beaucoup plus menacante que la première, alors que le colosse aux pieds d’argile est aux prises avec un « parapluie » qu’est l’OTAN et l’UE.
- L’auteur évalue les possibilités d’alliance (Chine, Inde, Russie par exemple) et constate de quelles manières ce serait dévastateur pour l’harmonie mondiale. Oups.
Écartons les critiques idéologiques et quasi aveugles (à saveur idéalistes) : ce livre est un tremplin formidable vers le monde de la géostratégie. On comprend rapidement les manières de réfléchir des stratèges politiques. Il est plus aisé de lire le monde et les décisions politiques qui sont prises par la suite. Par ailleurs, d’un point de vue personnel, la lecture de cet ouvrage raffermit l’une de mes positions : les Empires ne cesseront pas d’exister. Pensons et agissons en conséquence (réalisme).
PS 2 : qu’est-ce que je donnerais pour lire son constat sur les plus récentes années !
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