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480 pages, Hardcover
First published February 24, 2015
The moment when the British reached a range of around 100 yards would help decide the engagement. Among professional military men, that was judged the optimal distance to balance accuracy against hitting power. At that range, a standard musket firing a nearly one-ounce ball would leave a bloody cavity in a man’s flesh measuring 9.5 cubic inches…From there, the extent of trauma rose sharply. At 75 yards, a typical round created an entry wound nearly two inches in diameter, then tunneled through the flesh and juiced tissue to leave an exit wound more than three inches wide. A range of between 25 and 60 yards seems to have been the ideal killing distance, as musket balls had not yet lost most of their kinetic energy, and neither had they sheared too far off their intended vectors, thus allowing the defending musketman to count on hitting what he was aiming at.
One surgeon [on Iwo Jima] analyzed the composition of the shrapnel he was rapidly learning about: “The smaller fragments buzzed by like swarms of angry bees. The medium-sized pieces sounded like a flock of purple grackles moving from one clump of trees to another. Some of the largest chunks were the size of dinner plates and make a soft sighing sound as they passed by. They were also clearly visible as they floated close by overhead. These large fragments could readily cut a man in half if he were to get in their way.” They could certainly decapitate you. When Patrick Caruso jumped into a shell crater he found a headless Marine sitting there with “a cigarette still burning between two of his fingers and a rifle in his other hand.” Another Marine recalled that he had just given a man a cracker when he was killed. The fragment “cut the top of his head off right above the eyes, all the way to the back of his neck, and the piece was hanging from his collar like a bucket lid.”
American military writers [after World War II] likened the recent bombing of campaigns against Germany and Japan to Sherman’s March to the Sea. Total War, in other words, was a singularly twentieth-century form of warfare that considered the enemy population, industry, and infrastructure as legitimate and as important a military target as combatants in the field--a concept and means of warfare quite alien to those living in the nineteenth century, when generals thought almost exclusively in terms of defeating the enemy in a decisive battle. (112)
I shall admit that over the course of my research I’ve become somewhat more cautious when it comes to listening to drums beaten by amateurs rousing nations to war with one another. . . . [Military historians] are more aware than most that embarking on war is like entering a dark room [where] even the simplest thing becomes very hard, and no matter what transpires or how incandescent the cause, men will be murdered, often mistakenly or accidentally, and sometimes pointlessly. . . . That does not mean that war is always unnecessary or never justified, but one must pick one’s battles (so to speak) and be realistic as to balancing often incommensurate ends and means, knowns and unknowns. (356)