Nietzsche once proclaimed himself the 'Buddha of Europe', and throughout his life Buddhism held enormous interest for him. While he followed Buddhist thinking in demolishing what he regarded as the two-headed delusion of Being and Self, he saw himself as advocating a response to the ensuing nihilist crisis that was diametrically opposed to that of his Indian counterpart. In this book Antoine Panaïoti explores the deep and complex relations between Nietzsche's views and Buddhist philosophy. He discusses the psychological models and theories which underlie their supposedly opposing ethics of 'great health' and explodes the apparent dichotomy between Nietzsche's Dionysian life-affirmation and Buddhist life-negation, arguing for a novel, hybrid response to the challenge of formulating a tenable post-nihilist ethics. His book will interest students and scholars of Nietzsche's philosophy, Buddhist thought and the metaphysical, existential and ethical issues that emerge with the demise of theism.
260317 later addition: one of my first books on nietzsche 120710 that determined how i always thought of him, still relevant after this book, captures my reason for surprise that i did not think to think more on nz and bd: The Philosophy of Nietzsche
221016 first review: this book was an engaging surprise. i had not in thought seen together philosophical bd and nz, had not seen how their work in many ways is complementary, through vastly separate traditions, though yes nz knew of bd through schopenhauer and yes he could critically speak to this somewhat mistaken interpretation. the outcome of similar conceptions lead to an ethical chasm between the two. but according to this work, this is more fault of my limited reading of nz, in thought, in speculative tendencies, than actually there...
this book is organized well: after intro, part 1 is two chapters: nz as bd, nz as anti-bd, part 2 is two chapters on suffering: nz on overcoming, bd on cessation, part 3 is two chapters on compassion: nz on overcoming, bd on cultivating, then conclusion which suggests new response to nihilism. for it is nihilism which nz feels he must address, why he thinks first as bd, why he thinks second as anti-bd. i have not read enough nz to know all of his argument, his sources, his decisive, somewhat final stance. there is also the problem that perhaps there is no core nz, rather series of voices, of characters, and in format may be ironic as often as serious...
apparently both nz and bd saw themselves as 'physicians', and the diagnosis is clear: there is the threat of nihilism haunting europe now with the 'death of god', as sort-of 'death of brahmanism' (caste, social roles etc) once in india, with the sense there is no meaning, no value, no purpose to human life, and his new, un-christian valuation of metaphysics not of good/evil but healthy/unhealthy, which nz finds in sch, which in turn is found in godless bd. but the omnipresence of 'suffering' should be viewed as a challenge welcomed by the 'active', free spirit, mastering man, rather than meekly accepted by the 'reactive', the herd, the slave... this is the time to investigate how 'that which does not kill me/him/you/them makes me/him/you/them stronger', though of course this 'stronger' is not merely physical but more spiritual...
for if there is a root problem of our culture(s) (european, indian) for both bd and nz it is in the shared, common, mistaken valourization of 'being' rather than 'becoming', which in christianity, european culture, ensures that even the weakest will be granted mercy and survive from 'suffering' in this immediate 'becoming' world, to the 'transcendent' world of 'being', where all is blissful, all is quiet, all is gentle... in other words, where their 'suffering' is again good thing. these are apparently illusions offered by religion, and at first bd seems to offer something more: there is no 'being', there is only 'becoming', and bd offers way to be outside/beyond good and evil of our typical 'western' metaphysics- but then nz decides bd, at least as he understood it through sch, is the ultimate nihilism that offers only 'no' to the 'sufferings' of life, rather than joyous 'affirmation', eternal 'engagement', rather than 'love of fate' and 'eternal recurrence'... only 'extinction' of 'nirvana'...
on this plan, 'suffering' is good thing. again. real suffering, that is, that must be 'overcome', a challenge, an exercise, rather than disability or 'decadence' that inverts all 'positive' values- strength of body, mind, spirit, rather than worshipping those values appropriate only to 'slaves' such as meekness, obeying, acceptance- these unnatural stances 'revenged' through 'ressentiment' which sees the positive values as 'bad'- i actually learn more nz here, in this text, than i ever had from reading 3 books of his (Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Beyond Good and Evil, Thus Spoke Zarathustra but this does not necessarily convince me)... now 2 more books: Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ...
according to this book, all thought, all religions, all societies, develop through 3 pillars: 1) metaphysics, or 'what is', 2) epistemology, or 'how do we know' 3) ethics, or 'what do we do'... and it is 1) as diagnosis, that nz and bd share. 2) is less parallel as it seems nz starts looking for what he has already decided he will find, and 3) is the subject of several chapters on compassion, then the conclusion offered...
i have certainly read much more bd than nz. i am only reading this book first time. but there seems to me an error that threads though nz's ideas of 1), 2), 3)- an error that begins not with the diagnosis 1), evades 2), determines 3)... and this 'error' seems to me an unjust idea of 'human being'. i do not believe (who does...?) in 'human nature' as determinant of our lives, but i do believe in 'human condition' (mortal, moving in body one way through time) in 'human situation' (with others, with world) and in 'human aptitude' (no more able to beat latest chess computers than run faster than a car...). and it is this argument i have with nz: to be everything 'active', that is 'potent', is often essentially momentary and sometimes deluded status that disappears just when it arrives... whereas to be 'reactive', 'impotent' or at least 'limited' in possibilities is more likely true and enduring status... so it is worthwhile to practice ethics that speak to this...
'compassion' is weakness for nz, in that in some way it damages the free spirit, the 'master', and is in fact deceptive, not truly helping, not leading those in need of help to true understanding of the world- of struggle, of suffering, which precedes all those 'slave moralities'. 'compassion' is hence to be 'overcome' in the interests of the strong, the heroic, the naturally powerful, over the 'decadents' who promote such inverted values, such lies. 'compassion' is to be 'cultivated' by bd's followers and this in an ultimately 'ironic' way, for bd's precepts to help, to serve, are 'conventional' truths, the helping of those yet to recognize the 'ultimate truth' that there is 'no self'. bd is not weak, does not suffer, offers no revenge or transcendence...
this is an inspiring read, and though i do not address 3) much, aside from nz depending on sch's understanding of bd, i am not sure the conclusion is very possible. but good ideas...
added: one philosopher i have read, ortega y gasset, in response to his book 'revolt of the masses' The Revolt of the Masses inspired the following in my review:
'in pedagogical theory, there is the idea that all learners will fit in three classes: those who will learn easily, competent, quick, deep and well- those who will not learn, who are ignorant, uninterested, or likely to learn only superficially- and the great majority who will learn with some help, gradually, sometimes deeply, sometimes not. it is the third students for whom a teacher will be of most use, for the quick will learn themselves well, the ignorant and unmotivated are a waste of any help, but the majority will be in the middle, who can use some help... now replace the concept "learn" with "live" and recognize that any teacher or thinker might also turn some effort to the unmotivated, not charity, not cultish, only generous- also recognize that living as learning is of multiple values, that proficiency in any one "field" does not guarantee such in all fields, and if that field is "how to live" even so that determination is individual, not something to choose for the other, or to impose on the other...'
then: 'this is a later addition: after the election of the orange-skinned hair-challenged man in the United States it is perhaps time to reflect on the current of anti-intellectualism which informs this event and Ortega addresses. there is an aspect that is neglected in my 'pedagogical theory' of politics. that is, irrespective of quality, sincerity, expertise, of the teacher: not everyone wants to learn and may in fact be hostile to any suggestion that they need learn, or that knowledge, thought, perception may be helpful, useful, practical in any way. that informed thought rather than ignorant emotion is perhaps the best way to deal with complexity...
this is what nz and bd inspire in me, despite being sometimes rejected: to try, with compassion, to learn as much as teach, to allow living to be perpetual search, endless investigation, shared project- to live, to become, to act in compassion helping one another. to recognize your fellow humans with sympathy, with the ancient roman greeting 'courage!'... or swahili: 'pole sana' (very sympathetic for you)... there are so many books to read and so little time...
Three and three quarter stars really. Good reading.
If you were to lock the Buddha and Nietzsche in a room with instructions to reconcile their philosophies, you would most likely come up with something similar to Antoine Panaïoti's Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy. Each of them would put forward his own philosophy, reply with his criticisms of the other’s, try to clarify misunderstandings and, finally, search for common ground and try to resolve differences through argument. As with Panaïoti's work, disagreements would remain and each would remain somewhat suspicious of the other. That being said, this is a generally well-written book attempting a difficult but praiseworthy undertaking. Well worth the time and effort to read. - Nietzsche and the Buddha are both notoriously difficult to understand. Panaïoti’s understanding and explication of Nietzsche is both concise and, in my opinion, accurate. He brings great intelligibility to Nietzsche’s overall undertaking and brings clarity to many of the concepts which Nietzsche’s critics and supporters alike struggle with. Nietzsche’s perspectivism, ‘amor fati’, eternal return, ‘décadence’, ‘ressentiment’, and will to power are all brought into play so as to work towards a single position. The general point of view expressed here differs little from that to be found in ‘Nietzsche: Life as Literature’ (Nehamas) although there are some significant differences. - For Nietzsche, the idea which says “no” to ‘becoming’, which replaces becoming with the ‘wahre Welt’, the real world, the absolute, Truth, Being, lie behind all religions and much of Western philosophy. He understands that the concept of Being, which is the basis of all Western philosophy from Plato to Hegel, and of Christianity, with its absolute idea of God, has long forestalled the crisis of nihilism as people have clung to nihilistic ideals to avoid the nothingness of existence. With the ‘Death of God’, Nietzsche foresaw Europe falling into a sea of other false ideals, some, such as nationalism, being dangerous for the future. - Likewise, the Buddha rejected the idea of Being. The world for the Buddha was an ever-changing illusion. There was no Being, only becoming. The World is never-ending flux. That being the case, there is also no such thing as ‘self’ as substance, only as becoming. However, on my understanding of Buddhist philosophy, I am on much less stable ground. Whereas I have spent a great deal of my life conversing with Nietzsche, my knowledge of Buddhism is pretty generic and that is largely my own doing. Seeing the multiplicity of ‘Buddhisms’ out there and the tendency to theistic explanations within them, I have mostly avoided the subject. (Panaïoti has inspired me to approach the Madhyamaka tradition through the works of Nāgārjuna because, according to Panaïoti, Nāgārjuna , “did little more than draw the logical conclusions of the Buddha’s philosophical views.” On verra.) That being the case, I have been much more accepting of what Panaïoti states as to what the Buddha stood for. On occasion, I was not overly impressed with his explanations as he drew out terms through several definitions: the whole ‘thirsting/fever/duhka/self’ through ‘paranoid personality disorder’ discussion left me somewhat befuddled and blinking into the lights. I was also non-appreciative of reference to Theravada Buddhist texts when the Madhyamaka texts were not able to carry the argument. (Sort of like taking a quote from Billy Graham to explain what the Pope is saying about the power of confession and repentance.) - The author sets out to find common solutions in the two philosophers to resolve their common problem of the nihilism that arises with the loss of absolutes in explaining human existence: God, reality, Truth, Being, as well as concepts of the self/ego/subject which have arisen as a result of the former. In setting out the parallels between the two basic views, Panaïoti has done an excellent job. It is clear that both philosophers have defined and attempted to resolve very similar issues in human existence. One has to wonder if the general malaise of nihilism which Nietzsche predicted, and in which much of modern society seems to be wallowing (except that for many today the pain is softened by consumerism – Stuff overcomes the loss of purpose. I’d be fine if I owned a Jeep with built-in GPS and access to Sirius), was around in the Buddha’s time. Were many Hindus feeling a sense of alienation and loss of purpose? - Panaïoti’s biggest challenge arises as he attempts to fit together Nietzsche’s and the Buddha’s concepts of ‘amor fati’/’nirvāna’ on the hand, and their contradictory views on ‘compassion’ on the other: Nietzsche says, “Compassion is the practice of nihilism” and must be overcome versus Buddhism’s prescription for the “cultivation of compassion.” I find that, at several points, Panaïoti strains both Nietzschean and Buddhist concepts in order to bring them into a parallel structure. The skeptic in me raises its ugly face as I struggle to grasp his points. (It may be that Panaïoti is making perfect sense and I am just not getting it but I am sure that I saw him pulling cards out of his sleeve a couple of times.) - All of that nit picking aside, I believe that this book is well worth reading. Panaïoti does a great deal towards demonstrating what the two thinkers have in common and to present the possibility that their respective points of view are not far apart. It is clear that for both of them, “the two-headed delusion of soul/ego/self and God/Being/Substance…” is a creation of humankind. Panaïoti has taken on a huge task and is aware that he has not entirely resolved all of the issues he has raised. In his conclusion he acknowledges this and suggests that there is much work to do to finally resolve the outstanding issues. I do look forward to his future undertakings.
Probably one of my favourite books I've read in the past year, and directly answers a lot of the questions I've had in my mind for a while, along the four Indo-German coordinates of Schopenhauer, Vedanta, Nietzsche, and Buddhism. I think Panaioti is correct in identifying Nietzsche and Buddha as kindred philosophers: in their rejection of Being (God/Brahman), and hence, any purposiveness / telos based interpretation of the world. Also really insightful chapters on the medical notion of nirvana in Buddhism, and the Buddha as the great physician (bhaishajyaguru) who puts out / extinguishes the fire of desire.
But at the same time, I think Panaioti is significantly weakened by his lack of engagement with Buddhist notions of karma and rebirth. Could the Nietzschean "eternal recurrence" be compared with the bodhisattva's vow to return to the world infinite times to help other beings? A few more chapters which actually considered rebirth as a metaphysical truth posited by the Buddha, and not a "historical or cultural contingency" would have made his book a more serious contribution to Buddhist studies. As it stands, it's an interesting - and important - intervention in cross-cultural philosophy, but not something that can actually help Buddhists understand their faith better. Nonetheless, I think Panaioti is right in arguing that any possible religious practice today must answer Nietzsche's challenge of nihilism, and the Buddhadharma could possibly survive this challenge.
A brilliant much needed contemporary examination of the striking similarities and differences between Nietzsche and Buddhist philosophy. Moreover, an excellent presentation of the philosophical criticism of the defenders of "Being" (Heidegger et al.) in favor of the affirmers of Becoming (Nietzsche, Buddha et al.)
Brilliant. Panaioti does a deep dive into the post-metaphysics of Nietzsche and Buddhism to show how, contrary to what Nietzsche himself thought about Buddhism, nirvana very nicely complements amor fati. Nietzsche's philosophy is without a doubt the most creative construction I've read so far; it's also extremely inspiring. I've also found a new appreciation for Buddhism. You will learn in detail a lot about Buddhism and the complexities of Nietzsche's philosophy. I will need to give this another read to absorb the information that slipped past my first reading. I hope to read more on this specific subject.
I disagree with the conclusion Panaioti reaches with his apparent synthesis of Nietzsche and Buddhism, but I nonetheless grant this book 4 stars for how clear, concise, and elucidating it was on key Nietzschean and Buddhist concepts I had trouble wrapping my head around. All around a very good book that is sure to spark disagreement and debate among Indian and Nietzsche scholars alike.
En tant que lecteur de Nietzsche et en tant que lecteur du message fondamental du Buddha (qui est une pratique et un art et non une réponse ontologique) et non du bouddhisme déformé par la religion, je ne peux que saluer l'impeccable démonstration d'Antoine Panioti. Plusieurs concepts nietzschéens m'échappaient ou j'en avais une compréhension approximative. J'ai été en particulier bien éclairé par son explication du nihilisme et de son origine, concept souvent présenté de façon fruste et hors contexte comme une idéologie simplement "destructrice". J'en avais une compréhension historique liée à l'Europe de la fin du 19e siècle (Dostoieski, Proudhon, Bakounine), mais j'en ai maintenant une compréhension "psycho-philosophique" en tant que pulsion réactive face à un monde en devenir. Pour ce qui est du bouddhisme, les concepts présentés sont ceux que je connais et comprends de la même façon. En lisant en parallèle ces deux sources, je voyais depuis longtemps des convergences dans les deux philosophies. Aussi, quand j'ai vu le titre de ce livre, j'ai tout de suite été attiré par le sujet. Cet exposé est non seulement convaincant et bien documenté, comme en atteste la bibliographie, mais c’est aussi une invitation, une sorte de début de porte entrouverte pour sortir du nihilisme ambiant qui persiste depuis la fin du 19e siècle, malgré un siècle d’existentialisme et d’autres philosophies modernes qui peinent à trouver un chemin cohérent. On peut apercevoir de quoi pourrait avoir l'air une éthique humaine renouvelée à partir de ce contexte. Bravo. Vraiment une belle lecture.
Decently written overview of two philosophies, but a very unconvincing thesis. The main idea of the book is that Nietzsche, supposedly influenced by Schopenhauer, fundamentally misunderstood Buddhism. It is not a radical pessimistic religion based on life negation, but a self-help therapy that promotes healthy, peaceful existence. Supposedly, Nietzsche was striving for the same goal.
What the author means by the term Buddhism is not the traditional religion but an agnostic secular philosophy loosely inspired by Mahayana Buddhism. He also gives a very mild interpretation of Nietzsche, saying that his harsher claims are supposed to be taken as provocations against his sensitive contemporaries. Although the author acknowledges the differences and complexity of the two philosophies – and occasionally makes some very good juxtapositions – when formulating conclusions he stretches them a bit too much to fit his thesis.
The concluding chapter is very weak, he even starts using the term "Buddho-Nietzschean" and ridiculously ends the book with a quote from Che Guevara. It seems like the author wanted to create a cheerful therapeutic philosophy so he freely borrowed parts from two philosophies that fit his purpose and ignored everything that doesn’t. It’s sad to see this book getting such high reviews.