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The World's Worst Bet: How the Globalization Gamble Went Wrong
Why globalization failed so many Americans and why we must defend it in the face of burgeoning economic nationalism.
The triumphant globalization of the 1990s and early 2000s has given way to a world economy riven by conflict and populism, as the United States, China and other world powers embrace economic nationalism. In The World’s Worst Bet, global economics specialist David J. Lynch offers a trenchant, fast-paced narrative of the rise and fall of the greatest engine of prosperity the world has ever known and sheds important new light on why the march toward greater global integration faltered. How have we fallen so far – from the global hopes of the 1990s to the fractured world and sour, angry politics of the current moment? Lynch explains what went right, what went wrong, and what needs to change to preserve the benefits of global integration and build prosperity for Americans.
Lynch’s deep understanding of the tumultuous forces shaping Americans’ lives is vividly portrayed through a fascinating cast of presidents and policymakers, factory workers whose jobs vanished amid the euphoria over free trade and whose anger reshaped a nation’s politics, and the ideological warriors on the right and left who fought globalization. Their stories illuminate the changing nature of the global economy and what it means for all Americans, from politicians to business executives, workers, and the average citizen. With the world economy at a tipping point, The World’s Worst Betis an essential corrective to arguments for economic nationalism. Our future prosperity depends on getting this right.
The triumphant globalization of the 1990s and early 2000s has given way to a world economy riven by conflict and populism, as the United States, China and other world powers embrace economic nationalism. In The World’s Worst Bet, global economics specialist David J. Lynch offers a trenchant, fast-paced narrative of the rise and fall of the greatest engine of prosperity the world has ever known and sheds important new light on why the march toward greater global integration faltered. How have we fallen so far – from the global hopes of the 1990s to the fractured world and sour, angry politics of the current moment? Lynch explains what went right, what went wrong, and what needs to change to preserve the benefits of global integration and build prosperity for Americans.
Lynch’s deep understanding of the tumultuous forces shaping Americans’ lives is vividly portrayed through a fascinating cast of presidents and policymakers, factory workers whose jobs vanished amid the euphoria over free trade and whose anger reshaped a nation’s politics, and the ideological warriors on the right and left who fought globalization. Their stories illuminate the changing nature of the global economy and what it means for all Americans, from politicians to business executives, workers, and the average citizen. With the world economy at a tipping point, The World’s Worst Betis an essential corrective to arguments for economic nationalism. Our future prosperity depends on getting this right.
416 pages, Hardcover
Published September 9, 2025
44 people are currently reading
339 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
September 7, 2025
This book gives an interesting overview of how globalization came to be and some of the policies behind it. And the swing toward more nationalism in recent years. It covers the good and bad and how it wasn’t distributed evenly across the country. But it reads as pretty much a recent history lesson. Interesting, but can get a little dry and long at times.
C/o Netgalley
C/o Netgalley
December 11, 2025
In the beginning, China was poor. But America wanted to help it and so invited it to join the WTO. Then China became aggressive and did not become democratic as expected. And now blue collared workers are pissed as they lost their jobs to China. Solution? Tax the rich and multinational companies and use the money to retrain displaced workers and create a social safety net. Tariffs just act as a tax and manufacturing jobs will not come back due to robots.
My take: this reasoning has become mainstream. In an alternative universe, Nixon would not have needed to court China had there been no USSR and the Cold War. The book also pointed out that American companies were worried then that countries from other countries would build factories in China and out compete them.
All countries innovate and change. Singapore started with garment manufacturing and memory chips. As jobs moved to South East Asian countries and China, Singapore kept moving up the value chain. The government is always on the lookout for new industries for workers to work in. That I think is the only solution.
My take: this reasoning has become mainstream. In an alternative universe, Nixon would not have needed to court China had there been no USSR and the Cold War. The book also pointed out that American companies were worried then that countries from other countries would build factories in China and out compete them.
All countries innovate and change. Singapore started with garment manufacturing and memory chips. As jobs moved to South East Asian countries and China, Singapore kept moving up the value chain. The government is always on the lookout for new industries for workers to work in. That I think is the only solution.
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December 12, 2025David J. Lynch’s "The World’s Worst Bet" examines how a moment of world-historical confidence at the end of the twentieth century slowly unraveled into today’s era of suspicion, division, and protectionism. The book opens by returning to the 1990s, when American leaders believed they had discovered a formula for peace: integrate former adversaries into the global marketplace, lower barriers everywhere, and let economic interdependence generate freedom and stability. The United States emerged from the Cold War with unrivaled influence, markets were unifying, and leaders in Washington assumed that trade was not just profitable but transformational. The bet was bold - open borders would open minds, and prosperity would produce democracy. For a time, the wager seemed to pay off. But Lynch traces how optimistic assumptions hardened into dogma, how warnings were ignored, and how the architecture of globalization, built without strong safety nets or guardrails, ended up destabilizing the very societies that championed it.
One of the earliest expressions of this ambition appeared in 1997, when President Bill Clinton welcomed Boris Yeltsin to the G7 summit, symbolically bringing Russia into the club of Western democracies. China, too, was inching closer to global markets, with its leaders performing gestures of openness by appearing on Wall Street and promising reforms. Washington’s theory of change was simple: commerce would seep into authoritarian systems and soften them from within. After Tiananmen Square, both Bush and Clinton argued that engagement, not isolation, would lead China toward political liberalization. Clinton’s big domestic embodiment of this worldview was NAFTA, a sweeping agreement that linked the United States, Mexico, and Canada into a single trade zone. He assured workers that the gains would be widespread, and that any disruptions would be cushioned by retraining, investment, and rising living standards. But the supports he promised withered as political will faded. Labor unions had warned that without enforceable labor standards, the deal would encourage offshoring - and they were right. When factories left and new opportunities failed to materialize, entire towns felt trade not as an expansion of possibility but as an abrupt abandonment.
By the late 1990s, cracks in the globalist worldview were already visible. A financial crisis originating in Thailand rippled outward and toppled economies across Asia, demonstrating how fragile the new system could be. In Seattle, protests against the World Trade Organization erupted into chaos, signaling that public frustration was mounting. Still, Washington pressed ahead with its most consequential decision: bringing China into the WTO. Policymakers misjudged the impact. They assumed Chinese imports would rise but American exports would surge as well. The reverse happened. Chinese goods flooded the U.S. market and upended manufacturing hubs. Entire industries shrank or vanished. The 'China shock' - the tidal wave of cheaper imports - emptied factories in places like Tennessee and the Carolinas. Support programs meant to help dislocated workers were threadbare and poorly executed. Millions of people experienced globalization as a one-way street that led their jobs elsewhere, while the promised new opportunities rarely arrived.
As the 2000s unfolded, the relationship between the United States and China grew more lopsided. China’s export earnings looped back into American financial markets, with Beijing accumulating staggering amounts of U.S. government debt. This kept borrowing cheap and fueled a sense that the global economy was humming smoothly - until the 2008 financial crisis shattered that illusion. When Wall Street collapsed, the irony was unmistakable: China, the country Washington had expected to liberalize politically, had become a key lender propping up the American financial system. The crash wiped out trillions in household wealth, destroyed millions of jobs, and shattered public faith in elites who had promised that globalization would benefit everyone. The political backlash was immediate. Movements as different as the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street were united by a sense that the system was unfair, opaque, and tilted toward the powerful. During this same period, hopes that China might liberalize were extinguished by Xi Jinping, whose crackdown on dissent, restriction of companies, and widespread cyber-espionage campaigns made clear that political reform was not on the horizon.
By the time Barack Obama tried to pivot U.S. strategy with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the political appetite for big trade agreements had evaporated. Even Democrats distanced themselves from the deal, fearful of voter anger. In 2016, both Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump tapped into years of discontent. Trump offered an especially simple narrative: globalization had betrayed American workers, China had taken advantage of the United States, and trade deals were tools for the elite. Economic pain in manufacturing regions made these claims resonate. Trump’s victory marked a decisive break - globalization was no longer a bipartisan project but a symbol of everything many voters felt they had lost. Yet his own policies, heavy with tariffs and deficit-expanding tax cuts, created contradictions. Tariffs raised prices for Americans while supply chains rerouted through other countries, making trade flows appear different on paper but not in substance. Meanwhile, factory employment stagnated.
The COVID-19 pandemic exposed another weakness in the global system: its dependence on intricate, far-flung supply chains fine-tuned for efficiency but not resilience. As cities and provinces shut down, shipments halted, ports became overwhelmed, and vital components failed to arrive. Shortages rippled from hospitals to electronics stores. Biden’s administration responded by mapping vulnerable supply chains, building data-sharing systems like FLOW, maintaining tariffs on China, and passing industrial policies centered on microchips and clean technology. The CHIPS and Science Act, along with major manufacturing investments in states like Ohio and Arizona, represented a shift toward shortening supply lines and regaining capabilities lost over decades. Yet political wounds remained deep, especially in regions where jobs had disappeared and never returned.
By 2024, Washington’s strategy hardened further, with steep new tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and green technologies. The move reflected bipartisan skepticism of China and a belief that earlier openness had gone too far. But tariffs alone cannot recreate lost industries, and companies quickly found ways around them by shifting stages of production to Southeast Asia or Mexico. The deeper challenge, Lynch suggests, is that globalization’s disruptions are now being intensified by a new force: artificial intelligence. Many of the workers who suffered through earlier waves of trade shock are poised to face another round of destabilization, this time hitting both blue-collar and white-collar sectors.
The final chapters of the book focus on what it would take to build a more humane and resilient economic order. Lynch argues that the United States must strengthen its safety nets, expand retraining aligned with real job opportunities, and provide wage insurance for displaced workers. Communities - not just individuals - must be supported so that regions hollowed out by past shocks have a chance to reinvent themselves. Greenville, South Carolina, offers one example, transforming from a collapsed textile hub into a manufacturing center by coordinating schools, employers, and local institutions. But such transformations require resources, which means reconsidering tax structures that have shifted dramatically over the past forty years. Economists note that without meaningful help for those harmed by economic transitions, resentment will not fade.
In closing, "The World’s Worst Bet" contends that America’s gamble on globalization failed not because integration itself was misguided, but because leaders repeatedly neglected the people and places that bore the costs. The promise of open markets was real, but so were the dislocations, and the nation never built the protections that could have preserved faith in the broader system. As the next era of technological and geopolitical disruption approaches, the central lesson is unmistakable: without strong safeguards, shared gains, and deliberate support for workers and communities, the United States risks repeating the same cycle of hope, neglect, and backlash that defined the world’s worst bet in the first place.
One of the earliest expressions of this ambition appeared in 1997, when President Bill Clinton welcomed Boris Yeltsin to the G7 summit, symbolically bringing Russia into the club of Western democracies. China, too, was inching closer to global markets, with its leaders performing gestures of openness by appearing on Wall Street and promising reforms. Washington’s theory of change was simple: commerce would seep into authoritarian systems and soften them from within. After Tiananmen Square, both Bush and Clinton argued that engagement, not isolation, would lead China toward political liberalization. Clinton’s big domestic embodiment of this worldview was NAFTA, a sweeping agreement that linked the United States, Mexico, and Canada into a single trade zone. He assured workers that the gains would be widespread, and that any disruptions would be cushioned by retraining, investment, and rising living standards. But the supports he promised withered as political will faded. Labor unions had warned that without enforceable labor standards, the deal would encourage offshoring - and they were right. When factories left and new opportunities failed to materialize, entire towns felt trade not as an expansion of possibility but as an abrupt abandonment.
By the late 1990s, cracks in the globalist worldview were already visible. A financial crisis originating in Thailand rippled outward and toppled economies across Asia, demonstrating how fragile the new system could be. In Seattle, protests against the World Trade Organization erupted into chaos, signaling that public frustration was mounting. Still, Washington pressed ahead with its most consequential decision: bringing China into the WTO. Policymakers misjudged the impact. They assumed Chinese imports would rise but American exports would surge as well. The reverse happened. Chinese goods flooded the U.S. market and upended manufacturing hubs. Entire industries shrank or vanished. The 'China shock' - the tidal wave of cheaper imports - emptied factories in places like Tennessee and the Carolinas. Support programs meant to help dislocated workers were threadbare and poorly executed. Millions of people experienced globalization as a one-way street that led their jobs elsewhere, while the promised new opportunities rarely arrived.
As the 2000s unfolded, the relationship between the United States and China grew more lopsided. China’s export earnings looped back into American financial markets, with Beijing accumulating staggering amounts of U.S. government debt. This kept borrowing cheap and fueled a sense that the global economy was humming smoothly - until the 2008 financial crisis shattered that illusion. When Wall Street collapsed, the irony was unmistakable: China, the country Washington had expected to liberalize politically, had become a key lender propping up the American financial system. The crash wiped out trillions in household wealth, destroyed millions of jobs, and shattered public faith in elites who had promised that globalization would benefit everyone. The political backlash was immediate. Movements as different as the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street were united by a sense that the system was unfair, opaque, and tilted toward the powerful. During this same period, hopes that China might liberalize were extinguished by Xi Jinping, whose crackdown on dissent, restriction of companies, and widespread cyber-espionage campaigns made clear that political reform was not on the horizon.
By the time Barack Obama tried to pivot U.S. strategy with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the political appetite for big trade agreements had evaporated. Even Democrats distanced themselves from the deal, fearful of voter anger. In 2016, both Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump tapped into years of discontent. Trump offered an especially simple narrative: globalization had betrayed American workers, China had taken advantage of the United States, and trade deals were tools for the elite. Economic pain in manufacturing regions made these claims resonate. Trump’s victory marked a decisive break - globalization was no longer a bipartisan project but a symbol of everything many voters felt they had lost. Yet his own policies, heavy with tariffs and deficit-expanding tax cuts, created contradictions. Tariffs raised prices for Americans while supply chains rerouted through other countries, making trade flows appear different on paper but not in substance. Meanwhile, factory employment stagnated.
The COVID-19 pandemic exposed another weakness in the global system: its dependence on intricate, far-flung supply chains fine-tuned for efficiency but not resilience. As cities and provinces shut down, shipments halted, ports became overwhelmed, and vital components failed to arrive. Shortages rippled from hospitals to electronics stores. Biden’s administration responded by mapping vulnerable supply chains, building data-sharing systems like FLOW, maintaining tariffs on China, and passing industrial policies centered on microchips and clean technology. The CHIPS and Science Act, along with major manufacturing investments in states like Ohio and Arizona, represented a shift toward shortening supply lines and regaining capabilities lost over decades. Yet political wounds remained deep, especially in regions where jobs had disappeared and never returned.
By 2024, Washington’s strategy hardened further, with steep new tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and green technologies. The move reflected bipartisan skepticism of China and a belief that earlier openness had gone too far. But tariffs alone cannot recreate lost industries, and companies quickly found ways around them by shifting stages of production to Southeast Asia or Mexico. The deeper challenge, Lynch suggests, is that globalization’s disruptions are now being intensified by a new force: artificial intelligence. Many of the workers who suffered through earlier waves of trade shock are poised to face another round of destabilization, this time hitting both blue-collar and white-collar sectors.
The final chapters of the book focus on what it would take to build a more humane and resilient economic order. Lynch argues that the United States must strengthen its safety nets, expand retraining aligned with real job opportunities, and provide wage insurance for displaced workers. Communities - not just individuals - must be supported so that regions hollowed out by past shocks have a chance to reinvent themselves. Greenville, South Carolina, offers one example, transforming from a collapsed textile hub into a manufacturing center by coordinating schools, employers, and local institutions. But such transformations require resources, which means reconsidering tax structures that have shifted dramatically over the past forty years. Economists note that without meaningful help for those harmed by economic transitions, resentment will not fade.
In closing, "The World’s Worst Bet" contends that America’s gamble on globalization failed not because integration itself was misguided, but because leaders repeatedly neglected the people and places that bore the costs. The promise of open markets was real, but so were the dislocations, and the nation never built the protections that could have preserved faith in the broader system. As the next era of technological and geopolitical disruption approaches, the central lesson is unmistakable: without strong safeguards, shared gains, and deliberate support for workers and communities, the United States risks repeating the same cycle of hope, neglect, and backlash that defined the world’s worst bet in the first place.
December 12, 2025
Efficiency doesn’t equal resiliency.
(LOTS OF THIS BOOK IS CHINA/USA ONLY)
Then there’s the harsh reality that the costs of globalisation, while still being felt, are likely nothing compared to what artificial intelligence will do.
Investors like Mark Cuban and economists like Daron Acemoglu are blunt (disruption will be broader than the last thirty years, and the only way through is to train and prepare people for how to meet the moment.)
notes:
- The prosperity that globalisation created was never evenly shared, and the warning signs – Midwest factory towns suffering, protests turning violent, and growing authoritarianism in places once thought to be reforming – went largely ignored. Populism surged as workers were left behind, and nations that once cheered free markets began building walls again.
- Washington’s guiding assumption was that commerce could do what diplomacy could not – reshape political systems from within. After the events of Tiananmen Square, US leaders from George H. W. Bush to Bill Clinton insisted that trade would gradually lead China toward democracy.
- (US/CANADA/MEXICO) The big problem was, that while the economy as a whole thrived, the benefits weren’t shared evenly. Labor unions were opposed to NAFTA from the start because minimum labor standards weren’t baked into the agreements. So there was nothing to stop manufacturers from moving jobs to Mexico where the labor was cheaper.
- In 1997, Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea collapsed under the weight of speculative finance and overborrowing.
- Washington’s calculations were narrow: they assumed China’s entry would open new markets for American goods and have only a minor impact on imports. The opposite happened. Chinese exports flooded into the US, reshaping entire industries.
- Economists later tallied at least 2.4 million US jobs lost to Chinese import competition from 1999 to 2011.
- Not only was China selling far more to America than it bought, but China was also using its profits to invest in US Treasury securities, which eventually turned China into the biggest single owner of American debt.
- in 2008, the entire financial system buckled under catastrophic investment schemes, and the ironies piled up. Not only was Beijing heavily invested in financial behemoths like Morgan Stanley, Blackstone, and Bear Stearns’ partner CITIC, they held over a trillion dollars in US government debt. Desperate pleas had to be made with China’s central bank not to dump their US bonds.
- At the same time, with China now under the leadership of Xi Jinping, party control was as tight as ever. Chinese services were caught running broad industrial espionage campaigns. Economic cybertheft meant that China could further undermine foreign businesses by stealing designs and producing cheaper versions. And when homegrown payment platforms – like Alipay and Tenpay – grew so large as to threaten the state banks, a crackdown ensued. There were licensing limits, fines, geographic bans, and even arrests. The message was unmistakable – financial plumbing fell under party supervision.
- Obama was considering ways to box China out. This was the strategy behind the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which attempted to strengthen ties to other partners in the region so that nations like Japan and Korea would be less tempted by Beijing’s deals.
- by that time, no one wanted their name attached to any big trade deals for fear that it would just worsen the situation. Even Obama’s VP, Joe Biden, was throwing shade on the TPP. Trade, and the very concept of globalization, was turning into a political lightning rod, and so the TPP would never come to pass
- Hillary Clinton, who’d once overperformed with white working-class voters, struggled to sell a familiar promise of help and retraining in communities that had been hearing that tune for years. But what really hurt was that her data-driven campaign was aimed at big-city turnout, which meant that factory towns and the suburban Reagan Democrats felt largely ignored. (THEN LOST 2016)
- But even as he promised a manufacturing revival, Trump’s own policies were at odds with each other. He dismantled NAFTA, and piled tariffs on steel and most goods from China, but at the same time offered generous tax cuts that widened the budget deficit and pulled in more imports. The new tariff exclusion process turned the Commerce Department into an industrial gatekeeper – an overworked staff of around 30 people sorting through tens of thousands of firms pleading for exemptions. The trade deficit barely budged, and by the time his first term was over, factory employment was lower than it was when he took office.
- The pandemic ripped it apart at the seams. Lockdowns in Chinese provinces that housed tens of thousands of foreign subsidiaries choked the flow of essentials, from emergency ventilators to microchips. Ports clogged; containers stacked up; a round trip that used to take three and a half days stretched to more than two weeks.
- Russia had launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which sent gas prices soaring. Inflation was an ongoing problem. Biden’s efforts weren’t reaching places like Trumbull County, in Ohio, where decades of manufacturing losses flipped a sixty–forty Obama stronghold into firm Trump territory.
- there should be a safety net for workers that offers wage insurance and more relevant retraining programs. On top of that, there should be more attention placed on helping communities recover.
- If the US were able to restore corporate tax contributions to the pre-Reagan era, the economy would raise hundreds of billions a year – funds that could shore up budgets and build real labor-market programs
- one thing that makes humans great is their ability to work together to solve big problems. And there’s no problem we can’t solve if we pool our resources. The idea is appealing, and, in a war-torn world with impending ecological threats, probably essential
(LOTS OF THIS BOOK IS CHINA/USA ONLY)
Then there’s the harsh reality that the costs of globalisation, while still being felt, are likely nothing compared to what artificial intelligence will do.
Investors like Mark Cuban and economists like Daron Acemoglu are blunt (disruption will be broader than the last thirty years, and the only way through is to train and prepare people for how to meet the moment.)
notes:
- The prosperity that globalisation created was never evenly shared, and the warning signs – Midwest factory towns suffering, protests turning violent, and growing authoritarianism in places once thought to be reforming – went largely ignored. Populism surged as workers were left behind, and nations that once cheered free markets began building walls again.
- Washington’s guiding assumption was that commerce could do what diplomacy could not – reshape political systems from within. After the events of Tiananmen Square, US leaders from George H. W. Bush to Bill Clinton insisted that trade would gradually lead China toward democracy.
- (US/CANADA/MEXICO) The big problem was, that while the economy as a whole thrived, the benefits weren’t shared evenly. Labor unions were opposed to NAFTA from the start because minimum labor standards weren’t baked into the agreements. So there was nothing to stop manufacturers from moving jobs to Mexico where the labor was cheaper.
- In 1997, Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea collapsed under the weight of speculative finance and overborrowing.
- Washington’s calculations were narrow: they assumed China’s entry would open new markets for American goods and have only a minor impact on imports. The opposite happened. Chinese exports flooded into the US, reshaping entire industries.
- Economists later tallied at least 2.4 million US jobs lost to Chinese import competition from 1999 to 2011.
- Not only was China selling far more to America than it bought, but China was also using its profits to invest in US Treasury securities, which eventually turned China into the biggest single owner of American debt.
- in 2008, the entire financial system buckled under catastrophic investment schemes, and the ironies piled up. Not only was Beijing heavily invested in financial behemoths like Morgan Stanley, Blackstone, and Bear Stearns’ partner CITIC, they held over a trillion dollars in US government debt. Desperate pleas had to be made with China’s central bank not to dump their US bonds.
- At the same time, with China now under the leadership of Xi Jinping, party control was as tight as ever. Chinese services were caught running broad industrial espionage campaigns. Economic cybertheft meant that China could further undermine foreign businesses by stealing designs and producing cheaper versions. And when homegrown payment platforms – like Alipay and Tenpay – grew so large as to threaten the state banks, a crackdown ensued. There were licensing limits, fines, geographic bans, and even arrests. The message was unmistakable – financial plumbing fell under party supervision.
- Obama was considering ways to box China out. This was the strategy behind the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which attempted to strengthen ties to other partners in the region so that nations like Japan and Korea would be less tempted by Beijing’s deals.
- by that time, no one wanted their name attached to any big trade deals for fear that it would just worsen the situation. Even Obama’s VP, Joe Biden, was throwing shade on the TPP. Trade, and the very concept of globalization, was turning into a political lightning rod, and so the TPP would never come to pass
- Hillary Clinton, who’d once overperformed with white working-class voters, struggled to sell a familiar promise of help and retraining in communities that had been hearing that tune for years. But what really hurt was that her data-driven campaign was aimed at big-city turnout, which meant that factory towns and the suburban Reagan Democrats felt largely ignored. (THEN LOST 2016)
- But even as he promised a manufacturing revival, Trump’s own policies were at odds with each other. He dismantled NAFTA, and piled tariffs on steel and most goods from China, but at the same time offered generous tax cuts that widened the budget deficit and pulled in more imports. The new tariff exclusion process turned the Commerce Department into an industrial gatekeeper – an overworked staff of around 30 people sorting through tens of thousands of firms pleading for exemptions. The trade deficit barely budged, and by the time his first term was over, factory employment was lower than it was when he took office.
- The pandemic ripped it apart at the seams. Lockdowns in Chinese provinces that housed tens of thousands of foreign subsidiaries choked the flow of essentials, from emergency ventilators to microchips. Ports clogged; containers stacked up; a round trip that used to take three and a half days stretched to more than two weeks.
- Russia had launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which sent gas prices soaring. Inflation was an ongoing problem. Biden’s efforts weren’t reaching places like Trumbull County, in Ohio, where decades of manufacturing losses flipped a sixty–forty Obama stronghold into firm Trump territory.
- there should be a safety net for workers that offers wage insurance and more relevant retraining programs. On top of that, there should be more attention placed on helping communities recover.
- If the US were able to restore corporate tax contributions to the pre-Reagan era, the economy would raise hundreds of billions a year – funds that could shore up budgets and build real labor-market programs
- one thing that makes humans great is their ability to work together to solve big problems. And there’s no problem we can’t solve if we pool our resources. The idea is appealing, and, in a war-torn world with impending ecological threats, probably essential
September 18, 2025
Lynch's narrative examines the "rise and fall" of the Globalization Movement.
My (observer) analysis [and confirmed by Lynch] is that the benefits of Globalization were over-hyped; the downsides under-hyped; and the larger US population left uninformed and the U.S. Government unprepared to address any negative economic effects.
This is a difficult and nuanced conversation.
Overall Globalization has (slightly) benefitted the US - more growth and income....however the growth and income have not been widely dispersed - (usually geographic) pockets of manufacturing industries were very adversely impacted - with little or no incremental assistance from the U.S. Government; while other super-Cities- Boston, Silicon Valley and etc. benefitted significantly.
A very distressing part of this is that within the trade agreements struck contained clauses that allowed safeguards to be implemented should a foreign country "dump" produced goods into the U.S. faster than could be easily absorbed - thereby dislocating US production (think automobile tires)...however even with these clauses located within existing agreements - consecutive US Governments didn't exercise them. The usual reasons given were - these cost to much to implement (retraining and stipends for displaced workers) and or the US wishes to 'get along' with China and not let a labor issue 'upset' a strategic partnership.
Lynch provides a good history of this - a balanced history - but is short on proposed solutions to this - other than correctly saying that the American population currently has come to the conclusion that 'free trade costs more than its worth'.... Nevertheless Lynch outlines that trade in Services in flourishing - the U.S. Economy is ~70% Services based. Lynch notes the fascination U S politicians have in recreating U S Manufacturing Jobs - while ignoring Services traded Internationally.
A good overview - a balanced overview.
We are witnessing a repeat of what seems to have worked previously.....the previous order touted Globalization and Trade as 'the answer'; the current order now touts retrenchment from trade - and reshoring of American Manufacturing Jobs as 'the answer'. Both are too simplistic and are likely to fail disappointing those who believe.
Lord Melbourne:
"What the wise men said would happen hasn't happened
What the damned fools said would happen - did happen..."
Should be of interest to those who read economics.
Carl Gallozzi
Cgallozzi@comcast.net
My (observer) analysis [and confirmed by Lynch] is that the benefits of Globalization were over-hyped; the downsides under-hyped; and the larger US population left uninformed and the U.S. Government unprepared to address any negative economic effects.
This is a difficult and nuanced conversation.
Overall Globalization has (slightly) benefitted the US - more growth and income....however the growth and income have not been widely dispersed - (usually geographic) pockets of manufacturing industries were very adversely impacted - with little or no incremental assistance from the U.S. Government; while other super-Cities- Boston, Silicon Valley and etc. benefitted significantly.
A very distressing part of this is that within the trade agreements struck contained clauses that allowed safeguards to be implemented should a foreign country "dump" produced goods into the U.S. faster than could be easily absorbed - thereby dislocating US production (think automobile tires)...however even with these clauses located within existing agreements - consecutive US Governments didn't exercise them. The usual reasons given were - these cost to much to implement (retraining and stipends for displaced workers) and or the US wishes to 'get along' with China and not let a labor issue 'upset' a strategic partnership.
Lynch provides a good history of this - a balanced history - but is short on proposed solutions to this - other than correctly saying that the American population currently has come to the conclusion that 'free trade costs more than its worth'.... Nevertheless Lynch outlines that trade in Services in flourishing - the U.S. Economy is ~70% Services based. Lynch notes the fascination U S politicians have in recreating U S Manufacturing Jobs - while ignoring Services traded Internationally.
A good overview - a balanced overview.
We are witnessing a repeat of what seems to have worked previously.....the previous order touted Globalization and Trade as 'the answer'; the current order now touts retrenchment from trade - and reshoring of American Manufacturing Jobs as 'the answer'. Both are too simplistic and are likely to fail disappointing those who believe.
Lord Melbourne:
"What the wise men said would happen hasn't happened
What the damned fools said would happen - did happen..."
Should be of interest to those who read economics.
Carl Gallozzi
Cgallozzi@comcast.net
December 2, 2025
'The World’s Worst Bet' offers a nuanced and well-researched explanation of how America’s policymakers mishandled globalization and managed to do so with remarkable consistency over the course of the last 30 years. As Lynch points out, globalization was not a choice. It was a fact. Along with it, China’s rise as an economic powerhouse was almost inevitable. The book’s examination of the 30-year history of globalization offers a timely object lesson as America today faces another seemingly inevitable seismic shift in its economy, this time one brought about by artificial intelligence.
Lynch argues that policymakers failed to appreciate the extent to which globalization and China’s ascendancy would change the face of work in America, and failed to prepare for and mount an effective response to the job losses to come. Today, experts warn that AI is on the verge of reshaping work in America once again. The question for its policymakers is how to prepare now for that next change.
One lesson the book offers is that leaders must approach broad economic shifts through the prism of supporting consensus national priorities, whether they be national security concerns, employment, or ensuring the availability of critical items now produced overseas. Lynch persuasively demonstrates that when it came to the bet on globalization, policymakers failed to do that, or at least failed to do so sufficiently.
As Harry Truman is quoted to have said, “There is nothing new in the world except the history you do not know.” It remains to be seen whether America's policymakers have learned the lessons of globalization as they prepare to place America's next big bet. This book removes any excuse for their ignorance.
Lynch argues that policymakers failed to appreciate the extent to which globalization and China’s ascendancy would change the face of work in America, and failed to prepare for and mount an effective response to the job losses to come. Today, experts warn that AI is on the verge of reshaping work in America once again. The question for its policymakers is how to prepare now for that next change.
One lesson the book offers is that leaders must approach broad economic shifts through the prism of supporting consensus national priorities, whether they be national security concerns, employment, or ensuring the availability of critical items now produced overseas. Lynch persuasively demonstrates that when it came to the bet on globalization, policymakers failed to do that, or at least failed to do so sufficiently.
As Harry Truman is quoted to have said, “There is nothing new in the world except the history you do not know.” It remains to be seen whether America's policymakers have learned the lessons of globalization as they prepare to place America's next big bet. This book removes any excuse for their ignorance.
December 27, 2025
Thanks to NetGalley and Public Affairs for the digital copy of this book; I am leaving this review voluntarily.
I’ve been reading a lot of hard-edged political commentary in 2025; I think you know that’s for obvious reasons. Examining the forces that are reshaping America’s economy was right up my alley. The World’s Worst Bet is a dense analysis of the rise and fall of globalization with a fast-paced, macro-economic critique.
Focusing mainly on the United States and China, the book explains the harsh reality of globalization, whose consequences are still being felt. American companies are worried that companies from other countries as choosing China to build factories and compete with them. As messed up as that is, the current and future economies are slowly being rewritten by the effects of artificial intelligence. Disruptions to the global economy will be more pronounced than anything we’ve seen in decades.
I’ve been reading a lot of hard-edged political commentary in 2025; I think you know that’s for obvious reasons. Examining the forces that are reshaping America’s economy was right up my alley. The World’s Worst Bet is a dense analysis of the rise and fall of globalization with a fast-paced, macro-economic critique.
Focusing mainly on the United States and China, the book explains the harsh reality of globalization, whose consequences are still being felt. American companies are worried that companies from other countries as choosing China to build factories and compete with them. As messed up as that is, the current and future economies are slowly being rewritten by the effects of artificial intelligence. Disruptions to the global economy will be more pronounced than anything we’ve seen in decades.
November 24, 2025
David Lynch conflates a number of serious problems facing America with his attack on trade agreements. Serious inequality in both wealth and income, the politicization of our governing institutions by monied interests, a failing educational structure, and immobility as a result of severe shortages of housing are manifest across the United States. Effective trade agreements between nations, while absolutely in the right direction according to the preponderance of economists, will not solve those problems but international trade serves as an effective scapegoat for these dilemmas. Comparative advantage and opportunity costs are difficult economic theories to explain, but the understanding gained would put an end to some of this faulty thinking.
January 6, 2026
TL;DR America fought to integrate China into the global free trade economy hoping for its liberalization, instead, ended up decimating its own working class (referred to as the "China Shock") and today, economic nationalism reigns.
This book is an expansive detailed dive into this entire history.
What went wrong?
Essentially, America did not do enough to help those who lost their jobs due to globalization leading to the backlash that voted in populist Trump and eventually led Biden to embrace soft economic nationalism.
IMHO, this is a systemic issue that was inevitable. A large number of Americans are allergic to what they perceive as "socialism" and corporations rule. Which is why this will not be solved whoever is in power.
This book is an expansive detailed dive into this entire history.
What went wrong?
Essentially, America did not do enough to help those who lost their jobs due to globalization leading to the backlash that voted in populist Trump and eventually led Biden to embrace soft economic nationalism.
IMHO, this is a systemic issue that was inevitable. A large number of Americans are allergic to what they perceive as "socialism" and corporations rule. Which is why this will not be solved whoever is in power.
November 7, 2025
Mixed feelings about this book because on one hand it was an excellent look into globalisation but from a very American and Chinese focused lense which isn't necessarily bad but the title of the book implies a more global approach. Nonetheless the content is interesting and frames political decisions and their political, social and economic consequences well.
December 12, 2025
Blinkist book of the day
The World’s Worst Bet (2025) tells the gripping story of how America’s faith in free trade and open markets reshaped the world – and backfired at home.
From factory towns hollowed out by the China shock to fragile supply chains exposed by the pandemic, it traces the human and political fallout of an era once sold as inevitable progress.
The World’s Worst Bet (2025) tells the gripping story of how America’s faith in free trade and open markets reshaped the world – and backfired at home.
From factory towns hollowed out by the China shock to fragile supply chains exposed by the pandemic, it traces the human and political fallout of an era once sold as inevitable progress.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
January 29, 2026
Essential reading to understand how the world got to where we are. Deep research on politics, economics/industries and trade throughout the last 30 years. A bit dry and best read alongside domestic and international sociocultural analyses of this period. The final chapter interview with Bill Clinton is devastating.
November 8, 2025
Close to being Stein's "Pivotal Decade" for 1990s-2024
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