Science: Key Concepts in Philosophy

by Steven French

The philosophical questions raised by the history and practice of science are among the most complex and stimulating. The philosophy of science inquires into such matters as scientific reasoning, scientific explanation, the nature and value of scientific knowledge, progress in science, and the debate between realist and anti-realist views of science.

Key Concepts in Philosophy is the ideal first stop for the student wishing to get to grips with this challenging subject. Written with the specific needs of students new to the discipline in mind, it covers the work of key thinkers and outlines clearly the central questions, problems and arguments encountered in studying the philosophy of science. The book considers such fundamentals as discovery, evidence, verification and falsification, realism and objectivity. It also draws on specific examples from the history of science to further illuminate the philosophical questions addressed. This is a practical and informative introduction to a major component of the undergraduate philosophy curriculum, as well as being a support to ongoing study.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

172 pages, Paperback

First published August 9, 2007

About the author

Research Interests:
- Philosophy of Science, especially models and the semantic approach, representation and structural realism
- Philosophy of Physics, especially the metaphysical foundations of quantum mechanics
- History of Physics, especially twentieth century

Steve French is Professor of the Philosophy of Science and his teaching and research interests are in the philosophy of science and the history and philosophy of modern physics. He has recently published a book on structural realism (The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation; OUP 2014) and is currently working on a series of papers on monism, dispositionalism and the relationship between science and metaphysics in general. He is also planning to explore further the connections between the philosophy of art and the philosophy of science with regard to the nature of scientific and artistic objects. At some point he is going to stun the world (or not) with a book on Husserl and the phenomenological approach to quantum mechanics.

Steven is Co-Editor-in-Chief (with Michela Massimi of the University of Edinburgh) of The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/), one of the most highly regarded journals in the field. He is also Editor-in-Chief of the Palgrave-Macmillan series, New Directions in Philosophy of Science (www.palgrave.com/products/series.aspx...).

Reviews

[Italo Lins Lemos · Rating 4 out of 5]

Uma importante introdução à filosofia da ciência, na medida em que aborda algumas das perspectivas mais influentes do século XX (como o verificacionismo e o falsificacionismo) e contextualiza o debate contemporâneo, apelando para as disputas existentes na teoria de modelos.

Steven French acerta, ainda, ao pautar as discussões sobre a dependência das investigações científicas em relação ao contexto social e à parcialidade de gênero, que são duas discussões que acabam por ser (erroneamente) deixadas de lado nos manuais sobre filosofia da ciência.

De qualquer forma, eu diria que o coração do livro está na disputa entre os realistas e antirrealistas, na medida em que alguns problemas importantes surgem quando perguntamos o que uma teoria científica nos diz (ou poderia nos dizer) sobre o mundo que habitamos.

Em suma, uma simpática introdução ao tema.

[Chris · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a nice, gentle introduction to concepts in the philosophy of science. I thought the author pushed a little too hard against the hypothetico-deductive approach by arguing that it has or requires no theory of how hypotheses get created. This doesn't mean, it seems to me, that it implies or requires an irrational theory of creative genius, which is how French treats it. I really enjoyed the discussion of theoretical models, phenomena, and data models, but I don't see why hypothetico-deductive approach, or even sophisticated falsificationism isn't consistent with this approach. This is an issue that I don't think the author gives enough attention to--instead, he spends most of his time explaining why Popperian falsificationism doesn't work, just as confirmation doesn't work. But Lakatos only gets a page or so before we move on. The discussion of scientific realism and anti-realism was especially fruitful.

[juca · Rating 5 out of 5]

Good introduction to Philosophy of Science.