I'm not sure I have ever read a more poorly written book before, and I have had to suffer through Sellars, McDowell, and the German Idealists. It's not that the prose are unclear--they are fine, though at times he doesn't seem sure what he wants to say--it is that the style is apocalyptically annoying. I am confident it is written in an attempt to mimic the style of Malcolm Gladwell and Nassim Taleb that was fashionable at the time, as it has tons of 'funny' side comments, 'interesting' anecdotes, and other kinds of digressions that attempt to spice up the book. The problem is that Scott is not funny, nor are his examples and anecdotes interesting; his prose lacks the punchiness of Gladwell, nor the fascinating boldness (some might say arrogance) of Taleb that keeps their books from becoming the tedious slog this one is. The book is filled with irritating, expatiating tedium at both the sentence and paragraph levels of writing, which constantly pulled me out of the arguments.
The fear was clearly that the math theorem Scott is trying to promulgate here--"Diversity Trumps Ability" (DTA)--is going to come off as boring to most readers, but that is only the case if you spend as long as he does not explicitly stating the boldness and provocative possibilities of the DTA. The stakes of the book are never clear because it is not nearly as clear as it could be what Scott thinks he is contributing to our self-understanding. Instead he is so careful and hedged about the implications of the DTA in the way academic books often are that the potential import of the book is not really clear until the last couple of chapters.
The actual argument itself is interesting, but highly inconclusive for two reasons. First, he concedes there is a huge problem for the DTA--it needs to assume a certain homogeneity of outcome preferences that the real-world clearly lacks--but he never articulates why this isn't a complete death-knell for the applicability of the DTA. He instead argues, correctly, that what we need for the DTA (perspectival diversity) often causes, or at least is concomitant with, preference diversity. His argument seems to be that we can thread a needle such that we can get the perspectival diversity the DTA needs without succumbing to such diverse preferences that the DTA no longer holds. Why? Why is that the case in the real-world? Why is it not the case that there is no good way to get the necessary perspectival diversity without a level of preferences diversity that undermines the DTA? (Perhaps there are isolated exceptions to that when an organization can limit the amount of preference diversity, but on the whole, why not think that this sinks the DTA?)
His answer to my rhetorical questions leads us to the second main problem with the argument. His reply to that concern seems to be that we've got empirical evidence of diverse groups outperforming other groups. However, this is empirical evidence is inconclusive as best. There's a classic problem for applying theorems that he completely ignores, which is that the real world, in its enormous complexity and ambiguity, often has both multi-causal explanations and the interpretive freedom for different people to form plausible alternative explanations for phenomena. Math theorems like the DTA are only interesting insofar as you can prove that the underlying mechanism in the DTA is the same underlying mechanism causing the benefits you claim the examples to show. He never does this. He just assumes that success of the examples he cites are caused by the mechanisms underlying the DTA result. But there could be a huge variety of reasons that the examples he cites occur. To give one example, in political and corporate settings, ethnically and racially diverse groups tend to be exemplary members of their respective identities, and therefore more talented. Why is that not the explanation for why identity-diverse groups can sometimes achieve such spectacular results, rather than the DTA? I don't know, because he doesn't address this.
There are positive qualities to the book. The one I'll highlight is his discussion of intelligence and the different ways you can try to schematize what intelligence is. I was not convinced by his argument that it basically reduces down to the tools we have for solving problems--some people seem far more capable of adopting news tools and applying old ones in powerful ways--but I think he successfully showed that many of the more conventional approaches to intelligence are inadequate. This is the strongest chapter, I suspect, because unlike many others, it is clear what the opposing views are, the import of the chapter more generally, and how his view changes our understanding of the 'thing' in question.
This is a frustrating book to read and engage with, and I'm not sure I recommend it to anyone not also interested in the arguments of political philosophers who have tried (also unsuccessfully) to apply the DTA to political contexts.