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Metaphysics & Historicity
In the 26th Aquinas Lecture, Fackenheim claims that man is what he becomes, and the processes of becoming human are self-making. It must, however, find room for timeless metaphysical truth - the transhistorical possibilities of self-making - to avoid inconsistency. But this leaves man in an unresolved struggle between his infinite and finite aspects, thus rendering philosophy impossible. In response Existentialism with its view of human situation as self-choosing suggests a reality other than man, nature, or history which shares in the constitution of the human being. T.G.R.
- GenresPhilosophy
100 pages, Hardcover
First published June 1, 1961
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November 13, 2023
Emil Fackenheim In Milwaukee
Emil Fackenheim (1916 -- 2003) is best known for his work beginning in about 1967 as a Jewish philosopher and theologian of the Holocaust who taught that there was a 614th commandment in Jewish law to not give a posthumous victory to Hitler. Prior to that time, Fackenheim wrote on Jewish philosophy but he wrote as well on broad philosophical themes not particularly tied to Judaism. Thus, in 1961, Fackenheim, then a professor at the Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, gave the annual Aquinas Lecture at Marquette University, Milwaukee, on the subject "Metaphysics and Historicity". His lecture was published, heavily expanded with extensive footnotes, in this book as part of the outstanding series of the Aquinas Lectures. I studied philosophy as an undergraduate in Milwaukee many years ago. The city and philosophy are always linked for me.
Fackenheim's lecture is broad and difficult and deals with metaphysics with no specific reference to Jewish philosophy. At the outset, Fackenheim points out that metaphysical philosophy, dealing with the broad nature of reality or what Aristotle called being qua being had little place in the then current practice of philosophy which was split between analysis and existentialism. Still, Fackenheim expressed gratitude that metaphysics could still be practiced and receive a respectful hearing in a forum such as the Aquinas Lecture. In his lecture, Fackenheim explores what he calls the deepest challenge to the pracitice of metaphysics in historicism. Roughly, historicism argues that metaphysics as the study of timeless being is impossible because all human activity and knowledge is historically conditioned. The issue in the lecture is whether human beings are able to rise above their historical situation to knowledge and life independent of it. Fackenheim finds an urgency to this question in view of the fast paced changes of modern life, the continued progress of science, and philosophical challenges to the possibility of metaphysics.
The body of this complex, difficult lecture develops what Fackenheim understands as the assumptions underlying historicism. He works to the conclusion that historicism cannot be sustained because, in Fackenheim's view, it is self-contradictory. Fackenheim briefly develops a position on the nature of man and of metaphysics. Human beings are both historically conditioned by their time, place and culture and also strivers for reality and for timelessness. The human condition is a necessarily uneasy mix of the tension between the two. The ultimate role of metaphysics is to show this tension and to point to the search for timeless being and for God. Fackenheim's highly erudite discussion draws from and comments on Aristotle, the German idealists, particularly Schelling and Hegel, existentialism, and process philosophy and pragmatism, among other sources.
I was fascinated to read Fackenheim practicing this broad, heavily traditional form of metaphysics. I looked for comments on Fackenheim's lecture and found a 1964 four-page review of Fackenheim's book by the American philosopher Sidney Hook (1902 -- 1989). Like Fackenheim, Hook was a philosopher who changed his emphasis and orientation over the years. However, Hook always remained a secular, hard-headed thinker, and a pragmatist. Hook finds the lecture "a straightforward piece of ontology which may raise the hackles of empiricists but it can serve a useful function in challenging them to rethink their philosophical approach in the light of other alternatives." Hook rejects the alternatives in which Fackenheim frames the issue between timeless reality and "self-creation" and he finds Fackenheim's discussion devoid of argument and in many places unintelligible. He rejects Fackenheim's form of metaphysics writing that "the very fact that Fackenheim can say that logic is not autonomous with respect to metaphysics and that conflicting metaphysical systems have different logics is further evidence that there is little likelihood that metaphysics will ever be regarded as a discipline whose conclusions may be legitimately regarded as knowledge."
I was glad to struggle with Fackenheim's book and glad as well to find Hook's bracing critique of Fackenheim's form of metaphysics. Philosophy has fascinated me all my life, particularly in thinking about the possibility of the form of metaphysics Fackenheim adopted in this early lecture. As is the philosopher's wont, I tried to think of ways of adopting what is best in both Fackenheim and Hook. I enjoyed thinking about Fackenheim's lecture and remembering my own early life with philosophy in Milwaukee.
Robin Friedman
Sidney Hook's review of Fackenheim's book is found in the Journal "History and Theory", vol 3 no 3 pp 389 --392 (1964). It was kindly provided to me by JSTOR.
Fackenheim's "Metaphysics and Historicity" is available in this book in the Aquinas Lecture Series and is also included in a 1996 collection of Fackenheim's writings, "The God Within: Kant, Schelling, and Historicity", edited by John Burbidge.
Emil Fackenheim (1916 -- 2003) is best known for his work beginning in about 1967 as a Jewish philosopher and theologian of the Holocaust who taught that there was a 614th commandment in Jewish law to not give a posthumous victory to Hitler. Prior to that time, Fackenheim wrote on Jewish philosophy but he wrote as well on broad philosophical themes not particularly tied to Judaism. Thus, in 1961, Fackenheim, then a professor at the Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, gave the annual Aquinas Lecture at Marquette University, Milwaukee, on the subject "Metaphysics and Historicity". His lecture was published, heavily expanded with extensive footnotes, in this book as part of the outstanding series of the Aquinas Lectures. I studied philosophy as an undergraduate in Milwaukee many years ago. The city and philosophy are always linked for me.
Fackenheim's lecture is broad and difficult and deals with metaphysics with no specific reference to Jewish philosophy. At the outset, Fackenheim points out that metaphysical philosophy, dealing with the broad nature of reality or what Aristotle called being qua being had little place in the then current practice of philosophy which was split between analysis and existentialism. Still, Fackenheim expressed gratitude that metaphysics could still be practiced and receive a respectful hearing in a forum such as the Aquinas Lecture. In his lecture, Fackenheim explores what he calls the deepest challenge to the pracitice of metaphysics in historicism. Roughly, historicism argues that metaphysics as the study of timeless being is impossible because all human activity and knowledge is historically conditioned. The issue in the lecture is whether human beings are able to rise above their historical situation to knowledge and life independent of it. Fackenheim finds an urgency to this question in view of the fast paced changes of modern life, the continued progress of science, and philosophical challenges to the possibility of metaphysics.
The body of this complex, difficult lecture develops what Fackenheim understands as the assumptions underlying historicism. He works to the conclusion that historicism cannot be sustained because, in Fackenheim's view, it is self-contradictory. Fackenheim briefly develops a position on the nature of man and of metaphysics. Human beings are both historically conditioned by their time, place and culture and also strivers for reality and for timelessness. The human condition is a necessarily uneasy mix of the tension between the two. The ultimate role of metaphysics is to show this tension and to point to the search for timeless being and for God. Fackenheim's highly erudite discussion draws from and comments on Aristotle, the German idealists, particularly Schelling and Hegel, existentialism, and process philosophy and pragmatism, among other sources.
I was fascinated to read Fackenheim practicing this broad, heavily traditional form of metaphysics. I looked for comments on Fackenheim's lecture and found a 1964 four-page review of Fackenheim's book by the American philosopher Sidney Hook (1902 -- 1989). Like Fackenheim, Hook was a philosopher who changed his emphasis and orientation over the years. However, Hook always remained a secular, hard-headed thinker, and a pragmatist. Hook finds the lecture "a straightforward piece of ontology which may raise the hackles of empiricists but it can serve a useful function in challenging them to rethink their philosophical approach in the light of other alternatives." Hook rejects the alternatives in which Fackenheim frames the issue between timeless reality and "self-creation" and he finds Fackenheim's discussion devoid of argument and in many places unintelligible. He rejects Fackenheim's form of metaphysics writing that "the very fact that Fackenheim can say that logic is not autonomous with respect to metaphysics and that conflicting metaphysical systems have different logics is further evidence that there is little likelihood that metaphysics will ever be regarded as a discipline whose conclusions may be legitimately regarded as knowledge."
I was glad to struggle with Fackenheim's book and glad as well to find Hook's bracing critique of Fackenheim's form of metaphysics. Philosophy has fascinated me all my life, particularly in thinking about the possibility of the form of metaphysics Fackenheim adopted in this early lecture. As is the philosopher's wont, I tried to think of ways of adopting what is best in both Fackenheim and Hook. I enjoyed thinking about Fackenheim's lecture and remembering my own early life with philosophy in Milwaukee.
Robin Friedman
Sidney Hook's review of Fackenheim's book is found in the Journal "History and Theory", vol 3 no 3 pp 389 --392 (1964). It was kindly provided to me by JSTOR.
Fackenheim's "Metaphysics and Historicity" is available in this book in the Aquinas Lecture Series and is also included in a 1996 collection of Fackenheim's writings, "The God Within: Kant, Schelling, and Historicity", edited by John Burbidge.
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