Hitler's Greatest Defeat: The Collapse of Army Group Centre, June 1944

by Paul Adair

"...provides more than ample strategic and operational detail and context about the operation...The human view of combat...is most revealing and significant."-- Journal of Slavic Military Studies . It was a battle worse than the one at Stalingrad, and World War Two's turning point, thanks to Hitler's strategic miscalculations. Succinct and groundbreaking, this analysis of the largely ignored, bloody conflict in Byelorussia reveals how the Nazis lost the Eastern Front. Their defeat cost 350,000 casualities--and left the war effort doomed and broken.

Genres: History, Military History, World War II, Military Fiction, Germany, Nonfiction

208 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1994

Reviews

[Stefania Dzhanamova · Rating 3 out of 5]

Paul Adair's work is a brief overview of the first main offensive in the series that Stalin planned for the summer of 1944 and that were intended to bring about the destruction of Army Group Centre and the liberation of Belorussia, the last area of the Soviet Union still under German occupation.

In 1943, after the fateful battle of Kursk, which, argues Adair, was the turning-point on the Eastern Front as the Wehrmacht was never able again to take more than a local initiative, Stalin agreed to meet Churchill and Roosevelt at Teheran. This was the first occasion on which all three leaders were able to discuss their strategy for the destruction of Nazi Germany and eventually Japan, and to share their views on the post-war structure of Europe. To Stalin's evident satisfaction, the date of Operation OVERLORD (the codename for the Allied invasion of Normandy) was confirmed; "I am satisfied with this decision," the Russian dictator remarked calmly, "but I also want to say to Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt that, at the moment the landings begin, our troops will be preparing a major assault on the Germans.'" As Adair narrates, this was the birth of the offensive that was to liberate Belorussia and "inflict the greatest defeat on the German army in its history."

Although Stalin had told Roosevelt and Churchill at Teheran that the OVERLORD landings in Normandy would be followed by a major attack on the Germans, there was no evidence that any planning had begun. It is possible that the offensive was discussed at the meeting of the State Committee for Defence, which Marshal Zhukov attended in December, with members of the Stavka present, but no decision was recorded as it was too early to tell how the winter and spring offensives would develop. The four main options the Stavka had examined all had their difficulties.
The first was to continue the advance through Roumania into the Balkans. Yet, while this was politically highly desirable and would threaten Germany's dwindling fuel supplies, such advance would leave strong German forces on the Soviet flanks, explains Adair.
The second was to launch a major offensive from northern Ukraine across Poland to the Baltic. However, to sustain an advance of this magnitude was proved to be beyond the capabilities of Soviet forces in the area, and it again would have left strong German formations on the Red Army's flanks.
The third was to attack in the north, but this was rejected because of the many natural obstacles that would hamper movement.
The last option was to cut off Army Group Centre in the Belorussian "balcony", which barred the shortest route to Warsaw and provided airfields from which Moscow could be bombed. "It also had great symbolic importance, being the last area of Russia to be occupied by the Germans," writes Adair. Finally, it would have the advantage of clearing the forces that would threaten an advance to the Vistula from the Lvov area.

The Stavka weighed up the advantages and disadvantages of each option, bearing in mind that the Front had already failed in Belorussia during their winter and spring offensives. Yet, as it was considered that the failure was more the result of Soviet planning and conduct of the offensive rather than the strength of the German positions, it was decided by Stalin and the Stavka on 12 April that the destruction of the German forces in Belorussia should be a priority.
The Stavka now began planning the details of the operations for the forthcoming summer – the timing of the attacks was critical so that the enemy would not have time to move reserves into the threatened sectors, explains Adair.

The sequence of operations for the summer was produced by late April. The plan was to open with a distracting offensive in the north (Karelia and the Lake Ladoga area) in early June. When German attention had been drawn northwards, the main offensive would be launched against Army Group Centre in Belorussia later in the month. This main offensive in Belorussia was codenamed Operation BAGRATION after the Russian Marshal mortally wounded before Moscow in 1812.
The terrain was crucial in shaping the course of the forthcoming operations, argues Adair; the southern sector of the lines ran through the Pripyat Marshes, "home of myriads of wildfowl and mosquitoes," and virtually impassable for armoured vehicles. The difficult ground influenced the Soviet decision to use the cavalry/mechanized group, a strange but very effective formation. It consisted of a cavalry corps and a tank or mechanized corps, and gave the Soviet troops the ability to operate across terrain that was unsuitable for tanks and in all weather conditions.

As Adair reveals in his well-researched overview of BAGRATION's logistics, an offensive on this scale required a supreme effort from the Red Army's logistic services, which had to rely upon primitive roads and a heavily damaged rail network, only recently recaptured from the Germans. The required amount of ammunition and fuel was enormous. The Stavka had laid down that Fronts should have five first and second basic loads of ammunition, 10 to 20 refills of fuel, and 30 days' rations, but in many cases this goal was not met because of delayed transportation. Zhukov reported on 11 June: "The movement of trains with ammunition for First Belorussian Front is extremely slow. Only one or two trains a day . . . There is reason to believe that the Front will not be fully provided for on time." Although at Stalin's insistence the railway timetable was revised and trains were speeded up, the operation had to be postponed until June 23.

While there were deficiencies in the Red Army's logistics, especially regarding the provisioning of food, fuel, and ammunition for the cavalry/mechanized groups, there was something that the Soviets had, by this stage of the war, developed into a fine art – maskirovka. (Adair cites the official Soviet definition of the term: "The means of securing combat operations and the daily activities of forces; a complexity of measures, directed to mislead the enemy regarding the presence and disposition of forces, various military objectives, their condition, combat readiness and operations, and also the plans of the command.")

As Adair further relays, during the virtual collapse of the Red Army in the first months after the start of Operation BARBAROSSA, Soviet military thought was devoted to survival and little attention was given to formulating a concept for maskirovka. German tactical intelligence, particularly their radio interception units, were able to reap "rich harvests as Soviet units appeared to be unable to grasp the principles of radio security." During the battle for Moscow, however, German strategic intelligence was inadequate because it did not detect the presence of three new armies arriving to take part in the first major Soviet counter-offensive at a time when the Germans were confident that the Soviets had little left in the way of reserves. "It is not clear whether this was the result of a definite maskirovka plan or whether it was a combination of coincidence and the appalling conditions," writes Adair, "but it did have the effect of alerting the Soviet High Command to the advantages of deception."
The Soviet counter-attack at Stalingrad in November 1942 was the first major example of this newly found confidence in conducting maskirovka operations on a large scale. The extent to which the Soviets had been able to conceal their preparations is confirmed by the Chief of the German General Staff, General Zeitzler, who stated in early November: "The Russians no longer have any reserves worth mentioning and are not capable of launching a large-scale attack. In forming any appreciation of enemy intentions, this basic fact must be taken fully into consideration." Just over two months later the German Army suffered its greatest defeat so far in the war.

Thus, once the Stavka had decided upon the strategic plan for their 1944 summer offensive, they began to discuss how the Germans could be deceived about the objectives and scale of BAGRATION. The first question was "how the Stavka be sure that German attention was directed to the south and remained there." The solution, explains Adair, was to assume an aggressive attitude in the areas where activity was to be simulated, namely in the south and, to a more limited extent, in the north: an attack was launched by 27th Army and 2nd Tank Army across the River Prut near the Roumanian border. This was the one of the first occasions in which the Grossdeutschland Division met the new Josef Stalin heavy tanks; although the Soviet forces were overpowered, in reality it was a success for the maskirovka plan because the Germans thought that they had defeated a major Soviet thrust. "It is also interesting to note that this reverse, known as the Battle of Targul-Frumos, was regarded by NATO forces in the early 1980s as an ideal example of the handling of armour in the defensive battle," comments Adair.
The other deception measure consisted of reconnaissance in force along the front so that the actual area of attack could not be isolated. However, as June passed, it became clear that a major offensive was imminent. The Stavka hoped, though, that although the Germans were aware of the intense activity behind the Soviet lines, they would still be unaware of the goals and the scale of the offensive.

The scene was now set for the opening of BAGRATION, which was to lead to a German defeat even greater than Stalingrad. Soviet superiority was awesome. The four armies of Army Group Centre had a total strength of 800,000 men of whom only half were front-line troops; they had five hundred tanks and self-propelled guns. The Red Army, meanwhile, had mustered 2,500,000 men, with a front-line strength of 1,250,000. It had 4,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 22,000 guns and mortars, and 2,000 Katyusha multiple rocket-launchers. As Adair demonstrates, this represented an overall superiority of 3:1 in men and 10:1 in tanks, although in key areas it was increased dramatically by concentration of force. "Although the morale of the German front line troops was high, they would have been far less confident if they had been aware of the vastly superior numbers of tanks and men poised to attack them," writes he.

Despite its well-written examination of the offensive's logistics, in my opinion, Paul Adair's book has some major drawbacks. Maybe the outstanding works of Antony Beevor, Rick Atkinson, and David Stahel have spoiled me too much, but I can't help but notice how dry and boring the account of the offensive itself is – Adair fails to evoke vivid pictures of the battles; his narrative is sometimes even confusing, as it jumps from one episode to another much too quickly. On top of that, there aren't enough maps, and the ones provided are perplexing. (A map must have a legend!!) In addition, his attempt, in the earlier chapters of the book, to present concise histories of the German and Soviet Armies is also, I'm afraid, a failure: both accounts seem like badly done paraphrases of some much better written, more detailed and engaging works.

Nevertheless, I read "Hitler's Greatest Defeat" to the end because aside from the well-examined logistics, it also offers an interesting, insightful explanation of why Operation BAGRATION, which succeeded in liberating Belorussia, was also such a crucial contribution to the downfall of the German Army in 1944.

Apart from their great superiority in tanks, guns and aircraft, the Soviet success was the result of their use of maskirovka and the flexibility in concentrating their forces to achieve a crushing superiority in critical sectors, explains Adair. Because of their relative weakness, the Germans could not react to these Soviet concentrations of strength until it was too late. However, on the German side even these disadvantages could have been partially mitigated had it not been for Hitler stultifying operations on every level: German generals, for instance, were denied the opportunity to use the mobility of their still powerful armoured divisions to bring the Soviet tank formations to a halt. (Soviet production for tanks had risen to 29,000 tanks in 1944, while Germany was producing 19,000 tanks and assault guns a year.) Furthermore, unlike the Soviet Union, which had only one major front to furnish with armoured vehicles, Germany had the "ulcer" of Italy and the overhanging danger of Allied invasion of north-western Europe. "Germany's historical fear of having to fight a major war on two fronts was now a reality," describes Adair the Nazi situation.

Also, in German accounts of BAGRATION one of the most consistent complaints is that few German aircraft were available either to provide tactical air support or to deter the Soviet ground attack, which had harried the columns withdrawing across Belorussia mercilessly. As Adair asserts, to some extent these facts illustrate the fruits of Hitler's insistence on giving priority to the west, where Allied air power was having a devastating effect upon German movement in Normandy. The same aircraft were also needed to counter Bomber Command's raids on German cities. Yet, Göring's much-vaunted Luftwaffe was "on its last legs."
After the numerical superiority of the Soviets in tanks and aircraft, the most decisive factor of the Soviet planning for the offensive was their use of maskirovka. While the Germans were expecting a Soviet summer offensive, they had no idea where the first blow would fall and how deep it would penetrate. The Soviet success depended upon the secret deployment of three armies, 6th Guards and 28th on the north and south flanks, and 5th Guards Tank as the Stavka reserve. The concentration of these forces achieved an overwhelming superiority that enabled the Red Army to crush the German defences and strike deep into their rear areas before the Nazi troops got an opportunity to summon their reserves.

The defeat of Army Group Centre resulted in the destruction of about 30 divisions. Although the Soviet success wasn't at all cheap – 178,000 dead and missing – the destruction of the Army Group Center was the greatest military defeat suffered by Germany during the Second World War, surpassing even that of Stalingrad. The two senior staff officers of the panzer divisions that fought so hard to prevent the disaster, recognized its significance. General Gerd Niepold stated: "The loss of the entire Army Group Centre greatly accelerated the collapse of the German State. The war would have lasted much longer and the defence of the east could have continued if the divisions of Army Group Centre had not been smashed." And according to General von Kielmansegg, it "was the beginning of the end. The end on the Eastern Front, and in conjunction with the recent invasion of France, the beginning of the end of the War."

As I already stated, Paul Adair's work is far from impressive both in style and in bibliography. A WWII buff will discover nothing new and exciting in the chapters dealing with the previous major battles on the Eastern front or Stalin and Hitler, or the Stavka. Nevertheless, when it comes to Operation BAGRATION, the book has its valuable parts. Worth a read if you are interested in the strategy behind the Soviet offensive of summer 1944.


*3.25 stars

[Jamie Smith · Rating 4 out of 5]

It was three years and one day since the Germans had invaded in June 1941, and the Soviets had learned a lot in that time. They had paid for it with the blood of millions of their people, soldiers and civilians alike, but they were ready to deliver a decisive blow to the Germans. Stalingrad and Kursk had stopped Hitler’s forces, and the strategic initiative had passed to the Soviets. On June 23, 1944 they launched Operation Bagration and delivered a crushing blow in Belorussia. The long march to Berlin was on.

They had prepared well and had managed to deceive the Germans about where they would launch the main attack. As part of their preparations they had built up an overwhelming superiority in men and equipment: “The four armies of Army Group Center had a total strength of 800,000 men of whom only half were front-line troops. They had five hundred tanks and self-propelled guns. The Red Army had amassed 2,500,000 men, with a front-line strength of 1,250,000. They had 4,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 22,000 guns and mortars and 2,000 Katyusha multiple rocket launchers. This represented an overall superiority of 3:1 in men and 10:1 in tanks, although in key areas this superiority was increased dramatically by concentrations of force.” (pg. 86)

The ability of the Soviets to mobilize their industries for total war after the invasion makes for an interesting historical discussion. Stalin’s brutal Five Year Plans of the 1930s focused on heavy industry at the expense of everything else. Sheila Fitzpatrick’s Everyday Stalinism describes in detail the hardships people experienced when the Soviet Union focused on increasing industrial production. The suffering was beyond measure, and millions were killed or imprisoned. And yet, without that vicious policy the Soviets would not have have had the industrial base necessary to turn back the German invasion.

One of the best accounts of World War II on the Eastern Front from the German side is Hans Roth’s Eastern Inferno: The Journals of a German Panzerjäger on the Eastern Front, 1941–1943. He was part of the initial invasion of Russia in 1941 and once a year when he got leave, he would leave his diary with his family. He did that twice, in 1942 and 1943, and was no doubt working on a third volume when he got swept up in Operation Bagration. His regiment, the 299th, was on the front lines when the Soviets attacked, and was destroyed on the second day of the fighting. He, along with his diary, disappeared into the maelstrom, never to be seen again.

At one point on 29 June the 5th Guards Tank Army, while attempting to force additional crossings of the Berezina river, found itself in the same spot as Napoleon’s disastrous crossing of that river in 1812. There are many books on Napoleon in Russia, but my recommendation is Philippe-Paul de Ségur’s Defeat: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign. De Ségur was a general in the French army and had first hand experience in the campaign. His account of the Berezina crossing is one of the ghastliest, most horrific things I have ever read.


Following is a chapter by chapter summary:

1. The Germany Army: The Weimar army was not based on the old Imperial army, but was built up largely from the Freikorps, and thus never had the same discipline or sense of honor. The 20’s and 30’s were spent rebuilding the armed forces, first in secret and later in open defiance. Since most of Europe treated Germany as a pariah state their closest collaborator was the Soviet Union, which allowed the Germans to set up secret air and tank training facilities on their soil.
2. Hitler and his Generals: Humiliated by the Versailles treaty, the army saw Hitler as someone who could restore Germany to a position of power and respect. Many of the most senior generals came to believe that Hitler really was the country’s savior, and the army lost its ability to represent the interests of the country as a whole and became wholly subordinated to Hitler and the Nazi party.
3. The Turn of the Tide: German command and control was seriously compromised by policy and personnel changes that brought the Army even more fully under Hitler’s control. Officers, such as Jodl, who were willing to disagree with the Fuehrer found themselves pushed aside. Hitler sacked Manstein, his most capable defensive general, for not being aggressive enough.
4. Stalin and the Stavka: Stalin micromanaged the war to an amazing extent, requiring detailed reports on situations that would normally be handled at a much lower level. He demanded complete obedience and permitted no failures; those who displeased him would be transferred to the front or simply shot.
5. The Soviet Army: Stalin’s purges had decimated the Soviet military. Unqualified and incompetent – but politically reliable – men were promoted far beyond their abilities, and the Winter War in Finland was a disaster. Because of it, however, the Germans held too low an opinion of the Soviet fighting men, and became convinced that they could conquer Russia in a single campaign season. Meanwhile the Soviets were experimenting with armor doctrine and learned how to turn it into a deep-thrust spearhead.
6. 1944 – A Year of Decisions: Having seized the initiative, the Soviets could choose where they wanted to make their next strike. They considered four options: through Romania into the Balkans; through northern Ukraine into Poland and the Baltics; attack in the north near Leningrad, or cut off Army Group Center’s salient in Belorussia to open the way to Warsaw. The fourth option was selected and Zhukov was put in charge of planning it.
7. Maskirovka (Deception): The Soviets had learned important lessons in tactical and strategic deception since the start of the war. Dummy formations, radio silence, movement by night, and forbidding artillery to register guns in advance left the Germans guessing about their intentions. Soviet mastery of the air further reduced German reconnaissance capabilities.
8. The German View: German intelligence anticipated the main Soviet attack would be farther north and moved a critical Corps away from Army Group Center. Hitler promulgated the disastrous Fester Platz doctrine that tied forces down in fortified towns, supposedly to disrupt enemy advances and assist counterattacks, but which in fact just doomed large formations to being surrounded and captured. The Germans would lose nine divisions in these surrounded fortress towns during this battle
9. The Partisans: By 1944 the partisans were no longer rag-tag units made up of soldiers who had been cut off during the early fighting. According to post-war reports there were 374,000 partisans in 199 brigades, with an additional 400,00 reserves that could be called up. The Soviet army kept them well supplied, and provided regular army officers to lead them. Their task for Operation Bagration was to disrupt German communications and slow reinforcements, particularly through attacks on railroads and bridges.
10. Final Soviet Preparations: To the German troops opposite what would be the main thrust of the Soviet attack it was obvious that something was imminent, but high command continued to believe the attack would be farther north.
11. In the North: Although the Germans were able to hold back the Russians in some areas, they were for the most part overwhelmed and forced back, opening large gaps between divisions and corps. Requests to withdraw to prevent being surrounded were summarily dismissed. The Soviets were breaking through all along the northern sector of the front.
12. To the Berezina: Soviet forces overwhelmed the German front line forces, which were prevented from retreating and regrouping because of orders from higher authority to stand their ground. The Soviet advance created dangerous gaps in the German lines.
13. Fourth Army and Mogilev: The Soviets have total domination of the air and use to it to harass and interdict German forces all along the battlefield. German fighter and bomber squadrons had been moved west, both to confront the Allied invasion of France, and to protect Germany from ever-increasing bombing attacks.
14. In the South – Ninth Army and Bobruisk: Field Marshall Busch, the senior German commander, was unequal to the task. He was more concerned with carrying out Hitler’s orders than with coming to grips with the situation facing his divisions. Troops were told to hold untenable positions, and the Soviets broke through in more places.
15. 5th Panzer Division and 5th Guards Tank Army: Two elite forces square off. The 5th Panzer entered the battle with 70 Panther and 55 long barrel Pz IV tanks, but its accompanying panzer grenadier companies averaged only 35 men each, rather than the 150 they would have had at full strength. The 5th Guards Tank Army’s two Corps had 524 tanks and assault guns going into the battle. At one point, as the 5th Panzer detrained, the Soviet tanks were so close the Panthers engaged them while still sitting on railroad cars. Soviet penetrations threatened Minsk, headquarters of Army Group Center, and a panicked evacuation started. The Soviet strategy of destroying bridges stranded many German troops and caused a great deal of equipment to be abandoned. In many cases the German retreat turned into a rout.
16. 12th Panzer Division in the South: The division was detached from Army Group North to try to stabilize the situation. Hitler and senior army staff still believed the Soviet attacks were a feint, and the real plan was to attack farther north. Once again the refusal to allow German units to retreat caused them be surrounded and destroyed. Hitler relieved Field Marshall Busch of command and replaced him with Model, who is a master of defensive battle. More troops were sent from Army Group North to try to shore up the defenses. More and more German troops were surrendering and the partisans became a major factor, ambushing the retreating Germans and causing further breakdowns in order.
17. The Fate of the Fourth Army: Had it been permitted to retreat in time, it is possible that the Fourth Army might have made it back to German held territory intact. However, it was first told to stand fast, then given conflicting orders, and finally surrounded and destroyed. Only a few hundred men out of its ten infantry divisions made it back to German lines.
18. Afterwards: Once the Soviets had smashed Army Group Center they then attacked in the north and the south. Since both of those Army Groups had been stripped of assets to bolster the Center, they collapsed as well. The only thing that kept the Soviets from continuing on was their lengthening supply lines and exhausted soldiers.
19. The Long March Home: The fate of the German soldiers who attempted to escape encirclement was grim. In the Fourth Army somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 initially escaped, but only about 900 eventually made it back to German lines. Constant air attacks and partisans all along the line of retreat killed many, and the fate of those who surrendered was often worse than a quick death.
20. To the West: The end was in sight for Germany. Army Group North was about to be encircled in the Courland Pocket, doomed, once again, by Hitler’s refusal to allow them to retreat. The Finns asked for surrender terms, and in the south the German forces in the Balkans were crushed.
21. Fifty Years On: German losses were estimated at 350,000 men, of which 200,000 died during the battle, and another 75,000 in captivity. Official Soviet losses were 178,000 dead, although there is no way to tell if that is accurate or something created to serve a propaganda purpose.

[Asma · Rating 5 out of 5]

Really informative overview of the collapse of the Wehrmacht in 1944. The book focuses on the fight in the eastern front and all the external and internal reasonings for complete military failure on the German side. I really enjoyed reading about how underestimated the Red Army had been before 1944 and how this coupled up with the Russian winter completely turned the tide of the war in favour of the allies.

[Emerson Stokes · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book is certainly a result of its time. When the USSR collapsed and all those juicy military records started to become public (along with people starting to shy away from trusting the account of German generals), one probably couldn't resist touching this subject. However, the idealism and strange racey explanations on how the Soviets won present in this book reflects many other accounts of the war on the eastern front. The Soviet Union did not win because Russian men did not fear death, they were as scared as any soldier. These sorts of "explanations" seem to project a nationalistic ideal of the common man in WWII that borders on race-politics. I don't recommend this book.

[Mark Adams · Rating 4 out of 5]

An examination of the German invasion of the eastern front in Operation Barbarosa through the Soviet Operation Bagration into the fall of Germany. It's detailed and impeccably documented. It's a great overview of the big picture in the east as well as a credible source of information about the individuals involved in the strategy and tactics of the conflict in the east culminating in the loss of Stalingrad.

[Carl · Rating 2 out of 5]

I was somewhat disappointed by this book, it felt like to much fluff before getting to the core of what the book is about: Operation Bagration. I feel like there has to be a better work out there detailing the fighting.

[Dave · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very detailed account of the destruction of Army Group Centre in June and July 1944 by the Soviet army in WWII.

[Avis Black · Rating 3 out of 5]

Hitler's Greatest Defeat doesn't give you a grunt-on-the-ground perspective. It's primarily a staff-and-planning level analysis that attempts to explain why Hitler made the decisions that he did on the Eastern Front. It's not a very dramatic read, but it's a necessary one for understanding what happened.

Adair outlines how Hitler strengthened his hold over the military and secretly re-armed Germany in the 1930s. Do you want to know where the Germans held training maneuvers for their tanks and air force? In Soviet Russia, that's where. Yes, Stalin actually let the Germans evade the Versailles Treaty by providing secret training centers on his own soil all the way up to 1933. Boy, would the Russians ever regret this later.

So why did Hitler invade Russia? Most people point to Stalin's destruction of the Soviet officer corps as laying an invitation on Hitler's doorstop, but Adair makes clear it was the Russian invasion of Finland that made up Hitler's mind. Nothing makes a country look weak than having trouble fighting Finland. A German General staff report to Hitler read, "Fighting qualities of the troops in a heavy fight, dubious. The Russian "mass" is no match for an army with modern equipment and superior leadership." In essence, both Hitler and the German General Staff concluded, 'God, these guys suck. We can take them.'

In the second half of the book, Adair describes the main reasons why the Germans went to pieces. The German generals wanted to capture Moscow ala Napoleon, but Hitler wanted to concentrate on destroying armies and capturing oil fields. It looks like he wanted to avoid Napoleon's mistake. Napoleon took Moscow only to discover that without annihilating Russian armies, their war-making capacity was still intact.

But the scorned Russian 'mass,' being motivated by a ruthless dictator, was far more effective than the Germans realized, and the Germans lacked air power, since the Luftwaffe had been drawn off to protect German cities from Allied bombing raids. This meant Russian air could do exactly what it pleased on the Eastern Front without interference. Ultimately, though, the Russian mass was simply to big to be fought.

Adair also provides other revelations. How many people know that the Allies created a war plan to land a sacrificial few divisions in northern France two years ahead of time, just in case the Russians were catastrophically defeated by the Germans?

Adair's book does have a flaw. He assumes you're already acquainted with the Eastern battles, and if you're new to this theater, he's going to go right over your head in describing how the Russians took the German military to pieces. Therefore, I suggest this book is best read after you've already read an overview about this front.

[Judy · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a great book describing Operation Bagration and the collapse of Germany's Army Group Centre in World War II. Adair provides detailed accounts of the battle from both the Nazi and Soviet sides, and does so objectively. In order to truly understand the Nazi defeat on the Eastern front, this is an important book to read. Highly recommended for those interested in World War II on the Eastern Front.

[Claudio · Rating 3 out of 5]

Un relato pormenorizado sobre la ofensiva soviética que marcó el inicio de la derrota definitiva de Alemania. Muy bien documentado, pero algo árido, sin que se logre tomar el peso de las condiciones y las bajas. En ese sentido un relato con mucho mas corazón es "Stalingrado", de Antony Beevor. Interesante, pero me costó bastante terminarlo.

[Jose-Raul · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very professional blow-by-blow account of the destruction of the German Army Group destroyed by the Soviet Army that opened the path to Berlin.

[Mark Dunn · Rating 4 out of 5]

i am not all that interested in military campaigns ,but found this book to have been very well written.

[Dave · Rating 3 out of 5]

A detailed look at the most successful Soviet offensive of World War II, an event often overshadowed by D-Day and the battle in Normandy.

[Rich Taylor · Rating 3 out of 5]

A good overview of Operation Bagration etc. Very much the strategic/operational picture only.