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Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History
The New York Times–bestselling authors of Miracle at Midway delve into the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor during WWII in “a superb work of history” (Albuquerque Journal Magazine). In the predawn hours of December 7, 1941, a Japanese carrier group sailed toward Hawaii. A few minutes before 8:00 a.m., they received the order to rain death on the American base at Pearl Harbor, sinking dozens of ships, destroying hundreds of airplanes, and taking the lives of over two thousand servicemen. The carnage lasted only two hours, but more than seventy years later, terrible questions remain unanswered. How did the Japanese slip past the American radar? Why were the Hawaiian defense forces so woefully underprepared? What, if anything, did American intelligence know before the first Japanese pilot shouted “Tora! Tora! Tora!”? In this incomparable volume, Pearl Harbor experts Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon tackle dozens of thorny issues in an attempt to determine who was at fault for one of the most shocking military disasters in history.
1031 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1985
138 people are currently reading
308 people want to read
About the author
Gordon W. Prange
23 books45 followersA graduate of the University of Iowa, from where he received his Ph.D. in 1937, Gordon Prange began his teaching career as a professor of history at the University of Maryland. In 1942, he was granted a leave of absence from the University to embark on a wartime career as an officer in the United States Navy. Sent to Japan in 1945 as a member of the American Occupation Forces, after completing his Navy service he continued in Japan as a civilian from 1946 to 1951 as chief of General Douglas MacArthur's 100-person historical staff. When censorship of the Japanese media by Allied Forces was lifted in 1949 and the Civil Censorship Detachment disestablished, Professor Prange, recognizing the historical significance of the CCD material, arranged for its shipment to the University of Maryland. The materials arrived at the University in 1950. On September 15, 1978, the Board of Regents of the University of Maryland passed a motion to name the collection the 'Gordon W. Prange Collection: The Allied Presence in Japan, 1945-1952.' Professor Prange continued to teach at the University of Maryland until several months before his death on May 15, 1980. He is still remembered by alumni as one of the University's truly great teachers, and is well known today for major works on the war in the Pacific, particularly Tora! Tora! Tora!" The Terrapin, the University of Maryland's yearbook, said of his World War I and World War II history lectures in 1964: "Students flock to his class and sit enraptured as he animates the pages of twentieth century European history through his goosesteps, 'Seig Heils', 'Achtungs', machine gun retorts and frantic gestures.
Dr. Prange's manuscript about the attack on Pearl Harbor is credited as the basis for the screenplay Tora! Tora! Tora!, filmed in 1970 while Prange took a leave of absence from the University of Maryland to serve as technical consultant during its filming. His extensive research into the attack on Pearl Harbor was the subject of a PBS television program in 2000, "Prange and Pearl Harbor: A Magnificent Obsession", and was acclaimed "a definitive book on the event" by The Washington Post.
Dr. Prange's manuscript about the attack on Pearl Harbor is credited as the basis for the screenplay Tora! Tora! Tora!, filmed in 1970 while Prange took a leave of absence from the University of Maryland to serve as technical consultant during its filming. His extensive research into the attack on Pearl Harbor was the subject of a PBS television program in 2000, "Prange and Pearl Harbor: A Magnificent Obsession", and was acclaimed "a definitive book on the event" by The Washington Post.
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Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews
May 21, 2014
After reading "At Dawn We Slept," I had very high expectations for this book. I am pleased to say that those expectations were not only met, but that Gordon Prange exceeded them in this work.
Whilst many Pearl Harbor books have recounted the story of the events for the first few chapters, Gordon Prange did not do his reader's the disservice of recounting the same information from his earlier works in this book. He begins in a place of knowledge, offering up evidence to support the conclusions he draws about the way American's thought about the war, our chances of attack and ultimately the reactions to the attacks and continues from there.
This book delves into the deeper political aspects of the Pearl Harbor attacks and gives a multiple perspective account of the events that both preceded and followed the ill-fated day of infamy.
What I enjoyed about this book, as with the previous titles by this author, is that he doesn't bore the reader with unnecessary facts. Instead, he uses his massive knowledge of the subject to form a complete picture, and yet, still allows the reader to draw their own conclusions based on the information he has provided.
For any history buff, or WWII hobbyist, this is a book that you will definitely want to add to your collection.
This review is based on a complimentary copy from the publisher, and provided by Netgalley.
Whilst many Pearl Harbor books have recounted the story of the events for the first few chapters, Gordon Prange did not do his reader's the disservice of recounting the same information from his earlier works in this book. He begins in a place of knowledge, offering up evidence to support the conclusions he draws about the way American's thought about the war, our chances of attack and ultimately the reactions to the attacks and continues from there.
This book delves into the deeper political aspects of the Pearl Harbor attacks and gives a multiple perspective account of the events that both preceded and followed the ill-fated day of infamy.
What I enjoyed about this book, as with the previous titles by this author, is that he doesn't bore the reader with unnecessary facts. Instead, he uses his massive knowledge of the subject to form a complete picture, and yet, still allows the reader to draw their own conclusions based on the information he has provided.
For any history buff, or WWII hobbyist, this is a book that you will definitely want to add to your collection.
This review is based on a complimentary copy from the publisher, and provided by Netgalley.
February 15, 2022
Love this book I would love to go to pearl harbor hawaii some day it will happen
Read
May 17, 2019I didn't finish this book.
December 31, 2020
This book really gets a split reaction from me. On one hand, the research and information regarding the responsibilities and testimony of the various persons involved in the attack on Pearl Harbor is excellent. On the other, the book constantly engages in expressing opinions as fact and in engaging in the same sort of assumptions that it attacks. As examples, in the section regarding FDR, it makes a comment about Roosevelt having no other choice, literally a few sentences after pointing out some of the other choices that he had.
The chapters regarding Short, Kimmel and Bloch are excellent. The rest is mediocre. In addition, there are a couple of chapters at the end that should have simply not been written. They are irrelevant (and the chapter regarding MacArthur probably falls in that same category).
The chapters regarding Short, Kimmel and Bloch are excellent. The rest is mediocre. In addition, there are a couple of chapters at the end that should have simply not been written. They are irrelevant (and the chapter regarding MacArthur probably falls in that same category).
July 30, 2023
An engineer, I find this book reminiscent of a root or apparent cause analysis, a post-mortem of the Pearl Harbor debacle that consolidates the assessments of multiple boards of inquiry, etc. In this thorough analysis, Dr. Prange considers the following:
• The contribution of the American public and political leaders to a general lack of readiness for war
• The contribution of political and military leadership to a lack of readiness in Hawaii
• Japan’s tactical genius and strategic imbecility in launching a brilliant attack while failing to consider the ramifications of a prolonged war of attrition
With these considerations, it should not be a surprise that Dr. Prange doesn’t lay all the blame at any one person’s feet although he views Admiral Kimmel and General Short, the Navy and Army commanders on the ground in Hawaii, as being particularly negligent with regards to defensive arrangements.
Given that World War II was preceded by the Great Depression, there wasn’t much of an appetite for military spending. Furthermore, the public was largely isolationist, viewing the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans as barriers to an attack and not wanting to get involved in overseas conflicts. Even in the face of Japanese aggression in China, Germany’s military buildup and the outbreak of war in Europe, preparation for war was politically risky. While Dr. Prange gives President Roosevelt credit for his efforts to aid the British and to strengthen the military, he feels FDR could have taken a stronger stand than he actually did. FDR had a reputation for keeping his thumb in the air to see which way the political winds were blowing. While this helped get him reelected three times, it also likely hampered the nation’s preparation for war as he pushed for less funding than the military sought on at least one occasion.
Interestingly enough, the Army was responsible for the defense of the naval base at Pearl Harbor. Hickam Field and Wheeler Field existed to provide for air defense. While naval aircraft utilized the air field on Ford Island, many of them would have been carrier aircraft that would be away when their carriers were at sea. So, the Army Air Corps served a vital role in the defense of Hawaii. For this reason, the War Department placed a premium on supplying aircraft, etc., to Hawaii at the expense of units on the mainland. Furthermore, some radar sets were provided although there was a lack of radar expertise on Oahu. However, air fields, planes and radar do not by themselves make an air defense. The available radar sets had a maximum effective range of 130 miles, which would provide at best a half hour to an hour early warning. Long range aircraft such as the Navy’s PBY Catalina flying boats and Army bombers could have been sent out on regular patrols, but there were some issues. General Short didn’t want to intrude on the Navy’s turf and declined to arrange for bomber patrols. The Navy didn’t have enough PBY’s for 360º coverage and didn’t see the point in partial coverage. Dr. Prange argues that all the Navy had to do was patrol to the north, the direction from which the attack actually came, but he neglects the threat of an attack from the south while acknowledging that commanders in Hawaii primarily believed that a Japanese carrier force would come from the Marshall Islands, possessed by Japan since 1914, and attack from the south. In fact, when naval forces sortied from Pearl Harbor to search for the Japanese carriers, they headed south, believing them to be south of Oahu. So much for Dr. Prange’s idea of limiting the patrol scope to the north.
At the time of the attack, the radar sets were being operated from 7:00 to 10:00 AM because General Short considered this to be the most likely time for an attack. However, the primary use of the radar sets was training, as the operators were inexperienced, and there was not much of an organizational structure for them to report unusual observations. One individual often targeted for blame was Kermit Tyler, a lieutenant on duty at the information center who received the message from radar operators that there was a large mass of aircraft approaching from the north and who dismissed it, assuming that the operators were seeing a flight of bombers in transit from the west coast. What could he have done? No lines of communication had been set up to arrange for him to get aircraft, whether Army Air Corps or Navy. No provision had been made for aircraft identification although this had been a staple of British air defense during the Battle of Britain. Furthermore, General Short had placed all the air fields under his command in a sabotage alert status. Consequently, none of the planes were fueled and armed, ready to fly at a moment’s notice, and ammunition was locked up. I served on a CVN in the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm and remember multiple 1MC announcements ordering the launch of various alert 5 (minute) aircraft. Imagine ordering the launch of alert 4 (hour) fighters to counter an air attack less than an hour away. Over the years, American military personnel have developed a reputation for personal initiative, but it can only go so far, especially for a junior officer dealing with a sclerotic bureaucracy that is not properly set up to accommodate the needs of the hour. The fault of the organizational failures lay not with Kermit Tyler, but with General Short.
Another issue was communication coupled with a plethora of bad assumptions. For example, the Army had multiple levels of alert. Remember that the air fields were on an alert for sabotage. When the Navy learned about the alert, it didn’t know about these levels and assumed an overall alert status on the part of those tasked with the defense of the naval base. It assumed and didn’t bother to inquire about details.
Much ink has been spilled about a war alert that went out on the morning of December 7, 1941, in response to an intercepted message to the Japanese embassy in D.C. Because atmospheric conditions precluded communications with Hawaii, the alert was transmitted via Western Union (D.C. to San Francisco) and RCA (San Francisco to Honolulu). The telegraph was in the hands of a courier in Honolulu when the attack started and was not delivered until the coast was clear after the Japanese attack wings had returned to their carriers. This has been used as the basis for speculation that FDR wanted Pearl Harbor attacked to draw the U.S. into war or as the basis for apologists for Admiral Kimmel and General Short. In other words, if they had received the message before the attack, they would have been ready. Dr. Prange is skeptical of this given that there had been multiple alert warnings since late November, including one on December 8 warning them that the Japanese consulates were burning their code books. Why would they do this unless war was imminent? What more was required to wake up Admiral Kimmel and General Short to the threat of an attack?
As for Japan, its leaders were aiming for an encore. In 1904, when Russia was muscling into Manchuria, which Japan considered its turf, the Imperial Japanese Navy launched a surprise attack on Russia’s Pacific fleet at its berths in Port Arthur, commencing the Russo-Japanese War, which concluded with a negotiated settlement favorable to Japan. As a result of Japanese aggression in China, the U.S. set up a trade embargo terminating the export of strategic materials such as oil and steel to Japan and moved the Pacific fleet from the west coast to Pearl Harbor to serve as a deterrent to further aggression. Japan, however, refused to be deterred and saw the naval base at Pearl Harbor as a big fat target. If it could cripple the American Pacific fleet, its own forces would be free to seize and fortify territory. Once the Americans started offensive operations, fierce Japanese resistance would raise the price of victory to an unacceptable level, and the Americans would negotiate for peace. At least, that was the plan. As noted above, the Americans of that era were largely isolationist, wanting to leave alone and be left alone and assuming that everyone else saw the world the same way. As I have sometimes said, one doesn’t have to live by the law of the jungle, in which the strong eat the weak, but only a fool fails to acknowledge that the lions, tigers and bears do. The American public consisted of fools, fools who learned a painful lesson on December 7. They went from seeing the world through rose-tinted glasses to seeing red, with a bloodlust that wouldn’t be satiated until Japan’s unconditional surrender in 1945. So, Japan started the war in the Pacific with a brilliantly planned and executed attack that enraged and motivated America to pay any price for total victory.
My general impression of the book is that it is long and thorough, not exactly light reading and right down my alley. While I don’t agree with all of Dr. Prange’s conclusions, I commend him for a comprehensive review of the causal factors behind America’s failure to be ready for the attack on Pearl Harbor. It is quite the cautionary tale.
• The contribution of the American public and political leaders to a general lack of readiness for war
• The contribution of political and military leadership to a lack of readiness in Hawaii
• Japan’s tactical genius and strategic imbecility in launching a brilliant attack while failing to consider the ramifications of a prolonged war of attrition
With these considerations, it should not be a surprise that Dr. Prange doesn’t lay all the blame at any one person’s feet although he views Admiral Kimmel and General Short, the Navy and Army commanders on the ground in Hawaii, as being particularly negligent with regards to defensive arrangements.
Given that World War II was preceded by the Great Depression, there wasn’t much of an appetite for military spending. Furthermore, the public was largely isolationist, viewing the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans as barriers to an attack and not wanting to get involved in overseas conflicts. Even in the face of Japanese aggression in China, Germany’s military buildup and the outbreak of war in Europe, preparation for war was politically risky. While Dr. Prange gives President Roosevelt credit for his efforts to aid the British and to strengthen the military, he feels FDR could have taken a stronger stand than he actually did. FDR had a reputation for keeping his thumb in the air to see which way the political winds were blowing. While this helped get him reelected three times, it also likely hampered the nation’s preparation for war as he pushed for less funding than the military sought on at least one occasion.
Interestingly enough, the Army was responsible for the defense of the naval base at Pearl Harbor. Hickam Field and Wheeler Field existed to provide for air defense. While naval aircraft utilized the air field on Ford Island, many of them would have been carrier aircraft that would be away when their carriers were at sea. So, the Army Air Corps served a vital role in the defense of Hawaii. For this reason, the War Department placed a premium on supplying aircraft, etc., to Hawaii at the expense of units on the mainland. Furthermore, some radar sets were provided although there was a lack of radar expertise on Oahu. However, air fields, planes and radar do not by themselves make an air defense. The available radar sets had a maximum effective range of 130 miles, which would provide at best a half hour to an hour early warning. Long range aircraft such as the Navy’s PBY Catalina flying boats and Army bombers could have been sent out on regular patrols, but there were some issues. General Short didn’t want to intrude on the Navy’s turf and declined to arrange for bomber patrols. The Navy didn’t have enough PBY’s for 360º coverage and didn’t see the point in partial coverage. Dr. Prange argues that all the Navy had to do was patrol to the north, the direction from which the attack actually came, but he neglects the threat of an attack from the south while acknowledging that commanders in Hawaii primarily believed that a Japanese carrier force would come from the Marshall Islands, possessed by Japan since 1914, and attack from the south. In fact, when naval forces sortied from Pearl Harbor to search for the Japanese carriers, they headed south, believing them to be south of Oahu. So much for Dr. Prange’s idea of limiting the patrol scope to the north.
At the time of the attack, the radar sets were being operated from 7:00 to 10:00 AM because General Short considered this to be the most likely time for an attack. However, the primary use of the radar sets was training, as the operators were inexperienced, and there was not much of an organizational structure for them to report unusual observations. One individual often targeted for blame was Kermit Tyler, a lieutenant on duty at the information center who received the message from radar operators that there was a large mass of aircraft approaching from the north and who dismissed it, assuming that the operators were seeing a flight of bombers in transit from the west coast. What could he have done? No lines of communication had been set up to arrange for him to get aircraft, whether Army Air Corps or Navy. No provision had been made for aircraft identification although this had been a staple of British air defense during the Battle of Britain. Furthermore, General Short had placed all the air fields under his command in a sabotage alert status. Consequently, none of the planes were fueled and armed, ready to fly at a moment’s notice, and ammunition was locked up. I served on a CVN in the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm and remember multiple 1MC announcements ordering the launch of various alert 5 (minute) aircraft. Imagine ordering the launch of alert 4 (hour) fighters to counter an air attack less than an hour away. Over the years, American military personnel have developed a reputation for personal initiative, but it can only go so far, especially for a junior officer dealing with a sclerotic bureaucracy that is not properly set up to accommodate the needs of the hour. The fault of the organizational failures lay not with Kermit Tyler, but with General Short.
Another issue was communication coupled with a plethora of bad assumptions. For example, the Army had multiple levels of alert. Remember that the air fields were on an alert for sabotage. When the Navy learned about the alert, it didn’t know about these levels and assumed an overall alert status on the part of those tasked with the defense of the naval base. It assumed and didn’t bother to inquire about details.
Much ink has been spilled about a war alert that went out on the morning of December 7, 1941, in response to an intercepted message to the Japanese embassy in D.C. Because atmospheric conditions precluded communications with Hawaii, the alert was transmitted via Western Union (D.C. to San Francisco) and RCA (San Francisco to Honolulu). The telegraph was in the hands of a courier in Honolulu when the attack started and was not delivered until the coast was clear after the Japanese attack wings had returned to their carriers. This has been used as the basis for speculation that FDR wanted Pearl Harbor attacked to draw the U.S. into war or as the basis for apologists for Admiral Kimmel and General Short. In other words, if they had received the message before the attack, they would have been ready. Dr. Prange is skeptical of this given that there had been multiple alert warnings since late November, including one on December 8 warning them that the Japanese consulates were burning their code books. Why would they do this unless war was imminent? What more was required to wake up Admiral Kimmel and General Short to the threat of an attack?
As for Japan, its leaders were aiming for an encore. In 1904, when Russia was muscling into Manchuria, which Japan considered its turf, the Imperial Japanese Navy launched a surprise attack on Russia’s Pacific fleet at its berths in Port Arthur, commencing the Russo-Japanese War, which concluded with a negotiated settlement favorable to Japan. As a result of Japanese aggression in China, the U.S. set up a trade embargo terminating the export of strategic materials such as oil and steel to Japan and moved the Pacific fleet from the west coast to Pearl Harbor to serve as a deterrent to further aggression. Japan, however, refused to be deterred and saw the naval base at Pearl Harbor as a big fat target. If it could cripple the American Pacific fleet, its own forces would be free to seize and fortify territory. Once the Americans started offensive operations, fierce Japanese resistance would raise the price of victory to an unacceptable level, and the Americans would negotiate for peace. At least, that was the plan. As noted above, the Americans of that era were largely isolationist, wanting to leave alone and be left alone and assuming that everyone else saw the world the same way. As I have sometimes said, one doesn’t have to live by the law of the jungle, in which the strong eat the weak, but only a fool fails to acknowledge that the lions, tigers and bears do. The American public consisted of fools, fools who learned a painful lesson on December 7. They went from seeing the world through rose-tinted glasses to seeing red, with a bloodlust that wouldn’t be satiated until Japan’s unconditional surrender in 1945. So, Japan started the war in the Pacific with a brilliantly planned and executed attack that enraged and motivated America to pay any price for total victory.
My general impression of the book is that it is long and thorough, not exactly light reading and right down my alley. While I don’t agree with all of Dr. Prange’s conclusions, I commend him for a comprehensive review of the causal factors behind America’s failure to be ready for the attack on Pearl Harbor. It is quite the cautionary tale.
January 13, 2025
There's a type of report in my profession called a "post mortem," in which investigators acquire correspondence, evidence, and testimony, then weave it altogether into a giant after action report detailing what was done before the incident, what happened during the incident, and the end result, including analyses of who screwed up and where. This book is essentially a giant post mortem on the Pearl Harbor attack, breaking down in intense detail everything Mr. Prange could get his hands on to study what went wrong (with contributions from Mr. Goldstein and Ms. Dillon).
The benefit of this book is that it is not a recounting of the events of the day. In fact, the day itself receives relatively minimal attention for such a long book. Rather, it focuses on the assumptions that contributed to the Pearl Harbor attack, and all of the documentation that provides evidence of those assumptions. How those assumptions led to December 7, 1941, is part of the root cause analysis, along with observations on how those assumptions might have been either negated or guarded against. Mr. Prange also makes a considerable effort to demonstrate how discreditable the various conspiracy theories and revisionist accounts that lay the blame at FDR wanting to get involved in the war, and notes that the root for that attitude is the familiar American exceptionalism refusing to believe that the United States could possibly be outsmarted by foreigners of any stripe.
When it comes to making a scapegoat, Mr. Prange declines, noting that collectively, Pearl Harbor was the fault of the entirety of the United States from top to bottom. From the public antipathy, to national condescension toward Japan's military prowess, to government parsimony, to military negligence, every last aspect of American society of that generation is studied and rebuked. To quote the Christian Science Monitor that Mr. Prange quoted, "neither the American commanders in Washington, nor those in Hawaii, really, actually, seriously believed that a Japanese attack on Pearl Jarbor was impending or likely." From there, flow all the sins of omission and commission, to paraphrase Mr. Prange.
In many ways, this exhaustive study is actually helpful not only for World War II historians, but any professional facing short-sighted organization executives who lose sight of their duties in pursuit of routine. In fact, I'd say the biggest lesson for us mid-tier professionals is "get it all in writing, and keep records for the inevitable CYA."
The benefit of this book is that it is not a recounting of the events of the day. In fact, the day itself receives relatively minimal attention for such a long book. Rather, it focuses on the assumptions that contributed to the Pearl Harbor attack, and all of the documentation that provides evidence of those assumptions. How those assumptions led to December 7, 1941, is part of the root cause analysis, along with observations on how those assumptions might have been either negated or guarded against. Mr. Prange also makes a considerable effort to demonstrate how discreditable the various conspiracy theories and revisionist accounts that lay the blame at FDR wanting to get involved in the war, and notes that the root for that attitude is the familiar American exceptionalism refusing to believe that the United States could possibly be outsmarted by foreigners of any stripe.
When it comes to making a scapegoat, Mr. Prange declines, noting that collectively, Pearl Harbor was the fault of the entirety of the United States from top to bottom. From the public antipathy, to national condescension toward Japan's military prowess, to government parsimony, to military negligence, every last aspect of American society of that generation is studied and rebuked. To quote the Christian Science Monitor that Mr. Prange quoted, "neither the American commanders in Washington, nor those in Hawaii, really, actually, seriously believed that a Japanese attack on Pearl Jarbor was impending or likely." From there, flow all the sins of omission and commission, to paraphrase Mr. Prange.
In many ways, this exhaustive study is actually helpful not only for World War II historians, but any professional facing short-sighted organization executives who lose sight of their duties in pursuit of routine. In fact, I'd say the biggest lesson for us mid-tier professionals is "get it all in writing, and keep records for the inevitable CYA."
August 6, 2025
An eye opening account
As the second book in a series, this book (it is actually titled Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History) was full of detail on what really happened - or didn’t happen - when Japan attacked Pearl Harbour. The ineptitude of everyone who received the warnings of the impending attack is truly dumbfounding. It really is worth a listen, although the language of the time was grating (the Japanese referred to as “Japs”).
I actually listened to the full 3 volume series, listening to abridged versions of the first (At Dawn We Slept) and third (December 7, 1941) in a collection. I did appreciate this unabridged version of Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History for its depth and detail.
As the second book in a series, this book (it is actually titled Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History) was full of detail on what really happened - or didn’t happen - when Japan attacked Pearl Harbour. The ineptitude of everyone who received the warnings of the impending attack is truly dumbfounding. It really is worth a listen, although the language of the time was grating (the Japanese referred to as “Japs”).
I actually listened to the full 3 volume series, listening to abridged versions of the first (At Dawn We Slept) and third (December 7, 1941) in a collection. I did appreciate this unabridged version of Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History for its depth and detail.
January 23, 2018
Read This Book
A great read!. Addresses most of the 'conspiracy' theories and reveals their falsehoods. The last chapter - recommendations - written in 1985, is even more valid in 2018.
Only 'down' side is that book assumes you know what happened on that 'day of infamy'. This NOT a minute-by-minute history of the attack, but an in-depth analysis of failures at all levels that allowed the attack to succeed.
A great read!. Addresses most of the 'conspiracy' theories and reveals their falsehoods. The last chapter - recommendations - written in 1985, is even more valid in 2018.
Only 'down' side is that book assumes you know what happened on that 'day of infamy'. This NOT a minute-by-minute history of the attack, but an in-depth analysis of failures at all levels that allowed the attack to succeed.
July 20, 2024
Oh my god. This book is only for the most diehard historians of the event who want to know, in molecular detail, all the missives that relate to decisions before Pearl Harbor. In addition, the author goes to great lengths, researching material to debunk revisionist history. most of these can be dismissed at face value, even without the kind of detailed this author provides.
December 18, 2019
Thorough analysis of the events leading up to the 7 December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. The author cites testimony before both the Army and Navy investigative boards, as well as Congressional committees. Interesting insight into various human factors and multiple lapses in situational awareness.
October 30, 2019
If you are a history buff, you must read this book. This book is more than the telling of the events that led to the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The writing style will engage the reader immediately.
December 23, 2023
Assessing blame for the Pearl Harbor disaster.
February 28, 2024
A very detailed account of what led up to 12/07/1941 and after. Complete historical view and its participants
Read
August 5, 2011This is a comprehensive examination of all aspects of the aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor - Prange does not deal with the attack itself here, having done so extensively and meticulously in his epic work "At Dawn We Slept". Rather, his goal here is to deal with the many and varied questions regarding accountability for the attack and with the equally many and varied conspiracy theories that have inevitably arisen about the "truth" underlying the attack. Prange thoroughly rebuts all of them - conspiracies that allege that somebody (FDR, the Navy, the government, etc) knew of the attack, or could have stopped the attack, or could have been prepared for the attack because of some intelligence, some message, some hidden contact or radio interception. None of them are true. Prange equally well deals with the thorny issues of command responsibility - specifically the failures of General Short and Admiral Kimmel - and does so fairly and objectively and with considerable sympathy for them and their subordinates. He looks at political trends and moods, strategic planning, social issues and outlooks of the day regarding the Japanese and the Germans, popular opinion and its influences. This is a very comprehensive and exhaustively researched examination of accountability - in every way, shape and form imaginable. One of the strengths of the book is its organization, enabling the reader to skip subject areas of lesser interest and delve into specific topics without losing any historical thread or line of reasoning. This book was first published in 1986 and there have been an assortment of more recent works exploring the very same topics, but not in a single comprehensive volume. And in each case, Prange's work is validated by this more recent scholarship. They may have new information to add to the record - but they come to the same conclusions as did Gordon Prange over 23 years ago.
December 31, 2008
This book was actually not quite what I was expecting (since my copy was missing it's dust jacket). I had picked it up expecting more of a description of Pearl Harbor. Instead, the book is a very detailed analysis of the information available before the attack, the decisions made by the people who might have been able to prevent the attack (from President Roosevelt to the commanders at Pearl Harbor) and a look at the problems that lead to the attack being so successful.
All the information is presented in a very detailed and yet clear way, and is easy to read and absorb. It doesn't have a strong narrative, which is usually something I need in the non-fiction I read, but it is accessible to people who haven't memorized all the major players and events of World War II.
All the information is presented in a very detailed and yet clear way, and is easy to read and absorb. It doesn't have a strong narrative, which is usually something I need in the non-fiction I read, but it is accessible to people who haven't memorized all the major players and events of World War II.
June 12, 2015
Focuses mostly on systemic individual\organizational issues as the cause. Thorough, but repetitive and sometimes requires a leap-of-faith that most high-level officers would draw their conclusions if placed in the same position.
Read
December 28, 2008767.92 Gol
Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews