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The Right Way to Lose a War: America in an Age of Unwinnable Conflicts
Why has America stopped winning wars?
For nearly a century, up until the end of World War II in 1945, America enjoyed a Golden Age of decisive military triumphs. And then suddenly, we stopped winning wars. The decades since have been a Dark Age of failures and stalemates-in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan-exposing our inability to change course after battlefield setbacks.
In this provocative book, award-winning scholar Dominic Tierney reveals how the United States has struggled to adapt to the new era of intractable guerrilla conflicts. As a result, most major American wars have turned into military fiascos. And when battlefield disaster strikes, Washington is unable to disengage from the quagmire, with grave consequences for thousands of U.S. troops and our allies.
But there is a better way. Drawing on interviews with dozens of top generals and policymakers, Tierney shows how we can use three key steps-surge, talk, and leave-to stem the tide of losses and withdraw from unsuccessful campaigns without compromising our core values and interests.
Weaving together compelling stories of military catastrophe and heroism, this is an unprecedented, timely, and essential guidebook for our new era of unwinnable conflicts. The Right Way to Lose a War illuminates not only how Washington can handle the toughest crisis of all-battlefield failure-but also how America can once again return to the path of victory.
For nearly a century, up until the end of World War II in 1945, America enjoyed a Golden Age of decisive military triumphs. And then suddenly, we stopped winning wars. The decades since have been a Dark Age of failures and stalemates-in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan-exposing our inability to change course after battlefield setbacks.
In this provocative book, award-winning scholar Dominic Tierney reveals how the United States has struggled to adapt to the new era of intractable guerrilla conflicts. As a result, most major American wars have turned into military fiascos. And when battlefield disaster strikes, Washington is unable to disengage from the quagmire, with grave consequences for thousands of U.S. troops and our allies.
But there is a better way. Drawing on interviews with dozens of top generals and policymakers, Tierney shows how we can use three key steps-surge, talk, and leave-to stem the tide of losses and withdraw from unsuccessful campaigns without compromising our core values and interests.
Weaving together compelling stories of military catastrophe and heroism, this is an unprecedented, timely, and essential guidebook for our new era of unwinnable conflicts. The Right Way to Lose a War illuminates not only how Washington can handle the toughest crisis of all-battlefield failure-but also how America can once again return to the path of victory.
400 pages, Hardcover
First published February 1, 2015
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
May 19, 2015
So, this book had a number of strengths and weaknesses, but overall it was worth the read. Bad news first. “The Right Way to Lose a War” was a little bit repetitive. Presumably anyone reading this book is at least marginally familiar with the Korean and Vietnam wars. Explaining (multiple times) how the United States became sidetracked is a little tedious. The vignettes were far more effective (such as how Eisenhower flew over the lines in Korea firsthand). This repetition also affected the latter part of the book such as the discussion on how to conduct a surge. I am under the impression that with judicious editing the book could have been 25% shorter.
The second weakness was a slight lack of focus. My impression, particularly based on the subtitle, was that there would be more focus on the current geopolitical state of affairs and the roll of the United States within this system. Most of the book seemed dedicated to a series of lessons learned from past experiences (and not just of the United States). This is not a problem per se (and I personally enjoyed the learn-from-the-past sections more) but it makes for a slightly awkward narrative.
Now for the good. The historical discussions, while they made have weakened the narrative, were probably the most interesting sections. There were numerous side stories, such as Project Solarium, and the perhaps infamous discussions over the shape of the negotiation table during the Paris Peace Conference to end the Vietnam War. These stories made the book far more interesting and would broaden the appeal to those not merely interested in contemporary conflicts.
The other positive though is the tone taken throughout most of the book. I was somewhat worried that this would be a work that accused the United States of being idiotic and now must be provided with a way out of the messes it created. Actually, “The Right Way to Lose a War” is rather fair in that it simply assumes that mistakes happen and that the era of inter-state conflict is essentially over. Perhaps is succeeds because the recommendations made are overly broad.
Given the relatively vague nature of the recommendations made, and the unnecessary repetition, I would be inclined to rate “The Right Way to Lose a War” at three stars, however the interesting side-stories and anecdotes save the book from being to dry and push it up to four.
The second weakness was a slight lack of focus. My impression, particularly based on the subtitle, was that there would be more focus on the current geopolitical state of affairs and the roll of the United States within this system. Most of the book seemed dedicated to a series of lessons learned from past experiences (and not just of the United States). This is not a problem per se (and I personally enjoyed the learn-from-the-past sections more) but it makes for a slightly awkward narrative.
Now for the good. The historical discussions, while they made have weakened the narrative, were probably the most interesting sections. There were numerous side stories, such as Project Solarium, and the perhaps infamous discussions over the shape of the negotiation table during the Paris Peace Conference to end the Vietnam War. These stories made the book far more interesting and would broaden the appeal to those not merely interested in contemporary conflicts.
The other positive though is the tone taken throughout most of the book. I was somewhat worried that this would be a work that accused the United States of being idiotic and now must be provided with a way out of the messes it created. Actually, “The Right Way to Lose a War” is rather fair in that it simply assumes that mistakes happen and that the era of inter-state conflict is essentially over. Perhaps is succeeds because the recommendations made are overly broad.
Given the relatively vague nature of the recommendations made, and the unnecessary repetition, I would be inclined to rate “The Right Way to Lose a War” at three stars, however the interesting side-stories and anecdotes save the book from being to dry and push it up to four.
August 18, 2015
This is almost a textbook analysis in how a country should extricate itself from a losing war. Case studies are primarily constructed around the Korean, Vietnamese, Afghani, and Iraqi conflicts. The emphasis is on how we Americans can and should withdraw from unwinnable situations, including wars we never should have pursued to begin with.
The reader comes away with the unmistakable conclusion that when we consider whether to use force to impose our will on another country or on the insurgents within an ally or an enemy, we should think twice, or indeed, many times before doing so. Unwinnable situations are costly in terms of lives lost, casualties sustained, and in national treasure spent.
The best way to avoid the costs and humiliations of war is never to fight these kinds of war to begin with.
The reader comes away with the unmistakable conclusion that when we consider whether to use force to impose our will on another country or on the insurgents within an ally or an enemy, we should think twice, or indeed, many times before doing so. Unwinnable situations are costly in terms of lives lost, casualties sustained, and in national treasure spent.
The best way to avoid the costs and humiliations of war is never to fight these kinds of war to begin with.
September 12, 2019
The United States of America hasn't won a war since World War II. Some will argue that the first Gulf War was a win... but the counterargument is that we didn't win because we had to go back. Tierney argues that we need to find ways to exit when our stated policy, battlefield success, and objectives aren't matching. He proposing a 3 step process of surge, talk, and leave.
Why I started this book: I've been testing out the app Scribd and having been working through everything on my long list that they have.
Why I finished it: Fascinating, if a little repetitive. And still timely, as President Trump scuttled a peace settlement with the Taliban this past week. Eighteen long years on war.
Why I started this book: I've been testing out the app Scribd and having been working through everything on my long list that they have.
Why I finished it: Fascinating, if a little repetitive. And still timely, as President Trump scuttled a peace settlement with the Taliban this past week. Eighteen long years on war.
May 22, 2015
I won this in a Goodreads giveaway.
I guess if a country is going to war there is a lot to consider from this book, but my thought is why the USA continues to think it is OK to get involved with foreign conflicts in the first place.
I guess if a country is going to war there is a lot to consider from this book, but my thought is why the USA continues to think it is OK to get involved with foreign conflicts in the first place.
July 3, 2017
Abseits des Kalten Krieges haben sich die USA seit 1945 sehr schwer getan, Konflikte, in die sie eintraten, zu ihren Gunsten zu entscheiden. Im Irak schaffte man es gar einen Krieg zu verlieren, den man eigentlich schon als gewonnen ausrief.
Hinter all diesen verlorenen Konflikten und Kriegen steht ein Muster an Verhalten. Fehlender Staatenbau. Und davor, das Streben nach einem Krieg um sein Gesicht zu wahren. Gerade bei letzterem hat sich herausgestellt, dass die Befürchtungen immer zu hoch angesetzt waren.
So zumindest sagt es der Autor und die Frage wäre an dieser Stelle, ob der weit positivere Verlauf nicht auch gerade wegen des Krieges zustande kam. Das wird indirekt in Abrede gestellt und dabei werden die aktuelleren Kriege mit den früheren (Vietnam und Korea) flink durcheinander gemischt, sprich nicht voneinander abgegrenzt.
Dabei sind die neueren Konflikte gänzlich anders als die Alten. Es steht den USA kein großer Block entgegen, der das entstandene Machtvakuum füllen könnte, das die USA schufen resp. hinterlassen. In diesem Sinne wird die Herleitung der Lösung von Tierney etwas unglaubwürdig, denn er beruft sich in seiner Argumentation auf Korea und Vietnam.
Auch die Lösung an sich scheint recht platt. Aufstocken, verhandeln, positive Narrative erzeugen, Zeitdruck vermeiden, abziehen und die neuen Machthaber stützen. Vergessen wird dabei, dass ein Krieg, der wegen es eines Tyrannen begann, politisch besser enden muss als zuvor. Tierney deckt also die Komplexität des politischen Handelns nicht wirklich ab. Er spart sich die Egos in der Lösungsfindung aus.
Am Ende bleibt ein durchaus interessantes Buch mit vielen Schwächen, das man eher zur Anregung des eigenen Weiterdenkens verwenden kann.
Hinter all diesen verlorenen Konflikten und Kriegen steht ein Muster an Verhalten. Fehlender Staatenbau. Und davor, das Streben nach einem Krieg um sein Gesicht zu wahren. Gerade bei letzterem hat sich herausgestellt, dass die Befürchtungen immer zu hoch angesetzt waren.
So zumindest sagt es der Autor und die Frage wäre an dieser Stelle, ob der weit positivere Verlauf nicht auch gerade wegen des Krieges zustande kam. Das wird indirekt in Abrede gestellt und dabei werden die aktuelleren Kriege mit den früheren (Vietnam und Korea) flink durcheinander gemischt, sprich nicht voneinander abgegrenzt.
Dabei sind die neueren Konflikte gänzlich anders als die Alten. Es steht den USA kein großer Block entgegen, der das entstandene Machtvakuum füllen könnte, das die USA schufen resp. hinterlassen. In diesem Sinne wird die Herleitung der Lösung von Tierney etwas unglaubwürdig, denn er beruft sich in seiner Argumentation auf Korea und Vietnam.
Auch die Lösung an sich scheint recht platt. Aufstocken, verhandeln, positive Narrative erzeugen, Zeitdruck vermeiden, abziehen und die neuen Machthaber stützen. Vergessen wird dabei, dass ein Krieg, der wegen es eines Tyrannen begann, politisch besser enden muss als zuvor. Tierney deckt also die Komplexität des politischen Handelns nicht wirklich ab. Er spart sich die Egos in der Lösungsfindung aus.
Am Ende bleibt ein durchaus interessantes Buch mit vielen Schwächen, das man eher zur Anregung des eigenen Weiterdenkens verwenden kann.
August 9, 2015
Respectable summary of challenges facing US in ending conflicts in the limited wars characterizing warfare since World War II. Relies on examples from Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan primarily to highlight US challenges and shortfalls related to successfully ending "unwinnable" conflicts. Not new or profound but a critical insight highlighted by the author is the importance of seeing war's outcomes as something other than binary victory or defeat - something that runs counter to US strategic culture. Ultimately the author argues that when the US faces "unwinnable" wars it should base its strategy for extricating itself on the framework of "surge, talk, and leave" and offers six fundamental principles for future US policy in an age of irregular warfare.
Author presents his arguments in readable and coherent manner but there is little new for those who have been studied or practiced counterinsurgency since 9/11. That said this book offers an easily readable summary of many important considerations for developing and implementing successful strategies when facing "unwinnable" wars.
Author presents his arguments in readable and coherent manner but there is little new for those who have been studied or practiced counterinsurgency since 9/11. That said this book offers an easily readable summary of many important considerations for developing and implementing successful strategies when facing "unwinnable" wars.
June 2, 2015
I read an advanced copy over the weekend (which is exactly the same as the final version). First, the book is completely original. I don’t know of any other books about what to do if a war turns into a quagmire. It reads like a survival guide. But instead of a zombie invasion, it’s a U.S. military disaster. America is such a victory culture that we haven’t noticed that we stopped winning wars a long time ago. Nearly all major conflicts since 1945 (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq) were either stalemates or defeats. One of the many ironies highlighted by Tierney is that the U.S. started losing wars after 1945, just as the country became a superpower. The book is full of compelling stories of loose nukes in Algeria, the War of 1812 being a near-disaster (not what we were taught in high school), and the U.S. bizarrely negotiating for weeks over the shape of the negotiating table in Vietnam. If the war on ISIS goes south, the president might need to get a copy.
August 17, 2015
This is an excellent book, which should be required reading to our nation’s leaders. It provides a strong summary of the various wars and conflicts America has been involved with since the War of 1812. It outlines the difference between conflicts which have been successful and those which have not. And it provides a right way to win a war. I have often believed that ‘once you drive off the cliff, your options are limited’, but this book provides viable options to consider. And it shows a great deal of respect to the brave men and women in our armed forces who sacrifice so much for the freedom we enjoy. I strongly recommend this book.
July 13, 2015
Too Reliant on Hindsight
While well written, the author appears predisposed that wars against non-state adversaries are unwinnable. Missing from this book is a formula to determine when a war is a "fiasco" and thus a candidate for his "surge, talk, leave" formula. To use a sports analogy, the U.S. would seemingly capitulate every match where it fell behind in the first half.glad we haven't had that mentality.
While well written, the author appears predisposed that wars against non-state adversaries are unwinnable. Missing from this book is a formula to determine when a war is a "fiasco" and thus a candidate for his "surge, talk, leave" formula. To use a sports analogy, the U.S. would seemingly capitulate every match where it fell behind in the first half.glad we haven't had that mentality.
October 5, 2016
Interesting read. The author examines american's binary understanding of war outcomes and our ability to recognize when ends and means are not in sync. He puts forward a conceptual framework for getting out of a war after the initiative is lost through "surge, talk, leave". His use of historical examples and comparisons to illustrate how his method can be applied in future conflicts when they don't go as planned.
June 16, 2015
Frankly speaking, I am not particularly interested in the topic. I received an ARC of this book. It’s nice that I have an opportunity to read this book. I found this book readable and compelling. I cannot say I really love this book, but I would recommend this book to friends who are interested in political science.
I received a free ARC from the Goodreads First Reads program.
I received a free ARC from the Goodreads First Reads program.
June 24, 2015
I received this book for free through a Goodreads giveaway.
The Right Way to Lose a War gave me a good snapshot on battles from years gone by, and the similarities between them. Interesting insights into the outcomes of the wars, politicians responses and motivations to enter the battleground in the first place.
The Right Way to Lose a War gave me a good snapshot on battles from years gone by, and the similarities between them. Interesting insights into the outcomes of the wars, politicians responses and motivations to enter the battleground in the first place.
May 19, 2015
Not sure that I can say it any better than Gregory did, it was pretty spot on in my eyes.
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December 19, 2015Very informative and well written
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews