Knowing One's Enemies

by Ernest R. May (Editor)

In essays that illuminate not only the recent past but shortcomings in today's intelligence assessments, sixteen experts show how prospective antagonists appraised each other prior to the World Wars. This cautionary tale, warns that intelligence agencies can do certain things very well--but other things poorly, if at all.



Originally published in 1985.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Genres: History, International Relations

578 pages, Kindle Edition

First published March 1, 1984

About the author

Ernest Richard May was an American historian of international relations whose 14 published books include analyses of American involvement in World War I and the causes of the fall of France during World War II. His 1997 book The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis became the primary sources of the 2000 film Thirteen Days that viewed the crisis from the perspective of American political leaders. He served on the 9/11 Commission and highlighted the failures of the government intelligence agencies. May taught full time on the faculty of Harvard University for 55 years, until his death.

Reviews

[DoctorM · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very fine collection of articles on intelligence gathering and analysis before each of the two world wars. The treatments of pre-1914 intelligence processes in the Habsburg Monarchy, imperial Germany, and France are especially good. The articles highlight the institutional weaknesses of the intelligence process before the Great War, and the political limits of analysis. A very good collection for anyone interested in how the major states saw their adversaries before each world war and how they tried to gather information.

[Ted · Rating 5 out of 5]

A must-read for intelligence professionals, especially those who work at the policy-making level, this book was published by Princeton University Press in 1986 and is now out of print. When I read it for the first time it had an substantial impact on my perspective of national intelligence and military operations. The book goes beyond being merely a professional, scholarly analysis of the past and is easy to read as a deliberately constructed set of case-studies with important lessons for today's policy makers.

The book consists of sixteen essays that illuminate intelligence collection, analysis and decision making at the national level in various countries at critical junctures in their history (Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Great Britain and Italy before WWI and Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, and the US before WWII).

In many ways, the essays spin a subtle cautionary tale, warning that even when a nation is in possession of sufficient intelligence of a quality to make effective policy decisions, it can all come to disaster due to the inherent biases, proclivities and abilities of key policy makers. The harmful effects of internal disputes within intelligence agencies, and turf battles between competing agencies, are also laid out in careful detail.

I highly recommend this book for anyone wishing a clearer understanding of the use and impact of intelligence on the decision processes at the national policy-making level.