What do you think?


Statul național-legionar
Proclamarea statului național-legionar, în 6 septembrie 1940, nu a fost rezultatul vreunei victorii a „revoluției fasciste” în România și nici al presiunii exercitate de Ion Antonescu asupra regelui Carol al II-lea, ci consecința eșecului total în materie de politică externă a regimului carlist. În noul sistem politic, în care generalul Antonescu era Conducător al Statului, iar Horia Sima, vicepreședinte al guvernului, s-au confruntat două concepții diferite: conservator-autoritaristă a elementelor antonesciene și dinamic-revoluționară a adepților radicalismului fascist-legionar. Cele cinci luni de existență ale acestui adevărat „stat dual” au fost presărate cu numeroase violențe și infracțiuni ale membrilor Mișcării Legionare, care au atins punctul culminant prin Asasinatele de la Jilava, Snagov și Strejnicul, în 26–27 noiembrie 1940. Cu arbitrajul celui de-Al Treilea Reich, conflictul a fost tranșat în 1941, când Armata a învins rebeliunea declanșată de „cămășile verzi”. Din acel moment, Mișcarea Legionară a ieșit definitiv de pe scena istorică activă a României.
- GenresHistoryNonfictionRomania
496 pages, Paperback
Published February 1, 2025
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 1 of 1 review
March 3, 2025
The national-legionary state was a short dictatorship, the result of a compromise between the authoritarian Ion Antonescu and the fascist Iron Guard movement, led by Horia Sima. It only lasted five months, and it is remembered as one of the bloodiest and most shameful governments that led Romania since its founding. The recent Florin Müller's book emphasizes the political, legal and especially the ideological features of this rule. While it devotes much space to ideology and less to other issues, I recommend this work to any reader interested in fascism and right-wing populism.
The regime was paradoxical. It was based on extreme right-wing nationalism, yet Romania wasn’t a sovereign state anymore since the fate of its domestic politics was decided by Nazi Germany. Florin Müller describes how Ion Antonescu defeated the Iron Guard only after gaining the approval of Hitler, during a meeting on 14 January 1941. It was also the result of the national humiliation and submission of 1940, when Romania gave up, without a fight and under pressure, lands to the Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria.
It was also extremely violent. The Iron Guard used its new position in order to take revenge or target personalities of the older regime, such as the famous historian Nicolae Iorga. It pursued anti-Semitic policies, it pushed for the ethnicization of the economy and enriched some of its members, as Florin Müller reminds the reader. It was pushed out of power by Ion Antonescu during the revolt of 21-23 January 1941, when it also launched a pogrom in Bucharest, and its leaders were snatched by the Nazis.
Florin Müller takes ideology seriously. He extends his old thesis on the Iron Guard as a revolutionary movement, with a modernist outlook representing the only way in which popular communism could find a voice in the Romanian politics of that time. The historian analysed several papers published by its members or supporters, especially those of Traian Herseni, Petre P. Panaitescu, Mihail Polihroniade or Leon Țopa. The anti-capitalist and working-class elements of this movement were also underlined, though the author admits that other interpretations are also valid.
For most of the book, Florin Müller relied on typical regime theory that distinguishes between authoritarian (Ion Antonescu) and totalitarian (Iron Guard) political actors. At the end, the author nuances the classification and writes about fascism without fascists to understand the succeeding Ion Antonescu regime, which organised the Romanian version of the Holocaust. The Nazi German approval existed, but the impulse came from Bucharest. The author thinks that it was the result of the widespread anti-Semitism of that time, combined with an ideological input from the Iron Guard, and the new dictator’s own beliefs.
The regime was paradoxical. It was based on extreme right-wing nationalism, yet Romania wasn’t a sovereign state anymore since the fate of its domestic politics was decided by Nazi Germany. Florin Müller describes how Ion Antonescu defeated the Iron Guard only after gaining the approval of Hitler, during a meeting on 14 January 1941. It was also the result of the national humiliation and submission of 1940, when Romania gave up, without a fight and under pressure, lands to the Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria.
It was also extremely violent. The Iron Guard used its new position in order to take revenge or target personalities of the older regime, such as the famous historian Nicolae Iorga. It pursued anti-Semitic policies, it pushed for the ethnicization of the economy and enriched some of its members, as Florin Müller reminds the reader. It was pushed out of power by Ion Antonescu during the revolt of 21-23 January 1941, when it also launched a pogrom in Bucharest, and its leaders were snatched by the Nazis.
Florin Müller takes ideology seriously. He extends his old thesis on the Iron Guard as a revolutionary movement, with a modernist outlook representing the only way in which popular communism could find a voice in the Romanian politics of that time. The historian analysed several papers published by its members or supporters, especially those of Traian Herseni, Petre P. Panaitescu, Mihail Polihroniade or Leon Țopa. The anti-capitalist and working-class elements of this movement were also underlined, though the author admits that other interpretations are also valid.
For most of the book, Florin Müller relied on typical regime theory that distinguishes between authoritarian (Ion Antonescu) and totalitarian (Iron Guard) political actors. At the end, the author nuances the classification and writes about fascism without fascists to understand the succeeding Ion Antonescu regime, which organised the Romanian version of the Holocaust. The Nazi German approval existed, but the impulse came from Bucharest. The author thinks that it was the result of the widespread anti-Semitism of that time, combined with an ideological input from the Iron Guard, and the new dictator’s own beliefs.
Displaying 1 - 1 of 1 review


