Levinas and Lacan, two giants of contemporary theory, represent schools of thought that seem poles apart. In this major new work, Mari Ruti charts the ethical terrain between them. At first glance, Levinansian and Lacanian approaches may seem more or less incompatible, and in many ways they are, particularly in their understanding of the self-other relationship. For both Levinas and Lacan, the subject’s relationship to the other is primary in the sense that the subject, literally, does not exist without the other, but they see the challenge of ethics quite while Levinas laments our failure to adequately meet the ethical demand arising from the other, Lacan laments the consequences of our failure to adequately escape the forms this demand frequently takes. Although this book outlines the major differences between Levinas and Judith Butler on the one hand and Lacan, Slavoj Žižek, and Alain Badiou on the other, Ruti proposes that underneath these differences one can discern a shared concern with the thorny relationship between the singularity of experience and the universality of ethics. Between Levinas and Lacan is an important new book for anyone interested in contemporary theory, ethics, psychoanalysis, and feminist and queer theory.
Mari Ruti is Distinguished Professor of critical theory and of gender and sexuality studies at the University of Toronto in Toronto, Canada. She is an interdisciplinary scholar within the theoretical humanities working at the intersection of contemporary theory, continental philosophy, psychoanalytic theory, cultural studies, trauma theory, posthumanist ethics, and gender and sexuality studies.
Perhaps I understand Foucault differently, but I don't agree that Foucault leaves no room for radical change in his conceptualisation of power, for power constitutes subjectivity, much like how gravity constitutes directionality--through limitation. Without gravity, an endless drift; without power, an unbounded nothing. Only the limit grants mobility--thus, agency.
While I haven't read enough Butler to respond to Ruti's claim that Butler's Levinasian ethics allow for no radical break from power, I don't think you can break from power (in the conventional sense). Rather, you travel between discourses, and in that transversal, you invite the accident, the mistake, the misperformance, an unexpected line of flight that brings one discourse into contact with another. You never break from power through escape, but rather, through an intensification of power, a multiplication of misalignment, that grants you and others the ability to recognise the alien nature of your reified relations. Power only breaks through its disjuncture.
I generally liked this book (Butler is mired in ressentiment, Zizek is a raving sexist--neither alone are enough for us to pave a way forward that isn't either a politics of Abrahamic meekness or white male jouissance), but I think this gulf between Lacanians and Foucaultians is far smaller than it's made out to be. Just because power is inescapable, doesn't mean you can't transfigure it.
I really enjoyed this as a way to better understand the thinkers Ruti discusses, as she is an excellent writer at taking difficult ideas and making them clearer, especially Lacan. I will definitely want to re-read later on, after I work through the many works referenced here that caught my attention. By contrasting two very different approaches to ethics, the reader can use this to help develop and interrogate their own views. Highly recommended, but only if you already have familiarity with at least Levinas (or Butler) and Lacan.