What do you think?
Rate this book
Roosevelt and Stalin: Portrait of a Partnership
A hugely important book that solely and fully explores for the first time the complex partnership during World War II between FDR and Stalin, by the editor of My Dear Mr. The Complete Correspondence of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin (“History owes a debt to Susan Butler for the collection and annotation of these exchanges”—Arthur Schlesinger, Jr).
Making use of previously classified materials from the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History, and the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, as well as the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and three hundred hot war messages between Roosevelt and Stalin, Butler tells the story of how the leader of the capitalist world and the leader of the Communist world became more than allies of convenience during World War II. Butler reassess in-depth how the two men became partners, how they shared the same outlook for the postwar world, and how they formed an uneasy but deep friendship, shaping the world’s political stage from the war to the decades leading up to and into the new century.
Roosevelt and Stalin tells of the first face-to-face meetings of the two leaders over four days in December 1943 at Tehran, in which the Allies focused on the next phases of the war against the Axis Powers in Europe and Asia; of Stalin’s agreement to launch another major offensive on the Eastern Front; and of his agreement to declare war against Japan following the Allied victory over Germany.
Butler writes of the weeklong meeting at Yalta in February of 1945, two months before Roosevelt’s death, where the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany was agreed on and postwar Europe was reorganized, and where Stalin agreed to participate in Roosevelt’s vision of the United Nations.
The book makes clear that Roosevelt worked hard to win Stalin over, pursuing the Russian leader, always holding out the promise that Roosevelt’s own ideas were the best bet for the future peace and security of Russia; however, Stalin was not at all sure that Roosevelt’s concept of a world organization, even with police powers, would be enough to keep Germany from starting a third world war, but we see how Stalin’s view of Roosevelt evolved, how he began to see FDR as the key to a peaceful world.
Butler’s book is the first to show how FDR pushed Stalin to reinstate religion in the Soviet Union, which he did in 1943; how J. Edgar Hoover derailed the U.S.-planned establishment of an OSS intelligence mission in Moscow and a Soviet counterpart in America before the 1944 election; and that Roosevelt had wanted to involve Stalin in the testing of the atomic bomb at Alamogardo, New Mexico.
We see how Roosevelt’s death deeply affected Stalin. Averell Harriman, American ambassador to the Soviet Union, reported that the Russian premier was “more disturbed than I had ever seen him,” and said to Harriman, “President Roosevelt has died but his cause must live on. We shall support President Truman with all our forces and all our will.” And the author explores how Churchill’s—and Truman’s—mutual mistrust and provocation of Stalin resulted in the Cold War.
A fascinating, revelatory portrait of this crucial, world-changing partnership.
Making use of previously classified materials from the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History, and the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, as well as the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and three hundred hot war messages between Roosevelt and Stalin, Butler tells the story of how the leader of the capitalist world and the leader of the Communist world became more than allies of convenience during World War II. Butler reassess in-depth how the two men became partners, how they shared the same outlook for the postwar world, and how they formed an uneasy but deep friendship, shaping the world’s political stage from the war to the decades leading up to and into the new century.
Roosevelt and Stalin tells of the first face-to-face meetings of the two leaders over four days in December 1943 at Tehran, in which the Allies focused on the next phases of the war against the Axis Powers in Europe and Asia; of Stalin’s agreement to launch another major offensive on the Eastern Front; and of his agreement to declare war against Japan following the Allied victory over Germany.
Butler writes of the weeklong meeting at Yalta in February of 1945, two months before Roosevelt’s death, where the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany was agreed on and postwar Europe was reorganized, and where Stalin agreed to participate in Roosevelt’s vision of the United Nations.
The book makes clear that Roosevelt worked hard to win Stalin over, pursuing the Russian leader, always holding out the promise that Roosevelt’s own ideas were the best bet for the future peace and security of Russia; however, Stalin was not at all sure that Roosevelt’s concept of a world organization, even with police powers, would be enough to keep Germany from starting a third world war, but we see how Stalin’s view of Roosevelt evolved, how he began to see FDR as the key to a peaceful world.
Butler’s book is the first to show how FDR pushed Stalin to reinstate religion in the Soviet Union, which he did in 1943; how J. Edgar Hoover derailed the U.S.-planned establishment of an OSS intelligence mission in Moscow and a Soviet counterpart in America before the 1944 election; and that Roosevelt had wanted to involve Stalin in the testing of the atomic bomb at Alamogardo, New Mexico.
We see how Roosevelt’s death deeply affected Stalin. Averell Harriman, American ambassador to the Soviet Union, reported that the Russian premier was “more disturbed than I had ever seen him,” and said to Harriman, “President Roosevelt has died but his cause must live on. We shall support President Truman with all our forces and all our will.” And the author explores how Churchill’s—and Truman’s—mutual mistrust and provocation of Stalin resulted in the Cold War.
A fascinating, revelatory portrait of this crucial, world-changing partnership.
608 pages, Hardcover
First published March 3, 2015
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 29 of 29 reviews
June 17, 2015
Butler does a yeoman's job of having gathered together all the Roosevelt-Stalin correspondence, then, here, putting it together in a coherent framework.
I learned a few things from the book, and it was somewhat worth the read. But not totally.
Beyond some facts, and a bit of framing, my biggest other learning was perhaps that Butler has a high naivete level and can engage in simplistic analysis.
Yes, Churchill may have been a racist. But, what about FDR's race-based stereotyping comments about the Vietnamese, quoted in this book? No such analysis from Butler. What about his paternalistic attitude toward China, which is what it was? Again, no analysis.
And, outside this, Roosevelt's saying, shortly before the start of WWII that Italians were good for nothing but opera singers, being ready to castrate Germans, and, not only passively signing off on but actively supporting the war-duration detention of Japanese Americans. All this eventually got this book knocked down another star. Goes to credibility on her part, and she loses that much.
And, if Butler thinks that every change Stalin made in Soviet society that FDR hinted at, like freedom of religion, was solely in response to FDR, then I have tickets to an unpoliced rally by a modern Russian democratic opposition to sell her.
Again, it's somewhat worth a read, but not that much. I hope that somebody else builds on her previous book about the full correspondence between the two, and writes about their relationship with a little less naivete.
I learned a few things from the book, and it was somewhat worth the read. But not totally.
Beyond some facts, and a bit of framing, my biggest other learning was perhaps that Butler has a high naivete level and can engage in simplistic analysis.
Yes, Churchill may have been a racist. But, what about FDR's race-based stereotyping comments about the Vietnamese, quoted in this book? No such analysis from Butler. What about his paternalistic attitude toward China, which is what it was? Again, no analysis.
And, outside this, Roosevelt's saying, shortly before the start of WWII that Italians were good for nothing but opera singers, being ready to castrate Germans, and, not only passively signing off on but actively supporting the war-duration detention of Japanese Americans. All this eventually got this book knocked down another star. Goes to credibility on her part, and she loses that much.
And, if Butler thinks that every change Stalin made in Soviet society that FDR hinted at, like freedom of religion, was solely in response to FDR, then I have tickets to an unpoliced rally by a modern Russian democratic opposition to sell her.
Again, it's somewhat worth a read, but not that much. I hope that somebody else builds on her previous book about the full correspondence between the two, and writes about their relationship with a little less naivete.
March 4, 2017
I have taken absolute ages to read this book. It's nearly 600 pages and mine is some pre-publication copy that slows down the simple act of turning the pages (makes flicking through the pages impossible). However, it doesn't fully explain why it has taken so long.
The first 200 pages read like a thriller: it's an excellent start to the important subject of meetings between Roosevelt and Stalin. And Tehran (1943) was their first face-to-face meeting. There are good descriptions, good explanation of who's who - I really enjoyed that part.
I got stuck, however, when we moved back in time to 1941 and Russia's involvement in the war. Roosevelt sort of disappeared. He did reappear in the later chapter on the atomic bomb, but that part didn't include much Stalin. And so the middle part of the book was not really about the partnership between these two greats; it was just to explain the background. I thought a few judicious editorial cuts would have helped. As it was, my attention kept wondering; there was hardly anything new there.
The Yalta chapter (1945) improved things but only marginally. There was too much detail about the daily meetings. Both Roosevelt and Stalin had brought their foreign ministers and other staff, so there were more discussions than in Tehran and many more names (lots of wives and daughters). Even the fact that the final dinner given by Churchill was described in great detail didn't have the charm of similar menus in Tehran.
The final 50 pages picked up again, with Roosevelt dying. There were fascinating details about US-Soviet meetings after his death, a reminder to today's leaders to seek face-to-face meetings.
All in all, I think the book is too long and somewhat confused. I have read criticism that Roosevelt comes out rather too well in the book, but this didn't worry me. I think that any author has the right to make his/her preferences known. Susan Butler obviously admires Roosevelt. What to make of the 'portait of a partnership' is harder to say. Maybe not the best title. I did, however, enjoy some parts of the book enormously and gained plenty of insights.
The first 200 pages read like a thriller: it's an excellent start to the important subject of meetings between Roosevelt and Stalin. And Tehran (1943) was their first face-to-face meeting. There are good descriptions, good explanation of who's who - I really enjoyed that part.
I got stuck, however, when we moved back in time to 1941 and Russia's involvement in the war. Roosevelt sort of disappeared. He did reappear in the later chapter on the atomic bomb, but that part didn't include much Stalin. And so the middle part of the book was not really about the partnership between these two greats; it was just to explain the background. I thought a few judicious editorial cuts would have helped. As it was, my attention kept wondering; there was hardly anything new there.
The Yalta chapter (1945) improved things but only marginally. There was too much detail about the daily meetings. Both Roosevelt and Stalin had brought their foreign ministers and other staff, so there were more discussions than in Tehran and many more names (lots of wives and daughters). Even the fact that the final dinner given by Churchill was described in great detail didn't have the charm of similar menus in Tehran.
The final 50 pages picked up again, with Roosevelt dying. There were fascinating details about US-Soviet meetings after his death, a reminder to today's leaders to seek face-to-face meetings.
All in all, I think the book is too long and somewhat confused. I have read criticism that Roosevelt comes out rather too well in the book, but this didn't worry me. I think that any author has the right to make his/her preferences known. Susan Butler obviously admires Roosevelt. What to make of the 'portait of a partnership' is harder to say. Maybe not the best title. I did, however, enjoy some parts of the book enormously and gained plenty of insights.
December 10, 2017
This book is a story of how Roosevelt and Stalin, both leaders of two vastly different countries, tried to create a better postwar world. This portrayed the difficulties, issues, and all of the relationship building that needed to happen to create a more peaceful world. The argument going into the book was that if it wasn't due to Churchill's and Truman's meddling and distrust of the USSR, the framework that was set up wold have lasted
From reading this book, I think that no amount of FDR charm could have changed Stalin's mind on any of the issues that were brought up in the book. For starters, Stalin was really upset that there was no second front on the western front until 1944. Because of that, he was going to get whatever he wanted out of the concessions because of that.
Second, Churchill was in no mood to comproise, just like Stalin, and while he wanted a unified Europe to settle out their own affairs, he was not willing to include America or the rest of the world in deciding the fate of, in his mind, the dismantling of the British Empire. Because of the fact that FDR was dealing with two stubborn leaders, he had to have somewhat known that he wasn't going to get his ideal situation.
I think FDR's biggest mistake was keeping Truman at arms length during these negotiations, and she briefly mentions that it would be a good idea to include him in what he was doing because FDR did have plans to step down in the middle of his fourth term and should have had a more concise plan in place.
I think Ms. Butler does a good job in setting the scene and detailing the negotiations down to the very fine points. I think that she paints Stalin in a glowing light and paints Churchill and the entire British command as bumbling idiots. Overall, its an interesting book to look at how the world we live in today was shaped and how it got there.
From reading this book, I think that no amount of FDR charm could have changed Stalin's mind on any of the issues that were brought up in the book. For starters, Stalin was really upset that there was no second front on the western front until 1944. Because of that, he was going to get whatever he wanted out of the concessions because of that.
Second, Churchill was in no mood to comproise, just like Stalin, and while he wanted a unified Europe to settle out their own affairs, he was not willing to include America or the rest of the world in deciding the fate of, in his mind, the dismantling of the British Empire. Because of the fact that FDR was dealing with two stubborn leaders, he had to have somewhat known that he wasn't going to get his ideal situation.
I think FDR's biggest mistake was keeping Truman at arms length during these negotiations, and she briefly mentions that it would be a good idea to include him in what he was doing because FDR did have plans to step down in the middle of his fourth term and should have had a more concise plan in place.
I think Ms. Butler does a good job in setting the scene and detailing the negotiations down to the very fine points. I think that she paints Stalin in a glowing light and paints Churchill and the entire British command as bumbling idiots. Overall, its an interesting book to look at how the world we live in today was shaped and how it got there.
April 1, 2015
This book details the diplomacy between FDR and Stalin. From the beginning when FDR recognized the communist government in 1933 till his death in April,1945, he had extensive dealings with Stalin. When the war broke out FDR worked to aid Russia through lend-lease despite public and congressional dislike of communism.
Then during the war, FDR worked on such issues as the second front, the formation of a world organization after the war and the Polish question. FDR felt that he could work with Stalin towards winning the war and setting up the United Nations.
The issue of the atomic bomb was also a big part of dealings between the two leaders. FDR probably would have shared the secret of the bomb to avoid an arms race and to ensure that the alliance would continue to defeat Japan and into the postwar world.
Then during the war, FDR worked on such issues as the second front, the formation of a world organization after the war and the Polish question. FDR felt that he could work with Stalin towards winning the war and setting up the United Nations.
The issue of the atomic bomb was also a big part of dealings between the two leaders. FDR probably would have shared the secret of the bomb to avoid an arms race and to ensure that the alliance would continue to defeat Japan and into the postwar world.
March 14, 2018
I enjoyed this book immensely and found it added to my understanding of both FOR and Stalin. One small criticism is that the author jumps around in timeline a great deal and the book would be better if the narrative moved based on time. I was also happy to see the author's depiction of Truman in the final portion. Plain speaking Harry caused many of the problems of the Cold War.
February 18, 2022
This book shows two quite different sides that make it difficult for me to give a unified overall review. On the positive side is the richness of data and background information that paints a much more nuanced and balanced picture of the development in time of the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union based on the relationship of their respective leaders Roosevelt and Stalin. Rather than the pretty one-sided narrative we usually see in the Western World a more balanced story is told highlighting the strong and weak points of Roosevelt and Stalin and the impact on the post (2nd World) War world. A lot of details and nuances were new to me, and definitely contributed to a better understanding of history in the 30’s and 40’s of last century. In that respect this book should be read by everyone who is interested in the prelude to and causes of the cold war. That said there is a completely other side to this book, and that is that the level of (to me sometimes irrelevant) details on the settings of meetings and side events distracts from the core story to be told. The book is too anecdotal and lacks structure in the story and above all fails to properly point out the causality of (suspected) reasons for opinions stated and actions taken and the results of these in global history. In other words, the book more or less fails to bridge between the personal acts of the main characters (Roosevelt and Stalin), their entourage and the global political effects. Maybe this judgement is too harsh, because in many instances Susan Butler proves to be capable of just doing that in a highly effective way, but just too infrequent to keep the story intense for 600 pages. It doesn’t help that the story isn’t told in chronological order, so as a result the logic of the events gets sometimes lost.
Still I enjoyed the book a lot and I considered it an easy and at the same time interesting read. The anecdotes that may be a little distractive on the analytical side are definitely interesting and fun to read, and the richness of the story gives the reader the feel to be present at the meetings. As a vivid depiction of the interaction between the world leaders and the spirit of the time it succeeds without a shadow of a doubt. Despite the 600 pages it took me a relatively short time and no effort at all to complete. As a historical analysis however I am left with a slightly unsatisfied feeling of what could have been. A balanced average for me would have been 3.5 stars, but that is not an option at Goodreads, so after careful consideration I rounded this up.
Still I enjoyed the book a lot and I considered it an easy and at the same time interesting read. The anecdotes that may be a little distractive on the analytical side are definitely interesting and fun to read, and the richness of the story gives the reader the feel to be present at the meetings. As a vivid depiction of the interaction between the world leaders and the spirit of the time it succeeds without a shadow of a doubt. Despite the 600 pages it took me a relatively short time and no effort at all to complete. As a historical analysis however I am left with a slightly unsatisfied feeling of what could have been. A balanced average for me would have been 3.5 stars, but that is not an option at Goodreads, so after careful consideration I rounded this up.
December 23, 2024
Although it is not untrue to say that the death of FDR undid whatever trust existed with Stalin. I believe Roosevelt intended to share nuclear scientific progress with the Soviets. The decisions of those who governed after his death undoubtedly contributed to the cold war. One idea that was never mentioned is that a Vice-President is not pointless position. If FDR had been open with Truman and kept him apprised at all times concerning his attitudes and opinions, grave mistakes might not have happened. The President and Vice-President should ALWAYS BE A PARTNERSHIP. Prior to FDR's death, Truman had no knowledge of the Manhattan project!!!!! I am afraid Roosevelt's ego may have contributed to the destruction of whatever progress with the Soviets had been made. Roosevelt accomplished amazing progress toward the UN and trust among nations especially considering he was caught between a racist colonialist and a paranoid murderer of his own people. Churchill: "if Independence is granted to India, power will go to the hands of rascals, rogues, freebooters; all Indian leaders will be of low calibre and men of straw. They will have sweet tongues and silly hearts. They will fight amongst themselves for power and India will be lost in political squabbles." " I do not agree that the dog in a manger has the final right to the manger even though he may have lain there for a very long time. I do not admit that right. I do not admit for instance, that a great wrong has been done to the Red Indians of America or the black people of Australia. I do not admit that a wrong has been done to these people by the fact that a stronger race, a higher-grade race, a more worldly wise race to put it that way, has come in and taken their place." (Sounds like Hitler.) "The Bengal famine of 1943 killed more than three million people in eastern India. It was one of the worst losses of civilian life on the Allied side in World War II. Although there was no single cause for the starvation, the British cabinet continued to export rice from India to other parts of the empire, despite warnings that this could lead to famine." "According to former British PM Harold Macmillan, Churchill floated “Keep England White” as a campaign slogan for the 1955 election. Perhaps most damning is the recollection of Churchill’s friend, the politician Violet Bonham Carter: when asked his opinion on China in 1954, he reportedly replied, “I hate people with slit eyes and pigtails”. Churchill had no plans for England to lose any colonies after the war. Yet he criticized the Soviets for keeping lands they had "liberated" during WWII. Although the U.S. had colonies during WWII we had already set up a program to establish the Philippines as an independent nation after the war........ Stalin, I believe, could not be labeled a racist per se. He was an equal opportunity murderer of his own people. He hated the Germans and the Poles, but the people of Poland were not of a different "race". German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, pact signed on August 23, 1939, between Germany and the Soviet Union that was concluded a few days before the beginning of World War II and which *******divided eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence*****. Relations between Hiter and Stalin were "friendly" until Operation Barbarossa - on Sunday, 22 June 1941 the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union. It was the largest and costliest land offensive in human history, with around 10 million combatants taking part, and over 8 million casualties by the end of the operation. ******Deaths in the Soviet Union under the rule of Joseph Stalin: Some historians claim that the death toll was around 20 million, a figure based on Conquest's book The Great Terror (1968). In 2003, British historian Simon Sebag Montefiore suggested that Stalin was ultimately responsible for the deaths of at least 20 million people. In 2006, political scientist Rudolph Rummel wrote that the earlier higher victim total estimates are correct, although he included those killed by the government of the Soviet Union in other Eastern European countries as well. In his most recent edition of The Great Terror (2007), Conquest stated that while exact numbers may never be known with complete certainty, at least 15 million people were killed "by the whole range of Soviet regime's terrors."............. Roosevelt was not under any illusions, I believe, about the natures of Churchill and Stalin. By 1943 which is the year of the first meeting of the Big Three, the Soviet Union had been fighting the Nazis in Europe alone. The only exceptions were the conflict in North Africa and the Allied invasion of Italy which began on September 3 1943. The Americans and British were making bombing runs on regular a regular basis. ( Never forget that the British bombed at night with less precision and the Americans flew during the day attempting to do precision attacks with the Nordin bombsight. The Americans had a much larger percentage of lost bombers than the British.) We had been promising the Soviets a second front but were in no position to land in the West of Europe. We needed the Soviets to continue to engage the Nazis in all- out war in the East while we prepared the invasion which including sailing our own Mulberry Harbors across the English Channel to supply the ground forces. The Soviets suffered horrible loss of life and destruction of villages and cities to give time to the Americans, British, Australians, and Canadians to accomplish D-day. FDR knew that the only hope of victory in Europe was to keep the Soviets fighting. We misled Stalin about the second front and FDR had to convince him that it was simply impossible for the Allied forces to invade before spring of 1944. I do not want to diminish the importance of the British ( including colonial forces ), but they were no longer the most important country in the fight - they were the third most important. FDR had been working with Stalin and his representatives to help make the Soviet Union a more "palatable" partner in the war. An example is work toward a freedom of religion. ************* The interactions among the Big Three, but largely between Stalin and Roosevelt are well covered in this book. Although I read extensively in WWII history, I had never encountered this exact relationship. I recommend the book highly. Kristi & Abby Tabby Childless Cat Lady p.s. Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister of Canada is mentioned frequently in this book as a friend and confidant of FDR. By chance my next WWII book is " The Good Allies: How Canada and the United States Fought Together to Defeat Fascism during the Second World War " by Tim Cook. Although I have seen a multi-disc documentary about Canada and WWII, I have never read about how the two leaders co-0perated.
October 25, 2019
basically trash, but some fun anecdotes
August 27, 2015
Roosevelt and Stalin:
Portrait of a Partnership
By Susan Butler
Reviewed by Greg Cusack
August 27, 2015
One of the foundational myths of the far Right’s worldview is that the Cold War was a direct result of how an overly trusting president Franklin Roosevelt was thoroughly “taken in” by the Soviet Union’s Marshal Stalin, falsely believing that they had reached an “understanding” for a peaceful postwar world. One fateful consequence of Roosevelt’s delusion, this false narrative continues, was that – at the critical Yalta Conference of early 1945 – Roosevelt succumbed to Stalin’s wiliness by agreeing to the Soviet Union’s postwar domination of vast portions of central and eastern Europe.
Susan Butler’s excellent work deftly cuts through this fog of misrepresentation by revealing a far richer and more nuanced reality to the relationship between President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin. From studying the correspondence, conversations and meetings between them, she concludes that they had succeeded in forging a vital working partnership, not only in waging war against the Germans, but also in envisioning an effective, postwar world body intended to ward off future conflicts.
Despite the considerable history of mistrust between United States and the Soviet Union, this happened because each man truly needed the other’s assistance. Stalin, for example, knew that the Soviet Union’s survival depended upon two things that only the United States could provide: massive amounts of desperately needed military supplies to assist the Soviet Union’s besieged armed forces, and the initiation of a second front on Germany’s west. For his part, Roosevelt needed the Soviet Union to remain in the war and also play a vital postwar role in maintaining the peace. He believed that World War II would permanently alter the power realities throughout greater Eurasia, allowing both the Soviet Union and China to assume critical leadership roles.
The complicating role of British Prime Minister Churchill
The path towards forging this partnership was rocky, however. Not only did they have to overcome their reservations about each other, but they also had to deal with another key player: Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain. Churchill, who deeply disliked and mistrusted the Russians, not only was intent upon preserving the British Empire (a goal not shared by Roosevelt), but also sought to restrict Soviet power in the postwar world.
By the time Stalin and Roosevelt first met, the president had been working closely with Churchill for several years. With England desperately resisting repeated German bombing raids – isolated and alone after Germany’s lightning conquest of all of Europe – Churchill requested financial loans and military arms from the United States. Roosevelt, recognizing that England’s survival was necessary if he were to have the time he needed to ready the United States for a war with Germany that he regarded as unavoidable, managed to funnel military supplies and other needed provisions to her, even though the majority of Congress and the people wanted nothing to do with the war.
A Turning Point
Nonetheless, despite subsequent U.S. assistance, England was in dire shape by 1941 as her cargo ships and fighter planes were being destroyed faster than they could be replaced.
Had Hitler persevered just a little longer, England might well have succumbed. Instead, he made a critical blunder to invade the Soviet Union. In so doing, he not only pushed the Soviet Union and United States into each other’s arms, but also exposed Germany’s western flank to a two-front war. These two factors spelled certain defeat for the Nazis.
Nonetheless, in the early months after invading Russia the Germans seemed unstoppable, inflicting millions of casualties, ravaging crops and fields, and destroying hundreds of villages. In desperation, Stalin appealed to the United States for the material and provisions necessary for the Red Army to fight on. Roosevelt, continuing to face Congressional and public resistance, nonetheless sent many tens of thousands of trucks, jeeps, ships, planes, howitzers, and tanks to Russia, a flow that continued until war’s end.
Winning the War, Creating the Peace
From the beginning, Roosevelt looked beyond the war’s end to the conundrum that his predecessor Wilson failed to solve: ensuring postwar peace. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy during World War I, Roosevelt had sadly watched the unraveling of Woodrow Wilson’s dream for a strong and united League of Nations. It was, he concluded, the U.S. Senate’s failure to ratify the peace treaty that fatally weakened the League. Without the U.S.’s participation, the League had neither the unity of will – nor the necessary power – to deter the rising Japanese and German militarism of the 1930s.
Accordingly, Roosevelt was determined that World War II’s Russian, American and British wartime alliance continue after the war, as it was the only means of preventing the grim pattern of the ‘30s from reoccurring. Further, determined to avoid what he saw as Wilson’s key tactical mistakes, Roosevelt assiduously courted key members of the Senate in order to secure support for his vision of an effective post-war world body. He also shunned the kind of inter-state negotiations, so integral to the maneuverings of the 1919 Versailles Conference, that had forced Wilson into having to support the Allies’ carving up the former Austro-Hungarian, Turkish, and Russian Empires for their own colonial interests.
What were the major issues Stalin and Roosevelt confronted together?
1. Initiating a second front
Stalin, seeking to relieve the German pressure on his troops, consistently pressed for an early invasion of France. Although Roosevelt agreed with him, he required sufficient time to get the required ships, planes, and troops in place, a matter complicated by desperate efforts to rebuild America’s Pacific fleet that had been badly shattered by the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. But Churchill, in his concern over Russia’s postwar ambitions, consistently argued for delaying any invasion, countering that he preferred an attack from the south. Neither Roosevelt nor Stalin agreed with him.
2. Crafting The United Nations:
At first cool to Roosevelt’s conception of a “united nations,” Stalin eventually embraced it, believing that Roosevelt’s proposal that “The Big Four” (the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and China) must continue to work closely together to ensure the maintenance of world peace would not only allow the Soviet Union to survive and thrive, but also to be recognized as a world power. In this kind of world Russia would at last be secure.
3. The future of Germany:
Stalin had two over-riding goals: to keep Germany permanently weakened so it could never again threaten Russia, and to ensure that the states on its western borders were “friendly.”
Roosevelt was in total agreement with him about Germany, but he struggled with Stalin’s vision of a Soviet “sphere of influence.” Roosevelt, however, was also a realist. However much he desired more politically free states throughout Europe, the reality was that Soviet troops – as a consequence of their relentless westward drive toward Germany – already occupied those very lands. He knew that any attempt to expel them out would mean war.
However, from his experience in working with Stalin, Roosevelt was confident that, over time, as the Soviets became more comfortable with its collaborative postwar partnership with the United States, the Soviet Union would come to feel less threatened about allowing an expanded range of political representation along her western borders.
4. The atom bomb:
Because Roosevelt wanted to be certain that the atomic bomb actually worked before divulging information about it to the Allies, he did not tell Stalin about the secret project before his own untimely death (although Stalin knew of it through his extensive spy network).
The collapse of the partnership
Unfortunately, Roosevelt’s death shortly after the Yalta Conference left the decision about the bomb in the hands of his uninformed, and more conservative successor, Vice-President Truman. Personally suspicious of the Russians, Truman heeded the hardline minority of his advisors and concluded that information about the bomb should not be shared. He saw it as a means of “insurance” against future Soviet aggression.
Stalin interpreted this decision as proof that the United States was now turning away from the partnership Roosevelt had forged with him. Other subsequent events – the halting of promised relief supplies to Russia, the “Marshall Plan” for the rebuilding of war-torn countries that was restricted to Western Europe, and the maneuvering to “contain” the Soviet Union – only served to reinforce this conclusion.
The result was the unnecessary Cold War.
Ms. Butler’s fine book reminds us that once we had the kind of leaders who, despite having multiple reasons to suspect and distrust each other, nonetheless decided to reach across the chasm in order to foster mutual understanding, determine important goals held in common, and develop cooperative agreements for implementing them. In this they not only achieved many successes, but also vitalized a vision for a more peaceful world.
May we see a return to those days and such leaders soon!
Portrait of a Partnership
By Susan Butler
Reviewed by Greg Cusack
August 27, 2015
One of the foundational myths of the far Right’s worldview is that the Cold War was a direct result of how an overly trusting president Franklin Roosevelt was thoroughly “taken in” by the Soviet Union’s Marshal Stalin, falsely believing that they had reached an “understanding” for a peaceful postwar world. One fateful consequence of Roosevelt’s delusion, this false narrative continues, was that – at the critical Yalta Conference of early 1945 – Roosevelt succumbed to Stalin’s wiliness by agreeing to the Soviet Union’s postwar domination of vast portions of central and eastern Europe.
Susan Butler’s excellent work deftly cuts through this fog of misrepresentation by revealing a far richer and more nuanced reality to the relationship between President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin. From studying the correspondence, conversations and meetings between them, she concludes that they had succeeded in forging a vital working partnership, not only in waging war against the Germans, but also in envisioning an effective, postwar world body intended to ward off future conflicts.
Despite the considerable history of mistrust between United States and the Soviet Union, this happened because each man truly needed the other’s assistance. Stalin, for example, knew that the Soviet Union’s survival depended upon two things that only the United States could provide: massive amounts of desperately needed military supplies to assist the Soviet Union’s besieged armed forces, and the initiation of a second front on Germany’s west. For his part, Roosevelt needed the Soviet Union to remain in the war and also play a vital postwar role in maintaining the peace. He believed that World War II would permanently alter the power realities throughout greater Eurasia, allowing both the Soviet Union and China to assume critical leadership roles.
The complicating role of British Prime Minister Churchill
The path towards forging this partnership was rocky, however. Not only did they have to overcome their reservations about each other, but they also had to deal with another key player: Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain. Churchill, who deeply disliked and mistrusted the Russians, not only was intent upon preserving the British Empire (a goal not shared by Roosevelt), but also sought to restrict Soviet power in the postwar world.
By the time Stalin and Roosevelt first met, the president had been working closely with Churchill for several years. With England desperately resisting repeated German bombing raids – isolated and alone after Germany’s lightning conquest of all of Europe – Churchill requested financial loans and military arms from the United States. Roosevelt, recognizing that England’s survival was necessary if he were to have the time he needed to ready the United States for a war with Germany that he regarded as unavoidable, managed to funnel military supplies and other needed provisions to her, even though the majority of Congress and the people wanted nothing to do with the war.
A Turning Point
Nonetheless, despite subsequent U.S. assistance, England was in dire shape by 1941 as her cargo ships and fighter planes were being destroyed faster than they could be replaced.
Had Hitler persevered just a little longer, England might well have succumbed. Instead, he made a critical blunder to invade the Soviet Union. In so doing, he not only pushed the Soviet Union and United States into each other’s arms, but also exposed Germany’s western flank to a two-front war. These two factors spelled certain defeat for the Nazis.
Nonetheless, in the early months after invading Russia the Germans seemed unstoppable, inflicting millions of casualties, ravaging crops and fields, and destroying hundreds of villages. In desperation, Stalin appealed to the United States for the material and provisions necessary for the Red Army to fight on. Roosevelt, continuing to face Congressional and public resistance, nonetheless sent many tens of thousands of trucks, jeeps, ships, planes, howitzers, and tanks to Russia, a flow that continued until war’s end.
Winning the War, Creating the Peace
From the beginning, Roosevelt looked beyond the war’s end to the conundrum that his predecessor Wilson failed to solve: ensuring postwar peace. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy during World War I, Roosevelt had sadly watched the unraveling of Woodrow Wilson’s dream for a strong and united League of Nations. It was, he concluded, the U.S. Senate’s failure to ratify the peace treaty that fatally weakened the League. Without the U.S.’s participation, the League had neither the unity of will – nor the necessary power – to deter the rising Japanese and German militarism of the 1930s.
Accordingly, Roosevelt was determined that World War II’s Russian, American and British wartime alliance continue after the war, as it was the only means of preventing the grim pattern of the ‘30s from reoccurring. Further, determined to avoid what he saw as Wilson’s key tactical mistakes, Roosevelt assiduously courted key members of the Senate in order to secure support for his vision of an effective post-war world body. He also shunned the kind of inter-state negotiations, so integral to the maneuverings of the 1919 Versailles Conference, that had forced Wilson into having to support the Allies’ carving up the former Austro-Hungarian, Turkish, and Russian Empires for their own colonial interests.
What were the major issues Stalin and Roosevelt confronted together?
1. Initiating a second front
Stalin, seeking to relieve the German pressure on his troops, consistently pressed for an early invasion of France. Although Roosevelt agreed with him, he required sufficient time to get the required ships, planes, and troops in place, a matter complicated by desperate efforts to rebuild America’s Pacific fleet that had been badly shattered by the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. But Churchill, in his concern over Russia’s postwar ambitions, consistently argued for delaying any invasion, countering that he preferred an attack from the south. Neither Roosevelt nor Stalin agreed with him.
2. Crafting The United Nations:
At first cool to Roosevelt’s conception of a “united nations,” Stalin eventually embraced it, believing that Roosevelt’s proposal that “The Big Four” (the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and China) must continue to work closely together to ensure the maintenance of world peace would not only allow the Soviet Union to survive and thrive, but also to be recognized as a world power. In this kind of world Russia would at last be secure.
3. The future of Germany:
Stalin had two over-riding goals: to keep Germany permanently weakened so it could never again threaten Russia, and to ensure that the states on its western borders were “friendly.”
Roosevelt was in total agreement with him about Germany, but he struggled with Stalin’s vision of a Soviet “sphere of influence.” Roosevelt, however, was also a realist. However much he desired more politically free states throughout Europe, the reality was that Soviet troops – as a consequence of their relentless westward drive toward Germany – already occupied those very lands. He knew that any attempt to expel them out would mean war.
However, from his experience in working with Stalin, Roosevelt was confident that, over time, as the Soviets became more comfortable with its collaborative postwar partnership with the United States, the Soviet Union would come to feel less threatened about allowing an expanded range of political representation along her western borders.
4. The atom bomb:
Because Roosevelt wanted to be certain that the atomic bomb actually worked before divulging information about it to the Allies, he did not tell Stalin about the secret project before his own untimely death (although Stalin knew of it through his extensive spy network).
The collapse of the partnership
Unfortunately, Roosevelt’s death shortly after the Yalta Conference left the decision about the bomb in the hands of his uninformed, and more conservative successor, Vice-President Truman. Personally suspicious of the Russians, Truman heeded the hardline minority of his advisors and concluded that information about the bomb should not be shared. He saw it as a means of “insurance” against future Soviet aggression.
Stalin interpreted this decision as proof that the United States was now turning away from the partnership Roosevelt had forged with him. Other subsequent events – the halting of promised relief supplies to Russia, the “Marshall Plan” for the rebuilding of war-torn countries that was restricted to Western Europe, and the maneuvering to “contain” the Soviet Union – only served to reinforce this conclusion.
The result was the unnecessary Cold War.
Ms. Butler’s fine book reminds us that once we had the kind of leaders who, despite having multiple reasons to suspect and distrust each other, nonetheless decided to reach across the chasm in order to foster mutual understanding, determine important goals held in common, and develop cooperative agreements for implementing them. In this they not only achieved many successes, but also vitalized a vision for a more peaceful world.
May we see a return to those days and such leaders soon!
January 11, 2018
Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it. Those who do not remember their past are condemned to repeat their mistakes. Those who do not read history are doomed to repeat it. Those who fail to learn from the mistakes of their predecessors are destined to repeat them. - George Santayana.
The relationship of the US and Russia is much in the news today. Many of us grew up during the Cold War, most of us have lived during the time of the United Nations (UN). So, you, as did I, learned during US History class that the United Nations was started after World War II, and that Roosevelt met with Stalin at Yalta to divide up the world after the war, and that Truman met with Stalin after Germany surrendered to divide up Germany. All true, but such a limited part of the story of the relationship of Roosevelt and Stalin, the US and the USSR. It turns out that Roosevelt was convinced that (a) without Russia fighting the Nazis that Hitler was unbeatable, (b) that the best way to corral the USSR after the war was to recognize it's strength and to invite it to play a large role in his plans for the United Nations that he hoped would prevent war for a generation or two, (c) the best way to get cooperation from Stalin was to earn his trust so that tough, frank negotiations could take place. Roosevelt was attempting to build a functioning United Nations even before Germany invaded Czechoslovakia and Poland. In fact Roosevelt was very successful in this endeavor.
But, despite Truman's desire to follow through on Roosevelt's policies for peace, he was suspicious of Stalin, the USSR, and Communism and he surrounded himself with a cabinet that was even more so. This lack of trust lead to a renewal of suspicion on the part of Stalin and the USSR. Thus, the Cold War was started.
Is it so wrong for President Trump to want to build better relations with Russia? No. But, I think that Trump is as avaricious as Putin is, I am afraid that his motive for improving relationships with Russia to to enhance his own fortunes. Trump has offered as a foreign policy that rejects cooperation for mutual benefit and asks that other countries either comply with US wishes or we will hurt them financially. Roosevelt saw colonialism,oligarchy, and tyranny as those forces that lead to social upheaval and sought ways to allow the peoples of the nations of our world to achieve freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want and freedom from fear.
The relationship of the US and Russia is much in the news today. Many of us grew up during the Cold War, most of us have lived during the time of the United Nations (UN). So, you, as did I, learned during US History class that the United Nations was started after World War II, and that Roosevelt met with Stalin at Yalta to divide up the world after the war, and that Truman met with Stalin after Germany surrendered to divide up Germany. All true, but such a limited part of the story of the relationship of Roosevelt and Stalin, the US and the USSR. It turns out that Roosevelt was convinced that (a) without Russia fighting the Nazis that Hitler was unbeatable, (b) that the best way to corral the USSR after the war was to recognize it's strength and to invite it to play a large role in his plans for the United Nations that he hoped would prevent war for a generation or two, (c) the best way to get cooperation from Stalin was to earn his trust so that tough, frank negotiations could take place. Roosevelt was attempting to build a functioning United Nations even before Germany invaded Czechoslovakia and Poland. In fact Roosevelt was very successful in this endeavor.
But, despite Truman's desire to follow through on Roosevelt's policies for peace, he was suspicious of Stalin, the USSR, and Communism and he surrounded himself with a cabinet that was even more so. This lack of trust lead to a renewal of suspicion on the part of Stalin and the USSR. Thus, the Cold War was started.
Is it so wrong for President Trump to want to build better relations with Russia? No. But, I think that Trump is as avaricious as Putin is, I am afraid that his motive for improving relationships with Russia to to enhance his own fortunes. Trump has offered as a foreign policy that rejects cooperation for mutual benefit and asks that other countries either comply with US wishes or we will hurt them financially. Roosevelt saw colonialism,oligarchy, and tyranny as those forces that lead to social upheaval and sought ways to allow the peoples of the nations of our world to achieve freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want and freedom from fear.
February 7, 2018
Academic Susan Butler’s Roosevelt and Stalin: Portrait of a Partnership is dense, covering a lot of historical background on how the Allies worked together and prevailed in WWII, the groundwork laid for the United Nations, and the origins of the Cold War and how it possibly could have been avoided had FDR lived another year or longer. But it’s also a compelling read – I often had trouble putting it down and often found myself wanting to quickly pick it back up to find out what came next.
The overriding theme of the book is Roosevelt’s deliberate and painstaking efforts to win Stalin’s trust in order to not only achieve victory in the war but to implement his vision of a post-war world order in which the UN would mediate international conflicts to prevent war and eventually facilitate disarmament.
Roosevelt was under no illusions that Stalin or the Soviet Union would become the U.S.’s friends, but that the world’s other emerging superpower needed incentive to cooperate with his post-war vision in which all nations could be reined in.
In order to achieve his goals, however, FDR would have to navigate a potential minefield of distrust between Britain and Russia as historic imperial rivals, as well as the personal dislike between their leaders. FDR was confident in his ability to serve as a mediator between the two and his confidence turned out to be well-placed.
According to observers, FDR was by turns charming, audacious and used subterfuge in order to gain Stalin’s trust and keep Churchill at bay:
“FDR was a master manipulator of people. He instinctively knew how to keep Stalin and Churchill working together…Roosevelt was brilliant at sizing people up. He could intuit other people’s views of reality and appeal to them. He could lay out a path that made sense from where other people stood; in the process of understanding, he could lead them forward to accept his goals as theirs.” (p. 324)
Continue reading this review here:
http://natyliesbaldwin.com/2018/02/re...
The overriding theme of the book is Roosevelt’s deliberate and painstaking efforts to win Stalin’s trust in order to not only achieve victory in the war but to implement his vision of a post-war world order in which the UN would mediate international conflicts to prevent war and eventually facilitate disarmament.
Roosevelt was under no illusions that Stalin or the Soviet Union would become the U.S.’s friends, but that the world’s other emerging superpower needed incentive to cooperate with his post-war vision in which all nations could be reined in.
In order to achieve his goals, however, FDR would have to navigate a potential minefield of distrust between Britain and Russia as historic imperial rivals, as well as the personal dislike between their leaders. FDR was confident in his ability to serve as a mediator between the two and his confidence turned out to be well-placed.
According to observers, FDR was by turns charming, audacious and used subterfuge in order to gain Stalin’s trust and keep Churchill at bay:
“FDR was a master manipulator of people. He instinctively knew how to keep Stalin and Churchill working together…Roosevelt was brilliant at sizing people up. He could intuit other people’s views of reality and appeal to them. He could lay out a path that made sense from where other people stood; in the process of understanding, he could lead them forward to accept his goals as theirs.” (p. 324)
Continue reading this review here:
http://natyliesbaldwin.com/2018/02/re...
March 12, 2022
It's hard for me to know how to rate this book. On the one hand, there's some excellent scholarship. Butler has really dug in to primary sources to bring a new, more detailed understanding of the interactions between FDR and Stalin.
On the other hand, the pro-Stalin bias is so overwhelming that by the end of the book it felt hard to trust her analysis. Throughout the book she excuses or justifies any wrongdoing on Stalin's behalf as if he was a perfectly normal, reasonable leader who should be lauded for helping to defeat the Nazis. She suggests that the Russian Army's behavior as it conquered Eastern Europe was only to be expected and that FDR tacitly endorsed it (she does not actually mention the mass violence and rape).
She argues that Stalin trusted the US until FDR died and Truman withheld information about the atomic bomb, as if she wasn't aware that she was talking about a man so paranoid that he murdered 750,000 people in the 1930s in the Great Purge. While she went on for several pages about Churchill's policy that caused a famine in Bengal -- revealing a vitriolic attitude towards Churchill that she never displayed for Stalin -- she briefly mentioned the Holodomor in an aside so small it didn't make it into the index and felt like an editor made her stick it in there.
After spilling a lot of ink on the negotiations over the future of Poland, Butler entirely omits how the story ends, making it seem like Poland was on a path to free and fair elections as promised at Yalta. While it's certainly interesting to see such a detailed account of the relationship between FDR and Stalin, any analysis of WWII that makes Churchill a deeply evil imperialist and Stalin a thoroughly rational savior who was ultimately betrayed by Harry Truman is hard to take too seriously.
On the other hand, the pro-Stalin bias is so overwhelming that by the end of the book it felt hard to trust her analysis. Throughout the book she excuses or justifies any wrongdoing on Stalin's behalf as if he was a perfectly normal, reasonable leader who should be lauded for helping to defeat the Nazis. She suggests that the Russian Army's behavior as it conquered Eastern Europe was only to be expected and that FDR tacitly endorsed it (she does not actually mention the mass violence and rape).
She argues that Stalin trusted the US until FDR died and Truman withheld information about the atomic bomb, as if she wasn't aware that she was talking about a man so paranoid that he murdered 750,000 people in the 1930s in the Great Purge. While she went on for several pages about Churchill's policy that caused a famine in Bengal -- revealing a vitriolic attitude towards Churchill that she never displayed for Stalin -- she briefly mentioned the Holodomor in an aside so small it didn't make it into the index and felt like an editor made her stick it in there.
After spilling a lot of ink on the negotiations over the future of Poland, Butler entirely omits how the story ends, making it seem like Poland was on a path to free and fair elections as promised at Yalta. While it's certainly interesting to see such a detailed account of the relationship between FDR and Stalin, any analysis of WWII that makes Churchill a deeply evil imperialist and Stalin a thoroughly rational savior who was ultimately betrayed by Harry Truman is hard to take too seriously.
March 24, 2018
This book goes through periods of being very interesting and being an overwhelming amount of minutiae that do not add to the central story. The central story has gotten lost to me a few times because of the, literal, blow by blow of the narrative.
I take some issue with the author's sanitization of Stalin. She argues that FDR knew all about how Stalin was a dictator who committed atrocities--and validity points out that Churchill committed just as many atrocities towards those he considered inferior (basically anyone who wasn't white)--but that acknowledgement is juxtaposed with stories of toasts, friendly letters, how much respect Stalin had for FDR and how accommodating FDR was to Stalin. It makes it hard to believe that FDR knew, or cared, about what Stalin was doing to people. Obviously, there is some realpolitik involved: FDR knew he needed Stalin at the table after the war. But there are several instances where she belittles the members of FDR's administration who wanted to push Stalin on human rights issues which makes her attitude seem to be that Stalin's atrocities were a necessary evil in history that were not justifiably judged at the time to further post-war peace. That conclusion bothers me.
I take some issue with the author's sanitization of Stalin. She argues that FDR knew all about how Stalin was a dictator who committed atrocities--and validity points out that Churchill committed just as many atrocities towards those he considered inferior (basically anyone who wasn't white)--but that acknowledgement is juxtaposed with stories of toasts, friendly letters, how much respect Stalin had for FDR and how accommodating FDR was to Stalin. It makes it hard to believe that FDR knew, or cared, about what Stalin was doing to people. Obviously, there is some realpolitik involved: FDR knew he needed Stalin at the table after the war. But there are several instances where she belittles the members of FDR's administration who wanted to push Stalin on human rights issues which makes her attitude seem to be that Stalin's atrocities were a necessary evil in history that were not justifiably judged at the time to further post-war peace. That conclusion bothers me.
July 28, 2026
I share in the author's underlying belief that their relationship was magical* but do think the accounts of theirs and their administrations' every move (exhaustive (good and bad)), especially after Tehran, was made as if through telepathic agreement.
Shelving this 300 ish pages in because it's too much and too little lmfao also Potsdam coming up isn't going to make it any more enjoyable to read.
One star because it's always nice to read about a bond strengthened if not forged in a shared disdain for the British third, and another for shouting out (several times, too) the Filipino staff FDR brought with him everywhere.
*review is written in 2026
Shelving this 300 ish pages in because it's too much and too little lmfao also Potsdam coming up isn't going to make it any more enjoyable to read.
One star because it's always nice to read about a bond strengthened if not forged in a shared disdain for the British third, and another for shouting out (several times, too) the Filipino staff FDR brought with him everywhere.
*review is written in 2026
March 9, 2022
A perspective altering book that gets you behind the scenes on the tense negotiations that brought about the post-WW2 world. Roosevelt comes across as admirable and pragmatic as he forms a productive relationship with Stalin that was deeper and more nuanced than we've often been led to believe. Reading this will make you regret that Roosevelt died so early and wonder what the post-war reality might have been if he had survived. Would a Cold War have occurred or would the relationship between Roosevelt and Stalin have taken a radically different form?
December 5, 2024
Great information, very thought-provoking about one of the most well-known and controversial figures of history. Great story-telling, but so many poorly-written sentences: run-ons, confusingly little punctuation (using only commas when splitting a sentence up with commas, semicolons, and hyphens would make things clearer). Glad I read it overall.
September 25, 2018
A fascinating thing to read Roosevelt and Stalin's correspondence and views of their respective national systems. Many questions came to my mind wondering how history might of been different if FDR had lived a longer life.
October 31, 2023
An Excellent book on the unique World War II Alliance
Susan Butler does a brilliant job of covering the unique relationship and alliance that FDR forged with Churchill and, especially, Stalin.
Susan Butler does a brilliant job of covering the unique relationship and alliance that FDR forged with Churchill and, especially, Stalin.
July 2, 2024
Fascinating concept spoiled by simplistic, occasionally hagiographic analysis. Stalin gets treated with kid gloves. Also what's with the repeated references to atomic fusion, when fission was the technology du jour?
August 3, 2018
Long, but vert interesting outling aan exceptional relationship
February 17, 2018
very good book
February 15, 2024
The book is filled with interesting tidbits and is at its best when it is covering the back-in-forth of the Big Three Conferences at Tehran and Yalta. That’s about the only positives.
Butler really likes Stalin and really wants you to like him too. This is so evident throughout the book where she goes out of the way to barely acknowledge the Great Purge and the Ukrainian genocide. She paints FDR as some master manipulator who felt like he “got to Stalin” but fails fails to grasp the fact that Stalin was playing the role of jovial “Uncle Joe” to manipulate FDR, and boy did he ever. She goes on to condone Stalin’s justification of the Katyn Massacre 1939 invasion of Poland (which barely gets a mention) and eventual takeover of Poland as an acceptable outcome because pre-war Poland, was “pro-Nazi”. She conveniently ignores the fact that Poland was more or less trying to survive diplomatically against a hostile and expansionist power on its border. Butler also seems to have an axe to grind against Winston Churchill, somehow implying that he’s worse than Stalin because he was early 20th century racist. British policies in Burma were unfortunate, but in no way does it make Churchill somehow as bad or worse than Stalin. She also pins the start of the Cold War and break down on the relationship with the Soviet Union on Truman, which couldn’t be farther from the truth. Butler seems to lack a background in anything outside the Stalin and FDR relationship.
Not worth the time.
Butler really likes Stalin and really wants you to like him too. This is so evident throughout the book where she goes out of the way to barely acknowledge the Great Purge and the Ukrainian genocide. She paints FDR as some master manipulator who felt like he “got to Stalin” but fails fails to grasp the fact that Stalin was playing the role of jovial “Uncle Joe” to manipulate FDR, and boy did he ever. She goes on to condone Stalin’s justification of the Katyn Massacre 1939 invasion of Poland (which barely gets a mention) and eventual takeover of Poland as an acceptable outcome because pre-war Poland, was “pro-Nazi”. She conveniently ignores the fact that Poland was more or less trying to survive diplomatically against a hostile and expansionist power on its border. Butler also seems to have an axe to grind against Winston Churchill, somehow implying that he’s worse than Stalin because he was early 20th century racist. British policies in Burma were unfortunate, but in no way does it make Churchill somehow as bad or worse than Stalin. She also pins the start of the Cold War and break down on the relationship with the Soviet Union on Truman, which couldn’t be farther from the truth. Butler seems to lack a background in anything outside the Stalin and FDR relationship.
Not worth the time.
September 30, 2016
Roosevelt and Stalin: Portrait of a Partnership is a disappointing examination of the actions between the two most powerful men in the 20th Century.
Butler's work is well-written, well-researched, and is a thorough examination of the actions of Roosevelt and Stalin throughout their active adult lives. Unfortunately, the book is slightly misleading as the portrait (over 600 pages!) is a examination of the two's actions that is largely separate and where they end up coinciding.
The most arguably disappointing part of Portrait of a Partnership is Butler falling into the trap of bringing down FDR's partnership with Churchill in order to heighten his one with Stalin. Churchill comes off as a crude, racist, and all around boar throughout the book while good ol "Uncle Joe" is seen as a clever foil to the dumb British oaf. Butler simultaneously entertains the notions that there are different dimensions to the Roosevelt/Churchill partnership but not so with the Roosevelt/Stalin partnership.
Butler also arguably gives Stalin too much credit, particularly with FDR's influence on the man. Furthermore, all but completely blaming the Allies (Truman & Churchill) for the destruction of the Post WWII Allies partnership is a shockingly almost naive view considering the amount of research that has been done for this book.
The book's mileage may vary ultimately based on what you draw from Butler's conclusions. Unfortunately, the book doesn't get very far for me.
Butler's work is well-written, well-researched, and is a thorough examination of the actions of Roosevelt and Stalin throughout their active adult lives. Unfortunately, the book is slightly misleading as the portrait (over 600 pages!) is a examination of the two's actions that is largely separate and where they end up coinciding.
The most arguably disappointing part of Portrait of a Partnership is Butler falling into the trap of bringing down FDR's partnership with Churchill in order to heighten his one with Stalin. Churchill comes off as a crude, racist, and all around boar throughout the book while good ol "Uncle Joe" is seen as a clever foil to the dumb British oaf. Butler simultaneously entertains the notions that there are different dimensions to the Roosevelt/Churchill partnership but not so with the Roosevelt/Stalin partnership.
Butler also arguably gives Stalin too much credit, particularly with FDR's influence on the man. Furthermore, all but completely blaming the Allies (Truman & Churchill) for the destruction of the Post WWII Allies partnership is a shockingly almost naive view considering the amount of research that has been done for this book.
The book's mileage may vary ultimately based on what you draw from Butler's conclusions. Unfortunately, the book doesn't get very far for me.
Read
November 29, 2023In this book author Butler equates the atrocities of Churchill with those of Stalin: both men had instigated famines that killed thousands. Among the 3 leaders at Tehran and Yalta, FDR was the most savy, winning over Stalins trust. FDRs primary goal was to establish a second League of Nations to prevent future wars. He succeeded. He was hugely popular in the wartorn USSR. Noteworthy, also, is the fact that the day of the Nagasaki bombing, the USSR unleashed 1 million soldiers to battle the Japanese in Manchuria.
May 27, 2017
Glowing review of Roosevelt and Stalin; Churchill, not so much. I've always read that in small groups Stalin was a pretty nice guy. Roosevelt, the consummate politician, known and respected by just about all the rest of the world; the author is a bit effusive in her praise. Another reviewer calls her "naive." I don't think that's it, she did the book on Roosevelt/Stalin letters, but it sums it up.
Lots of details that were new to me. Reads well. Recommended, understanding there is some bias.
Lots of details that were new to me. Reads well. Recommended, understanding there is some bias.
March 29, 2015
What a powerful book- though I only gave it a 4 star because sometimes the author got bogged down in details that slowed the book down. I had always thought that Roosevelt and Churchill saw eye to eye when instead they did not. Roosevelt really was the consummate politician indeed. Not sure if Stalin deserved the whitewash he gets in this book but certainly he deserves a re evaluation .
January 15, 2016
Excellent book! Covering from 1943 to the end of WWII, the author emphasizes Roosevelt's desire to bring Stalin and the USSR into the community of nations, and his strong desire since 1939 to create the United Nations. Different take on history than we were taught in school. It makes you wonder how different the world may have been had Roosevelt not died when he did. Strongly recommend.
December 28, 2021
A hagiography of Roosevelt, and pretty much ignoring that Stalin probably manipulated Roosevelt more and took advantage of Roosevelt's misguided trust of the wily and evil Stalin. Stalin did murder 20,000,000 of his countrymen.
Currently Reading
April 20, 2015great so far
Displaying 1 - 29 of 29 reviews