What do you think?
Rate this book
Enemy in the East: Hitler's Secret Plans to Invade the Soviet Union
Operation Barbarossa, Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, led to one of the most brutal campaigns of World War II: of the estimated 70 million people who died in the war, over 30 million died on the Eastern Front. Although it has previously been argued that the campaign was a pre-emptive strike, in fact, Hitler had been planning a war of intervention against the USSR ever since he came to power in 1933. Using previously unseen sources, acclaimed military historian Rolf-Dieter Müller shows that Hitler and the Wehrmacht had begun to negotiate with Poland and had even considered an alliance with Japan soon after taking power. Despite the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, at the declaration of war in September 1939, military engagement with the Red Army was still a very real and imminent possibility. In Enemy in the East, Müller takes us behind the scenes of the Wehrmacht High Command, providing a fascinating insight into a lesser known story of World War II.
336 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2012
10 people are currently reading
127 people want to read
About the author
Rolf-Dieter Müller
23 books3 followersRolf-Dieter Müller is a German military historian and political scientist, who has served as Scientific Director of the German Armed Forces Military History Research Office since 1999. Rolf-Dieter Müller is also a former professor of military history at Humboldt University.
Müller, in cooperation with German journalist Rudibert Kunz, is known for being the first historian to write about the use of chemical weapons in the Rif War in a 1990 book titled Giftgas Gegen Abd El Krim: Deutschland, Spanien und der Gaskrieg in Spanisch-Marokko, 1922-1927.
Müller was one of the lead researchers on the seminal work Germany and the Second World War.
Müller, in cooperation with German journalist Rudibert Kunz, is known for being the first historian to write about the use of chemical weapons in the Rif War in a 1990 book titled Giftgas Gegen Abd El Krim: Deutschland, Spanien und der Gaskrieg in Spanisch-Marokko, 1922-1927.
Müller was one of the lead researchers on the seminal work Germany and the Second World War.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
January 18, 2015
Comprehensive account that convincingly punctures some previously held assumptions around the plans for the German-Soviet war.
Rolf-Dieter Müller convincingly explains that Hitler’s 1940 decision to invade the Soviet Union was not the first time a plan had been compiled by the German High Command, but that plans had been formed going back to the early 1930s even before the Nazis came to power.
Although Jodl and Keitel paid the ultimate price at the Nuremberg Trials Müller argues that the likes of Halder and Warlimont were just as guilty, but managed to cover their tracks better.
More surprisingly the early plans had always assumed that Poland was an ally or at the very least neutral and that the campaigns would have been two pincer movements from East Prussia via the Baltic states into Northern Russia and from Rumania and Slovakia into the Ukraine.
The author describes how Hitler and the Nazis held Pilsudski, the Polish leader until 1935, in very high regard and saw Poland as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. High level diplomacy from Germany tried to convince Poland to join the Anti-Comintern Pact along with Japan and Italy.
The surprising and shocking nugget of information that underlines the closeness of Poland and Germany prior to May 1939 was that the Polish Ambassador to Germany Jozef Lipski was actively talking to the Nazis about a joint effort to exile the Polish and German Jews to Africa.
In January 1939 Hitler tried to form a military alliance with Poland, but the relationship broke down over Danzig and the Polish corridor, forcing Poland towards Britain and setting in train the German invasion of September that year. However if agreement had been reached Barbarossa or it’s 1939 equivalent could have started off with both Polish and German armies participating and with the Baltic states as yet unoccupied by the Soviet Union.
Rolf-Dieter Müller has created a book that anyone interested in the Eastern Front should add to their bookshelves.
Rolf-Dieter Müller convincingly explains that Hitler’s 1940 decision to invade the Soviet Union was not the first time a plan had been compiled by the German High Command, but that plans had been formed going back to the early 1930s even before the Nazis came to power.
Although Jodl and Keitel paid the ultimate price at the Nuremberg Trials Müller argues that the likes of Halder and Warlimont were just as guilty, but managed to cover their tracks better.
More surprisingly the early plans had always assumed that Poland was an ally or at the very least neutral and that the campaigns would have been two pincer movements from East Prussia via the Baltic states into Northern Russia and from Rumania and Slovakia into the Ukraine.
The author describes how Hitler and the Nazis held Pilsudski, the Polish leader until 1935, in very high regard and saw Poland as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. High level diplomacy from Germany tried to convince Poland to join the Anti-Comintern Pact along with Japan and Italy.
The surprising and shocking nugget of information that underlines the closeness of Poland and Germany prior to May 1939 was that the Polish Ambassador to Germany Jozef Lipski was actively talking to the Nazis about a joint effort to exile the Polish and German Jews to Africa.
In January 1939 Hitler tried to form a military alliance with Poland, but the relationship broke down over Danzig and the Polish corridor, forcing Poland towards Britain and setting in train the German invasion of September that year. However if agreement had been reached Barbarossa or it’s 1939 equivalent could have started off with both Polish and German armies participating and with the Baltic states as yet unoccupied by the Soviet Union.
Rolf-Dieter Müller has created a book that anyone interested in the Eastern Front should add to their bookshelves.
January 31, 2015
This book is a fascinating insight that sheds light on Hitler’s war plans and brings us behind the scenes of the Wehrmacht High Command strategy to attack the Soviet Union from the very start of World War 11 and the risky move that was “Operation Barbarossa”. “Enemy in the East” is a wealth of research into newly and forgotten documents discovered in archives and notes taken from speeches recorded during meetings Hitler had with his military strategists. At the end of the book we have a list of handy references and foot notes at bottom of pages when need be.
The plan to invade the Soviet Union was in the making long before the Nazis came to power. The author brings us back to the 1800’s and to the early 1900’s with an overview of events that took place and have influenced the “Powers that be” later on. Hitler had planned a war of intervention against the USSR long before he seized power and declared the Nazi Party the only legal political party in Germany. We have surprising information how Hitler manipulated neighboring countries into alliance and used them as bulwark against the Soviet Union.
There is a lot said in this book that I will not touch here that is most interesting and educational. To facilitate our orientation since some countries have changed names and borders since, the author has included useful maps to orient us through the maze. I was happy to have them as reference it helped immensely to understand the strategy and the movement of troops along the different corridors.
In short, the author has written a concise yet a very comprehensive analysis of the military mind-set and what motivated them to carry the Crusade against Bolshevism and the subsequent atrocities that occurred.
If you are interested in the Eastern Front War, “Enemy in the East”, is an excellent addition to any library.
My thanks to NetGalley and to the publisher I.B. Tauris for the opportunity to read an advance copy of this book.
The plan to invade the Soviet Union was in the making long before the Nazis came to power. The author brings us back to the 1800’s and to the early 1900’s with an overview of events that took place and have influenced the “Powers that be” later on. Hitler had planned a war of intervention against the USSR long before he seized power and declared the Nazi Party the only legal political party in Germany. We have surprising information how Hitler manipulated neighboring countries into alliance and used them as bulwark against the Soviet Union.
There is a lot said in this book that I will not touch here that is most interesting and educational. To facilitate our orientation since some countries have changed names and borders since, the author has included useful maps to orient us through the maze. I was happy to have them as reference it helped immensely to understand the strategy and the movement of troops along the different corridors.
In short, the author has written a concise yet a very comprehensive analysis of the military mind-set and what motivated them to carry the Crusade against Bolshevism and the subsequent atrocities that occurred.
If you are interested in the Eastern Front War, “Enemy in the East”, is an excellent addition to any library.
My thanks to NetGalley and to the publisher I.B. Tauris for the opportunity to read an advance copy of this book.
January 29, 2015
‘On 22 June 1941, the German Wehrmacht and its allies began their assault on the USSR.’
Operation Barbarossa, Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, let to one of the most brutal campaigns of World War II. It is estimated that of the 70 million people who died during the war, more than 30 million died on the Eastern Front. In this book, Rolf-Dieter Müller explains that Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union in 1940 was based on earlier plans, some of which had been formed even before the Nazis came to power. The early plans had assumed that Poland would be at least neutral, if not an ally, and that the campaigns would have been two pincer movements: from East Prussia via the Baltic states into Northern Russia, and from Romania and Slovakia into the Ukraine. Professor Müller explains how Hitler and the Nazis held Józef Piłsudski, who led Poland until 1935, in very high regard. They saw Poland as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, and tried to convince Poland to join the Anti-Comintern Pact together with Italy and Japan.
The key questions to be addressed, identified in the introduction to this book, are:
‘When did plans for a war against the USSR emerge and become part of the Third Reich’s military deliberations? What role was played by the relationship with Poland, the ‘anti-Russian trench’? Was Hitler’s turn against Poland in spring 1939 intended to create the basis for a subsequent war in the west or in the east?’
How close were Poland and Germany before May 1939? Professor Müller writes that Józef Lipski, the Polish Ambassador to Germany: ‘.. promised Hitler ‘a nice monument in Warsaw’ if he could find a solution to the ‘Jewish question’.’ Poland and Germany were discussing a joint effort to exile the Jews of Poland and Germany to Africa. In January 1939 Hitler tied to form a military alliance with Poland, but the relationship broke down over Danzig and the Polish Corridor. This pushed Poland towards the ‘ever-greater support offered by the Anglo-Saxon powers’ and set in train the German invasion in September. If agreement had been reached between Poland and Germany in 1939, the 1939 equivalent of Barbarossa could have started with the armies of both countries participating, and with the Baltic States not yet occupied by the Soviet Union.
‘Hitler was deeply convinced in 1939 that conquering the USSR would be a piece of cake and that it would make his Third Reich unassailable for all time. An Operation Barbarossa in 1939 probably would have led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the destruction of Russia.’
In this book, Professor Müller takes us behind the scenes of the Wehrmacht High Command. I think that anyone the history of the Eastern Front would be interested in reading this book.
Rolf-Dieter Müller is a professor of military history at Humboldt University in Berlin and serves as the Scientific Director of the German Armed Forces Military History Research Institute in Potsdam.
Note: My thanks to NetGalley and the publisher I B Tauris for the opportunity to read an advance copy of this book.
Jennifer Cameron-Smith
Operation Barbarossa, Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, let to one of the most brutal campaigns of World War II. It is estimated that of the 70 million people who died during the war, more than 30 million died on the Eastern Front. In this book, Rolf-Dieter Müller explains that Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union in 1940 was based on earlier plans, some of which had been formed even before the Nazis came to power. The early plans had assumed that Poland would be at least neutral, if not an ally, and that the campaigns would have been two pincer movements: from East Prussia via the Baltic states into Northern Russia, and from Romania and Slovakia into the Ukraine. Professor Müller explains how Hitler and the Nazis held Józef Piłsudski, who led Poland until 1935, in very high regard. They saw Poland as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, and tried to convince Poland to join the Anti-Comintern Pact together with Italy and Japan.
The key questions to be addressed, identified in the introduction to this book, are:
‘When did plans for a war against the USSR emerge and become part of the Third Reich’s military deliberations? What role was played by the relationship with Poland, the ‘anti-Russian trench’? Was Hitler’s turn against Poland in spring 1939 intended to create the basis for a subsequent war in the west or in the east?’
How close were Poland and Germany before May 1939? Professor Müller writes that Józef Lipski, the Polish Ambassador to Germany: ‘.. promised Hitler ‘a nice monument in Warsaw’ if he could find a solution to the ‘Jewish question’.’ Poland and Germany were discussing a joint effort to exile the Jews of Poland and Germany to Africa. In January 1939 Hitler tied to form a military alliance with Poland, but the relationship broke down over Danzig and the Polish Corridor. This pushed Poland towards the ‘ever-greater support offered by the Anglo-Saxon powers’ and set in train the German invasion in September. If agreement had been reached between Poland and Germany in 1939, the 1939 equivalent of Barbarossa could have started with the armies of both countries participating, and with the Baltic States not yet occupied by the Soviet Union.
‘Hitler was deeply convinced in 1939 that conquering the USSR would be a piece of cake and that it would make his Third Reich unassailable for all time. An Operation Barbarossa in 1939 probably would have led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the destruction of Russia.’
In this book, Professor Müller takes us behind the scenes of the Wehrmacht High Command. I think that anyone the history of the Eastern Front would be interested in reading this book.
Rolf-Dieter Müller is a professor of military history at Humboldt University in Berlin and serves as the Scientific Director of the German Armed Forces Military History Research Institute in Potsdam.
Note: My thanks to NetGalley and the publisher I B Tauris for the opportunity to read an advance copy of this book.
Jennifer Cameron-Smith
November 8, 2022
Podobno z zasady o zmarłych nie mówi się źle. Jeżeli jednak zmarły był kanalią najwyżego gatunku, a i opinia wśród ogółu nienajlepsza, to czy przypisanie mu kilku grzeszków więcej może bardziej zaszkodzić? Niejeden zbrodniarz wojenny III Rzeszy z tego skorzystał. Wybielając siebie i zrzucając odpowiedzialność za zbrodnie uniknął sprawiedliwości Międzynarodowego Trybunału Wojskowego w Norymberdze. Historyk niemiecki Rolf-Dieter podważył przyjętą w latach 50. i 60. doktrynę historyczną co do udziału i odpowiedzialności za II wojnę światową niektórych prominentnych wojskowych, którzy potem dzięki temu mogli piastować urzędy w administracji publicznej RFN.
Książka w iście ascetycznym stylu przedstawia mało znany aspekt minonej wojny. Polityka zagraniczna Hitlera i próba pozyskania Polski jako sojusznika w walce z bolszewizmem to ciekawy temat, który zajmuje około połowy objętości książki. Reszta to analiza strategicznego i politycznego "geniuszu" wielkiego wodza tysiącletniej Rzeszy. Dla potwierdzenia stawianych tez autor umieszcza sporo materiału źródłowego. Chociaż książka wydaje się obiektywnie omawiać temat bez zbędnych emocji, gdzieniegdzie wkradają się drobne dygresje lub przypuszczenia, które są nieuniknione z racji celowo usuwanych dowodów zbrodni w dokumentach.
Książka w iście ascetycznym stylu przedstawia mało znany aspekt minonej wojny. Polityka zagraniczna Hitlera i próba pozyskania Polski jako sojusznika w walce z bolszewizmem to ciekawy temat, który zajmuje około połowy objętości książki. Reszta to analiza strategicznego i politycznego "geniuszu" wielkiego wodza tysiącletniej Rzeszy. Dla potwierdzenia stawianych tez autor umieszcza sporo materiału źródłowego. Chociaż książka wydaje się obiektywnie omawiać temat bez zbędnych emocji, gdzieniegdzie wkradają się drobne dygresje lub przypuszczenia, które są nieuniknione z racji celowo usuwanych dowodów zbrodni w dokumentach.
June 8, 2023
16/20
March 5, 2015
Rolf Dieter Müller outlines the German plans for the Eastern Front of World War II in Enemy in the East: Hitler’s Secret Plans to Invade the Soviet Union. I loved this book for so many reasons, most notably, because it thoroughly establishes the history leading up to the battle in the East. Müller writes clearly and concisely, masterfully weaving sources together to create a lucid account of the development of Operation Barbarossa.
My one qualm is that Müller’s title does him a great disservice; his book is actually about much more than “Hitler’s Secret Plans.” Instead, Müller notes, “This investigation will examine new, little-know and forgotten sources, and recall historical episodes and contexts that, in counterfactual analysis, call the accepted interpretations of German’s expansion politics into question.” Specifically, Müller convincingly argues that a war in the East was not a new, Hitler-centric idea, rather, as early as WWI Germany was looking to expand into the east. Yet another issue I take with the title is that this wonderful book thoughtfully discusses Poland, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, the Baltic nations, and even Japan. Sorry, Mr. Müller, but I fear that your title is too narrow and may actually hinder the success of this extremely adept book.
To sum up Enemy in the East, I think it’s best to include a large quote from the preface: “This book therefore examines the prelude to Barbarossa [the Nazi name for the advancement into the USSR] as a German-Polish-Russian triangle, while always keeping an eye on Japan as a possible Far Eastern partner in a pincer movement to shatter the Red empire. This will bring in a discussion of just how serious the proposals were for an anti-Russian military alliance under the aegis of the Hitler-Piłsudski pact of 1934 [Germany-Poland], and how Hitler’s eventual turn against Poland developed into a pact with Stalin. Relations between the German and Polish militaries in the 1930’s are still a largely unknown area of historical research. Here we will have to cut our own path.” The “path” Müller takes is exceptionally interesting, compellingly written, and pleasantly concise.
My favorite portion of the book is the discussions of Hitler’s changing relationship with Poland. Based on the information provided in Enemy in the East, Poland struggled to commit to a side, often entertaining alliances with France, Britain and Germany. Polish leadership, particularly Piłsudski, deeply worried about the U.S.S.R. swooping in and gobbling up precious Polish land, pushed Poland into the arms of the Nazis, hoping to avoid a devastating war with the U.S.S.R., which would ultimately lead to the Soviets seizing Eastern Poland. At one point, Germany and Poland opted to avoid discussing the heated area of Danzig, leading to the famous Hitler-Piłsudski Pact of 1934. A joint Polish-German invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938 seemed to solidify a relationship between Poland and German. Shortly thereafter, however, Poland began to fear that their Nazi ally could not be trusted, and looked to Britain for help. In August 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact, which ultimately bided time for Stalin and Hitler to prepare for an all out war against each other. In September 1939, Hitler invaded Poland, which now put the Nazi boarder adjacent to its ultimate enemy, the U.S.S.R.
On June 22, 1941 Hitler finally launched Operation Barbarossa, beginning one of the bloodiest most vicious fronts of WWII. This encounter was foreseeable: Germany strongly disliked Bolshevism and their ties to Jews, and Hitler was convinced that a stronger Germany meant the fulfillment of the goals of the First World War -Lebensraum (“living space”) for Germans to spread out and grow their empire. Ultimately, the war in the East dragged on for years, causing similar problems faced by Napoleon and Kaiser Wilhelm II.
In summation, Müller’s Enemy in the East is an excellent summary of the events leading to Hitler’s war in the East. Müller uses newly release documents, journals, and other relevant primary sources to establish the development of Operation Barbarossa. What this book does not do is discuss the actual war with the USSR, which I believe is a wise choice because covering the events after June 22, 1941 would have required several hundred more pages. I highly recommend this book to readers interested in WWII and the Eastern front, including the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Baltics. Furthermore, Enemy in the East provides the reader with a glimpse into the motives of the Third Reich, specially their desire to destroy Bolshevism and expand into the east.
Tags: WWII, Eastern Front of WWII, USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, Caucasus, Baltics, Japan, Danzig, Nazi, Third Reich, Operation Barbarossa, Military History, Red Army, Stalin, Hitler, Piłsudski,
My one qualm is that Müller’s title does him a great disservice; his book is actually about much more than “Hitler’s Secret Plans.” Instead, Müller notes, “This investigation will examine new, little-know and forgotten sources, and recall historical episodes and contexts that, in counterfactual analysis, call the accepted interpretations of German’s expansion politics into question.” Specifically, Müller convincingly argues that a war in the East was not a new, Hitler-centric idea, rather, as early as WWI Germany was looking to expand into the east. Yet another issue I take with the title is that this wonderful book thoughtfully discusses Poland, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, the Baltic nations, and even Japan. Sorry, Mr. Müller, but I fear that your title is too narrow and may actually hinder the success of this extremely adept book.
To sum up Enemy in the East, I think it’s best to include a large quote from the preface: “This book therefore examines the prelude to Barbarossa [the Nazi name for the advancement into the USSR] as a German-Polish-Russian triangle, while always keeping an eye on Japan as a possible Far Eastern partner in a pincer movement to shatter the Red empire. This will bring in a discussion of just how serious the proposals were for an anti-Russian military alliance under the aegis of the Hitler-Piłsudski pact of 1934 [Germany-Poland], and how Hitler’s eventual turn against Poland developed into a pact with Stalin. Relations between the German and Polish militaries in the 1930’s are still a largely unknown area of historical research. Here we will have to cut our own path.” The “path” Müller takes is exceptionally interesting, compellingly written, and pleasantly concise.
My favorite portion of the book is the discussions of Hitler’s changing relationship with Poland. Based on the information provided in Enemy in the East, Poland struggled to commit to a side, often entertaining alliances with France, Britain and Germany. Polish leadership, particularly Piłsudski, deeply worried about the U.S.S.R. swooping in and gobbling up precious Polish land, pushed Poland into the arms of the Nazis, hoping to avoid a devastating war with the U.S.S.R., which would ultimately lead to the Soviets seizing Eastern Poland. At one point, Germany and Poland opted to avoid discussing the heated area of Danzig, leading to the famous Hitler-Piłsudski Pact of 1934. A joint Polish-German invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938 seemed to solidify a relationship between Poland and German. Shortly thereafter, however, Poland began to fear that their Nazi ally could not be trusted, and looked to Britain for help. In August 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact, which ultimately bided time for Stalin and Hitler to prepare for an all out war against each other. In September 1939, Hitler invaded Poland, which now put the Nazi boarder adjacent to its ultimate enemy, the U.S.S.R.
On June 22, 1941 Hitler finally launched Operation Barbarossa, beginning one of the bloodiest most vicious fronts of WWII. This encounter was foreseeable: Germany strongly disliked Bolshevism and their ties to Jews, and Hitler was convinced that a stronger Germany meant the fulfillment of the goals of the First World War -Lebensraum (“living space”) for Germans to spread out and grow their empire. Ultimately, the war in the East dragged on for years, causing similar problems faced by Napoleon and Kaiser Wilhelm II.
In summation, Müller’s Enemy in the East is an excellent summary of the events leading to Hitler’s war in the East. Müller uses newly release documents, journals, and other relevant primary sources to establish the development of Operation Barbarossa. What this book does not do is discuss the actual war with the USSR, which I believe is a wise choice because covering the events after June 22, 1941 would have required several hundred more pages. I highly recommend this book to readers interested in WWII and the Eastern front, including the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Baltics. Furthermore, Enemy in the East provides the reader with a glimpse into the motives of the Third Reich, specially their desire to destroy Bolshevism and expand into the east.
Tags: WWII, Eastern Front of WWII, USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, Caucasus, Baltics, Japan, Danzig, Nazi, Third Reich, Operation Barbarossa, Military History, Red Army, Stalin, Hitler, Piłsudski,
October 12, 2015
This was a solid read. Muller doesn't have much in the way of stylistic flourishes or anecdotes. He's totally matter-of-fact in describing the Germans' decisions that led to Barbarossa. I suppose this is the result of the fact that he's writing in German and then having the book translated into English.
Things I didn't know before reading the book:
1. Hitler assiduously courted Poland as an ally for years. He had good relations with Pilsudski, as did many members of the German military. There was also cultural affinity there. Most importantly, Hitler saw Poland as a vital ally in an anti-Soviet pact. Indeed, if Hitler could have made this relationship work, then the jumping off point for Barbarossa would have been farther east and the Germans would have had fifty Polish divisions added to their order of battle. But because of disagreements over Danzig and the western Ukraine, as well as offers of support from the UK and France, the alliance never happened.
2. The initial German plan was not for total war against the Soviets. Rather, the Wehrmacht had the concept of fighting a decisive battle near the border to knock the Soviets out of the war and force them into a peace agreement that would give the Germans a free hand in the West. The plan shifted when the Germans realized how much they would need to plunder in terms of food and natural resources. And there was incoherence in the German plan between whether they would attack on all three fronts equally or whether they would prioritize a push towards Moscow.
3. The Wehrmacht and SS butted heads over the occupation of Poland, with the former wanting to prioritize ease of transport and a functional economy, while the latter prioritized resettlement/population displacement for racist, ideological reasons.
4. Hitler never had a coherent plan for what he wanted to accomplish. For instance, he ordered a large number of divisions demobilized after the victory over France. It was only after he talked himself into invading the USSR (bolstered by a meeting with Molotov in 1940 that convinced him that the Soviets had designs on chunks of Europe) that production of armaments ramped up again. And even with the change in focus, German industry was still focused on producing airplanes and naval assets, as the assumption was that the campaign in Russia would be quick.
5. Numerous German military figures, such as Halder and Guderian, minimized their roles in planning Barbarossa, choosing to blame everything on Hitler.
Things I didn't know before reading the book:
1. Hitler assiduously courted Poland as an ally for years. He had good relations with Pilsudski, as did many members of the German military. There was also cultural affinity there. Most importantly, Hitler saw Poland as a vital ally in an anti-Soviet pact. Indeed, if Hitler could have made this relationship work, then the jumping off point for Barbarossa would have been farther east and the Germans would have had fifty Polish divisions added to their order of battle. But because of disagreements over Danzig and the western Ukraine, as well as offers of support from the UK and France, the alliance never happened.
2. The initial German plan was not for total war against the Soviets. Rather, the Wehrmacht had the concept of fighting a decisive battle near the border to knock the Soviets out of the war and force them into a peace agreement that would give the Germans a free hand in the West. The plan shifted when the Germans realized how much they would need to plunder in terms of food and natural resources. And there was incoherence in the German plan between whether they would attack on all three fronts equally or whether they would prioritize a push towards Moscow.
3. The Wehrmacht and SS butted heads over the occupation of Poland, with the former wanting to prioritize ease of transport and a functional economy, while the latter prioritized resettlement/population displacement for racist, ideological reasons.
4. Hitler never had a coherent plan for what he wanted to accomplish. For instance, he ordered a large number of divisions demobilized after the victory over France. It was only after he talked himself into invading the USSR (bolstered by a meeting with Molotov in 1940 that convinced him that the Soviets had designs on chunks of Europe) that production of armaments ramped up again. And even with the change in focus, German industry was still focused on producing airplanes and naval assets, as the assumption was that the campaign in Russia would be quick.
5. Numerous German military figures, such as Halder and Guderian, minimized their roles in planning Barbarossa, choosing to blame everything on Hitler.
March 10, 2016
A stunning account of coalition; vacillation, and betrayal, concluding with apocalyptic Operation Barbarossa and the downfall of the Third Reich.
The narrative of the Second World War is littered with turning points. One of the most celebrated is that of Hitler's decision to invade his Soviet ally in 1941, being as it is, largely credited with the downfall of the Reich. The framework within which this decision was made in seems incredulous with hindsight, particularly when framed against the pre-existing the Molotov - Ribbentrop pact and the later backdrop of the failed Adler Tag of 1940.
Why then, would Hitler seek to invade his most-avowed enemy and creditor at a time when, strategically, Hitler was increasingly without allies? If the answer cannot be explained simply by psychosis, where can it be found? The answer to this conundrum is within the machinations of the unstable interwar world.
By using previously unseen records, the author creates an enthralling and dynamic scene of political engagements and negotiations between Germany; Poland, and Japan which sought to create both a bulwark against Bolshevik expansionism, and to provide the foundations for the eventual creation of the Lebensraum which Hitler was desperately seeking.
The politicking of the interwar period and the division of the world into communist and anti-communist spheres was built on a foundation mutual distrust and counter coalition, and the author skilfully reveals the fundamental contradiction within Nazi foreign policy which assumed the unstinting neutrality of it's partners in the face of Hitler's expansionist policies. In a post-war world which was anti communist in it's disposition, it was Hitler's inability to maintain the coalitions which had been sought and built in the interwar period which ultimately led to his nemesis.
Whilst the book doesn't concern itself with Hitler's apparent psychosis; it still paints a vivid and enthralling picture of how the Fuhrers' unrestrained campaign of duplicity, and political miscalculation forged a path leading towards the guaranteed destruction of the Third Reich, as opposed to the bread baskets; oilfields, and Lebensraum in the East that he was searching for.
The narrative of the Second World War is littered with turning points. One of the most celebrated is that of Hitler's decision to invade his Soviet ally in 1941, being as it is, largely credited with the downfall of the Reich. The framework within which this decision was made in seems incredulous with hindsight, particularly when framed against the pre-existing the Molotov - Ribbentrop pact and the later backdrop of the failed Adler Tag of 1940.
Why then, would Hitler seek to invade his most-avowed enemy and creditor at a time when, strategically, Hitler was increasingly without allies? If the answer cannot be explained simply by psychosis, where can it be found? The answer to this conundrum is within the machinations of the unstable interwar world.
By using previously unseen records, the author creates an enthralling and dynamic scene of political engagements and negotiations between Germany; Poland, and Japan which sought to create both a bulwark against Bolshevik expansionism, and to provide the foundations for the eventual creation of the Lebensraum which Hitler was desperately seeking.
The politicking of the interwar period and the division of the world into communist and anti-communist spheres was built on a foundation mutual distrust and counter coalition, and the author skilfully reveals the fundamental contradiction within Nazi foreign policy which assumed the unstinting neutrality of it's partners in the face of Hitler's expansionist policies. In a post-war world which was anti communist in it's disposition, it was Hitler's inability to maintain the coalitions which had been sought and built in the interwar period which ultimately led to his nemesis.
Whilst the book doesn't concern itself with Hitler's apparent psychosis; it still paints a vivid and enthralling picture of how the Fuhrers' unrestrained campaign of duplicity, and political miscalculation forged a path leading towards the guaranteed destruction of the Third Reich, as opposed to the bread baskets; oilfields, and Lebensraum in the East that he was searching for.
April 21, 2015
(I received a free copy of this book from Net Galley in exchange for an honest review.)
Operation Barbarossa, Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, led to one of the most brutal campaigns of World War II: of the estimated 70 million people who died in the war, over 30 million died on the Eastern Front. Although it has previously been argued that the campaign was a pre-emptive strike, in fact, Hitler had been planning a war of intervention against the USSR ever since he came to power in 1933. Using previously unseen sources, acclaimed military historian Rolf-Dieter Müller shows that Hitler and the Wehrmacht had begun to negotiate with Poland and had even considered an alliance with Japan soon after taking power. Despite the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, at the declaration of war in September 1939, military engagement with the Red Army was still a very real and imminent possibility.
Fascinating. That's the first word that comes to mind when describing this book. Fascinating.
I always thought I had a pretty decent knowledge of the causes and effects of WW2 - turns out, that a lot of the stuff that I thought I knew was either very wrong or just wrong enough to change the historical context of what happened.
The author has been able to gain access to a lot of newly released journals, documents and other sources of information to shed new light on the events that led to "Operation Barbarossa" and I found some of these details fascinating (like I said before!)
The best piece of information I learned from this book was the up-and-down relationship between Germany and Poland in the preceding year or so before the outbreak of WW2. At times, Poland looked to Germany for support in case the USSR swept down and plucked them from the face of the earth; other times, Poland looked to Great Britain for help when it felt like Germany couldn't be trusted. It was a topsy-turvy period and, ultimately, Germany decided that it would take what it wanted...
If you have any interest in WW2, this book is a must have for your collection. Lots of new information makes for a very interesting read.
Paul
ARH
Operation Barbarossa, Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, led to one of the most brutal campaigns of World War II: of the estimated 70 million people who died in the war, over 30 million died on the Eastern Front. Although it has previously been argued that the campaign was a pre-emptive strike, in fact, Hitler had been planning a war of intervention against the USSR ever since he came to power in 1933. Using previously unseen sources, acclaimed military historian Rolf-Dieter Müller shows that Hitler and the Wehrmacht had begun to negotiate with Poland and had even considered an alliance with Japan soon after taking power. Despite the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, at the declaration of war in September 1939, military engagement with the Red Army was still a very real and imminent possibility.
Fascinating. That's the first word that comes to mind when describing this book. Fascinating.
I always thought I had a pretty decent knowledge of the causes and effects of WW2 - turns out, that a lot of the stuff that I thought I knew was either very wrong or just wrong enough to change the historical context of what happened.
The author has been able to gain access to a lot of newly released journals, documents and other sources of information to shed new light on the events that led to "Operation Barbarossa" and I found some of these details fascinating (like I said before!)
The best piece of information I learned from this book was the up-and-down relationship between Germany and Poland in the preceding year or so before the outbreak of WW2. At times, Poland looked to Germany for support in case the USSR swept down and plucked them from the face of the earth; other times, Poland looked to Great Britain for help when it felt like Germany couldn't be trusted. It was a topsy-turvy period and, ultimately, Germany decided that it would take what it wanted...
If you have any interest in WW2, this book is a must have for your collection. Lots of new information makes for a very interesting read.
Paul
ARH
March 6, 2016
They have always told it as well: one day the very bad Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union and, unmindful of the example of Napoleon, get stuck in the immense Russian expanses, where he sent his men to die of hunger and cold under the Leningrad bastions. Well, yes, but maybe not. Despite its undeniable madness Hitler was not much different from any leader of his time, a time when the international policy was especially made of adolescence machismo, and the use of apocalyptic language against political or territorial opponents was the norm, and in which speaking of living space to the neighbors expenses was itself the norm.
Besides, who told us about this version of events? One might say 'Caesar's wife', one on which there should not have been suspicious ...
Great historical essay, well documented and very acute, and, above all, very well written.
Thank I.B.Tauris Netgalley and for giving me a free copy in exchange for an honest review.
Ce l'hanno sempre raccontata così: il cattivissimo Hitler un bel giorno ha deciso di attaccare l'Unione Sovietica e, immemore dell'esempio di Napoleone, si è impantanato nelle immense distese russe, dove ha mandato i suoi uomini a morire di fame e freddo sotto i bastioni di Leningrado. Ecco, sì, ma anche no. Nonostante la sua innegabile follia Hitler non era molto diverso da qualsiasi capo di stato del suo tempo, un tempo in cui la politica internazionale era fatta soprattutto di machismo adolescenziale, e usare un linguaggio apocalittico contro gli avversari politici o territoriali era la norma, e nel quale parlare di spazio vitale a spese dei vicini di casa era a sua volta la norma.
E poi, chi ci ha raccontato questa versione degli eventi? Verrebbe da rispondere "la moglie di Cesare", quella sulla quale non ci sarebbero dovuti essere sospetti...
Ottimo saggio storico, documentatissimo e molto acuto, e, soprattutto, scritto benissimo.
Ringrazio I.B.Tauris e Netgalley per avermi fornito una copia gratuita in cambio di una recensione onesta.
Besides, who told us about this version of events? One might say 'Caesar's wife', one on which there should not have been suspicious ...
Great historical essay, well documented and very acute, and, above all, very well written.
Thank I.B.Tauris Netgalley and for giving me a free copy in exchange for an honest review.
Ce l'hanno sempre raccontata così: il cattivissimo Hitler un bel giorno ha deciso di attaccare l'Unione Sovietica e, immemore dell'esempio di Napoleone, si è impantanato nelle immense distese russe, dove ha mandato i suoi uomini a morire di fame e freddo sotto i bastioni di Leningrado. Ecco, sì, ma anche no. Nonostante la sua innegabile follia Hitler non era molto diverso da qualsiasi capo di stato del suo tempo, un tempo in cui la politica internazionale era fatta soprattutto di machismo adolescenziale, e usare un linguaggio apocalittico contro gli avversari politici o territoriali era la norma, e nel quale parlare di spazio vitale a spese dei vicini di casa era a sua volta la norma.
E poi, chi ci ha raccontato questa versione degli eventi? Verrebbe da rispondere "la moglie di Cesare", quella sulla quale non ci sarebbero dovuti essere sospetti...
Ottimo saggio storico, documentatissimo e molto acuto, e, soprattutto, scritto benissimo.
Ringrazio I.B.Tauris e Netgalley per avermi fornito una copia gratuita in cambio di una recensione onesta.
March 26, 2016
Excellent and Revealing History
This is a very well written history of how Operation Barbarossa came to be. It explores Germany's long desire for greater control in the East. (Muller includes a quote from future Chancellor Von Bulow in the 1880s asserting this along with an annotation from Bismarck dissenting).
Most of the action takes place in the thirties. Muller shows that there was far more support for war in the East by the Wehrmacht albeit more traditional in aims than Hitler's war of annihilation. Initially Poland was envisioned as an ally. But they could not be enticed despite efforts by Hitler and Goring. So Poland became a victim. As Hitler asserted himself with greater confidence after France's defeat he envisioned much more brutal treatment of the conquered and the Army High Command went along with this.
There are long sections on the Polish as ally option and on the Army and Navy high commands support of war in the East (and the various plans for it) seen by them as an assertion of Germany right to be a global power. Hitler made it a total war as months prior to the actual invasion he was calling for a brutal war against the Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia and commissariat. And he got it.
Recommended for anyone with an interest in WW2, or in how grand strategy is made, and how delusional assumptions can be.
This is a very well written history of how Operation Barbarossa came to be. It explores Germany's long desire for greater control in the East. (Muller includes a quote from future Chancellor Von Bulow in the 1880s asserting this along with an annotation from Bismarck dissenting).
Most of the action takes place in the thirties. Muller shows that there was far more support for war in the East by the Wehrmacht albeit more traditional in aims than Hitler's war of annihilation. Initially Poland was envisioned as an ally. But they could not be enticed despite efforts by Hitler and Goring. So Poland became a victim. As Hitler asserted himself with greater confidence after France's defeat he envisioned much more brutal treatment of the conquered and the Army High Command went along with this.
There are long sections on the Polish as ally option and on the Army and Navy high commands support of war in the East (and the various plans for it) seen by them as an assertion of Germany right to be a global power. Hitler made it a total war as months prior to the actual invasion he was calling for a brutal war against the Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia and commissariat. And he got it.
Recommended for anyone with an interest in WW2, or in how grand strategy is made, and how delusional assumptions can be.
April 29, 2016
Good book, but not quite as good as I thought it would be. But I did not know about Hitler and Goering's attempts to get Poland to join them in their holy crusade against the USSR. The author covers Army Chief of Staff Franz Halder's influence on the plans and on the war, and wonders why Halder was never tried at Nuremberg for "waging an aggressive war against peaceful nations" when he had as much to do with the war in Europe as anyone.
August 3, 2015
Interesting to know more about an important time in our history.
A rather dry writing style made for a heavy going read.
A rather dry writing style made for a heavy going read.
September 7, 2015
Some gently interesting side theories about the diplomacy and early strategic directions of the Third Reich, but otherwise a fairly banal history of the lead up to the beginning of World War 2.
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews