On 28 June 1914 the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in the Balkans. Five fateful weeks later the Great Powers of Europe were at war.
Much time and ink has been spent ever since trying to identify the 'guilty' person or state responsible, or alternatively attempting to explain the underlying forces that 'inevitably' led to war in 1914. Unsatisfied with these explanations, Gordon Martel now goes back to the contemporary diplomatic, military, and political records to investigate the twists and turns of the crisis afresh, with the aim of establishing just how the catastrophe really unfurled.
What emerges is the story of a terrible, unnecessary tragedy - one that can be understood only by retracing the steps taken by those who went down the road to war. With each passing day, we see how the personalities of leading figures such as Kaiser Wilhelm II, the Emperor Franz Joseph, Tsar Nicholas II, Sir Edward Grey, and Raymond Poincaré were central to the unfolding crisis, how their hopes and fears intersected as events unfolded, and how each new decision produced a response that complicated or escalated matters to the point where they became almost impossible to contain.
Devoting a chapter to each day of the infamous 'July Crisis', this gripping step by step account of the descent to war makes clear just how little the conflict was in fact premeditated, preordained, or even predictable. Almost every day it seemed possible that the crisis could be settled as so many had been over the previous decade; almost every day there was a new suggestion that gave statesmen hope that war could be avoided without abandoning vital interests.
And yet, as the last month of peace ebbed away, the actions and reactions of the Great Powers disastrously escalated the situation. So much so that, by the beginning of August, what might have remained a minor Balkan problem had turned into the cataclysm of the First World War.
Life is not fair. Book reviews are a part of life. Therefore, book reviews are not fair. It is not, after all, the fault of Gordon Martel that I might – might – be suffering a bit from July Crisis fatigue. That his book on the Crisis, The Month that Changed the World felt a little tired and rehashed to me. No, the blame rests with me. It is entirely my fault that the three things that cause me to most neglect my family are: (1) drinking; (2) reading about World War I; and (3) a pleasant, boozy combination of (1) and (2).
Back to my point, such as it is. I pushed through The Month that Changed the World questioning its existence. Yes, when I drink, I get existential. What, I asked myself, did this book do that other World War I books did not already do better? The answer, I grudgingly came to, was “not much.”
This sounds a bit dismissive. If so, it is borne out of disappointment. I had decent expectations for Martel’s tome, mainly because he sold it as a narrative. In his preface, he claimed to eschew the standard goals of seeking the “origins” or “causes” of World War I, and instead to tell the story of a disparate group of men (they were all men) who made a cascading series of decisions that led to catastrophe. Martel seemed to place his emphasis on aspects the narrative art usually associated with novels, rather than history: scene setting; characterizations and personality; atmosphere. The epigraph he chose for this book has nothing to do with the war, but instead is about the art of storytelling. In the end, though, The Month that Changed the World does the same thing that Otte’s July Crisis and McMeekin’s July 1914 did, but not as well. (For different reasons: Otte is more scholarly and detailed; McMeekin is more readable).
The month that changed the world in The Month that Changed the World is July 1914. This was the month of frenzied diplomatic activity between the June 28 assassination of the Austrian heir Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo and the August 4 invasion of Belgium by Germany, which toppled the dominoes of world war.
(Connecting the assassination of an unloved archduke of a crumbling empire in a Balkan backwater to the invasion of a neutral country by a military behemoth within the span of a month is one of the chief joys of World War I study).
There are many books that cover this period, and many of them have the same helpful traits. Martel provides a dramatis personae, to keep track of the many, many participants; a diplomatic lexicon, so that you don’t do something embarrassing, like confuse a casus foederis with a casus belli (which is a typical first-date mistake); and a handful of useless maps. (The uselessness of the maps provided in World War I books is universal. There is something about the war that cannot be neatly captured on the maps provided in your average-sized book).
The heart of this book is a day-by-day recounting of the July Crisis, from Friday, July 24, 1914, to Friday, July 31, 1914. In doing so, Martel does not break any new ground, provide any new insights, or really take a strong stance as to culpability. If you’ve read about the July Crisis before, nothing here feels fresh or new or even prettily repackaged. All the events are there, of course, as familiar to a WWI student as the Stations of the Cross are to a good Christian. But Martel doesn’t really add that something more that he seemed to promise in his preface.
For instance, Martel’s biographical sketches are not nearly as memorable as though composed by Robert Massie or Margaret MacMillan. His set-pieces do not rise to the level of Barbara Tuchman. His conclusions are not as neatly packaged as Sean McMeekin.
But again, like I said before, I bring a certain level of apathy to this book. I’ve over-indulged on the July Crisis, so chalk some of this up to satiation. That said, I read a lot of history, and I know when I’m reading good history. Something just clicks, and pretty soon I’m telling my friends and family all about it, and they’re all ignoring me, and I don’t care, because I’ve cornered them and they have no place to escape.
As I’ve plodded through the writing of this review, trying to shrug off the July Crisis hangover I’m so obviously suffering from, I decided to give The Month that Changed the World four stars, because even though life isn’t fair, and I think it’s a three-star book, I can’t really find anything objectively wrong with it. So instead of being the utterly subjective and inconstant jerk that nature has made me, I’ll accept the Martel’s work for what it is.
The Month that Changed the World is an entirely decent “tweener” entry into daily-expanding reservoir of World War I histories. It is not quite entry level or WWI 101, and certainly does not streamline events. At times, it is even rather expansive. For example, I rather liked Martel’s focus on Austria-Hungary’s refusal to treat with Italy, thereby losing the chance to bring Italy into the war on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary. This oft-overlooked failure is just one more example of Austria-Hungary’s complete and total inability to do anything right in 1914. (It also answers the questions you have probably asked yourself many times: Could I run an Empire? The answer is yes, because you are more qualified than Franz Joseph and the Austria-Hungarian court).
While this is not an entry-level book, I don’t think it’s at the opposite end of the spectrum either. It is not overly sophisticated or complicated, but it is rather dense. Not inaccessible, just dense. There is a natural drama inherent to the July Crisis. It is a suspense thriller starring foreign ministers, ambassadors, and even an under-secretary or two. History has given this particular event a built-in countdown clock. It’s like New Year’s Eve, except that instead of a ball dropping an unfathomably terrible and inexplicable war starts instead. Despite this, Martel’s prose is rather plodding. Now, if I’d read this at a different time, I might have forgiven that. But I didn't. I read this after I read better books, so my reaction to this one is muted.
It gets the four stars because it does what it sets out to do. But if you were to come up to me and ask me to recommend you a book on World War I, this wouldn't make the list.
A good, solid history of the July Crisis. Martel’s book is fairly readable for the most part, although the general reader may find the level of detail tedious and the prose somewhat dry. The story gets so bogged down in detail and trivia that Martel’s core arguments are lost on the reader, at least until the conclusion. The book is more of a specialist work than a work of general history.
The book is very in-depth, with detailed background on all of the major players and issues involved. Martel is heavy on personalities and the political atmosphere. The book is reasonably well paced.
In the prologue, Martel writes that Emperor Franz Josef added “Josef” to his first name to honor his grandfather Josef II. However, Josef had no children and was succeeded by his brother. Also, I’m pretty sure Martel made a few errors regarding the sequence of the meetings between Sazonov and Pourtales on July 26-27, as well as the date of Austria-Hungary’s mobilization. But, in all, a great history of July 1914.
Ironically, when tensions arose between the powers in the decade before 1914 (in 1908 and 1911/12 in particular) their peaceful settlement seemed proof that the system worked, that diplomacy could resolve differences without warfare. Only the division of Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact established a more stable, predictable, and longer-lasting diplomatic system in the last two hundred years.
I am very glad I refreshed my memory on the July Crisis but I find it very hard to add anything meaningful in terms of reviewing this book.
In terms of the main story, the only thing that might be missing is the Russian influence on the Serbia’s reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. My recollection is that the edits to the reply made it less accommodating. Did it changes things practically? Probably not, though for those keeping score on the war guilt factor might find that a few points against the Entente. Martel himself avoids such tallying of collective responsibility, but does not absolve the parties.
Martel does not see the diplomats, politicians and monarchs who feature (a lot) as mere puppets of underlying forces such as militarism, imperialism and secret diplomacy, but nor does he consider them as modern Machiavellis. They each thought they could limit the crisis in differing (and conflicting ways) and there are multiple times where the parties worked at cross-purposes or misread communications/signals. Martel sets out concepts of localization and internationalization in an understandable fashion, which helps the reader understand the goals of the “negotiations”.
In terms of “fresh” commentary, there are a couple of things that stuck in my head. I like how Martel in his prologue approaches the supposed underlying tensions, reversing perceptions to suggest that things were okay. The interlocking international alliances/ententes were good under this narrative. I do feel that parts of How Martel portrays things in the prologue directly clashes with what happens during the July Crisis (fears of Russia, Austria/Italy relations going down the drain), but I do like the change in mindset.
The other useful part of the book was Martel’s explanation of post war historiography of the causes of World War I, how it swung from various blaming countries to blaming underlying forces, and then back again (with a few individuals picked out along the way). The collation of the evidence and attempts by historians to process it was also of interest. It is now hard to separate out conclusions on the causes from the context they arose in, so it is cool to see how that context itself… …uh… …arose.
What we do know is how those in positions of authority made the choices that produced unprecedented suffering and upheaval. The tragic era that followed can be explained only by their hubris, combined with chance and circumstance.
I enjoyed it, so I guess that is what matters in terms of meaning.
The month that preceded the onset of World War I is the subject of this book.
In its comprehensive look at the behind-the-scenes political and diplomatic activity in Europe following the assassination of the Austria-Hungarian regent - Archduke Ferdinand - and his wife - Sophie - on June 28, 1914 by a Serbian nationalist in Sarajevo, Bosnia, it shows not only the barely-patched fissures among the European powers that were centuries-old, but it also shows how much of human nature played a part in the culmination of a global war - World War I - that eventually claimed 9 million soldiers and left more than twice as many civilian and military casualties.
There is much to be learned from this book that about the roots of the uprisings, conflicts and wars that have erupted in Europe since World War I. The fissures, once opened, never healed.
Peace is an illusive smokescreen that awaits only another relatively minor spark (such as the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife, who were shunned by the Austria-Hungarian monarchy and court because Sophie was a commoner) to erupt in another cataclysmic global massacre.
As the European diplomatic and political mechinations of July 1914 are unveiled in this book, so are the human foibles are each of the people - and nations - involved in the process. This war did not have to happen, but, in the end, human nature and our default desires of pride, revenge, and unwillingness to yield to anyone or anything because of appearances' sake, even when its in our or the big picture's favor, it was inevitable.
I liked the beginning and end of this book. I had to slog through the middle; it took me almost a month to finish this book. Gordon Martel's audience is not so much the general public as other historians. He sets the stage well for the month before World War I began, and does a good job of explaining why Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated by Serbian separatists. For the first time, I felt I understood the triggering event of the war. But then Martel goes into excruciating detail about the diplomatic efforts made to avert war during the month of July 1914. Seven countries are heavily involved, and each country has at least one leader, plus foreign ministers and ambassadors. Martel has a list of all the principal characters at the beginning of the book, organized by nation, which helps, but it is very confusing to keep track of who said what to whom unless World War I is your life's work. Martel is trying to prove that the war was the result of individuals' decisions as well as the alliances that divided Europe into different camps in the early 20th century. Foreign ministers and leaders miscalculated what each other would do, mistakes built upon mistakes, and no country wanted to be seen as weak. There's a lot of good information in this book, and it's well-written, but I wouldn't recommend it to the general reader unless you study World War I and are intrigued by diplomatic minutiae.
"The Month that Changed the World" by Gordon Mantel is an excellently researched and well written book about the time leading up to WW1. It gives a detailed background of the key players of the diplomatic chess game leading up to the war, examines the personalities of key players, such as royals and the assassin and describes the political atmosphere in the various countries. With this much insight into the positions of all the parties it addresses the issue of whether the war was a necessity and unavoidable. It sets the scene perfectly to show the developments and moments that were of significance in that months of July 1914. Written with an excellent pace and a powerful sense of urgency this reads easily and is as entertaining and gripping as it is educational and insightful. Highly recommended.
Hard to know how to rate this, not having a benchmark (this being the 1st WW I book I've read). Actually it's about the run-up to WWI, the focus being the more immediate events, although covering - almost by necessity - much of the background to those immediate events. The 1st two chapters (quite long) and the final chapter were quite informative. Almost too much so. The middle - handled on a day by day basis - was just too detailed for me to want to follow. (Not that I couldn't, but to what point? - since I'd forget most of those details anyway). As the last chapter ('The Aftermath') indicates, millions of pages and studies, by governments, many academics, and by interested non-academics, have been written on the causes and suspected culprits; and often the wrong lessons have been learned by governments (ergo WWII - where sometimes governments over-compensated for perceived pre-WWI mistakes).
I was impelled to read up on the origins of WWI, after streaming the movie 'Sarajevo', and wanting to know how historically accurate that movie is. I won't answer that question here. This particular book seemed the most apropos of the choices at my local library.
Several (minor?) points caught my attention: 1) the mobilization of Austria-Hungary was delayed for ~3 weeks due to many of their troops on temporary leave to help with the harvest that summer. Else the war might have begun sooner. 2) The ultimatum from Austria-Hungary to Serbia was deliberately delayed by 1 hour, to ensure that the French President and entourage had left Russia (where they were on a state visit), so that the French ambassador could only act slowly - needing to consult with Paris - and thereby complicating, and delaying any Allied response.
This books is superbly researched (my layman's opinion), and accessible/readable. As the author himself points out, the outcome of the assassination was anything but inevitable, humanity is very flawed (that such outcome could occur), and in truth we will never know what the other possible outcomes might have been (although hard to imagine anything worse).
Whereas Barbara Tuchman's Guns of August focuses on Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality as a main cause of WWI, Martel provides a narrative on the diplomatic machinations of the July Crisis and eschews naming a specific cause for the War. His preface even begins by stating, "This is not another book on the 'origins' of the First World War."
The cast of characters and their various actions can be dizzying, and this tells a much more complex and nuanced story of the outbreak of WWI than Tuchman's work (which isn't to say hers isn't worth reading). The opening chapter "The Killing," which follows Gavrilo Princip and his co-conspirators through the planning and execution of Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassination, is one of the most exciting narrative histories I've read; almost cinematic in its fluidity.
Martel concludes the book with a history of the study of WWI, beginning with a look at attempts by the combatants in the immediate aftermath to shift blame away from themselves. He demonstrates that in the hundred years since the war began (the book was published in 2014), prevailing attitudes about the cause of the war have shifted at different periods of time. This look at the lens of history is fascinating in and of itself.
This is the standard recitation of the run-up to WWI. Its is on the diplomatic aspect. The infamous blank check the Kaiser gave Austria-Hungary is mentioned but it delves much deeper into apparent efforts by all the Great Powers to forestall the war. Whether these were really sincere efforts or blowing smoke is hard to say. In some cases the countries wanted to conceal their preparations for war. But relations between AH and Germany were not as smooth as many histories suggest. Unfortunately, Germany had the leverage to force AH to be more realistic but didn't use it. The long preface about no one saw any need for a war in Europe. I do think the author underplayed that AH was a dysfunctional country with all of the oppressed minorities. It may not have been key for the beginning, but it was clearly important. After reading this book and the dozen or so books, I have read on WWI in recent years, my guilty finger points more at AH than Germany with a lot of blame for Russia.
This book contains a tremendous amount of research on one of the most interesting months in the history of the world. But it is a very dry read. There are other books that tell the story with a much better sense of the suspense and drama that unfolded. It appears that some of the evidence that appears to move at least partial guilt for the war to the United Kingdom, France, and to a lesser extent Germany and Russia are not disclosed. It seems to make the outbreak of war entirely the fault of Austria-Hungary. Even Serbia seems to get a pass, although it certainly a prime mover. Again, this book contains a great deal of information, but it doesn't seem to add anything new, and there are much better books available.
Another excellent analysis on the crisis leading up to World War I. An interesting take on on how personalities of the diplomats and leaders affected the discussions and decisions made that fateful month. Quite enjoyable!
This book describes the diplomatic communications and internal deliberations within the leading European countries in the last month before the outbreak of war. Although nobody wants a greater conflict, all of their acts seem to be driven by the fear of not being taken serious, short-sightedness, intransigence and miscalculation. Especially the last chapter is interesting, where the author looks at the evolvement of the debate about guilt, which already started during the war. His conclusion: hubris, chance and circumstance were the main drivers.
Given we are just a little past 100 yrs since the start of WWI I thought I should this was a great read - we all know the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand started the path to war , but we know little of him and the events that followed - this is a well written and researched book one the timeline of events leading up to August 1914
This book lays open the behind-the-scenes diplomacy that the world never otherwise learns of. Absolutely fascinating and horrifying that so many talented people, committed to avoiding war, could not. WWII occurred after a long, relatively peaceful time; nobody suspected the world could descend into such carnage so quickly. Are we likewise complacent today?