Dr. Murray's book provides a detailed analytical study of the development of the Luftwaffe. The author takes an in-depth look at the "easy war" (1939-40) and the turn toward Russia in Operation Barbarossa. Dr. Murray investigates the war of attrition from 1942 through early 1944 and the reasons for the final demise of the Luftwaffe from April through September 1944.
Williamson "Wick" Murray was an American historian and author. He authored numerous works on history and strategic studies, and served as an editor on other projects extensively. He was professor emeritus of history at Ohio State University from 2012 until his death.
This book provides an in-depth examination of the Luftwaffe's structure, organization, and leadership, as well as its role in various military campaigns throughout the war. Murray argues that the Luftwaffe's defeat was due to a combination of factors, including a lack of long-term strategic planning, poor leadership decisions and the bombing offensive of the Allies in the later stages of the war.
In fact, the production and industrial decisions made by the German leadership in the summer of 1940 was the decisive turning point in World War II. Ignoring the severe attrition that had occurred even in the Battle of France, Murray states that Germany lost the air war over Europe for 1943 and 1944. Later in the war, when the Allies launched a massive bombing campaign against Germany this put significant strain on the Luftwaffe's resources and production capabilities. The development of advanced aircraft such as the P-51 Mustang and the introduction of long-range fighter escorts allowed Allied bombers to strike deeper into Germany without suffering heavy losses.
Packed with detailed statistics showing the production, attrition rates and crew losses this book provides a comprehensive analysis of the Luftwaffe's role in World War II, and provides an excellent insight into the challenges faced by the German air force during the conflict and the reasons for its defeat.
This is a fine work on the Luftwaffe, and it is well-researched, well-written, and worthy of praise. Murray makes his arguments clear and generally supports them effectively, though I have some reservations.
Naturally, there is much debate in history and academia, and there is certainly plenty when it comes to the military of the Third Reich and the Luftwaffe. There are the radicals, those who believe the German military was the greatest in history and only one step down from being infallible, and there are those who claim the German military was beyond inept, corrupt, incompetent, and extremely lucky. As with most things, the radicals paint things as black and white, when in reality things are gray.
I've done quite a lot of research on the Luftwaffe in an academic setting and have produced academic works of my own in the field of the Third Reich's military, and I find that Murray is a little too extreme and harsh in his critiques of the Luftwaffe (and the German military as a whole). Were they doomed for defeat? Possibly, and he makes some sound arguments. Were they as incompetent and ineffective as he claims? Possibly, but the Luftwaffe was also widely regarded in the 1930s and early 1940s as the finest air force on the planet. This was held by the contemporary counterparts of the Luftwaffe on the British and American sides, as well as by 21st century scholarship. There is always room for ineptitude in any organization, as well as room for improvement. However, the modern push by some historians to delegitimize the German military of the Third Reich whenever possible is very difficult to understand, not to mention insulting to the many nations and peoples that were very soundly and convincingly beaten by the alleged ineptitude of the German military. What does that say about Poland, Denmark, Norway, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Britain, and others, as labels such as incompetent and ineffective are all relative?
Regardless of his slightly extreme opinions, the piece is well-written, thought-provoking, and worth the read for those interested in a deeper, denser dive into the Luftwaffe.
Interesting Reading and a good argument line that the Luftwaffe was always behind in production of aircraft. And doomed to be eventually defeated. Backed up with good charts diagrams and statistics.
He paints a picture of an utterly incompetent Luftwaffe, underprepared and enamored with counter-productive theories, that only got anywhere through sheer luck. He might be right. But people are so eager to say negative things about the Nazis that it's hard to believe.
Murray does a great job detailing the strategy of the Luftwaffe, or a lack thereof, in WWII, and how that fit into the German War effort in general. While I considered myself fairly well versed in WWII history, I found a lot of new information in this book that changed some of my previous conceptions as to the course of the conflict. Without giving away any revelations, Murray uses extensive evidence and data to support his contentions on the eventual defeat of what was a tactically proficient and famous military organization. Likewise, while detailing the interaction between the military and Nazi leaders, Murray successfully avoids any bias for or against the Luftwaffe and Germany as a whole, maintaining a professional and scholarly tone throughout.
Additionally, Murray goes into some depth explaining the strategies and actions of the Allied Air Forces as well. While the focus of the book is on the Luftwaffe, the RAF, USAAF, and Soviet Air Force are also examined, and readers should come away much more knowledgeable about both sides of the European Air War in WWII.
The only downside to this book in my opinion was that it was at times a little dry and the large number of graphs started to overwhelm the reader. This is somewhat unavoidable, however, as keeping the book interesting with tactical-level anecdotes would distract from the strategic discussion he carries so well. Should a reader wish to use this work as a reference, however, I believe those graphs would be most helpful.
a deep dive analysis of how the Luftwaffe fought in WWII. More than just the operational strategy, Murray relates the industrial and institutional decisions of Goering and the Third Reich and how they each led to ultimate defeat. The Luftwaffe fought on four fronts (Western Europe, Russia, Balkans and over Germany) simultaneously, with each new front the Germans opened, the Luftwaffe had to spread its forces, ultimately turning into a battle of attrition (aircraft and pilots) which they could never win. Further, decisions to loot factories in occupied territories and store machine parts in Germany ensured that when those factories were needed, they were not available. The Germans were not efficient occupiers. The only flaw in the writing, Murray often gets bogged down with statistics and numbers which can be a bit mind numbing, but the prose and analysis in the book was spot on.
Finished -- a much better book than I expected on first blush (see below). Contains lots of factual information and visuals on planes, battles, etc., but is especially good in its analysis of Luftwaffe success and failures -- and, of course, the ultimate end was failure -- defeat. Murray shows how it couldn't have ended any other way.
Many tables and illustrations.
My initial review comments:
"Have scanned this; it's really a special-interest book with lots of statistics. Not sure how good it will be for straight-thru reading. Lots of photos and aircraft illustrations, though. Will add to reference shelf, too.
On further review, not bad for straight reading. So I'm going back and reading it all."
A rather amazing book as it discuss the actual decisions on aircraft production, wartime economic decisions and policy failures that destroyed Germany mighty Luftwaffe during the 2nd World War.