88 Days to Kandahar: A CIA Diary

by Robert L. Grenier

The “first” Afghan War, a CIA war in response to 9/11, was directed by the CIA Station Chief in Islamabad. It put Hamid Karzai in power in 88 days. “If you want an insider’s account of the first American-Afghan War, you can’t do better than this…Important reading to understand where we are today” ( Library Journal ).

From his preparation of the original, post-9/11 war plan, approved by President Bush, through to “final” fleeting victory, Robert Grenier relates the tale of the “southern campaign,” which drove al-Qa’ida and the Taliban from Kandahar, its capital, in an astonishing eighty-eight days.

“With his ringside seat as the senior agency official stationed closest to Afghanistan, Grenier is able to describe meeting by meeting, sometimes phone call after phone call, how events unfolded” (The New York Times). In his gripping account, we meet: General Tommy Franks, who bridles at CIA control of “his” war; General “Jafar Amin,” a gruff Pakistani intelligence officer who saves Grenier from committing career suicide; Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan’s brilliant ambassador to the US, who tries to warn her government of the al-Qa’ida threat; and Hamid Karzai, the puzzling anti-Taliban insurgent, a man with elements of greatness, petulance, and moods.

With suspense and insight, Grenier details his very personal struggles and triumphs. 88 Days to Kandahar is “an action-packed tale, rich in implication, of the post-9/11 race to unseat the Taliban and rout al-Qaida in Afghanistan” (Kirkus Reviews).

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, Politics, Biography, War, Autobiography

464 pages, Hardcover

First published January 27, 2015

Reviews

[Ted Lehmann · Rating 3 out of 5]

Robert L. Grenier's 88 Days to Kandahar (Simon & Schuster, 2015, 465 pages, $28.00/14.99) reads like two different books. When he's writing about the internal politics of the CIA, its relationships, internal rivalries, and policy debates within the vast U.S. Governmental establishment, the book reads like a political thriller, an exciting and engaging novel. However, he seems to delight in going deep into the mind numbing weeds of unpronounceable and unmemorable names of people and places that just won't stay in place in my mind. While both elements are important, it would appear that Grenier has two audiences in mind. The first is a general reader seeking to understand more fully the intricacies and ongoing importance of our engagement in Afghanistan during the late Clinton, Bush, and early Obama administrations. The second book seems to be more aimed at either a middle-east specialist or the kind of political junky who delights in finding error, or even hidden plots, in the minutia of the cloud of war. As a single volume, while at times terrifically engaging, the book is too long by at least a third for the general reader.

As a career CIA officer in the clandestine service, as Station Chief in Islamabad, Pakistan, and as director of Counter Terrorism Center, Grenier's perspective is one of recognizing the seams and stresses within an essentially tribal society and understanding the culture in such a way as to provide support for moving toward rational and effective self government. I've never read anything else that places Afghanistan and Pakistan in such a clear picture of the forces effecting the decisions and actions they take. This is particularly true in the rugged border territories called the Tribal Areas. The Taliban, particularly, is placed within a rational context of providing a counterweight for the unbridled greed and graft of the war lords in the tribal areas. As such, from their narrow, fundamentalist perspective, the Taliban often emerge as a force for good government and rationality, as men who operate out of a religiously motivated self-interest. They can be dealt with, but only within the context of subtle pressure to move in a more useful direction. Thus the cultural sensitivity and low profile are posited as moving in positively for the area. And then came September 11, 2001 turning the United States into a country driven my panicked populace and government seeking rapid, blunt hammer responses. Please read the remainder of this review on my blog and consider ordering it through the Amazon portal there.

[Mary · Rating 3 out of 5]

I was skeptical of a CIA “diary” with no end notes and no reproduced, redacted cables. Nothing but Grenier’s memory. If it’s accurate he is a superhuman tactician and strategist! He should have run our Afghanistan war. So, I was a little put off by the CYA, enhanced tone of the book and thought I would hate it. Once I got over the near total lack of sourcing, I grew to appreciate the review of our Afghanistan debacle. I read a lot and forget a lot, so this detailed account of what we did wrong, what we should’ve done and how South Central Asians interpret our moves refreshed my memory (Aaargh! No more Afghanistan war books.). I gained a much better perspective on Pakistan and its relationship with its neighbors, especially the Taliban. OBL holed up in Abbottabad makes even more sense now. Also the extremely decentralized nature of power in Afghanistan. We mirrored and failed miserably. Finally, Grenier also reaffirms my favorite scary Leitmotiv: The media really gets so much wrong. They seem to go in with a narrative and report that which fits, ignoring anomalies.

“88 Days”, is long on detail (421 pages!) but clearly written and structured so it was pretty breezy to get through. The author gets the big picture and does seem like a dedicated public servant who cares about our country and his staff. Not sure what to make of his assertion that the CIA’s role in arming the Muj during the Sov-Af war was a huge success. Or that going to war in Iraq while still up to our necks in Afghanistan was the right choice. Or his flattering comments about Tenet and Rice. But I did enjoy some scathing on Rumsfeld and Cheney. Always in the mood for that! I thought it rich that Grenier talks about the Obama/McChrystal surge as criminal while defending the Bush/Cheney invasion of Iraq. I do not disagree with most of his perceptions of how the Afghan war was fought and that there were essentially 2 US-Afghan wars. We won the first one in 88 days. We lost the second one Big Time. Hmm.

This one is for readers without lots of knowledge of our war(s) or those who need a refresher. His prescription is right on (even if at least a teensy bit of Monday morning quarterbacking seeps in!). What is one to do, paint an unflattering portrait of yourself in your own war journal? Winky, smiley face.

[Rayrumtum · Rating 4 out of 5]

Robert Grenier, former Chief of Islamabad Station and Director of CTC (Counterterrorism Center) wrote of his experience in the critical days of US/CIA involvement in Afghanistan post 9/11. Ironically one might consider this a sequel to "Charlie Wilson's War" about CIA's effort to support the mujahadin struggle against the Soviet invaders. In both cases, the stories start well but end with disaster just around the horizon.

Grenier was not in Afghanistan during the fighting, but he was the proponent of the initial strategy for pursuing the conflict and knew the inside story by virtue of his contacts in Islamabad including Pakistani intelligence. Because he was absent from the battlefield this is not the book to read for a military account, but it clearly shows the bureaucratic struggles. Rather than al Qaida and the Taliban as enemies, it turns out we are our major enemies. These months were fraught, according to Grenier, with two battles: one between headquarters and the field and the other between CTC and the area divisions. Add to that major issues with DoD aka Rumsfeld and you have a mess.

When the subject turns to Iraq, Grenier believes regime change was necessary even though there wasn't WMD. He admits policies were totally screwed up, but says it was necessary. On this point I disagree with him. 1. The US records on interventions usually end up as debacles, e.g., Viet Nam, Phillippines, Cuba, Iran before the shah, Afghanistan against the Soviet. So why would this time be any different?. 2. I agree Saddam was a bad dude, but we can't depose every bad dude in the world especially when there is scant chance it will end well. Personally, I am more worried by the threats posed by North Korea and Russia.

The last few chapters Grenier gives his perspective on the kerfuffle about detainees "enhanced interrogation." His was an interesting perspective, but I will leave it to you to read for yourself.

A final comment. In many ways it seemed this book was written for insiders to the policy or intelligence process. I am skeptical that readers in the hinterlands will capture the full nuances intended by Grenier. All in all, this book is recommended for anyone interested in national security issues.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

A well-written, fast-paced, evenhanded and frank memoir of Grenier’s involvement in the post-9/11 hunt for al-Qaeda. While the author’s role has been written of elsewhere, it was interesting to see these events from his perspective.

Grenier’s narrative is smooth and well-written, and the level of detail was a pleasant surprise (although it often just seems like filler). The writing is candid about both successes and failures during this critical period but the tone sometimes comes off as that of a self-justifying know-it-all, probably not intentionally. Grenier’s involvement during the beginning of the Afghan war is the most interesting part of the book, while his section on his subsequent roles as Iraq “mission manager” and CTC chief don’t hold your interest as tightly. This later section also seems much less in-depth.

The first part of the book is a summary of Grenier’s career up to his assignment as Islamabad station chief. The rest tells of Grenier’s interaction with Langley, Islamabad, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda, regarding such issues as terrorism and Pakistan’s nuclear program. Obviously, things pick up after 9/11 when Grenier was involved in abortive negotiations with the Taliban and assisting the military campaigns in southern Afghanistan; the complications involved in finding a leader for these mujahideen are described in detail. The end of the first round of the war saw Grenier involved with hunting down terrorists who now sought a new refuge in Pakistan (such as Abu Zubaydah), the beginning of extraordinary renditions (or at least the Bush-era version), and the frustrating hunt for bin Laden. Eventually, Grenier was pulled away to be tapped as “Iraq mission manager” at a quite inconvenient time for CTC, and was finally tapped as CTC chief (where he was fired for apparently not being aggressive enough). Grenier emphasizes how untraditional the CIA’s role in the war initially was, given that, historically, the CIA had up to that point mostly avoided intruding into the policy-making business. Like most CIA memoirs, Grenier lightens the tone with tidbits like the Agency’s operational culture (apparently putting profanity into CIA cable traffic is a big no-no).

Grenier’s recounting of the Agency’s rendition, detention, and interrogation program is fairly interesting and written in an unassuming, matter-of-fact tone. This program proved to be CTC’s biggest and most controversial challenge. As Grenier recalls, the RDI program basically consisted of two different components: the “detention” aspect, consisting of the Agency’s various black sites, and the interrogations themselves, which ranged from traditional to coercive. Grenier notes that the Agency had little institutional knowledge regarding interrogation, much less in running prisons. One reason for the prison network was to isolate the various detainees, who could easily coordinate their stories when held together in normal Pakistani jails. He notes the various techniques the CIA was permitted to employ, and also how uncontroversial they were at the time (although he does note that the Agency was only permitted to brief a few select members of Congress, a decision made by the White House). According to Grenier, when more lawmakers were briefed on the program in 2005, few raised objections, with responses along the lines of “You mean that’s it? That’s all you’re doing? They did worse to me in boot camp!” Grenier calls this an “illusion of support,” given that Congress would later claim to have been kept in the dark on the program.

Grenier recalls that the legal justification for the RDI program was flimsy even into 2005, although, of course, concerns never evaporated. The status of the black sites was up in the air and unresolved until Dana Priest broke the story about them, which was when the host countries quickly pressured the US to shut them down. Grenier does not consider the torture issue an academic one, and notes that either deciding to get involved in them or not involved tough choices with real consequences. “It is manifestly not in the interest of the American people to foster an an institutional climate that encourages the national intelligence service to decide for itself which of its legal orders it will follow, and to decline to carry out those assignments it deems risky or inconvenient to itself....if we are not careful, institutional insubordination will be the unwanted legacy of our collective moral ambiguity on the difficult measures which have been taken, and are still being taken now, to deal with vicious, committed non-state actors who hide in the shadows, and plot to do us harm.”

The book has only few problems, such as the brash tone that sometimes makes Grenier come off as self-congratulatory, and much of the dialogue comes off as invented. He describes many of the controversies that began under his tenure, such as cash payments to corrupt, despotic warlords, which Grenier admits the Agency often turned a blind eye towards. He also describes the pressure faced by Pakistan’s government by the Taliban and al-Qaeda, pressure that was only made worse when the groups decided to turn Pakistan into a sanctuary. The tone of the book is rather unreflective until one gets to the last few chapters, where Grenier’s take on Afghanistan’s future is rather bleak. Grenier is somewhat defensive when it comes to the torture debate, arguing that the CIA’s tactics produced actionable intelligence. If you’ve read through the Senate’s report on the issue, you’ll probably disagree (then again, if you’ve read the minority report, you probably won’t. But, in the end, Grenier has disappointingly little to say about this issue). The book also has very little to say about drone warfare (Grenier hints that the Agency discouraged him from writing about it).

An interesting, insightful, and thought-provoking memoir well worth a read, told in a sharp, straightforward style, even if it often comes off as fatalistic and tragic.

[Steve · Rating 2 out of 5]

It’s doubtful that Robert L. Grenier intended it this way. But, it’s true. A 27 year-veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency, Grenier’s entire, 419-page “CIA Diary,” can be summed up in just one paragraph.

On page 8, Grenier wrote:
More than “thirteen years have passed since 9/11. The improbably quick victory won by small numbers of CIA and Special Forces operatives allied with anti-Taliban dissidents in what we might call the First American-Afghan War has nearly faded from memory. Our ‘victory’ proved short-lived. After a pause of perhaps three years, the United States again found itself at war with the Taliban in what we might call the Second American-Afghan War. Only this time, the comparatively modest objectives of the first war had been replaced with an over-ambitious set of millennial nation-building goals which American could not achieve and Afghans could not sustain.”

That’s it. That’s “88 Days to Kandahar” in a nut shell. That’s all you need to know about this war memoir from a former CIA station chief at Islamabad and former director of the CIA Counter Terrorism Center.

Putting a formal name on those two wars was probably the most compelling thing I read in this journal. I had never before considered America’s role in Afghanistan big enough to give it title, like the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the American Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, etc., etc. I could be wrong, but, I don’t recall the media ever putting a face on the Afghan conflict in that way.

Bottom line, Grenier has assembled here an eye witness account of the history of the CIA’s involvement in the First American-Afghan War. In summary, as Grenier’s title would suggest, this is the story of “the deceptive ease with which the Taliban had been driven off in a period of only eighty-eight days since the attacks on 9/11. Rather than fighting on in a twilight guerilla struggle, the Taliban had simply disappeared as Afghan-American forces closed in on their final redoubt in Kandahar.”

It’s worth noting Grenier’s purpose in publishing this review of his CIA career. Grenier wrote, “It is my hope that a grasp of the practical lessons learned by this writer and his colleagues in the First American-Afghan War, and an understanding of how our distraction from those lessons led to the failure of the Second, will yet prove to be of use as and when America and its allies are forced to embark upon a Third.”

There’s just one problem. Actually two. Grenier meant this diary to be a day-by-day, play-by-play of America’s response to 9/11 for the 88 days following the attack. Problem is, as a time line narrative, it’s extremely difficult to follow. Add to that the nearly two-dozen impossible-to-spell, impossible-to-pronounce Afghan and Pakistani names sprinkled on every page, it makes for very difficult, slow, ponderous reading. Sad to day, I couldn’t wait to finish!

[Homer · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was a fairly informative book, but some areas are a little doubtful due to the author's self promotion. Still the book shed a lot of light on the events in the early days of the Afghan conflict. It was interesting to learn the many ways in which the CIA gained intelligence about opposition strength and the United States's collaboration with anti-Taliban leaders such as Hameed Karzai. The last 50 or 60 pages where the most informative for me in which the author laid out deficiencies in the Bush administration and how many of their decisions led to corruption followed by deficiencies by the Obama administration in which the US overcompensated for many Bush administration failures leading to more corruption; however since neither administration was willing to think at the tribal level, or allow the conflict to end in a draw he concludes that we have failed in Afghanistan despite reaching our objectives. On top of this his insights into Pakistan were also very deep and far reaching. This book is well worth the read.

[Mustafa Kazemi · Rating 4 out of 5]

I've read many books by former CIA staffers but 88 Days to Kandahar was like no other. It gives you a griming and grinding view of what's happened and happening here.

[Jessica 🐶 · Rating 1 out of 5]

Took an interesting topic and made it boring. DNF

[Grant Seeds · Rating 4 out of 5]

Originally, I picked up this book due my interest in conflicts in the middle east after 9/11. At first, I was quite overwhelmed by this book due to the large amount of characters. But after easing into the quick style of the author, it started to get interesting. Over the course of the book, I could tell that the author was a CIA analyst, just by the way he wrote. At the start of the book, you could see a very fast pace, quickly describing each character and running through their background swifty. The author often used very harsh and analytical words probably due to his background in the CIA. I found the book very refreshing due to the author giving the cold hard facts and not page filling fluff. While the author often kept the same tone, sometimes that tone changed for good reasons. When he looked back at failed mission resulting in the deaths of anyone he knew, the author would give a good background on them in a somber tone. The analytical way he presenting information allowed me to understand the complex conflicts in the Middle East much better. But there were some drawbacks to his style, it was often hard to remember all the people he mentions in the book. I would say there are probably 40 people that all have different and unique backgrounds, making it quite hard to fully understand all the stories he was telling. Naturally as an English speaker, some of the names that were quite important to the story were very hard to remember due to the foreignness of the names. Overall, the author's style at some points was very information but at other points quite confusing and hard to follow.

I would recommend this book to anyone who is interested in books of war or conflict, this book is pretty similar to 13 Hours and The Operator. I would read this book again, because it really helps you appreciate how complicated the matters in the Middle East are. But I do have a word of advise for any perspective readers, don’t try to remember all the people’s names, you will still largely get the same out of it without the pain of memorizing 40 people names and backgrounds.

[Wes F · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was an interesting enough read overall, though it had some of that "can't-give-you-all-details" feel to it. Well, what do you expect from the "confessions" of a real spy master? I gave it a 3-1/2 stars in my reading log. This was another library e-book. What I was most interested/intrigued by was the info Grenier sheds on the US/CIA/military's relationships with Pakistan's so-called intelligence agency, the ISI. I have a better view of them after this reading and, no doubt, they played a big part in helping the US capture number of al Qaeda operatives (many lower level ones). But, I think Grenier was just a tad too positive on them, given his official political position and intelligence agency partner relationship. So much of what they do/represent is two-faced, give-here-while-taking-there, backdoor, duplicitous operations that involve outright treachery & bald-face lies. While taking billions of US dollars with one hand, they have trained, armed, planned, and supported terrorists & terrorist operations with the other hand. Of course, in this part of the world, you have to work with what you've got...

I think Grenier's concluded chapters are very insightful and spot on with regard to what the US/coalition has done over the years since 2001--and his comments on Obama's "clear" disengagement timeline and the results to be expected have proven true. But, the new great game isn't over yet--and things continue to develop even now in 2017 that give pause for hope for a better & more stable Afghanistan. May it be so.

[Edwin Voll · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book was one I completed as an audiobook. The content was well covered and was an interesting look into how the US faced terrorism before and after 9/11. The author is well versed and was in the middle of most of the topics he covered. He offered both facts and his opinion on the matter.

However, at times, the book was too technical for my liking. The author dove deep on topics and explained things at a level that left me somewhat confused. It was hard at times to follow the action based on his account.

Overall, a solid read but 3/5 stars.

[Jimmy · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is the memoir of CIA officer Robert L. Grenier with a significant portion of the book devoted to his time as a station chief in Pakistan during the response of the United States to the September 11th attack. I picked up this book to read because of its title that really grabbed my attention.
In the beginning of the book Grenier tells us of his younger days in life and how he eventually joined the CIA and also the various stations and duties he had all around the world. What really captured my interests was his description of how it was not easy for his family with all the moving around the world and though both he and his wife enjoy traveling the rest of his relatives was starting to wonder when they were going to be “settling down.”
I imagine most people wanted to read this book is because of the author’s involvement with the Afghanistan conflict and counterterrorism. The book describes a lot of political and bureaucratic turf wars. There’s conflict between Langley headquarters and the foreign stations. There’s the conflict between the Counter Terrorism Center and Pakistan Station chief. There’s also bureaucratic turf war between the Counter Terrorism Center and the National Counter Terrorism Center which is rather redundant and a creation of Congress as a result of politicians wanting to create something so it looks like they are doing something to help present terrorism after the September 11th attack. The problem between the two Counter-Terrorism Centers is further compounded when they are trying to fight for the same analysts and specialists. Finally there’s also the CIA relationship with the military and specific sector of the military such as the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). I found a lot of this interesting as someone who is interested in how government institutions work.
Other interesting aspect of the book is the author’s description of the US and Pakistan relationship. Surely there are misunderstanding on the American side and also mistrust. At the same time the book also describe the incredible length Pakistan went to fight terrorism right after September 11th. The book has a good discussion of the complexity of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas that border Afghanistan which political reality is not always well understood by American policy makers nor the US military. The book does note a shift of strategies the US took towards the war on Terror from what is successful to what ultimately ended up as failure.
Overall this is an eye opening book of the political and intelligence side of counter-terrorism.

[Sameer · Rating 2 out of 5]

Typically having so many good reviews, I shy away from posting one myself. Except of course other than rating a book. However I chose to make a departure with this one.

I am not even done with this book and already I am wishing it was over already. I am going to push myself to complete it to see what else is going to be covered. However, I am really starting to dislike it for several reasons.

1. There is a direct and strong ridicule aimed at the one American Ally during a time when there was much hand wringing and not much else by the Europeans. The UK Government stood staunchly with America through those trying times. Whether their work was helpful or not is besides the point. They at least tried their best. The ridicule is very much misplaced in my opinion.

2. The author, in my opinion appears to be a disgruntled glory seeker. He managed to minimize his triggering of the 2001–2002 India–Pakistan standoff (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001%E2...) which put South Asia on the brink of Nuclear War.

3. Grenier appears to display a strongly Pro-Pakistani bias at least to me. This is at the cost ridiculing and criticizing American Foreign policy and decision making during those early chaotic days of Post-911. Especially when those policies they did not put Pakistan in Positive Light. Considering that, this was at a time when there was widespread dislike for Westerners in General and Americans in particular, in Pakistan. (Ex. Kidnapping and death of Daniel Pearl).

4. It was pretty clear from the book that, ISI the Pakistani Intelligence Agency (their CIA) seemed to know the name of CIA Chief of Station and every member there. I am a mere civilian but this appears as a security breach, since I'd think except in case of UK, no foreign Intelligence organization would have access to such information. Without the Chief sharing this, I don't think its possible.

5. Grenier seems to blame issues with Operation Anaconda ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operati... ) on him being limited from it. That's far from the truth. Anyone who wants to know the true reasons should read Not A Good Day To Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda

6. Minor issue and only in case of the Audio book version. From the book it appears as if the Author is at least fluent in Urdu the Pakistani National Language and possibly Arabic. So he should not have had difficulty in pronouncing names of people and places. Yet the Narrator on the Audiobook appears to stumble on the names. Given this is a first person narrative, it is disconcerting.

[Ryan · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the CIA station chief from Pakistan around 9/11 (who also had extensive responsibilities with Afghanistan), and later high-level CIA official's opinion of internal and external CIA politics and activities throughout his career (up until around 2014). Spoiler alert: CIA really didn't get along with DOD+Rumsfeld+Cheney, and everyone thought CPA was incompetent.

Probably the best part of the book was the concept of "first" and "second" US-Afghan wars, and the possibility of a third. Essentially the first was the CIA/SOF-driven small war from 2001-2005 (which was largely "won", in the sense of achieving the limited initial objectives, by the end of 2001); the second was the 2005-Present failure involving the big army, hundreds of thousands of military personnel, and essentially negative gains. The third US-Afghan war would be whatever happens after we pull out, Afghanistan becomes a threat again, and we're forced to intervene again.

It's evident from this book that Grenier is very convinced of his own superiority, but it also seems very likely his high estimate of his own competence is accurate. It also seems like CIA, DOD, and the rest of the US Government really were the wrong tools for the job in 2001 (and really, since the end of the Cold War), and that the internal politics within CIA's bureaucracy are toxic and counter to US interests. What's interesting to me is what a purpose-built entity would look like -- and would probably work a lot closer to how a business enters a new market than how CIA/DOD handle operations.

As a tangent, I'd be interested in a book about the role of gender politics within CIA; from this book, other books, and other reports I've heard, it seems like a lot of the post-cold-war hires were female, and highly concentrated in certain roles/departments, and at cross purposes to the post-9/11 challenges, and that the post-9/11 personnel were excessively paramilitary/drone focused, perhaps bad in the other direction.

[Elliot · Rating 3 out of 5]

An interesting retrospective of the war in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2015. Despite the title, which strongly implies that it will be about the first three months after 9/11, this book actually covers (in occasionally excruciating detail) far more history from before 9/11 and up to when it was written. The author comes across as a pompous jerk who thought he knew better than everyone around him and therefore got on everyone's nerves. At the same time he also comes across as an apologist explaining away why things didn't work out well, largely because his advice wasn't followed. Ugh...

Obviously he has an incredibly Pakistan-centric vision of Afghanistan and the war, which I think he was well aware of, but at the same time he ends up sounding like either an apologist for Pakistan or completely hoodwinked by the Pakistanis (which I have trouble believing could be true since he was the CIA station chief in Islamabad).

That said, I listened to this as an audiobook after being in Afghanistan for almost a year and a half, which made it more interesting to me, as I was hearing about the same people and their roles in the early parts of the war that are important now, or even were important in the Soviet war. The reader Joe Barrett does accents for Pakistanis, Afghans, and occasionally others, but most of them come out as more Scottish than South Asian, which was painful. The reading also did not help the author sound less pompous in any way.

The conclusions in the end were fascinating.

[Gareth Franklin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really interesting book that gives a lot of background and context to a war that, quite honestly, we haven't heard a huge amount about.

The amount of work that goes on in the background that never makes it into the public eye (unless it goes wrong) is frankly astounding. Hearing it from someone who was not only there but was leading a huge chunk of it is enlightening.

There were a few areas I thought we could've had more detail on, mostly because they're interesting areas (morally and philosophically) - especially around the idea of Guantánamo Bay and other "black sites". I guess it's because the author couldn't really say a huge amount without likely getting into a bit of trouble, but the ethics around it would've been fascinating for a broader look.

Overall, a good book if you're interested in modern history, Afghanistan, American wars or the work of the CIA and other agencies. Otherwise, it might be a tough read.

[Atar · Rating 5 out of 5]

I wonder why it is that people who have given reviews are so inclined to be so negative about a 27 year veteran of the CIA in terms of disliking his self aggrandisement. The guy writes a spot on 419 page book about his time, effort, and influence and people choose to be negative about him playing himself up a little. This is a company man whose worked with the highest level of politicians, head of state, the national security apparatus and militaries of many countries. I have read a prodigious amount on the Afghanistan war & Central Asian complexities, an in my opinion he is right on with the narrative. I think some of the reviews are garrulous & pugnacious and that people are showing their intransigence. The book is a fantastic read. If your interested in this war and have read about it extensively this book and author will be a great addition to your understanding.

[Dylan Simon · Rating 5 out of 5]

A Vital Account of America’s early efforts in Afghanistan

I have made it a goal of mine to read as many early accounts of the war in Afghanistan. Grenier’s account provides a crucial perspective of how the Taliban were toppled in the Pashtun south from someone who led that area from Islamabad, Pakistan. The anecdotes provided in this account will serve as a great source for those who wish to try and make sense of what went into the early phases of America’s war in Afghanistan especially given the current situation in that country. I would highly recommend this great and important book.

[Jasmine · Rating 4 out of 5]

If you have a decent background in political theory, war theory, and the politics of spycraft, you'll find this rather nuanced work to be interesting. One could argue that you'll need to understand the history of the Taliban and Western operations in the region to fully appreciate the book. I don't think Grenier's intended audience is the lay person, but perhaps if one is fairly well read in the subject matter they would find it interesting. It's not a thriller biography, it's a recitation of the events that took place in the run-up to the titular event. To the limits he could, Grenier does expose many of the less savory aspects of war and intelligence operations.

[John Hash · Rating 2 out of 5]

While I cannot say this is a great book, I can say that the author is a great American. This true story of "Islamabad Bob" puts meat on the bones of the frequent praise patriotic Americans attribute to the men and women who risk their lives in defense of our country. Robert Grenier is smart, wise, and documents his career in the C.I.A. adeptly. His road to Khandahar exhibits the uncanny ability to traverse relations with tribal leaders among the Taliban in Asia and bureaucrats in Washington D.C. The close calls in each of these areas are compelling features of his story.

[Karlee Brooks · Rating 3 out of 5]

This books is 50% name dropping and military jargon that is just hard to follow and keep interest in for the length of this book. It was educational to read and I learned a few things along the way but it was difficult to get through. The book is also called 88 days to Kandahar but a 1/4 of the book is post Kandahar so I felt like it was a false peak. If you’re into military history, you’d probably enjoy it, but for the average reader, it’s alright.

[Jim · Rating 3 out of 5]

A tale of the labyrinthine world of politics and spycraft and how one influences the other or not. While difficult to follow at time this book uncovers and explains the many compelling entities in the Middle East from the pre 9-11 period and beyond. If one is intrested in the world where America has been mired in war for .ore than a decade and a half then this is a must read.

[Hank Moody · Rating 5 out of 5]

A must Read. The author has a sound knowledge of the culture in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The author clearly makes his point regarding policy level decision making bodies in his own country and Pakistan.
If you want to have a neutral view of what has happened since the WoT started than this is the book to read.

[Meredith · Rating 5 out of 5]

I learned a great deal about the workings of the CIA, but came away with even less respect than I had for Government bureaucracy and both internal and external politics, which got in the way of effective action.

[Tariq · Rating 4 out of 5]

A comprehensive account of initial 88 days that led to the fall of Taliban and capture of Kabul / Kandahar. The author has adopted a candid approach covering view of all the parties involved i.e America, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

[Don Jude · Rating 5 out of 5]

Grenier is a hero. This telling, both detailed yet riveting, relays the ironing out of the seemingly chaotic coordination and delicate balance with all of the characters, friend, foe and undetermined, during a segment of America's time in Afghanistan.

[Vanessa Olson · Rating 2 out of 5]

I rarely abandon books over 50% but halfway finished. This was an exception. The author's obsession with including names of people and places made this one impossible to keep up with on audio. Did not finish.

[Tariq Aziz · Rating 4 out of 5]

A comprehensive account of initial 88 days that led to the fall of Taliban and capture of Kabul / Kandahar. The author has adopted a candid approach covering view of all the parties involved i.e America, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

[Tom Jenckes · Rating 2 out of 5]

The tone of the book didn't sit well with me. Somehow when you're listening on Audible, it becomes more intimate. This book would perhaps do better without listening to it.

[Santosh Koshy · Rating 4 out of 5]

An honest account of American approach in Afghanistan.. a nice read to understand the diplomatic struggle to establish what we call peace.