Ontology Made Easy

by Amie L. Thomasson

In the decades following Quine, debates about existence have taken center stage in the metaphysics. But neo-Quinean ontology has reached a crisis point, given the endless proliferation of positions and lack of any clear idea of how to resolve debates. The most prominent challenge to mainstream ontological debates has come from the idea that disputants can be seen as using the quantifier with different meanings, leaving the dispute merely verbal. Nearly all of the work in defense of hard ontology has gone into arguing against quantifier variance.

This volume argues that hard ontology faces an entirely different challenge, which remains even if the threat of quantifier variance can be avoided. The challenge comes from the 'easy approach to ontology': a view that is arguably the heir to Carnap's own position. The idea of the easy approach is that many ontological questions can be answered by undertaking trivial inferences from uncontroversial premises, making prolonged disputes about the questions out of place. This book aims to develop the easy approach to ontology, showing how it leads to both a first-order simple realism about the disputed entities and a form of meta-ontological deflationism that takes ontological disputes themselves to be misguided, since existence questions may be answered by straightforward conceptual and/or empirical work. It also aims to defend the easy approach against a range of arguments wielded against it and to show it to be a viable and attractive alternative to the quagmire of hard ontology.

Genres: Philosophy, Metaphysics

360 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2014

Reviews

[Italo Lins Lemos · Rating 5 out of 5]

Um belíssimo trabalho em metaontologia que, neo-carnapianamente, defende que as questões sobre a existência de algo podem ser "facilmente" respondidas de duas formas: empiricamente ou conceitualmente. Desde que, evidentemente, estipulemos as condições de aplicação e co-aplicação do termo K relevante.

[Edmundo · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very exciting attack of Quinean and neo-Quinean metaphysics. I am very sympathetic towards the return to Carnap. The broad idea is that if we have a use condition for a certain term, then its referent exists, and some broader categories can be inferred as well. So, if "The apple is red" has a use case, then there are apples and redness, for instance, which in turn entail that properties and objects exist. This sort of approach to ontology seems incredibly useful. And in a way, it does not lead to an automatic resolution to ontological questions, but instead it seems that we'd have to start arguing about whether some sentences genuinely have use cases. We also have to ascribe a sort of manner in which the use case actually involves existence. So even if we say that some mental state exists, for instance, there is still the question about the manner in which a mental state exists as compared to things that are not mental, or that are not expressed in mental language. But, at least, such a debate seems clearer and less speculate than a debate about existence outright. It is a highly complicated field, however, and as Thomasson admits by the end, the easy ontology approach is one among many other approaches. I believe it's a powerful approach, a useful one, and a helpful one, especially if one is less disposed towards ontology. But it can't be accepted outright, and perhaps a full contrast and comparison with other ontological approaches will be done in the future. Thomasson started this process very effectively, but a complete comparison between approaches and their advantages and disadvantages would be an entire dissertation in its own right.

In any case, I need more familiarity with the neo-Fregean and neo-Quinean approaches before I side with Thomasson and Carnap, ultimately, but so far it is looking like a very appealing way to approach ontology. Thomasson makes a very good case for it. I will have to return to this book in the future.

[William · Rating 5 out of 5]

I had wanted to read this book for awhile, but when I finally sat down to read it I was worried I was no longer in the apt headspace for it - it is very much steeped in analytic debates about (in the technical sense) semantics - in a way that I now feel to be a blind alley. But it ended up being very generative after all, and I am going to have to read at least one chapter of Ordinary Objects afterwards (find this critique of Quine’s Two Dogmas), and maybe a few of the works she cites.

[Fraser McConachie · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the best books of philosophy I’ve ever read. Phenomenal - might make an entire field redundant.

[carmen bauer]

DAMN.