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The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership
Theories of social justice are necessarily abstract, reaching beyond the particular and the immediate to the general and the timeless. Yet such theories, addressing the world and its problems, must respond to the real and changing dilemmas of the day. A brilliant work of practical philosophy, Frontiers of Justice is dedicated to this proposition. Taking up three urgent problems of social justice neglected by current theories and thus harder to tackle in practical terms and everyday life, Martha Nussbaum seeks a theory of social justice that can guide us to a richer, more responsive approach to social cooperation.
The idea of the social contract--especially as developed in the work of John Rawls--is one of the most powerful approaches to social justice in the Western tradition. But as Nussbaum demonstrates, even Rawls's theory, suggesting a contract for mutual advantage among approximate equals, cannot address questions of social justice posed by unequal parties. How, for instance, can we extend the equal rights of citizenship--education, health care, political rights and liberties--to those with physical and mental disabilities? How can we extend justice and dignified life conditions to all citizens of the world? And how, finally, can we bring our treatment of nonhuman animals into our notions of social justice? Exploring the limitations of the social contract in these three areas, Nussbaum devises an alternative theory based on the idea of "capabilities." She helps us to think more clearly about the purposes of political cooperation and the nature of political principles--and to look to a future of greater justice for all.
The idea of the social contract--especially as developed in the work of John Rawls--is one of the most powerful approaches to social justice in the Western tradition. But as Nussbaum demonstrates, even Rawls's theory, suggesting a contract for mutual advantage among approximate equals, cannot address questions of social justice posed by unequal parties. How, for instance, can we extend the equal rights of citizenship--education, health care, political rights and liberties--to those with physical and mental disabilities? How can we extend justice and dignified life conditions to all citizens of the world? And how, finally, can we bring our treatment of nonhuman animals into our notions of social justice? Exploring the limitations of the social contract in these three areas, Nussbaum devises an alternative theory based on the idea of "capabilities." She helps us to think more clearly about the purposes of political cooperation and the nature of political principles--and to look to a future of greater justice for all.
512 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2006
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Displaying 1 - 24 of 24 reviews
May 4, 2009
I learned my meat-eating days may be numbered....
October 13, 2012
An ambitious and important book. Taking Rawls as a point of departure, Nussbaum argues that all of humanity is obligated -- collectively -- to support the dignified flourishing of all living creatures, including people with disabilities, people in other countries, and nonhuman animals.
I appreciate her critiques of the social contract tradition: I agree that the "classic" theories of social justice rest on unduly cynical, rationalistic assumptions about people and social relationships. And I like her conception of "central capabilities" as a way to capture the various elements, tangible and intangible, that make a human life meaningfully dignified. She's convinced me that these are crucial elements, and that in a decent society everyone would enjoy some threshold level of them.
She hasn't convinced me, though, that securing everyone's wellbeing is a matter of justice - rather than one of benevolence, or even love. She speaks of the need for a public culture of benevolence/compassion that would support the costly policies necessary to secure universal enjoyment of capabilities. But she doesn't clarify the relationship between benevolence and justice. If taking care of the disabled is something justice requires, why do we need benevolence - is it then superfluous as a moral motive? Or is it that we need benevolence to open our eyes to what justice requires - so then is benevolence just a useful sentiment, as opposed to a fundamental virtue (as Nussbaum takes justice to be)?
That's just a substantive quibble of mine; it may not bother other readers.
Overall, her critical arguments and theory-building efforts are smart and nicely laid out. It's a bit repetitive; better editing might whittle this 400-pager down to 200. Still, it's a good read for fans/critics of Rawls, and folks who care about questions of justice in relation to disabilities, international law, and animals.
I appreciate her critiques of the social contract tradition: I agree that the "classic" theories of social justice rest on unduly cynical, rationalistic assumptions about people and social relationships. And I like her conception of "central capabilities" as a way to capture the various elements, tangible and intangible, that make a human life meaningfully dignified. She's convinced me that these are crucial elements, and that in a decent society everyone would enjoy some threshold level of them.
She hasn't convinced me, though, that securing everyone's wellbeing is a matter of justice - rather than one of benevolence, or even love. She speaks of the need for a public culture of benevolence/compassion that would support the costly policies necessary to secure universal enjoyment of capabilities. But she doesn't clarify the relationship between benevolence and justice. If taking care of the disabled is something justice requires, why do we need benevolence - is it then superfluous as a moral motive? Or is it that we need benevolence to open our eyes to what justice requires - so then is benevolence just a useful sentiment, as opposed to a fundamental virtue (as Nussbaum takes justice to be)?
That's just a substantive quibble of mine; it may not bother other readers.
Overall, her critical arguments and theory-building efforts are smart and nicely laid out. It's a bit repetitive; better editing might whittle this 400-pager down to 200. Still, it's a good read for fans/critics of Rawls, and folks who care about questions of justice in relation to disabilities, international law, and animals.
April 5, 2021
I read chapters 1, 6, and 7. My goal in reading this book was two-fold: to see a critical perspective on the social contract tradition, and to see how Nussbaum applies her capabilities approach in dealing with issues of animal justice.
The thrust of the book is this: despite its value, the prevailing conception of political society as a scheme of mutual advantage (i.e., the "social contract" tradition) suffers from fundamental flaws that inhibit its ability to grant justice to some of the groups who most need it. Because a scheme of mutual advantage can only hold between rough equals who can both give and take, the social contract tradition cannot include within the realm of justice severely disabled humans, impoverished nations, and nonhuman animals.
Nussbaum takes particular aim at the social contract theory of John Rawls, both because of his theory's notable advancements over earlier social contract theories as well as its far-reaching influence. She commends some of the intuitive principles generated by Rawls' approach but opposes the theoretical framework from which he starts. In particular, Nussbaum identifies the following features that prevent Rawls' theory of justice (and, by extension, earlier instances of social contract theory) from adequately addressing justice for the asymmetrically vulnerable groups mentioned earlier.
Procedures and outcomes
Efficiency and necessity
Individuals and society
[...]
The thrust of the book is this: despite its value, the prevailing conception of political society as a scheme of mutual advantage (i.e., the "social contract" tradition) suffers from fundamental flaws that inhibit its ability to grant justice to some of the groups who most need it. Because a scheme of mutual advantage can only hold between rough equals who can both give and take, the social contract tradition cannot include within the realm of justice severely disabled humans, impoverished nations, and nonhuman animals.
Nussbaum takes particular aim at the social contract theory of John Rawls, both because of his theory's notable advancements over earlier social contract theories as well as its far-reaching influence. She commends some of the intuitive principles generated by Rawls' approach but opposes the theoretical framework from which he starts. In particular, Nussbaum identifies the following features that prevent Rawls' theory of justice (and, by extension, earlier instances of social contract theory) from adequately addressing justice for the asymmetrically vulnerable groups mentioned earlier.
Procedures and outcomes
For Rawls, justice is constituted by the principles generated by fair terms of agreement between individuals. This feature makes Rawls' theory a "procedural" one, determining just outcomes by reference to the fair terms of agreement from which they are generated. But this ensures that the creators of principles of justice are precisely the recipients of justice: the agreement is between only, and so concerns only us. In turn, disadvantaged groups cannot hope to be included within the realm of justice. Nussbaum is at odds with this procedural account of justice, opting instead for an "outcome-based" view, and selecting procedures by reference to the outcomes they produce. In assessing outcomes, Nussbaum begins with the intuitive idea that a just society must, among other things, guarantee for its citizens a minimally good life--one, we could say, worthy of dignity. But what is a minimally good life? Nussbaum maintains that a variety of moral frameworks will converge, or find "overlapping consensus," on the view that a minimally good life is one in which one has the ability to engage in the kinds of activities most valuable for the being one is. In concrete terms, a minimally good human life involves the ability to engage in the physical, emotional, intellectual, and social activities that constitute "truly human" functioning. Thus, the nature of justice requires, among other things, that individuals be guaranteed these vital capabilities, a tentative list of which is enumerated by Nussbaum, no matter whether they are able to partake in a social contract. This allows for Nussbaum's theory to include disadvantaged groups within the realm of justice.
Efficiency and necessity
The earlier point of disagreement concerned the nature of justice as purely procedural versus outcome-based. But Nussbaum is also at odds with Rawls' view of justice as contingent. As we saw earlier, Rawls defines justice in terms of fair terms of agreement. But agreement, on this view, only makes sense under particular circumstances. These circumstances of justice require that individuals are roughly equal in power, that resources are scarce so that each individual's selfishness imposes some cost on others but not so scarce that collaboration is impossible, and that benevolence is insufficiently powerful to curtail our selfish predictions. The first of these conditions, of course, can never hold between the powerful and the vulnerable. Why should we form terms of agreement for the purpose of mutual advantage when one can dominate another anyway? Nussbaum rejects this entire picture of things. But to fully understand why and how, we must examine another point of disagreement.
Individuals and society
Rawls' views emanate from his conception of persons as "free, equal, and independent," so that we only have reason to enter political life when it helps our independent projects. This logic of sameness entails that other groups are excluded from political life. On the other hand, Nussbaum provides a conception of persons as needy, heterogeneous in needs and capabilities, and inherently interdependent. Echoing an Aristotelian and Marxian line of thought, Nussbaum presents the human being as a political animal. Much follows from this changed conception of human nature. Since we are naturally sociable, social living and thus the principles of justice that assess such living are necessary features of human life. Moreover, because our interests are interdependent and we are naturally sociable, we have more resources at our disposal than strategic thinking in grounding justice. As creatures possessing (limited) benevolence, we desire justice for its own sake, even if it does not advance our independent projects. This desire is limited, of course, and must be supplemented by rational reflection grounded in the dignity of the individual and ultimately in proper education. Thus, Nubbaum emerges with a radically transformed vision of human nature and political life, finding a midway between liberal individualism and collectivism by emphasizing not only the dignity of the individual but also the inherently social nature of the individual. Likewise, she is able to ground the inclusion of animals and other vulnerable grounds within the realm of justice on the grounds of our fundamental moral connections to them, rather than in tenuous schemes of mutual advantage.
[...]
December 19, 2019
Wow! Five stars! A stellar work, by a great moral philosopher, that profoundly advances our theory of justice and clarifies our obligations to the less fortunate.
"The social contract tradition has one big apparent advantage over the approach to basic justice that I have just defended. Namely, it does not require extensive benevolence. It derives political principles from the idea of mutual advantage, without assuming that human beings have deep and motivationally powerful ties to others" (408). Here Professor Nussbaum expresses the Pre-Modernist critique of "The Enlightenment Projects" great error. The ancients recognized the criticality of virtue in citizens and leaders. From Machiavelli, through Hobbes and Kant, to Smith thinkers moved to designing systems that would produce positive results without requiring virtuous citizens and leaders. We see the culmination--to date--of this tragic error in President Trump.
Professor Nussbaum's treatment of "Mutual Advantage and Global Inequality" provides a pellucid basis for understanding the inherent injustice of our response to Climate Change and why we are certain to fail.
"The Central Human Capabilities" (76-78).
"Very likely the arrangements we need to make to give justice to developing nations, and to people with severe impairments within our own nation, will be very expensive and will not be justifiable as mutually advantageous" (p. 89-90).
"I believe that Rawls cannot explain why the ones below the 'line' are owed justice rather than charity, without fundamentally modifying this aspect of his theory" (118).
"The good of others is not just a constraint on this person's pursuit of her own good, it is a part of her good" (158).
". . . I do not favor policies that would make unhealthy activities such as boxing, unsafe sex, football, and smoking illegal, although education about risk seems to be highly appropriate, . . ." (171).
"If enough of them are impossible (as in the case of a person in a persistent vegetative state), we may judge that the life is not a human life at all, any more" (181).
"The use of terms suggesting the inevitably and 'naturalness' of such impairments masks a refusal to spend enough money to change things on a large scale for people with impairments" (188).
"And my main contention will be that we cannot arrive at an adequate account of global justice by evisaging international cooperation as a contract for mutual advantage among parties similarly placed in a state of nature" (226).
"States, he holds, 'already have a lawful internal constitution, and have thus have outgrown the coercive right of others to subject them to a wider legal constution in accordance with their conception of right" (232).
"In the real world, however, we see this tactic for what it is: an arrogant mentality that is culpably unresponsive to grave problems" (236). This just is our response to Climate Change, which is consequentially unjust and certain to fail.
"Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind" is captured by the Rawls quote on p. 239-240.
"There is a striking parallel between the situation of poorer nations and the situation of people with disabilities" (250).
". . . . Kant in Perpetual Peace: a moral loathing of colonial domination and a related moral belief that one should respect the sovereignty of any nation that is organized in a sufficiently accountable way, whether or not its institutions are fully just" (256).
"Pogge and Beitz abhor such inequalities in basic life chances. To cope with them, providing a philosophical rationale for an ambitious commitment to global redistribution, is the whole point of their project" (269).
"Quite simply, our world is not a decent and minimally just world, unless we have secured ten capabilities, up to an appropriate threshold level, to all the world's people" (281).
"(Not it seems to me, is it possible to assert with confidence that a nation such as our own connot move in the opposite direction. Indeed, on many of the issues that concern Rawls, the United States has been moving further and further away from anything like concensus.)" (304). We were warned.
"It is far better to create a decent instructional and the to regard individuals as having delegated their personal ethical responsibility to the structure" (308).
"ix. Ten Principals for the Global Structure" (315)
"5. The main structures of the global economic order must be designed to be fair to poor and developing countries" (319). No attempt has been made to do this on climate change.
". . . . plus a tax on the industrial nations of the North to support the development of pollution controls in the South; . . ." (320).
"The meat industry brings countless animals into the world who would not have existed but for that" (345). If we give up beef and dairy, it is the bovine, not the human, population that will collapse. They domisticated us.
"The capabilities approach judges instead, with the biologist Aristotle, that there is something wonderful and wonder-inspiring in all the complex forms of life in nature" (347).
"(Cooperation itself will now assume multiple and complex forms)" (351). As in the cooperation between humans and domesticated animals.
"It is not a single conception at all, because the plurality of forms of life is very important to the whole idea" (356).
"What about the continuation of species? Here my answers are tentative, and I am sure they will not satisfy many thinkers about ecology" (357). 99 percent of all the species, that have existed on Earth, are extinct. Surely there is not a natural right to persist now. All of the cosmological, geological, and biological processes that shaped Earth are still active. The universe continues to evolve towards greater complexity. It would be pure hubris to think that any existing species represents some end state.
". . . . it holds that the frustration of certain tendencies is not only compatible with flourishing, but actually required by it" (366). That is something I need to work on.
"(Competitive sports probably play a related role in human life.)" (371). In my youth I was acutely aware of how much of my love of basketball was from banging under the hoop, the sheer joy of running with the pack (on the fast break), etc.
"We have a strict duty not to commit bad acts, but we have no corresponding strict duty to stop hunger or disease or to give money to promote their cessation" (372).
"Nature is not just, and species are not all nice. . . . Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist traditions contain many elements of what I recommend, as did early Platonism. But Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and most people's secular comprehensive doctrines rank the human species metaphysically above other species and give the human secure rights to the use of animals for many purposes" (390).
"The social contract tradition has one big apparent advantage over the approach to basic justice that I have just defended. Namely, it does not require extensive benevolence. It derives political principles from the idea of mutual advantage, without assuming that human beings have deep and motivationally powerful ties to others" (408). Here Professor Nussbaum expresses the Pre-Modernist critique of "The Enlightenment Projects" great error. The ancients recognized the criticality of virtue in citizens and leaders. From Machiavelli, through Hobbes and Kant, to Smith thinkers moved to designing systems that would produce positive results without requiring virtuous citizens and leaders. We see the culmination--to date--of this tragic error in President Trump.
Professor Nussbaum's treatment of "Mutual Advantage and Global Inequality" provides a pellucid basis for understanding the inherent injustice of our response to Climate Change and why we are certain to fail.
"The Central Human Capabilities" (76-78).
"Very likely the arrangements we need to make to give justice to developing nations, and to people with severe impairments within our own nation, will be very expensive and will not be justifiable as mutually advantageous" (p. 89-90).
"I believe that Rawls cannot explain why the ones below the 'line' are owed justice rather than charity, without fundamentally modifying this aspect of his theory" (118).
"The good of others is not just a constraint on this person's pursuit of her own good, it is a part of her good" (158).
". . . I do not favor policies that would make unhealthy activities such as boxing, unsafe sex, football, and smoking illegal, although education about risk seems to be highly appropriate, . . ." (171).
"If enough of them are impossible (as in the case of a person in a persistent vegetative state), we may judge that the life is not a human life at all, any more" (181).
"The use of terms suggesting the inevitably and 'naturalness' of such impairments masks a refusal to spend enough money to change things on a large scale for people with impairments" (188).
"And my main contention will be that we cannot arrive at an adequate account of global justice by evisaging international cooperation as a contract for mutual advantage among parties similarly placed in a state of nature" (226).
"States, he holds, 'already have a lawful internal constitution, and have thus have outgrown the coercive right of others to subject them to a wider legal constution in accordance with their conception of right" (232).
"In the real world, however, we see this tactic for what it is: an arrogant mentality that is culpably unresponsive to grave problems" (236). This just is our response to Climate Change, which is consequentially unjust and certain to fail.
"Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind" is captured by the Rawls quote on p. 239-240.
"There is a striking parallel between the situation of poorer nations and the situation of people with disabilities" (250).
". . . . Kant in Perpetual Peace: a moral loathing of colonial domination and a related moral belief that one should respect the sovereignty of any nation that is organized in a sufficiently accountable way, whether or not its institutions are fully just" (256).
"Pogge and Beitz abhor such inequalities in basic life chances. To cope with them, providing a philosophical rationale for an ambitious commitment to global redistribution, is the whole point of their project" (269).
"Quite simply, our world is not a decent and minimally just world, unless we have secured ten capabilities, up to an appropriate threshold level, to all the world's people" (281).
"(Not it seems to me, is it possible to assert with confidence that a nation such as our own connot move in the opposite direction. Indeed, on many of the issues that concern Rawls, the United States has been moving further and further away from anything like concensus.)" (304). We were warned.
"It is far better to create a decent instructional and the to regard individuals as having delegated their personal ethical responsibility to the structure" (308).
"ix. Ten Principals for the Global Structure" (315)
"5. The main structures of the global economic order must be designed to be fair to poor and developing countries" (319). No attempt has been made to do this on climate change.
". . . . plus a tax on the industrial nations of the North to support the development of pollution controls in the South; . . ." (320).
"The meat industry brings countless animals into the world who would not have existed but for that" (345). If we give up beef and dairy, it is the bovine, not the human, population that will collapse. They domisticated us.
"The capabilities approach judges instead, with the biologist Aristotle, that there is something wonderful and wonder-inspiring in all the complex forms of life in nature" (347).
"(Cooperation itself will now assume multiple and complex forms)" (351). As in the cooperation between humans and domesticated animals.
"It is not a single conception at all, because the plurality of forms of life is very important to the whole idea" (356).
"What about the continuation of species? Here my answers are tentative, and I am sure they will not satisfy many thinkers about ecology" (357). 99 percent of all the species, that have existed on Earth, are extinct. Surely there is not a natural right to persist now. All of the cosmological, geological, and biological processes that shaped Earth are still active. The universe continues to evolve towards greater complexity. It would be pure hubris to think that any existing species represents some end state.
". . . . it holds that the frustration of certain tendencies is not only compatible with flourishing, but actually required by it" (366). That is something I need to work on.
"(Competitive sports probably play a related role in human life.)" (371). In my youth I was acutely aware of how much of my love of basketball was from banging under the hoop, the sheer joy of running with the pack (on the fast break), etc.
"We have a strict duty not to commit bad acts, but we have no corresponding strict duty to stop hunger or disease or to give money to promote their cessation" (372).
"Nature is not just, and species are not all nice. . . . Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist traditions contain many elements of what I recommend, as did early Platonism. But Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and most people's secular comprehensive doctrines rank the human species metaphysically above other species and give the human secure rights to the use of animals for many purposes" (390).
February 11, 2024
I believe she succeeded in using "philosophical argument to open the windows of our imaginations," as she writes in her very last paragraph. Specifically, the "extension of sentiments required by the normative project" of the book. Nussbaum refers to Rawls' Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism a lot, but modifies it significantly. Her goal is to present a theory of ethics based on capabilities and makes a point of extending it to the disabled, animals, and I think with the greatest difficulty to nations as well. Rawls and most contractarians limit the initial agreement to a social contract to individuals of roughly equal power and cognitive ability. She won me over that any ethical theory, even an abstract one which she acknowledges she is presenting, must take into account most life forms. I'm rather embarrassed that I never thought much about the justice (not charity) of enabling people with disabilities to achieve their natural capabilities. Although I've been a vegetarian for many years, it was more of an instinctual impulse, I just didn't want to cause pain to animals. But her capabilities approach to justice offers a systematic approach to thinking about animals that goes beyond simply not wanting to cause animals pain. It was a welcome education that I got--and I'm sure many animal rights supporters would also benefit from this part of the book.
The chapter entitled "Mutual Advantage and Global Inequality" will likely cause the greatest unease nowadays as we are in the middle of a backlash against "global elites" and the perception that they are promoting a transnationalism which would put a serious strain on national sovereignty. Correctly pointing out the huge wealth difference between nations, many with GDP per capita of one-third and some with far less of that of the United States and that we are "in a world in which the power of the global market and of multinational corporations has considerably eroded the power and autonomy of nations" there is a case to be made for some kind of international redistribution of wealth. As Nussbaum writes, "the whole idea that our transnational duties involve matters of war and peace only, and not matters of economic justice, may be questioned as both inadequate and, possibly, incoherent (in the sense that the adequate pursuit of global peace almost certainly involves economic redistribution)."
To the extent that a supranational entity would have to oversee such matters, any such redistribution will go against social contract theories which "take the nation-state as their basic unit" and should enter agreements with each other only for maintaining peace, as in Kant's foedus pacificuum. In Rawls's case, this view of international relations can be seen by his "refusal to consider substantial material redistribution across national boundaries." In other words he assumes a state of "fixity and finality" of nation-states. Nussbaum believes that states do not just pursue their self-interest, but are also moral entities. Unfortunately, she seems to think that unequal nations have no self-interested reason to cooperate and therefore any cooperation between unequal nations must be based on something other than pursuing a state's national interest. I fail to see why that should be so. Much trade occurs between unequal trading partners and it would seem the theory of comparative advantage would often be in operation at the nation-state level. Nussbaum recognizes the value of national traditions and somewhere does say she doesn't want a world state (phew!) but trying to figure out when intervention is justified or not doesn't seem very easy. In section ix. of Chapter 5 she lists "ten principles for the global structure" which can be a basis of intervening in a sovereign state under certain circumstances. She certainly doesn't give a blueprint of the why and when since she writes that she wants to maintain her arguments at the abstract level. Much of the responsibility will fall on institutions, such as NGOs or some voluntary associations because she writes that "nations and corporations have powers of prediction and foresight that individuals in isolation do not have." That seems so reasonable until you consider how many of these organizations seem to be fronts for exploiting developing countries.
Finally, though Nussbaum pays much lip service to the costs of her capabilities approach, both considered at the individual level and the national level, I just don't think she can skip details in this case. Financial objections are the biggest stumbling block in helping others. She should have addressed it in some way. Nonetheless, her book is inspiring should foster more detailed examination of our responsibilities towards others (including animals) and how to go about it.
The chapter entitled "Mutual Advantage and Global Inequality" will likely cause the greatest unease nowadays as we are in the middle of a backlash against "global elites" and the perception that they are promoting a transnationalism which would put a serious strain on national sovereignty. Correctly pointing out the huge wealth difference between nations, many with GDP per capita of one-third and some with far less of that of the United States and that we are "in a world in which the power of the global market and of multinational corporations has considerably eroded the power and autonomy of nations" there is a case to be made for some kind of international redistribution of wealth. As Nussbaum writes, "the whole idea that our transnational duties involve matters of war and peace only, and not matters of economic justice, may be questioned as both inadequate and, possibly, incoherent (in the sense that the adequate pursuit of global peace almost certainly involves economic redistribution)."
To the extent that a supranational entity would have to oversee such matters, any such redistribution will go against social contract theories which "take the nation-state as their basic unit" and should enter agreements with each other only for maintaining peace, as in Kant's foedus pacificuum. In Rawls's case, this view of international relations can be seen by his "refusal to consider substantial material redistribution across national boundaries." In other words he assumes a state of "fixity and finality" of nation-states. Nussbaum believes that states do not just pursue their self-interest, but are also moral entities. Unfortunately, she seems to think that unequal nations have no self-interested reason to cooperate and therefore any cooperation between unequal nations must be based on something other than pursuing a state's national interest. I fail to see why that should be so. Much trade occurs between unequal trading partners and it would seem the theory of comparative advantage would often be in operation at the nation-state level. Nussbaum recognizes the value of national traditions and somewhere does say she doesn't want a world state (phew!) but trying to figure out when intervention is justified or not doesn't seem very easy. In section ix. of Chapter 5 she lists "ten principles for the global structure" which can be a basis of intervening in a sovereign state under certain circumstances. She certainly doesn't give a blueprint of the why and when since she writes that she wants to maintain her arguments at the abstract level. Much of the responsibility will fall on institutions, such as NGOs or some voluntary associations because she writes that "nations and corporations have powers of prediction and foresight that individuals in isolation do not have." That seems so reasonable until you consider how many of these organizations seem to be fronts for exploiting developing countries.
Finally, though Nussbaum pays much lip service to the costs of her capabilities approach, both considered at the individual level and the national level, I just don't think she can skip details in this case. Financial objections are the biggest stumbling block in helping others. She should have addressed it in some way. Nonetheless, her book is inspiring should foster more detailed examination of our responsibilities towards others (including animals) and how to go about it.
September 6, 2023
Il libro mi è piaciuto molto, anche se non ho letto "Diventare Persone", che pare essere una sorta di radice di questo lavoro. Sono abbastanza rawlsiano, e apprezzo sempre chi cerca di glossarne i risultati, anche con intento polemico. L'approccio delle capacità è interessante e sostanzialmente condivisibile, e punta chiaramente a tre puncti dolentes della teoria della giustizia di Rawls, ossia la considerazione di animali, disabili e giustizia transnazionale. Per quanto la teoria di Rawls rimanga elegantissima, questi tre problemi rimangono e rischiano, se non affrontati, di far crollare tutto il castello. Consigliatissimo.
October 26, 2024
It is beyond me how one can first develop an approach to animal justice based on capabilities, consciously sidestep utilitarianism, even explicitly argue for bodily integrity, health, play, control over one’s environment on behalf of animals and still not condemn factory farming and animal testing.
to-keep-reference
October 12, 2018Citado en el artículo de Comim de Capabilities and Happiness.
May 6, 2019
I love Martha Nussbaum. in full agreement of everything. capabilities approach. subtle feminist plugs. brilliant arguments. queen of political philosophy!!
September 23, 2019
A very good book but it did not address the most difficult frontier of all for theories of justice: space
May 4, 2022
Hablando sobre zooética, Nussbaum ofrece una solución a la pregunta de cuáles derechos para cuáles animales. Además ofrece una buena explicación sobre las teorías contractualistas.
November 15, 2024
Detailed consideration of the capabilities approach to these three moral questions with reference to issues in Rawls.
August 13, 2023
Desarrollo del enfoque de las capacidades de Nussbaum enfocado, fundamentalmente, a las cuestiones que la autora considera no fueron solventadas por Rawls y su teoría de la justicia. Presenta un análisis muy interesante de la cuestión de la justicia en relación con las personas con discapacidades y los animales no humanos.
April 4, 2012
We live in a world of a growing tide of democracy with open and public reasoning, a tide that brings great promise for human development. And yet various kinds of deep injustice prevail. Is this because our institutions set up to bring justice have failed to deliver, or is it something more deep-rooted, some flaw in foundational aspects of justice? This book goes deep and thorough into the theories of justice as applied to three frontier areas that remain the serious examples of failures of justice in the public sphere: justice for mentally and physically disabled people, global justice transcending national boundaries, and the justice for animals (and nature) crossing species boundaries. Martha Nussbaum, writing cogently and with clarity, has done a wonderful job in bringing a thoughtful and informed discussion on these issues to the fore.
The prevailing theory and approach to justice, one most frequently attributed to John Rawls, is the 'social contract' tradition. This derives principles of justice as emerging from a social contract for mutual advantage among normal people who are nominally equal, independent, and rational, and who evolve these principles in an idealised impartial manner. Nussbaum argues that this approach, although with some strengths of its own, fails or is insufficient in important ways in all three frontier areas of justice. The alternative she proposes, based on the 'capabilities approach' that she and Amartya Sen have applied to human development issues, shows greater promise. This book provides a much better written and argued account of the contrast between these two approaches to justice than Amartya Sen's The Idea of Justice (my review: http://www.goodreads.com/review/show/...). The book is additionally illuminating by its careful explanation of the underlying philosophy and its attention to well-chosen examples from the real world.
(... to be continued...)
The prevailing theory and approach to justice, one most frequently attributed to John Rawls, is the 'social contract' tradition. This derives principles of justice as emerging from a social contract for mutual advantage among normal people who are nominally equal, independent, and rational, and who evolve these principles in an idealised impartial manner. Nussbaum argues that this approach, although with some strengths of its own, fails or is insufficient in important ways in all three frontier areas of justice. The alternative she proposes, based on the 'capabilities approach' that she and Amartya Sen have applied to human development issues, shows greater promise. This book provides a much better written and argued account of the contrast between these two approaches to justice than Amartya Sen's The Idea of Justice (my review: http://www.goodreads.com/review/show/...). The book is additionally illuminating by its careful explanation of the underlying philosophy and its attention to well-chosen examples from the real world.
(... to be continued...)
October 23, 2007
The book provides a really good vision of what she calls a minimally just society. She wants to bring all people up to a line that we would call a bare minimum for full functioning within the human community. She deals with disabilities in a very creative way. Instead of setting a different level, she chooses to operate on what she calls the species norm. She says that because they are human, they are not simply an advanced form of primate, as some philosophers want to suggest. People with severely crippling mental disabilities would not be satisfied living in a community of primates, they have capabilities that exceed this. Therefore, while we should push for their full fulfillment as per the list of human capabilities, we may have to accept that they will not be able to acheive them; however, that does not limit our responsibility to attempt to bring them to that level.
While I think the book is excellent for the idea of a minimally just society, I think she leaves out an incredibly important aspect of justice. There is no framework in her book to account for significant disparities over the line of minimal functioning. She admits that this is a problem, but she doesn't seem to realize how problematic it is. For this reason, I think it would be fantastic to attempt to come up with a framework where we use her theory as the baseline proposal and then something like Parecon to rest over top of that and balance out inequities based on a pure theory of what one deserves. Parecon has nothing to say for people with extreme disabilities. Albert admits this and puts it off as not a question of justice, but rather a question of care. Nussbaum makes an incredible case for these being questions of justice. For that reason I think a combination of the two approaches could create a theory of justice that everyone would be willing to fight for.
While I think the book is excellent for the idea of a minimally just society, I think she leaves out an incredibly important aspect of justice. There is no framework in her book to account for significant disparities over the line of minimal functioning. She admits that this is a problem, but she doesn't seem to realize how problematic it is. For this reason, I think it would be fantastic to attempt to come up with a framework where we use her theory as the baseline proposal and then something like Parecon to rest over top of that and balance out inequities based on a pure theory of what one deserves. Parecon has nothing to say for people with extreme disabilities. Albert admits this and puts it off as not a question of justice, but rather a question of care. Nussbaum makes an incredible case for these being questions of justice. For that reason I think a combination of the two approaches could create a theory of justice that everyone would be willing to fight for.
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July 15, 2015Uma das abordagens mais interessantes de justiça que já li. Sua proposta de justiça baseada na abordagem das capacitações não tem como proposta uma simples nivelamento da sociedade com ideais utópicos. Ela parte do pressuposto de que todas as pessoas possuem propriedades intrínsecas que em diferentes etapas e situações da vida precisam ser suportadas. Quando as pessoas recebem o suporte de que necessitam para, digamos assim, tirar o máximo de si mesmas, elas conseguem atingir seus alvos pessoais, ou pelo menos alvos minimos comuns a todos os seres humanos, para que tenham uma vida digna que valha a pena ser vivida, nas palavras da autora. Apesar da teoria do bem ser alicerçada num certo otimismo antropológico, justamente se contrapondo ao pessimismo de Rawls, podemos aprender muito desta abordagem de justiça, especialmente sobre como construir uma sociedade plural, livre e democrática e ao mesmo tempo justa e a favor da vida.
June 21, 2013
Nussbaum is a wonderfully clear writer (for a philosopher!). She explores questions that have bedeviled contemporary prescriptivist and Kantian moral philosophers, and does so from a perspective relying on both Aristotle and Marx. She calls her approach a "capabilities approach", and it greatly illumines questions about disability, nationality and species membership. While I think her account is very nuanced and careful, there are some moral issues where I would be curious about how her theory could be applied, e.g., abortion and end-of-life questions. But in any event this book is refreshing breeze amid the current analytically inspired theories.
August 16, 2011
An interesting expansion/modification of justice as fairness to tackle concern for the physically and mentally disabled, global justice and animals. It seems to me that Nussbaum tries to have her cake and eat it, too, and that Rawls (or social contract theories, generally) is perhaps not as useless for addressing these questions as she makes him out to be.
December 3, 2013
I've only read the bit on species membership, but that part laid out a solid introduction to how Nussbaum's neo-Aristotelianish capabilities approach can help us think about the lives and interests of nonhuman animals.
May 4, 2015
Zeer sterk en goed pleidooi om mensen met fysieke en/of mentale stoornissen, mensen uit alle landen en streken, en dieren te beschouwen als wezens die respect en waardering verdienen, waardigheid bezitten en waar men rechtvaardig tegenover dient te zijn.
December 18, 2016
Read through to the end of the disability section (which is what I picked this up for). More social contract studies than disability studies, which I hadn't been expecting but that's fine. Some interesting ideas marred by the author's all-or-nothing approach to being disabled.
April 23, 2009
Have to read for POLS 654.
May 20, 2014
Not overly accessible, but forgivable considering the abstract and difficult subject matter. Provocative and important. Nussbaum is an American treasure.
December 3, 2008
Genius. This book sets forth the capabilites approach
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