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The Summit: The Biggest Battle of the Second World War - fought behind closed doors
The idea of world leaders gathering in the midst of economic crisis has become all-too familiar. But the summit at Bretton Woods in 1944 was the only time countries from around the world have agreed to overhaul the structure of the international monetary system. And, what's more, they were successful - it was the closest to perfection the world's economy has ever been, and arguably the demise of the Bretton Woods system is behind our present woes.
This was no dry economic conference. The delegates spent half the time at each other's throats, and the other half drinking in the hotel bar. The Russians nearly capsized the entire project. The French threatened to walk out, repeatedly. John Maynard Keynes had a heart attack. His American counterpart was a KGB spy. But this summit could be instrumental in preventing World War Three.
Drawing on a wealth of unpublished accounts, diaries and oral histories, this brilliant book describes the conference in stunning colour and clarity. Bringing to life the characters, events and economics and written with exceptional verve and narrative pace, this is an extraordinarily accomplished work of history from a talented new writer.
This was no dry economic conference. The delegates spent half the time at each other's throats, and the other half drinking in the hotel bar. The Russians nearly capsized the entire project. The French threatened to walk out, repeatedly. John Maynard Keynes had a heart attack. His American counterpart was a KGB spy. But this summit could be instrumental in preventing World War Three.
Drawing on a wealth of unpublished accounts, diaries and oral histories, this brilliant book describes the conference in stunning colour and clarity. Bringing to life the characters, events and economics and written with exceptional verve and narrative pace, this is an extraordinarily accomplished work of history from a talented new writer.
481 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2014
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 48 reviews
February 7, 2017
Firmly a new favorite in ... dare one say popular ... economics. The global monetary system is a topic hardly likely to produce a page-turner but Conway has written a social history that is never dull, rarely dismal, and yet honest and intelligent. Little wonder inspiration came while attending a course at Harvard. Keynes and White are the central antagonists; their triumphs and anxieties, the national jealousies, and the tragedy of errors that undermine and uphold the Bretton Woods system make for the bulk of the discussion. Conway reserves commentary for the final chapters so events tell the story. It ends in the same place it begins which leaves a pleasing sense of symmetry. I hope, as the author seems to promise his agent in the acknowledgements, that he will be writing another. Soonish.
April 6, 2017
It’s unlikely that a general reader would pick up a book on economic history, and this one — with a bland main title and not one but two off-putting subtitles — would appear to be a work that only an economist could love. It’s not. The dramatic interplay of personalities that Ed Conway brings to light in The Summit is entertaining enough to please any devotee of serious historical fiction.
At its core, The Summit relates the stormy relationship between two towering personalities, John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White. Representing the UK, Keynes was the world’s most famous economist and a certified celebrity to boot. He is still widely regarded as the most important economist of the 20th Century. White, little known to the public before Bretton Woods and not much more so afterwards, was his counterpart heading up the US delegation on behalf of the Treasury. Together, these two men managed against all odds to put in place the world’s first global economic system in the waning days of World War II — a system whose surviving remnants include the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The mechanisms negotiated at the Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire in 1944 never truly worked as Keynes and White intended, but they did help accomplish the overarching goal of the conference: to maintain world economic stability up until Richard Nixon upended the system in 1973 by taking the US off the gold standard.
The details of these events, and of the tense negotiations that led up to them, are to be found in abundance in The Summit. Far more engaging, though — and no doubt more memorable — are the portraits Conway paints of Keynes and White. If you think people are necessarily boring if they study economics, you should read this book. It would be difficult to dream up two more fascinating people.
John Maynard Keynes was, by all accounts (including his own), a genius. Fresh out of the Versailles Peace Conference that ended World War I, his bestselling book The Economic Consequences of the Peace foresaw with rare prescience the economic turbulence of the 1920s and 30s and the likelihood of a second war. His General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, published in 1936, is often compared to Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations as one of the most consequential books of modern times.
But these accomplishments, and many more, were only part of Keynes’ story. Friends and foes alike considered him an asshole. He was crude, rude, arrogant, overbearing, and disdainful of practically everyone else except his long-suffering celebrity wife, the former prima ballerina of Ballets Russes. As a young man, Conway notes, hurrying along a outside with a colleague, he announced that he needed to urinate and, without stopping, unzipped his pants, pulled out his penis, and blithely dribbled urine all along the way between his legs — continuing to talk all the while. His often unspeakably bad behavior manifested itself under far more serious circumstances as well. For example, on several occasions, when he was dispatched by the British government to negotiate with the US, he so thoroughly alienated his counterparts that, had he not been accompanied by more temperate members of his delegation, he might have torpedoed the US-UK alliance.
Harry Dexter White, unknown by comparison, was brilliant, too. He was also almost equally capable of alienating those he worked with. He, and to be fair his progressive policies, made sworn enemies within the State Department, which frequently complicated and sometimes undermined international negotiations. He was also a Soviet spy. Though not a Communist, he shared the prevailing view within the American Left from the 1930s through the end of World War II that the USSR was advancing the interests of humanity. However, unlike most other progressives, White found his way into the arms of the NKVD (predecessor to the KGB and today’s FSB). Over the years, he handed over reams of sensitive documents to his handler in the Soviet Embassy — though, reportedly, nothing top secret. Following World War II, White was caught up in the Red Scare sweeping the country and driven from his government job.
It was inevitable that these two personalities would clash — the hard-driving son of poor Jewish immigrants and the Cambridge-educated son of an esteemed economics professor and a social reformer.
Ed Conway, a journalist, is the Economics Editor of Sky News, the 24-hour TV news service in the UK controlled by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation. The Summit is Conway’s second book.
At its core, The Summit relates the stormy relationship between two towering personalities, John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White. Representing the UK, Keynes was the world’s most famous economist and a certified celebrity to boot. He is still widely regarded as the most important economist of the 20th Century. White, little known to the public before Bretton Woods and not much more so afterwards, was his counterpart heading up the US delegation on behalf of the Treasury. Together, these two men managed against all odds to put in place the world’s first global economic system in the waning days of World War II — a system whose surviving remnants include the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The mechanisms negotiated at the Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire in 1944 never truly worked as Keynes and White intended, but they did help accomplish the overarching goal of the conference: to maintain world economic stability up until Richard Nixon upended the system in 1973 by taking the US off the gold standard.
The details of these events, and of the tense negotiations that led up to them, are to be found in abundance in The Summit. Far more engaging, though — and no doubt more memorable — are the portraits Conway paints of Keynes and White. If you think people are necessarily boring if they study economics, you should read this book. It would be difficult to dream up two more fascinating people.
John Maynard Keynes was, by all accounts (including his own), a genius. Fresh out of the Versailles Peace Conference that ended World War I, his bestselling book The Economic Consequences of the Peace foresaw with rare prescience the economic turbulence of the 1920s and 30s and the likelihood of a second war. His General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, published in 1936, is often compared to Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations as one of the most consequential books of modern times.
But these accomplishments, and many more, were only part of Keynes’ story. Friends and foes alike considered him an asshole. He was crude, rude, arrogant, overbearing, and disdainful of practically everyone else except his long-suffering celebrity wife, the former prima ballerina of Ballets Russes. As a young man, Conway notes, hurrying along a outside with a colleague, he announced that he needed to urinate and, without stopping, unzipped his pants, pulled out his penis, and blithely dribbled urine all along the way between his legs — continuing to talk all the while. His often unspeakably bad behavior manifested itself under far more serious circumstances as well. For example, on several occasions, when he was dispatched by the British government to negotiate with the US, he so thoroughly alienated his counterparts that, had he not been accompanied by more temperate members of his delegation, he might have torpedoed the US-UK alliance.
Harry Dexter White, unknown by comparison, was brilliant, too. He was also almost equally capable of alienating those he worked with. He, and to be fair his progressive policies, made sworn enemies within the State Department, which frequently complicated and sometimes undermined international negotiations. He was also a Soviet spy. Though not a Communist, he shared the prevailing view within the American Left from the 1930s through the end of World War II that the USSR was advancing the interests of humanity. However, unlike most other progressives, White found his way into the arms of the NKVD (predecessor to the KGB and today’s FSB). Over the years, he handed over reams of sensitive documents to his handler in the Soviet Embassy — though, reportedly, nothing top secret. Following World War II, White was caught up in the Red Scare sweeping the country and driven from his government job.
It was inevitable that these two personalities would clash — the hard-driving son of poor Jewish immigrants and the Cambridge-educated son of an esteemed economics professor and a social reformer.
Ed Conway, a journalist, is the Economics Editor of Sky News, the 24-hour TV news service in the UK controlled by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation. The Summit is Conway’s second book.
April 30, 2025
It's quite an achievement to write a pageturner on a financial policy conference, covering the human drama roller-coaster while remaining intellectually rigorous when the economics is discussed. It's a masterpiece.
November 21, 2015
Conway’s book is a fascinating tale about the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference that transformed the failed international economic order of the 1920s and 30s into the international economic system that was the engine of the post-World War II recovery and prosperity. Two intertwined narrative lines tell the story. One is of the rise of the two dueling personalities that dominated the conference, John Maynard Keynes of Britain and Harry Dexter White of the U.S. Treasury. The other is the historical arc of events from the 1919 Paris Peace Conference—a great disaster—to the Bretton Woods conference—an enduring success—twenty-five years later.
The Paris Peace Conference was the dark original sin of the twentieth century, the misanthropic victors’ justice that poisoned the fields from which a wounded world population, battered by a terrible war, had hoped that a deserved prosperity would spring from the sacrifices so bravely born. Instead, international leaders came to Paris and plowed salt into their own fields in a vengeance-crazed desired to impose a Carthaginian peace on defeated Germany.
There are two possible responses to the end of war: one is revenge and the other is to rebuild the economies and societies for everyone’s benefit. With regard to rebuilding, success demands that both victor and vanquished be rebuilt. The job can’t be half done. They are two sides of the same coin. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 went the first way and got it wrong. The Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 went the second way and midwifed decades of worldwide economic progress. A side observation is that the Bush administration in the wake of its 2003 Iraq invasion got it all wrong all over again, not even understanding that meaningful economic growth was even relevant to the Middle East when its absence had been a driver of much of the misery in the region for decades.
Conway then introduces a key fact to understanding the origins of the policy failure at Paris: President Woodrow Wilson did not bring a written draft of a peace treaty with him to Paris. The US economy came out of the war as the economic giant, the dollar dominated international finance in an unprecedented manner. But the Americans did not bring a written plan, the cardinal sin of conference going. The conference unfolded debating deeply flawed British and French proposals. The process never recovered; a policy debate on a positive trajectory never occurred. The forlornness of this failure was captured ten years later by Ernest Hemingway in the bleak and tragic ending of his novel “A Farewell to Arms,” the literary crescendo echoing the failure of a generation’s sacrifice.
After the poisonous policy of crippling reparations on Germany, the big legacy from Paris was the return to the gold standard and the economic straightjacket of fixed exchange rates. Economy after economy buckled in the early 1930s as monetary rigidity put millions of people out of work across Europe and America. Conway provides a lucid discussion of the gold standard and fixed-exchange rate systems. No reader would want to live in a country locked into one of these regimes. One can clearly see from this discussion that the current European currency union is a repetition of old sins and the substitution of hubris for hard-eyed economic analysis. Too much unemployment is a foreordained outcome of fixed exchange systems—and Europe is awash with underemployed resources.
For Bretton Woods in 1944, two principal goals were on the agenda: devising a postwar international exchange system less prone to crisis and a financial institution to finance international reconstruction and development. Avoiding a large postwar depression was an immediate goal. The two goals resulted in two agenda items. First, was the formation of the International Monetary Fund to regulate international exchange rates and provide a fireman to contain exchange rate crises. The other new institution to be birthed was the World Bank. There was uncertainty over what its basic mission of the Bank would be: was it to be a reconstruction bank—rebuild devastated Europe—or a development bank—start the developing economies on the road to advancement?
The IMF was the larger and more contentious of the two projects and this is where the Americans under Harry Dexter White differed most sharply with John Maynard Keynes and the British. White and the Americans—with the world’s most powerful economy under their feet—kept control over the process of developing the IMF while Keynes was delegated less controversial role of bringing forth the World Bank.
The British had very pragmatic immediate concerns about the IMF. The dominions of the British empire were chock full of sterling balances as a result of exporting supplies and money to Britain during the war and these sterling balances were effectively “blocked” and not convertible into currencies which could be used to buy goods in the world economy. If these blocked balances were freed, then sterling as an international reserve currency would be finished. A startling realization that Conway makes clear is that the United Kingdom was a massive debtor and that the dominions and protectorates of the empire were massive creditors. This financial imbalance by itself was bound to drive the end of empire.
The other issue was that Britain felt it needed to retain the sovereign decision on how much it might devalue sterling in the future to help British industry regain competitiveness in the postwar world. One can see that the Americans were correct in not letting these British concerns overly shape the design of the new IMF; broad international goals could not be subverted by parochial British interests. Churchill in particularly still clung to the hope that Britain would be able to keep and sustain its vast empire after the war—but literally Britain’s own sterling debts to the empire argued for breakup.
Ultimately, the World Bank did not refinance European reconstruction; the Marshall Plan did. And large European devaluations set off by the premature release of sterling onto to the wild seas of convertibility in the late 1940s rocked the international monetary boat no end. But over time ad hoc measures and reconfigurations of the basic structure provided the necessary resiliency for the modified Bretton Woods regime to flourish. It lasted up to the early 1970s when the US unhooked the dollar from gold and the world entered a system of floating exchange rates.
Ed Conway has made a valued addition to the burgeoning field of popular international economic history, the salient force shaping of the world in which we live.
The Paris Peace Conference was the dark original sin of the twentieth century, the misanthropic victors’ justice that poisoned the fields from which a wounded world population, battered by a terrible war, had hoped that a deserved prosperity would spring from the sacrifices so bravely born. Instead, international leaders came to Paris and plowed salt into their own fields in a vengeance-crazed desired to impose a Carthaginian peace on defeated Germany.
There are two possible responses to the end of war: one is revenge and the other is to rebuild the economies and societies for everyone’s benefit. With regard to rebuilding, success demands that both victor and vanquished be rebuilt. The job can’t be half done. They are two sides of the same coin. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 went the first way and got it wrong. The Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 went the second way and midwifed decades of worldwide economic progress. A side observation is that the Bush administration in the wake of its 2003 Iraq invasion got it all wrong all over again, not even understanding that meaningful economic growth was even relevant to the Middle East when its absence had been a driver of much of the misery in the region for decades.
Conway then introduces a key fact to understanding the origins of the policy failure at Paris: President Woodrow Wilson did not bring a written draft of a peace treaty with him to Paris. The US economy came out of the war as the economic giant, the dollar dominated international finance in an unprecedented manner. But the Americans did not bring a written plan, the cardinal sin of conference going. The conference unfolded debating deeply flawed British and French proposals. The process never recovered; a policy debate on a positive trajectory never occurred. The forlornness of this failure was captured ten years later by Ernest Hemingway in the bleak and tragic ending of his novel “A Farewell to Arms,” the literary crescendo echoing the failure of a generation’s sacrifice.
After the poisonous policy of crippling reparations on Germany, the big legacy from Paris was the return to the gold standard and the economic straightjacket of fixed exchange rates. Economy after economy buckled in the early 1930s as monetary rigidity put millions of people out of work across Europe and America. Conway provides a lucid discussion of the gold standard and fixed-exchange rate systems. No reader would want to live in a country locked into one of these regimes. One can clearly see from this discussion that the current European currency union is a repetition of old sins and the substitution of hubris for hard-eyed economic analysis. Too much unemployment is a foreordained outcome of fixed exchange systems—and Europe is awash with underemployed resources.
For Bretton Woods in 1944, two principal goals were on the agenda: devising a postwar international exchange system less prone to crisis and a financial institution to finance international reconstruction and development. Avoiding a large postwar depression was an immediate goal. The two goals resulted in two agenda items. First, was the formation of the International Monetary Fund to regulate international exchange rates and provide a fireman to contain exchange rate crises. The other new institution to be birthed was the World Bank. There was uncertainty over what its basic mission of the Bank would be: was it to be a reconstruction bank—rebuild devastated Europe—or a development bank—start the developing economies on the road to advancement?
The IMF was the larger and more contentious of the two projects and this is where the Americans under Harry Dexter White differed most sharply with John Maynard Keynes and the British. White and the Americans—with the world’s most powerful economy under their feet—kept control over the process of developing the IMF while Keynes was delegated less controversial role of bringing forth the World Bank.
The British had very pragmatic immediate concerns about the IMF. The dominions of the British empire were chock full of sterling balances as a result of exporting supplies and money to Britain during the war and these sterling balances were effectively “blocked” and not convertible into currencies which could be used to buy goods in the world economy. If these blocked balances were freed, then sterling as an international reserve currency would be finished. A startling realization that Conway makes clear is that the United Kingdom was a massive debtor and that the dominions and protectorates of the empire were massive creditors. This financial imbalance by itself was bound to drive the end of empire.
The other issue was that Britain felt it needed to retain the sovereign decision on how much it might devalue sterling in the future to help British industry regain competitiveness in the postwar world. One can see that the Americans were correct in not letting these British concerns overly shape the design of the new IMF; broad international goals could not be subverted by parochial British interests. Churchill in particularly still clung to the hope that Britain would be able to keep and sustain its vast empire after the war—but literally Britain’s own sterling debts to the empire argued for breakup.
Ultimately, the World Bank did not refinance European reconstruction; the Marshall Plan did. And large European devaluations set off by the premature release of sterling onto to the wild seas of convertibility in the late 1940s rocked the international monetary boat no end. But over time ad hoc measures and reconfigurations of the basic structure provided the necessary resiliency for the modified Bretton Woods regime to flourish. It lasted up to the early 1970s when the US unhooked the dollar from gold and the world entered a system of floating exchange rates.
Ed Conway has made a valued addition to the burgeoning field of popular international economic history, the salient force shaping of the world in which we live.
November 6, 2023
A fascinating, and easily understood account of the creation of the post WWIi economic order which, we are still living with. One of the great strengths of this book is that it places plans for what happened after the war back within the story of WWII. What happened at Bretton Woods in 1944 had far greater consequences then the far better know stories of battles and political decisions that garner far more attention because, as the peace of Versailles that ended WWI demonstrated with such lamentable results, that if you don't get the economics sorted out all other decisions are soon rendered obsolete.
If you are interested in WWII, or its post war consequences, or are just curious about how are current international financial system came into existence and how it works (or fails to work) this is book you will find essential reading. I must pay tribute to Mr. Conway's ability to render extremely complex economics into comprehensible language (and I say that as some one who has no grasp of complex mathematics or economic models) without vulgarising or dumbing down. It is rare and splendid talent to make the complex comprehensible.
If you are interested in WWII, or its post war consequences, or are just curious about how are current international financial system came into existence and how it works (or fails to work) this is book you will find essential reading. I must pay tribute to Mr. Conway's ability to render extremely complex economics into comprehensible language (and I say that as some one who has no grasp of complex mathematics or economic models) without vulgarising or dumbing down. It is rare and splendid talent to make the complex comprehensible.
March 11, 2022
Had to read it for NHD but still decent
July 31, 2025
It seems my rating following my initial 2015 was far too harsh. It is a superb explanation of the rise of the gold standard, inter-war austerity, the Bretton Woods system, and its subsequent fall. The Summit leans slightly towards monetary policy being the explanation for all the worlds goods (and ills) but, even if the pudding is overegged, it highlights the impact on a still critical policy element today.
The Summit also highlights about what would motivate a “creditor” nation versus a “debtor” nation, and demonstrates how the passage of history pre and post Bretton Woods changed the diplomatic positions of certain countries that moved from one status to another (most notably, the United States). The economics and finance aspects are coherent and readily understandable – I will not pretend to absolutely have my head around it, but I got the basic “vibe.”
The Summit also reinforces my decision to rate The Winner relatively lowly. The detailed (but hardly overlong) explanation as to why Bretton Woods caused Britain’s post war balance of payments crisises and currency devaluations compares very favourable to the near-context free handling in The Winner. The Summit makes it clear that the United Kingdom’s monetary policy was a systematic issue, not something that popped into existence at each particular time, to be covered by a few political intrigues and then “resolved”.
One mark off because Conway kept making fun of New Zealand’s finance minister Walter Nash.
The Summit also highlights about what would motivate a “creditor” nation versus a “debtor” nation, and demonstrates how the passage of history pre and post Bretton Woods changed the diplomatic positions of certain countries that moved from one status to another (most notably, the United States). The economics and finance aspects are coherent and readily understandable – I will not pretend to absolutely have my head around it, but I got the basic “vibe.”
The Summit also reinforces my decision to rate The Winner relatively lowly. The detailed (but hardly overlong) explanation as to why Bretton Woods caused Britain’s post war balance of payments crisises and currency devaluations compares very favourable to the near-context free handling in The Winner. The Summit makes it clear that the United Kingdom’s monetary policy was a systematic issue, not something that popped into existence at each particular time, to be covered by a few political intrigues and then “resolved”.
One mark off because Conway kept making fun of New Zealand’s finance minister Walter Nash.
June 18, 2017
This was a fun book to read. The author has the perfect background of English major with a public policy masters which allows him to sketch the details of the 1944 Breton Woods story using a smooth and engaging prose. Many personal accounts of the men are drawn, and most particularly John Maynard Keynes, the most eclectic of the bunch. Famed economist thanks to his best selling book on the economic consequences of the First World War peace treaty, his interests were wide and his achievements great. The story Conway tells starts from the first war and describe for laymen the economic situation following WW1, particularly the state of international trade and the break from the gold Standard. The difficulty European states (especially the Germans) in repaying debts, the various crisis from the 20s and the depreciation of the currencies, the general breakdown of states to handle their balance sheet at a time when "hot money" was freely flowing around, and the 2nd industrial revolution fueling a burst in productivity and outputs, form the background of the Breton woods story. This conference brought to an old decrepit yet majestic hotel at the bottom of mount Washington in New Hampshire, over a thousand representatives from more than 40 countries to discuss under what monetary rules should international trade function. This was a historic summit under historic circumstances, as it happens a mere 2 weeks after operation overlord or D-day in Normandy. Conway gives plenty of the gossip at the conference and keeps the tale engaging. As British and American deregulation fought, What did the Russian think, the Chinese, French, or Indians? Many stories of butting heads and foul languages are cited from primary sources, particularly on how to set each country's quota towards the IMF and world bank. The other economist in the tale that figures prominently is the American senior advisor to secretary Morgenthau, Harry Dexter White, a Stanford and Harvard graduate who quickly made his way up to his position in the treasury department. It was his plan that would win over the Keynes plan as the preparations towards the conference got underway. The author gives enough technical information to understand the differences between the plans without overwhelming a lay audience. White would end up being suspected by the FBI of espionage for Russia and one chapter is dedicated to what evidence was available, including the Verona files brought to light in the 1990s. Though this was a fun read overall, as someone who likes technical details I would have wanted more in this book, and less of the anecdotes peppered throughout, but I think this book should appeal to a wide and different audience.
June 20, 2020
I just finished reading Ed Conway's The Summit: Bretton Woods, 1944: J.M. Keynes and the Reshaping of the Global Economy
The emergence of the American Dollar as the world's currency was not by accident. Prior to the three-week intense negotiations to set up the IMF and the World Bank to oversee an envisaged postwar world economy in 1944, the U.S. had established itself as the world's economic superpower. The emergence of the IMF and the World Bank which are jointly referred to as Bretton Woods institutions, however, formally finalises the Dollar's status as the preferred international currency of exchange.
The delegates to the summit were 730 representing 44 countries. But among the delegates, two economics bigwigs stood out. They are John Maynard Keynes of Britain and the American Harry Dexter White.
But Keynes and White rarely agree on any of the key provisions. And the battle between Keynes and White provides much of the colour in the book. “They were the odd couple of international economics,” wrote Ed Conway. “The pair would shout at each other in meetings, bully each other in an attempt to get their way and, afterwards, abuse their rival to their friends.”
Keynes, of course, came to the summit with unparalleled intellectual credentials. He was, after all, the author of two widely influential economic books: The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money and The Economic Consequences of the Peace. But Keynes dominant intellectual force at the conference did not stop him from losing many of the crucial political battles to his American counterpart, Harry Dexter White.
Though the book is not much detailed on the substance of the agreements but remarkably covers the stormy relationship between the two towering personalities.
Economic history books are not usually enjoyable reads for even those of us who studied economics. But Conway's Summit is something different. It was as insightful as it was entertaining.
The emergence of the American Dollar as the world's currency was not by accident. Prior to the three-week intense negotiations to set up the IMF and the World Bank to oversee an envisaged postwar world economy in 1944, the U.S. had established itself as the world's economic superpower. The emergence of the IMF and the World Bank which are jointly referred to as Bretton Woods institutions, however, formally finalises the Dollar's status as the preferred international currency of exchange.
The delegates to the summit were 730 representing 44 countries. But among the delegates, two economics bigwigs stood out. They are John Maynard Keynes of Britain and the American Harry Dexter White.
But Keynes and White rarely agree on any of the key provisions. And the battle between Keynes and White provides much of the colour in the book. “They were the odd couple of international economics,” wrote Ed Conway. “The pair would shout at each other in meetings, bully each other in an attempt to get their way and, afterwards, abuse their rival to their friends.”
Keynes, of course, came to the summit with unparalleled intellectual credentials. He was, after all, the author of two widely influential economic books: The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money and The Economic Consequences of the Peace. But Keynes dominant intellectual force at the conference did not stop him from losing many of the crucial political battles to his American counterpart, Harry Dexter White.
Though the book is not much detailed on the substance of the agreements but remarkably covers the stormy relationship between the two towering personalities.
Economic history books are not usually enjoyable reads for even those of us who studied economics. But Conway's Summit is something different. It was as insightful as it was entertaining.
November 23, 2016
I enjoyed listening to the audiobook "The Summit: Bretton Woods, 1944: J.M.Keynes and the Reshaping of the Global Economy" for it's historical perspective. I'd heard of Bretton Woods before, but wouldn't have been able to describe it's details to anyone. So learning a little more about the economic conference, it's purpose, the key players, especially British Economist John Maynard Keynes and American Harry Dexter White, was worthwhile. I also hadn't realized that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were founded at Bretton Woods.
Being able to put such a conference together while still in the midst of the Second World War, and being able to anticipate the steps required for an encompassing post-war recovery was a remarkable feat. And finding a path to agreement with the various nations and interests involved, showed the amazing skill and leadership of the likes of Keynes and White, and among the other participants as well.
On the down side, try as I might, my brain appears to be incapable of comprehending the technical details of international economic theory. It's just a subject that doesn't grab me, so I know I don't give the subject a fair try. I'm sure most readers appreciate the author's discussions of the pros and cons of being on the gold standard as opposed to having fixed or floating monetary exchange rates. How those combinations impact one Country's trade, unemployment or job growth, inflation or deflation, recessions or depressions, etc. escapes me, but may be obvious to most readers, who may well enjoy this book for those discussions alone. Failing to appreciate that aspect of the book is my personal limitation, not necessarily a limitation of the book.
Being able to put such a conference together while still in the midst of the Second World War, and being able to anticipate the steps required for an encompassing post-war recovery was a remarkable feat. And finding a path to agreement with the various nations and interests involved, showed the amazing skill and leadership of the likes of Keynes and White, and among the other participants as well.
On the down side, try as I might, my brain appears to be incapable of comprehending the technical details of international economic theory. It's just a subject that doesn't grab me, so I know I don't give the subject a fair try. I'm sure most readers appreciate the author's discussions of the pros and cons of being on the gold standard as opposed to having fixed or floating monetary exchange rates. How those combinations impact one Country's trade, unemployment or job growth, inflation or deflation, recessions or depressions, etc. escapes me, but may be obvious to most readers, who may well enjoy this book for those discussions alone. Failing to appreciate that aspect of the book is my personal limitation, not necessarily a limitation of the book.
December 8, 2018
Sharing the below from another review because it was accurate and I felt similarly. High level, this was an interesting story of pre, during, and post-summit international monetary/economics. Monetary systems have evolved over time, from true gold standards, to the pseudo standard of BW (US linked to gold, other currencies linked to US), to true floating currencies. The book didn't go into great detail on this, but perhaps if the US hadn't spent so much in Vietnam (bad decisions) or instituted such significant social programs under Kennedy and Johnson (some good, some bad), the gold standard wouldn't have been problematic for the US, and BW may have survived because Nixon wouldn't have had to close the gold window. History is always interesting. The other nugget detailed at length in the book but not mentioned in the other review is about how the World Bank and IMF were both born out of BW, and how Keynes and White let the charge on their formation and intentions, even if those intentions changed from what those institutions ultimately became. Overall, an interesting read. I may have liked a bit more detail on why the currency/monetary systems needed to change over time, but the personality driven narrative was a good way to keep interest for the reader.
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It’s unlikely that a general reader would pick up a book on economic history, and this one — with a bland main title and not one but two off-putting subtitles — would appear to be a work that only an economist could love. It’s not. The dramatic interplay of personalities that Ed Conway brings to light in The Summit is entertaining enough to please any devotee of serious historical fiction.
At its core, The Summit relates the stormy relationship between two towering personalities, John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White. Representing the UK, Keynes was the world’s most famous economist and a certified celebrity to boot. He is still widely regarded as the most important economist of the 20th Century. White, little known to the public before Bretton Woods and not much more so afterwards, was his counterpart heading up the US delegation on behalf of the Treasury. Together, these two men managed against all odds to put in place the world’s first global economic system in the waning days of World War II — a system whose surviving remnants include the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The mechanisms negotiated at the Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire in 1944 never truly worked as Keynes and White intended, but they did help accomplish the overarching goal of the conference: to maintain world economic stability up until Richard Nixon upended the system in 1973 by taking the US off the gold standard.
The details of these events, and of the tense negotiations that led up to them, are to be found in abundance in The Summit. Far more engaging, though — and no doubt more memorable — are the portraits Conway paints of Keynes and White. If you think people are necessarily boring if they study economics, you should read this book. It would be difficult to dream up two more fascinating people.
John Maynard Keynes was, by all accounts (including his own), a genius. Fresh out of the Versailles Peace Conference that ended World War I, his bestselling book The Economic Consequences of the Peace foresaw with rare prescience the economic turbulence of the 1920s and 30s and the likelihood of a second war. His General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, published in 1936, is often compared to Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations as one of the most consequential books of modern times.
But these accomplishments, and many more, were only part of Keynes’ story. Friends and foes alike considered him an asshole. He was crude, rude, arrogant, overbearing, and disdainful of practically everyone else except his long-suffering celebrity wife, the former prima ballerina of Ballets Russes. As a young man, Conway notes, hurrying along a outside with a colleague, he announced that he needed to urinate and, without stopping, unzipped his pants, pulled out his penis, and blithely dribbled urine all along the way between his legs — continuing to talk all the while. His often unspeakably bad behavior manifested itself under far more serious circumstances as well. For example, on several occasions, when he was dispatched by the British government to negotiate with the US, he so thoroughly alienated his counterparts that, had he not been accompanied by more temperate members of his delegation, he might have torpedoed the US-UK alliance.
Harry Dexter White, unknown by comparison, was brilliant, too. He was also almost equally capable of alienating those he worked with. He, and to be fair his progressive policies, made sworn enemies within the State Department, which frequently complicated and sometimes undermined international negotiations. He was also a Soviet spy. Though not a Communist, he shared the prevailing view within the American Left from the 1930s through the end of World War II that the USSR was advancing the interests of humanity. However, unlike most other progressives, White found his way into the arms of the NKVD (predecessor to the KGB and today’s FSB). Over the years, he handed over reams of sensitive documents to his handler in the Soviet Embassy — though, reportedly, nothing top secret. Following World War II, White was caught up in the Red Scare sweeping the country and driven from his government job.
It was inevitable that these two personalities would clash — the hard-driving son of poor Jewish immigrants and the Cambridge-educated son of an esteemed economics professor and a social reformer.
-----------------------------------------------
It’s unlikely that a general reader would pick up a book on economic history, and this one — with a bland main title and not one but two off-putting subtitles — would appear to be a work that only an economist could love. It’s not. The dramatic interplay of personalities that Ed Conway brings to light in The Summit is entertaining enough to please any devotee of serious historical fiction.
At its core, The Summit relates the stormy relationship between two towering personalities, John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White. Representing the UK, Keynes was the world’s most famous economist and a certified celebrity to boot. He is still widely regarded as the most important economist of the 20th Century. White, little known to the public before Bretton Woods and not much more so afterwards, was his counterpart heading up the US delegation on behalf of the Treasury. Together, these two men managed against all odds to put in place the world’s first global economic system in the waning days of World War II — a system whose surviving remnants include the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The mechanisms negotiated at the Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire in 1944 never truly worked as Keynes and White intended, but they did help accomplish the overarching goal of the conference: to maintain world economic stability up until Richard Nixon upended the system in 1973 by taking the US off the gold standard.
The details of these events, and of the tense negotiations that led up to them, are to be found in abundance in The Summit. Far more engaging, though — and no doubt more memorable — are the portraits Conway paints of Keynes and White. If you think people are necessarily boring if they study economics, you should read this book. It would be difficult to dream up two more fascinating people.
John Maynard Keynes was, by all accounts (including his own), a genius. Fresh out of the Versailles Peace Conference that ended World War I, his bestselling book The Economic Consequences of the Peace foresaw with rare prescience the economic turbulence of the 1920s and 30s and the likelihood of a second war. His General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, published in 1936, is often compared to Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations as one of the most consequential books of modern times.
But these accomplishments, and many more, were only part of Keynes’ story. Friends and foes alike considered him an asshole. He was crude, rude, arrogant, overbearing, and disdainful of practically everyone else except his long-suffering celebrity wife, the former prima ballerina of Ballets Russes. As a young man, Conway notes, hurrying along a outside with a colleague, he announced that he needed to urinate and, without stopping, unzipped his pants, pulled out his penis, and blithely dribbled urine all along the way between his legs — continuing to talk all the while. His often unspeakably bad behavior manifested itself under far more serious circumstances as well. For example, on several occasions, when he was dispatched by the British government to negotiate with the US, he so thoroughly alienated his counterparts that, had he not been accompanied by more temperate members of his delegation, he might have torpedoed the US-UK alliance.
Harry Dexter White, unknown by comparison, was brilliant, too. He was also almost equally capable of alienating those he worked with. He, and to be fair his progressive policies, made sworn enemies within the State Department, which frequently complicated and sometimes undermined international negotiations. He was also a Soviet spy. Though not a Communist, he shared the prevailing view within the American Left from the 1930s through the end of World War II that the USSR was advancing the interests of humanity. However, unlike most other progressives, White found his way into the arms of the NKVD (predecessor to the KGB and today’s FSB). Over the years, he handed over reams of sensitive documents to his handler in the Soviet Embassy — though, reportedly, nothing top secret. Following World War II, White was caught up in the Red Scare sweeping the country and driven from his government job.
It was inevitable that these two personalities would clash — the hard-driving son of poor Jewish immigrants and the Cambridge-educated son of an esteemed economics professor and a social reformer.
March 1, 2017
Didn't look forward to reading this book as I thought it may cover too much detail in economics. Not that econ is a hard or dry subject, but the book was a selection of a WWII Book Club in which I am a member. Actually enjoyed the book, in lightly covered the field of economics, but went heavy on the personality characters, John Maynard Keynes of Britain and Harry Dexter White of the U.S. Treasury, and their battles to transform the failed international economic order of the 1920's and 30's into an international economic system that would enable countries to recover from the devastation of WWII. They did not want a repeat of the economic effects of 'The Great War".
January 16, 2016
It was an interesting read.
March 18, 2025
“The Summit” is a solid, if somewhat surface-level, account of the historic Bretton Woods conference and the two key personalities at its heart. It does a commendable job of capturing the drama, negotiations, and ideological clashes that shaped the post-war economic order. The narrative is engaging, particularly where the author brings to life the personalities and tensions that defined the event. For readers seeking a readable introduction to Bretton Woods, this book delivers.
The author does well to humanize the key players, particularly Keynes, whose brilliance and charisma shine through despite his physical frailty during the conference. Similarly, White emerges as a fascinating figure—a man driven by idealism but also mired in controversy. The agreement that impacted billions ever since is made more about these two, which may or may not be right, but their personal dynamics add color to what could have been a dry retelling of policy debates.
All that told, the book falls short of drawing the true, broader lessons for the modern world when it fails to explicitly explore the unique circumstances that made Bretton Woods possible—circumstances that are almost impossible to replicate today. The book’s value is in what it does not say about the impossibilities of any similar worldwide agreement in the periods from now, especially in light of the challenges the world faces in 2025.
The rest are my personal takeaways (not as part of the review, but reflections inspired by the book):
The Bretton Woods agreement was a product of its time—a unique convergence of factors that allowed 44 nations, largely allies in the midst of World War II, to come together under the leadership of the US and UK. Communication was slow, media influence was minimal, and the global power structure was heavily skewed in favor of a few dominant nations. The solutions crafted at Bretton Woods were designed to address the immediate scars of war and depression, with little consideration for the long-term or the voices of smaller nations. Yet, for all its flaws, the system it created—the IMF, World Bank, and the gold-dollar standard—provided a framework that stabilized the global economy for decades.
What’s striking is how difficult it is to achieve such international cooperation today. The number of nations has multiplied, power is more diffuse, and the spirit of partnership that existed among wartime allies is largely absent. Modern attempts at global cooperation, such as COP or WTO negotiations, have repeatedly faltered, highlighting how challenging it is to build consensus about any tangible items in a fractured world.
Bretton Woods teaches us that creating institutions like the IMF or the EU is incredibly difficult, requiring a rare alignment of circumstances, leadership, and shared purpose. Yet, dismantling them—as seen in Brexit or the US’s retreat from multilateralism—is alarmingly easy. The erosion of institutions like the WHO, NATO, WTO, and IMF risks pushing the world further toward a fragmented, “every nation for itself” mentality.
The book doesn’t explicitly say this, but it subtly underscores that what made Bretton Woods possible was less about the brilliance of Keynes or White and more about the unique conditions of the time: a manageable number of parties, all allies, united by the urgency of war, and led by two dominant powers with shared economic goals. The largest could sell/tell the vast majority that what was agreed to by them and good for them was good for all, even if they did not have all the details or understand most of the items being discussed.
In conclusion, the book’s real value lies in what it implicitly reveals about the near impossibility of building meaningful global cooperation—a lesson we need in 2025 as we go about dismantling what was miraculously achieved before.
The author does well to humanize the key players, particularly Keynes, whose brilliance and charisma shine through despite his physical frailty during the conference. Similarly, White emerges as a fascinating figure—a man driven by idealism but also mired in controversy. The agreement that impacted billions ever since is made more about these two, which may or may not be right, but their personal dynamics add color to what could have been a dry retelling of policy debates.
All that told, the book falls short of drawing the true, broader lessons for the modern world when it fails to explicitly explore the unique circumstances that made Bretton Woods possible—circumstances that are almost impossible to replicate today. The book’s value is in what it does not say about the impossibilities of any similar worldwide agreement in the periods from now, especially in light of the challenges the world faces in 2025.
The rest are my personal takeaways (not as part of the review, but reflections inspired by the book):
The Bretton Woods agreement was a product of its time—a unique convergence of factors that allowed 44 nations, largely allies in the midst of World War II, to come together under the leadership of the US and UK. Communication was slow, media influence was minimal, and the global power structure was heavily skewed in favor of a few dominant nations. The solutions crafted at Bretton Woods were designed to address the immediate scars of war and depression, with little consideration for the long-term or the voices of smaller nations. Yet, for all its flaws, the system it created—the IMF, World Bank, and the gold-dollar standard—provided a framework that stabilized the global economy for decades.
What’s striking is how difficult it is to achieve such international cooperation today. The number of nations has multiplied, power is more diffuse, and the spirit of partnership that existed among wartime allies is largely absent. Modern attempts at global cooperation, such as COP or WTO negotiations, have repeatedly faltered, highlighting how challenging it is to build consensus about any tangible items in a fractured world.
Bretton Woods teaches us that creating institutions like the IMF or the EU is incredibly difficult, requiring a rare alignment of circumstances, leadership, and shared purpose. Yet, dismantling them—as seen in Brexit or the US’s retreat from multilateralism—is alarmingly easy. The erosion of institutions like the WHO, NATO, WTO, and IMF risks pushing the world further toward a fragmented, “every nation for itself” mentality.
The book doesn’t explicitly say this, but it subtly underscores that what made Bretton Woods possible was less about the brilliance of Keynes or White and more about the unique conditions of the time: a manageable number of parties, all allies, united by the urgency of war, and led by two dominant powers with shared economic goals. The largest could sell/tell the vast majority that what was agreed to by them and good for them was good for all, even if they did not have all the details or understand most of the items being discussed.
In conclusion, the book’s real value lies in what it implicitly reveals about the near impossibility of building meaningful global cooperation—a lesson we need in 2025 as we go about dismantling what was miraculously achieved before.
February 9, 2022
A shining peak of a book. I would not have thought that I could be so caught up in a book about international economic systems but this was a very good book. Although this is nominally a book about the summit that remade the economic landscape over three weeks at Bretton Woods in 1944 it is really about the characters of the main negotiators and their ideas. The summit itself is at most a quarter of the book. It is also not mostly about economics. It does not get bogged down in details of how economics works and only provides that information at a high level. Those who might be concerned about picking up this book fearing lots of numbers should fear not.
It is not just the summit, but the ascent and the decent, and the foothills too, for what is the point of being at the summit without surveying the landscape from the top. We read about how the economy worked before and after WWI as the ascent. And then about the fate of Bretton Woods as the decent and the book leaves this reader at least wondering whether things might not have been better if we had not stuck more closely to the original conceptions Keynes had.
I think the only real crevasse is how much this is a two-man expedition; Keynes and White. This makes the book very anglophone centric. We get little backstory of the other delegates, and almost none for those in other countries. It would surely have been interesting to hear more of the backstory of H.H. Kung from China for example.
This anglophonecentricity carries through into the discussion of events in the conference. Where events are driven by outside actors there is little attention to why it is like this. For example, right at the end of the summit the USSR moves on its demands that it only contribute $900million raising it to $1.2billion (p279). The joy in the conference at the news is clear. What is less clear is why the USSR made the sudden concession.
As a book on an subject I would not normally read much about I learnt a lot from this and did not feel bored while doing so. All in all a book I would recommend to anyone with any interest in history or the world’s economy.
It is not just the summit, but the ascent and the decent, and the foothills too, for what is the point of being at the summit without surveying the landscape from the top. We read about how the economy worked before and after WWI as the ascent. And then about the fate of Bretton Woods as the decent and the book leaves this reader at least wondering whether things might not have been better if we had not stuck more closely to the original conceptions Keynes had.
I think the only real crevasse is how much this is a two-man expedition; Keynes and White. This makes the book very anglophone centric. We get little backstory of the other delegates, and almost none for those in other countries. It would surely have been interesting to hear more of the backstory of H.H. Kung from China for example.
This anglophonecentricity carries through into the discussion of events in the conference. Where events are driven by outside actors there is little attention to why it is like this. For example, right at the end of the summit the USSR moves on its demands that it only contribute $900million raising it to $1.2billion (p279). The joy in the conference at the news is clear. What is less clear is why the USSR made the sudden concession.
As a book on an subject I would not normally read much about I learnt a lot from this and did not feel bored while doing so. All in all a book I would recommend to anyone with any interest in history or the world’s economy.
September 28, 2024
Perplexed. I was. When, reading this book. I was… time and time again, wondering - “What in the world is this book referring to?’
Then. After reading an ample amount. 170 pages into the book (digital version : 170/708 - Chapter 5). I finally. Really! Finally! Was able to generate something that was reasonably important. And. Was Important enough. To become so attached to the discovery.
The discovery is the following. Truly a great discovery, that would regard even the best economic minds in the world. And. Surprisingly. This book reflects a whole lot of the book I read previously - “Atlas Shrugged”.
The book really provides such enamored pretentiousness. And. That pretentiousness is truly well received and in a way, well experienced. You get a true sense of joy and happiness once realizing the idea of how this book is written. Well… that’s what I experienced.
Anyway.
That pretentiousness is truly well received… all because, the book’s context is just like the ideology of “Atlas Shrugged”. That ideology is the following conceptual idea, “When is the best time to invest?”
This book provides many accounts of times when it is ideal and greatest to really buckle down and really be serious of making those plans for investments. During the times the book presents. The author really provides detail after detail. Context after context. Of about the unfolding realities that undergo when a person is in the process of that commitment - “Taking every opportunity to become rich, when it is the perfect time to”.
This book really capitalizes on the title - “The Summit”. And. Did a great job providing context of about times when it is the best time to invest. And. When investments are believed to be the empirical highest availability.
All in all. This book is written in of a perspective of - “It’s either you get it or don’t. And. Only those that deserve it. Will understand it. It’s just how it works.”
Then. After reading an ample amount. 170 pages into the book (digital version : 170/708 - Chapter 5). I finally. Really! Finally! Was able to generate something that was reasonably important. And. Was Important enough. To become so attached to the discovery.
The discovery is the following. Truly a great discovery, that would regard even the best economic minds in the world. And. Surprisingly. This book reflects a whole lot of the book I read previously - “Atlas Shrugged”.
The book really provides such enamored pretentiousness. And. That pretentiousness is truly well received and in a way, well experienced. You get a true sense of joy and happiness once realizing the idea of how this book is written. Well… that’s what I experienced.
Anyway.
That pretentiousness is truly well received… all because, the book’s context is just like the ideology of “Atlas Shrugged”. That ideology is the following conceptual idea, “When is the best time to invest?”
This book provides many accounts of times when it is ideal and greatest to really buckle down and really be serious of making those plans for investments. During the times the book presents. The author really provides detail after detail. Context after context. Of about the unfolding realities that undergo when a person is in the process of that commitment - “Taking every opportunity to become rich, when it is the perfect time to”.
This book really capitalizes on the title - “The Summit”. And. Did a great job providing context of about times when it is the best time to invest. And. When investments are believed to be the empirical highest availability.
All in all. This book is written in of a perspective of - “It’s either you get it or don’t. And. Only those that deserve it. Will understand it. It’s just how it works.”
June 16, 2017
Well written book on a pertinent and important topic
Money is of abiding interest when the talk is about spending it, who has it? What it might be like to be someone who has a lot of it. But thinking about it, it itself, is rare. This book provides a first class introduction to the business of making international monetary policy grounding its exposition in actual facts rather feather light sophistry, and explaining clearly its technical aspects. This it fleshes out with the remarkable characters which might have been lifted from a James Bond novel, the likes of Vile Bodies, a Raymond Chandler page turner, and a British bedroom farce.
This book is readable, occasionally funny, and humane.
Money is of abiding interest when the talk is about spending it, who has it? What it might be like to be someone who has a lot of it. But thinking about it, it itself, is rare. This book provides a first class introduction to the business of making international monetary policy grounding its exposition in actual facts rather feather light sophistry, and explaining clearly its technical aspects. This it fleshes out with the remarkable characters which might have been lifted from a James Bond novel, the likes of Vile Bodies, a Raymond Chandler page turner, and a British bedroom farce.
This book is readable, occasionally funny, and humane.
June 11, 2025
The Bretton Woods conference shaped the global economic order from the end of WW2 to Nixon's destruction of the gold standard in 1971. At the center of Bretton Woods were John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, two of the most dynamic economists of the 20th century, revered by some and despised by others, deified in one moment, only to be denounced as the world changed and they each tried to respond to it.
I picked up a used copy of this at Half Price Books, expecting to only skim it or read a few sections. I ended up finishing the entire thing and really enjoying it. The people and events are interesting, and I bookmarked many passages that continue to have much relevance today, more than 80 years after Bretton Woods.
I picked up a used copy of this at Half Price Books, expecting to only skim it or read a few sections. I ended up finishing the entire thing and really enjoying it. The people and events are interesting, and I bookmarked many passages that continue to have much relevance today, more than 80 years after Bretton Woods.
January 13, 2024
Libro muy muy entretenido y Keynes es de mis personajes del Siglo XX favoritos. Le daría 5 estrellas sino fuera porque el libro se pasa un poquito con la cantidad de notas de color y la historia del hotel de Breton Woods y etc.
Tiene un muy buen grado de profundidad de ideas de economía, y es un buen resumen de la historia del sistema monetario actual.
Complementa muy bien con la excelente biografía de Keynes "El Precio de la Paz" de Zachary D. Carter. Este libro contiene detalles biográficos sobre Keynes en Breton Woods. Cada libro puede servir de contexto o introducción al otro.
Tiene un muy buen grado de profundidad de ideas de economía, y es un buen resumen de la historia del sistema monetario actual.
Complementa muy bien con la excelente biografía de Keynes "El Precio de la Paz" de Zachary D. Carter. Este libro contiene detalles biográficos sobre Keynes en Breton Woods. Cada libro puede servir de contexto o introducción al otro.
June 19, 2024
Ed Conway is a journalist first and an economist second. "There have been a number of books about the conference...yet all of them have tended to focus far more on the economics than the sheer human drama" Mr. Conway says to justify his human interest focus. Nevertheless, he had plenty of opportunity to introduce a page or two of economic explanations, figures, and or charts. Conway does succeed at his limited goal of explaining the human drama of J. M. Keynes, Harry White, Dennis Robertson, and company.
August 26, 2024
I like economics and economic history, but this book doesn't rate very high on my list. Where Conway should have been more clear (explaining how Breton Woods functioned/unravelled, and its impact into the current day), he was vague. Where Conway should have been less clear (Keynes' love life), he was proficient and detailed. I was left with a distastefully vague sense of the origin of the IMF and the World Bank, and not much else.
February 14, 2020
Fascinating insight into the personalities, context, reasons and importance of the Bretton Woods agreement. Never since has our need to understand the importance of this event and multilaterlism been more important than it is today. I ensure all with an interest in multilaterlism to give it a read to put into context the challenges of today. In addition, it is at time hilarious!
September 8, 2025
Very entertaining read on how Bretton Woods came about. Next to some entertaining quotes and enriching anecdotes, the book aso illustrates the importance of international collaboration, and how crucial this is in properly organizing the monetary system (as catastrophically illustrated in the interbellum).
August 21, 2025
Phew, this was a slog. While the story of Bretton Woods snd the personalities involved was interesting this book needed to be edited and obfuscating vocabulary removed. Made for an unnecessarily tedious read.
November 13, 2018
Much better than I could have expected
March 4, 2021
Conway combines biography with economic history to paint an intriguing portrait of the people, place, and processes the resulted in the Bretton Woods system.
June 30, 2021
Fascinating and relevant up to the present
Read
December 30, 2022Informative
Want to read
June 29, 2025339.53
July 13, 2025
fantastic read!
Displaying 1 - 30 of 48 reviews