The Eurasian Century: Hot Wars, Cold Wars, and the Making of the Modern Century

by Hal Brands, Tim Fannon (narrator), Kalorama (publisher)

We often think of the modern era as the age of American power. In reality, we're living in a long, violent Eurasian century. That giant, resource-rich landmass possesses the bulk of the global population, industrial might, and potential military power. Eurasia is a strategic prize without equal—which is why the world has been roiled, reshaped, and nearly destroyed by clashes over the supercontinent.

Since the early twentieth century, autocratic powers have aspired for dominance by seizing commanding positions in the world's strategic heartland. Offshore sea powers, namely the United Kingdom and America, have sought to make the world safe for democracy by keeping Eurasia in balance. America's rivalries with China, Russia, and Iran are the next round in this geopolitical game. If this new authoritarian axis succeeds in enacting a radically revised international order, America and other democracies will be vulnerable and insecure.

Hal Brands argues that a better understanding of Eurasia's strategic geography can illuminate the contours of rivalry and conflict in today's world. The Eurasian Century explains how revolutions in technology and warfare, and the rise of toxic ideologies of conquest, made Eurasia the center of twentieth-century geopolitics—with pressing implications for the struggles that will define the twenty-first.

Genres: History, Politics, Nonfiction, Asia, International Relations, World History, Military Fiction

Audible Audio

Published January 28, 2025

Reviews

[Lilisa · Rating 3 out of 5]

Eurasia is a pivotal swath of landmass and waterways in the global world. Eurasia has been the scene of intense action in the past and the current century is no different, although some players have changed. This book replays the jockeying to dominate other countries in the twentieth century by Germany, the Soviet Union, and Japan. Eurasia birthed two world wars in the twentieth century extending them to the far reaches of the globe, with the United Kingdom and United States playing pivotal roles in stemming autocratic rule. The author looks at the twenty-first century as Russia and China flex their autocratic muscles and turmoil continues in the Middle East. The author speculates on how things might shift in the world as Russia, China and other countries deploy rapidly changing technology and warfare superiority in the autocracy vs democracy race. He demonstrates in his book that while geography matters, equally so does strategy. This book is a decent compilation of what has happened in the past. It presents a picture of what could happen as autocratic and democratic ideologies play out on the world stage, although I was hoping for a more definitive prediction from the author's viewpoint. Many thanks to the author, publisher, and NetGalley for the opportunity to read and review this book.

[Marks54 · Rating 4 out of 5]

A study of the continuing influence of Halford Mackinder and his theories regarding the central importance of the Eurasian land mass to the conduct of geopolitics. This story involves the related influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan and his theory of the influence of sea power on history. Mackinder’s ideas arguably motivated an entire set of geopolitical thinkers who work motivated military thought and diplomacy through the world wars, the Cold War (via George Kennan) and afterwards, such as in the strategic writers who emerged to motivate Putin in post-Cold War Russia. This is a fascinating and well written story by a skilled historian about ideas that are only partially recognized despite their influence on world politics.

I highly recommend the book.

[Chris · Rating 1 out of 5]

This book painfully manufactures a concept, which in my estimation was created for the author to sell a bunch of books, that adds zero to the literary world of geopolitics and great power competition. The idea of Eurasia being important is beyond obvious as it’s where most of Earth’s land mass is and where the greatest number of man-defined subdivisions known as countries exist. There wasn’t a day reading this book that I wasn’t excited to put it down. Do yourself a favor and skip this one.

[Yun Chen · Rating 1 out of 5]

Zero originality. The author is an academic hence it should be held to a higher standard in terms of merits, content, style and substance. Author started w Mckinder hypothesis to anchor this book or at least what readers are led to believe. Then it really is just a pedantic retelling of history play by play from two world war and Cold War. Did author challenge the mckinder thesis? Why is that valid today? For instance at the time of mckinder proposal US while already strong was no where close to the predominant position immediately after the Second World War. But accounting for 50% of manufacturing after 1945, makes North America the center of economy for decades. This is perhaps the foundation for American victory in Cold War. Today east Asia and se Asia is that center. How does this change or invalidate mckinder thesis? Shedding no lights on this author went on ti attack America various competitors without an iota of irony. It is a history notes w a screed appended. Quite a disappointment

[Albert Van · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a great and also very opportune book on geopolitics. Wo1, Wo2 and the cold war described with Mackinder theory (heartland, rimlands) as a framework works very well and offered me a lot of new insights. The last chapter -lessons of the past- I read with the election of Trump in mind. This chapter emphasis that carefull coalition building is necessary, with long term goals in mind; not something Trump excels in.

[Alexandria Avona · Rating 4 out of 5]

Exactly. What these totalitarian illiberal countries, Xi Jinping's China and Putin's Russia, have in common is that they use force instead of attraction. They are not attractive countries, they are very repressive and have mastered the art of repression as opposed to attraction. They call repression and suppression management which is where you have a problem and just say "stop talking about it". That's not management at all. The funny part is Putin wants to be competitive from a speed perspective when the book clearly makes the great point that the extreme corruption of oligarchy destroys the accountability mechanisms that lead to real speed. So then Putin is blown away and angered that his oligarchy corrupted itself out of any basic speed.

Can you imagine one of these lumbering, obese oligarchs suddenly becoming the infamous speed demon? You can't have both; illiberal totalitarianism supported by a corrupting oligarchy that basically just ignores problems and calls its management, and real speed and efficiency that can't be bought out of calling a clear spade and spade and then cleaning up the illogical, nepotistic blockages that slowed down everyone unfortunate to be affected by them.

The book also agrees with established research on Putin that he rules by institutionalized humiliation, injustice collecting, that fits the profile of covert homosexual. It's only funny when you know he's constantly mocking the US and West on homosexuality charges, when this book and established American research agree that he fits the profile of a homosexual who is fixated on "ritualized humiliation" and "injustice collecting".

They also agree that Xi Jinping is slowly moving off of debt bondage and debt governance due to its congruence with human trafficking, but is now literally trying to buy the internet and then falling in a rage when the repression mechanisms silence the very voices it was essentially trying to buy. It's too pathetic.

That these communist countries call themselves democracy while the world calls them "autocracies" or by their actual self-assigned name in the case of the CCP, "communist party" is just...what kind of lunatic world do we live in. Democracy is literally the opposite of repressing voices you don’t like. They’re more like a disabled Red than anything. Disabled Red is hardly Blue, it’s disabled Red.

This book says though China and Russia linking up will be a formidable force, it will also be a force for increasing corruption and with the increased corruption a mass de-intelligencing of the human species by the union.

Russia has been retarding its own country since the beginning. This was from a dissertation on Tolstoy, where an censor in deep envy of Tolstoy also somehow manages to retard his own country at the same time he bereaves the world of several notable pieces of his writing, to the point it doesn't get published but gets circulated with the pure corruption in-crowd and Tolstoy himself doesn't make a thing. Also showing a government arteries clogged with oligarchy destroys greats that are often the only reason people give a crap about the country at all to begin with. People were in the streets for that guy for Tolstoy due to how disgusting that act was, "Pobedonostev also severely restricted the flow of information, communication, and education". (aka, he retarded his own country, the literal meaning, to make it slower. Putin uses the exact same strategies, they are almost identical to Pobedonostev's in their utilization of the Orthodox church to cripple Russia's intelligence from the inside from gross incompetence thinking they were making it stronger. Then he throws a fit and tantrum when he can't have competitive speed with non-corrupt countries that don't give wrong answers or corrupt answers according to identity. If you've been so inudated in corruption you don't even know what your own eyes are telling you, you're certainly going to be useless in any speed environment.).

The union will literally retard any natural speed across the world due to repression and suppression where accountability, accurate recognition, and corruption-free ability to create real justice in congruence with well-written law once existed and once begot the lingering traces of intelligence that are now being put out by just these two. You can't have "slow down so the corrupt oligarchy can take any power you made or opened up" communist style and have your Blitzkrieg too. The part about Putin being mad he can't have his Blitzkrieg with a "slow down for the lingering Russian communist corruption" was just comedic and pathetic, but it's really like that. Deeply in denial that you can’t have the lumbering oligarch who just sits there and stops any anti-autocracy energy through sheer do-nothing rot, and also the responsive, super sharp correct apprehension that doesn’t struggle with basic recognition of a truly speedy expression. You can’t have both, and it’s hilarious that Putin is having a tantrum unable to accept you can’t have both.

Russia is primarily a natural resources economy. It is not very developed. Nord Stream 2 was so exciting for them because it wasn't technological, it was more natural resources, and that was mostly all they can handle these days. China is a technological parasite, stealing from other countries or the internet. This book overestimates the power these two will have. If it does anything, it will be to send developed countries backwards and retard any last non-corrupt bastions of intelligence across the world. A "gradual decoupling" is possible but this book really fails to look at how their economies are really based and that they are not independent at all (most residually communist countries aren't, that's why they're so desperate to not lose their satellites like Taiwan and Ukraine) and therefore it's not like two US equivalents moving against the US.

They are not that independent. This book overestimates the power of their linkage failing to see the weak basis of both of their economies and it underestimates how desperate they are not to not lose anything they parasite, like Ukraine, because they are that dependent still, to the point in some cases these communist areas that somehow think they're democratic have a mass disability problem.

So four instead of five stars for not looking keenly at the economic type to the degree they could. They say that these totalitarian states are based on technological hegemony, and that China is especially letting all that go to its head like developing countries do--look at a teenager when they're learning basic crap, but doing it very well, they fancy themselves the King of England for it, China is acting just like that --but they really underestimate the de-intelligencing effect of repressive, suppressive corrupt and oligarchical countries on the world.

They are desperate to keep themselves together in a way other countries aren't. They are way more fragile and in a state of collective disability more than this book can admit. Though their linkage is formidable, especially for a small country like Ukraine, it will not be a devastating, superior conquerer like America described and somewhat expected out of Nazi Germany. It will be more like their acquiring a satellite and begging it to want to stay with them and begging to make money off of them. So, all in all pathetic. They really overestimate how fragile and disabled these repressive/supressive regimes are and that forceful instead of attractive energy is usually compensating for profound failures in governance that don't hold their own. So although it's important to not underestimate the threat of these two linking up, it will be more like acquiring a very feeble and disabled husband who begs for you to do basic things and it will be more ongoing everyday pathetic than anything to actually fear, like a Nazi invasion. Since Elon Musk has begun doing that, literally begging users and sites to make money on them, that is how China treats its satellites and that is the government to look forward to. It will be worse, not better, and it will be pathetic compared to the norms America was used to.

I like the line that they won on their "heft". I literally saw two obese oligarchs lifting their fat and plunking it down as they "waged war" across the world.

So there was a lot of projection and overestimation happening there. All in all though they are formidable, they will send any conquered lands backwards and overall have a de-intelligencing effect that will ultimately render them so weak and hapless over time that they will be conquered back in no time. Don't forget the Chinese who have so little sex they want "war that is hot" because that's all the action they see. Literal Chinese incels in disturbing numbers, they were even targeting Ukrainian women “ironically”. They have a "shortage of viable females" problem literally because of their femicide problem, these people are not bright. That's hardly an invasion by a brutal and horrific, but arguably quite competent, force like Nazi Germany. It will send us backwards and it will be struggling with things we as American had put together long ago. That's what happens when a developing country licks its lips and tries to conquer a more developed country. In Nazi Germany's case, he just had geographic ambitions. Many of the places he conquered, like Poland, had nothing to offer them except a geographic advantage. It's the opposite for China and Russia. We have a lot to offer them, them not so much.

It's really funny to hear them call Putin the Tsar. The idea of a gopnik Tsar who thinks the west is gay for being basically educated is the most pathetic thing I've seen in a second. The old tsars used to import great thinkers from top universities to come teach them and make them more intelligent. This guy does some sort of "ritualized humiliation" to any equivalent and then puts forward troll memes with him riding a bear. The publications that call this illiberal totalitarian with conflated logic a tsar is pathetic. A gopnik tsar is one of the most pathetic misunderstandings I've seen in my life. That said, tsarists were not much better. They may have imported intelligentsia, but they were notorious for not actually getting what they imported. At least they tried. That's more liberal than this Gopnik Putin calling the west gay at any chance he gets while he literally fits the profile of a homosexual ruling Russia through ritualized humiliation.

If you don't know what a Gopnik is, this definition was helpful. Putin 100% unironically funds troll farms as political weapons (that alone is basically a Slavic squat for a diplomatic signature), believes any real industrial efficiency and care for quality as efficiency is "gay", and then throws a tantrum when his own infrastructure is so corrupt it is completely noncompetitive. "The Polish term for a similar subculture is dresiarz. Dresiarz is a term used to describe young men who are usually portrayed as unemployed, undereducated, aggressive, and anti-social".

[Juha · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a fact-filled book written in a highly readable and lively style. I found it very satisfying on several fronts, although I can sympathize with some of the reviewers who disagree with Hal Brands’ point of view. He makes no effort to hide where he is coming from, seeing the democratic West as something worth defending, and the USA as the necessary guarantor to the free world.

Brands draws upon the geopolitical theories and traditions of Halford Mackinder, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Nicholas Spykman, and others. This is one of the attractions of the book. As a trained geographer myself, I’ve always thought that geopolitics was unfairly criticized for decades. Sure, it was originally associated with the Swede Rudolf Kjellén and the German Friedich Ratzel both of whom were something of social Darwinists and whose ideas were embraced by the Nazis. Brand’s view is nuanced and his application of the perspective is intelligent. He sums it up: “Geopolitics tempered by democracy was stark but rarely evil. Geopolitics with an autocratic bent was poison, pure and simple” (p. 31). Bad application of an approach should not be a reason to ban the entire discipline (for example, genetics has been misused for bad purposes but it nevertheless is a vital science).

The first two-thirds of the book is dedicated to a backward look at the 20th century: the two World Wars, the Cold War, and the quarter century of peace and prosperity following the fall of the Soviet Union. The final part looks at the “second Eurasian century” which we are currently living and draws lessons from the past.

It is easy to see why readers of a certain persuasion would object to Brand’s interpretation. He readily acknowledges the American mistakes and overreactions in building and defending a safe and free world. Often, in defending democracy, America ended up crushing it and supporting oppressive regimes that it saw to be on its side. Scores of people died in wars from Vietnam to Iraq and many smaller skirmishes. However, Brand is unabashedly of the view that the US-dominated world after World War II has been, in the balance, hugely positive to everyone, and that US involvement in the world—especially the central Eurasian continent and the surrounding seas—is a necessity for the world and its people to prosper.

He does see the threat posed by rising isolationism. Although the book was published in 2025, the manuscript must have been completed prior to the November 2024 elections. Brand writes: “If America makes a habit of electing aspiring strongmen, it may not remain a democratic superpower. And don’t think for a second that troubled autocracies can’t bring a world of woe” (p. 219). Unfortunately, it seems this is where we stand for the moment.

Although a multipolar world would seem desirable at the face of it, the contenders to fill the other pole posts—notably China and Russia—do not provide an attractive alternative. In fact, these revisionist powers represent illiberal authoritarian regimes that would limit free speech and civil liberties in their spheres of influence. Western Europe without the US will not be able to resist. Brand makes a strong case for a broad coalition of democracies to cooperate, in terms of politics and policy, innovation and technology, and military. Citing Harry Truman in 1948: “America must pay the price for peace.” Brand’s final warning: “There is no law of nature that expansion must fail and tyranny must be vanguished. There is no guarantee that history takes the path of progress” (p. 245). As the book shows, the 20th century history is full of examples where things could have gone badly wrong.

[Preetam Chatterjee · Rating 5 out of 5]

Hal Brands’s The Eurasian Century is a sweeping, ambitious study of power, space, and struggle. It sets out to show that Eurasia—the vast landmass stretching from Europe across the steppes and deserts to the Pacific—has always been and remains the gravitational centre of global politics.

To Brands, the modern world as we know it was forged in a series of “hot wars” and “cold wars” for control of this supercontinent. In his telling, the twentieth century was a single long contest over Eurasia, beginning with the cataclysms of the First World War and continuing through the Second, the Cold War, and into our own age of renewed rivalry. The twenty-first century, he argues, is not the beginning of something new but the continuation of that long Eurasian century, reshaped by technology and ideology but governed by the same geographic imperatives.

The book succeeds first and foremost in its ability to marry grand theory with narrative. Brands draws on the classic geopolitical thinkers—Halford Mackinder’s “heartland” and Nicholas Spykman’s “rimlands”—but he does not leave them as abstract concepts. He walks the reader through how Eurasia’s geography, its sea and land interfaces, its resource basins, its transport corridors, and its shifting technological infrastructures shape the very possibilities of power. It is one thing to invoke “geopolitics” as a buzzword; it is another to make the reader feel, almost physically, how the shape of the land constrains and enables empires.

That is the book’s strongest suit. He then links these patterns to a set of historical episodes: pre-1914 imperial rivalries, the world wars, the Cold War’s partition of Europe and containment of the Soviet Union, the rise of China, Russia’s revisionism, and the contemporary dilemmas of American strategy.

In each case, the same forces of space, resources, ideology and technology are shown in play, though never in exactly the same configuration.

There is a moral seriousness running through the book. Brands does not romanticise power politics. He acknowledges that democracies have often blundered, compromised their ideals, or committed outrages of their own.

Yet he insists that the alternative—allowing authoritarian and revisionist powers to reshape the rules of Eurasia unilaterally—carries its own, greater risks. That stance shapes the tone of the book: sober rather than triumphalist, alarmed but not apocalyptic. It is very much a call for democratic societies to relearn hard lessons about strategy, alliance building, deterrence, and the costs of complacency.

For readers who have already absorbed a lot of international relations and grand strategy literature, the book’s framework may feel familiar. The heartland, the rimlands, the tension between land power and sea power, and the strategic importance of chokepoints—these are not new ideas. Brands packages them well, draws fresh connections, and updates them for the age of AI, cyberwarfare, and Belt and Road, but he is not breaking radically new theoretical ground. There is also a subtle tendency towards determinism.

Geography, in his telling, looms very large. While he acknowledges the role of agency—leaders, ideologies, technology—there are stretches of the narrative where Eurasia seems condemned to be a chessboard of endless rivalry, as though no other futures are imaginable. This can underplay the unpredictability of politics, the power of domestic upheaval, or the influence of actors outside the great powers.

Another limitation is the book’s normative tilt. Brands writes from within the American strategic community, and the vantage point shows. Democracies are framed as worth defending; autocracies are treated as inherently more dangerous. Many readers will share that assumption, but it shapes which threats are emphasised, which trade-offs are judged acceptable, and how the moral record of the West is treated.

The forecasts about the future, meanwhile, depend on assumptions that may not hold: that China will continue its trajectory of ambition, that Russia will remain revisionist but relatively weak, that democratic coalitions will cohere, and that internal dysfunctions in autocracies will limit them more than they embolden them. History, as the last century shows, has a way of surprising even the best-laid theories.

Still, the book matters because of the questions it forces onto the table. We are in a moment when many old assumptions are up for debate:

Will the United States remain the guarantor of a rules-based order, or will it retreat?

Can democratic societies sustain the strategic, military, and economic burdens of rivalry?

Will China succeed in establishing regional dominance?

Will Russia, Iran and other powers forge deeper alliances, or fracture?

Brands makes the case that these are not peripheral issues but the heart of world politics, because the balance of Eurasia shapes the global commons. If Eurasia is relatively open and balanced in favour of liberal norms, trade and cooperation, then the seas and offshore states benefit. If it is dominated by hostile autocracies, then sea lanes become containment zones, crises proliferate, and smaller states lose agency.

Brands’s use of historical analogy is one of his most powerful tools. He argues that the Cold War’s containment strategies, alliances and balancing acts were not just ideological contests but geographic necessities shaped by technology and ideology alike.

Those lessons, he says, must be relearnt if the world wants to avoid another era of catastrophic war. He does not sugarcoat how hard that is: it means long-term thinking, coalition maintenance, credible deterrence in multiple domains, and resisting the temptation to drift back into isolationism or wishful thinking.

For all its focus on the great powers, the book leaves certain questions open. How much can internal pressures—demographic decline, economic crisis, social unrest—reshape the trajectories of China, Russia or other Eurasian actors? How will non-state actors, transnational movements, climate change, or disruptive technologies alter the balance of power in ways that traditional state-on-state models miss? How can alliances among democracies function when domestic politics are fractured and publics are sceptical? And what about the smaller states of Eurasia—how can they exercise agency rather than being mere pawns? Brands touches on these issues, but they could have been more central.

Even with those caveats, The Eurasian Century is a bracing, timely read. It is not a repository of startling new facts or radical new theories, but it is a lucid, tightly argued synthesis that forces readers to see the stakes of the current moment. It will be especially useful to teachers, policymakers, students of international relations and curious citizens who want a big-picture view of where the world has been and where it might be going.

The book reminds us that strategy is not optional, that ideas of geography and power still matter, and that forgetting hard-won lessons is a luxury the twenty-first century does not permit. Its forecasts should be taken with humility, but its warning—that the Eurasian contest is not over—is persuasive.

In an age of fragmenting attention and short time horizons, Brands is urging us to think in longer arcs and larger spaces, and that is a valuable provocation.

Most recommended.

[Chad Manske · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hal Brands’ “The Eurasian Century: Hot Wars, Cold Wars, and the Making of the Modern World” is a masterful exploration of Eurasia’s pivotal role in shaping global geopolitics. Brands, a distinguished scholar of international relations, delivers a sweeping narrative that traces the strategic significance of this vast landmass from the early 20th century to today. He argues that Eurasia, with its immense resources, population, and industrial power, has been the central arena for global rivalry—a “cockpit” where autocratic land powers and democratic sea powers have clashed repeatedly. Brands revisits foundational geopolitical theories from figures like Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman, illustrating their enduring relevance in understanding Eurasia’s strategic geography. His analysis spans key historical events such as the World Wars and the Cold War, showcasing how struggles for dominance over Eurasia shaped modern history. He also highlights how revolutions in technology—ranging from gunpowder to nuclear weapons—have transformed warfare and altered the balance of power. The book’s contemporary focus is particularly compelling. Brands examines the rise of authoritarian regimes in China, Russia, and Iran, warning of their potential to reshape the international order. He posits that if these powers succeed in consolidating control over Eurasia’s strategic heartland and chokepoints, democracies worldwide could face unprecedented insecurity. This provocative argument underscores the stakes of modern geopolitics and offers a stark reminder of history’s lessons. Brands’ lucid prose and bold insights make “The Eurasian Century” both accessible and thought-provoking. While some readers may find his predictions unsettling or even melodramatic, his meticulous scholarship ensures they are grounded in historical precedent and strategic logic. Ultimately, this book is essential reading for policymakers, scholars, and anyone seeking to understand the dynamics of global power in the 21st century. It is not just a historical account but a vital roadmap for navigating an increasingly volatile world.

[J. Kirkland · Rating 1 out of 5]

There's a lot I could say about this work, but only the following is necessary: this book is cartoonishly biased.

The author is a noted member of the American Enterprise Institute, a far-right think tank.
It shows, LOL.

In a nutshell: "Realpolitik for thee, not for me."

Brands openly maintains that the Anglo-American world is driven by a desire to "preserve freedom" in its pursuit of foreign policy; it's the "other guys" who practice realpolitik and commit "real" atrocities and war crimes. When the US/UK do it, it doesn't count since it's implied to be a tragic necessity. Given the British Empire is among the most criminal regimes in world history (not to mention the US empire), this is a mistake of analysis that must be seen as disqualifying. Whatever drives poor Brands, it isn't academic integrity, LOL.

I'm not exaggerating when I say all this -- his bias is naked and unashamed. I was baffled and amused in equal measure.

The rational calculus of hard power is applied very, very selectively in his analysis. Rather ironic, as he is clearly a realist (along with his ilk at the think tank he works at).

He only deserves credit for correctly identifying the "strategic crescent" (i.e. the ring of land including Eastern Europe and the Middle East) as the fundamental battleground between states in the quest for world supremacy. But we must be very stingy with the credit given this is a widely-known fact in strategic studies.

Overall, a pretty primitive and disappointing attempt at something resembling academic history.

[Iotzky · Rating 4 out of 5]

In The Eurasian Century, Hal Brands delivers a masterful account of how Eurasia has shaped the trajectory of global power from the 20th century to today. With clarity and precision, Brands weaves together the story of two centuries of conflict, cooperation, and competition across the vast Eurasian continent—spanning from the trenches of World War I to the cyber battlefields of the 21st century.
Brands argues that Eurasia has been the central arena for both hot and cold wars, serving as the stage where great powers collided and global orders were tested. His analysis moves fluidly across time and space, covering pivotal moments such as World War II, the Cold War, the rise of China, and the current tensions with Russia. At the heart of the book is a powerful thesis: whoever dominates Eurasia, dominates the world.
What sets this book apart is its strategic lens. Brands, a leading historian and foreign policy expert, combines deep historical knowledge with sharp geopolitical insight. He doesn’t just recount events—he explains their significance for today’s emerging global order, where the U.S. faces growing challenges from resurgent Eurasian powers.
While dense in places, the book remains accessible and engaging, striking a balance between scholarly depth and readability. The Eurasian Century is a timely, thought-provoking work that challenges readers to rethink the past—and the future—through the lens of Eurasian geopolitics. It’s essential reading for students of history, strategy, and international affairs.

[timnc15 · Rating 3 out of 5]

Hal Brands is one of the most esteemed members of the foreign policy writing community, so his words have a particular weight that is hard to replicate elsewhere. That said, his attempt to establish a paradigm for modern geopolitical competition through the "Eurasian" landmass was not particularly convincing. While this framework may explain the First and Second World Wars (and may link to our modern adversaries in the form of Russia, Iran, and China), the framework seems too wide to really provide any analytical value. Brands' theory of world politics - the development of national ideology and the innovations in warfighting technology - is insightful for the history that they attempt to tackle. I also really appreciated his discussion of various geographers and early geopolitical analysts (Mackinder, Ratzel, Spykman, Mahan, etc.) - these individuals and their methods of geopolitical framing will greatly supplement my future analysis of geopolitics. Brands also anticipates the "hard fights" that America faces in the future and the need for robust coalition-building, defense spending, and learning lessons from our historical failures to maintain an American order that he insists is worth preserving. Regardless, his argument (while lacking in analytical quality) provides a rousing cry to re-awaken the American desire to make the world a better place and make the sacrifices and decisions needed to do so.

[Roland Glotzer · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very interesting book that depicts world history from the early 1900’s until now as a fight between democracies (United States and its allies) and autocracies focusing on Russia, China and Iran. It clearly explains why US support of nations in Europe and the Pacific are not philanthropic donations but a way to defend America (in that respect it should be a required reading for the current Trump administration).

While for most of the book I was tempted to give it five stars, I could only give it four for the following reasons :

1. Hal Brands admits that the US supported criminal dictators like Pinochet in Chile and Suharto in Indonesia but considers it a lesser evil in the fight against communism. While this may be a Machiavellian justification, it is hard to accept in terms of ethics.
2. The author paints the Eurasian Century as a fight between democracies and autarchies ignoring the current slide of America towards autarchy.

It is true that the book though published in 2025 was primarily written in 2024. However many of the policy shifts we see today in the US could have been anticipated from the rhetoric of Trump during his campaign.

It may be worthwhile to mention a quote of Hal Brands which is aptly applicable to Trump :

“ Good judgment after all, is a form of power, but dictators who silence debate and evade accountability get dumber over time”.

[E · Rating 4 out of 5]

I was impressed by this book. Brands does an excellent job of showing from a 30,000-foot view how the conflicts of the twentieth century developed and were waged. I learned more from 30 pages on the Great War or the last war than I expected--especially as it relates to Russia.

The book is an excellent introduction, in other words, to the warfare of the past 110 years. He also spends a lot of time explicating the philosophy of Mackinder and Mahan (though not better than, say, Robert Kagan has done). This was mostly review for me, though I think the summary was adequate.

What Brands didn't do a great job of was connecting those last two paragraphs. He explained the wars expertly, but not all that explicitly in Mahanian terms, for example. This was surprising to me, though again it's hard to fault someone for a book he didn't write.

Brands seems mostly negative about the future. He believes that China will strike at the heartland, perhaps successfully. I'll say it had better do so soon, because the nation is going to get old sooner than we realize. But we should have no assumptions that the current state of our one-war-at-a-time military will reach the results we expect, or desire. I hope people are paying attention.

[Terry Tucker · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an excellent look at the history of 20th and 21st century conflict through the context of Mackinder's pivot theory and Spykman's views on power politics. The author provides plenty of backdrop for a very readable narrative that flows consistently. The author provides a number of lessons learned and chapter 6 summarizes no less than 10 lessons learned for the contemporary environment. One item that gets a repetitive look is that no alliance is improbable or impossible. On 4 Feb 2022, Xi and Putin signed a "Friends of Steel Pact" with both committed to strengthening defense and to uphold authoritarian government. Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/...
Power politics, will in all likelihood, raise the stakes as states reassess what degrees of evil and morality will be accepted in order to deter threats to security and to form alliances that could converge - albeit temporarily - to undermine western influence and values. Lastly, there are consequences to retrenchment. If a state feels that the cost of deterrence early could be high, the cost of roll back could be staggering.

all in all a very good book.

[Alexandre · Rating 5 out of 5]

uma análise histórica da evolução geopolítica da eurásia, recorrendo à tradição de autores como spykman, mahan e sobretudo mackinder.

explora os desígnios de conquista continental da alemanha wilhelmina e hitleriana nas guerras mundiais, da urss durante a guerra fria, bem como da china e rússia atuais. presente a todas estas está a competição com as potências democráticas marítimas, seja os eua ou o reino unido, bem como o desenvolvimento massivo de potencialidades militares e tecnológicas por parte de ditaduras eurasiáticas, com vista a consolidar sob o seu domínio um espaço geográfico e geopolítico imenso, capaz de virar a balança a seu favor.

peca, no limite, na insistência de que os estados unidos ainda reconhecem o seu papel neste jogo, como principal potência democrática agregadora das restantes, numa altura em que a atual administração parece focada em reestruturar do zero a sua posição no mundo. como é evidente, dada a pequenez europeia nestes assuntos, pouco ou nada é dito sobre o relevo militar dos seus estados no mundo por vir.

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/the-e...

[Andrew Tollemache · Rating 4 out of 5]

Brands traces the role of the saga of global powers trying to subjugate/control/conquer the EurAsian continent, which Brands argues is the planets core in termsof population and economics, and Brands than makes the case that this fight for EurAsia will dominate the 21st century. The US and allies like the UK and Australia/New Zealand are just on the periphery and that the control of the core will decide whether peripheral powers will be cut off and hurt by who every wins. Surprise, surprise, Brands appears to think its a foregone conclusion that China will dominate.

[Fran Caparrelli · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is great and I have to say as a conservative think tank author it was pretty even handed except for a few things. The concept of geopolitics is explained very clearly and in a nice readable style. It's a bit discouraging at the end with the picture of how the world dynamics can go if democracy doesn't win out. Since the book obviously was written before the present presidential term I kept wondering what the author would say about the first 100 days.

[Chase Metcalf · Rating 4 out of 5]

Outstanding book examining the geopolitical competition for Eurasia in the 20th and 21st century. A must read for those interested in the factors driving that competition and the challenges facing the US in this century. Brands combines discussion of history and geopolitics in a way that is accessible to the average reader but still useful to those with an existing knowledge of the subject.

[James S. · Rating 2 out of 5]

The book's argument is that basically that Eurasia is the most important continent. I kept thinking, didn't we already know this? Most people live there, most of human history has happened there, it's the largest continent....

Once the author makes this earth-shattering claim, he goes on to give a rehash of WWII. He ends with a rote warning about China and Russia.

A water is wet book.

[Paul · Rating 1 out of 5]

One of the most boring books I have ever read. Its language is dry and there in nothing original in it. This is what happens with many people who come and write things for the academia: maybe they can like this kind of writing style. Avoid it.

[Robert · Rating 5 out of 5]

The book that Trump administration’s foreign policy decision makers need to read and it was released at the right time. This book vividly explains what happens when US turns isolationist and lets Eurasia run its own course.

[Özgür · Rating 5 out of 5]

I may be biased when it comes to history books but a good book with a set of historical narratives as to how Eurasia with its vast resources has been and will be key to global power. More relevant today than ever...

[Lance · Rating 3 out of 5]

Geography shapes but strategy decides. Coalition building, coalition breaking.

Pacing is fast. I wish it could go deeper on some arguments etc. so look elsewhere for more in-depth analysis of the current world order.

[Matthew Vaughan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Changed my perspective and gave me greater insight into some of the questions I'd had about decisions our government has made and is making. Generally balanced, at times overly brief. Doesn't overstay its welcome.

[Joni · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent. Well written and informative.

[karim Jebari · Rating 2 out of 5]

Boring and predicable.

[Dave · Rating 4 out of 5]

Probably 3.5 stars, but I'm a generous grader. Would have worked much better as a long Foreign Affairs essay.

[Dale · Rating 3 out of 5]

A comprehensive history of Eurasia through World War I, II, and the Cold War culminating with the challenges of an egressive Russia and China seeking a dominant place in today’s world.

[David · Rating 1 out of 5]

Absolutely nothing original