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Tomorrow Is Yesterday: Life, Death, and the Pursuit of Peace in Israel/Palestine
A Best Book of 2025
The New Yorker • Foreign Affairs • NPR • Foreign Policy • Responsible Statecraft
Two insiders explain why the Israeli–Palestinian peace process failed, and anticipate what lies ahead.
On October 7, 2023, Hamas fighters killed more than eleven hundred Israelis and took more than two hundred hostages, prompting an Israeli response that has in turn taken tens of thousands of lives and devastated the Gaza Strip. Why did this happen, and can anything be done to grant peace and justice to Israelis and Palestinians alike?
In Tomorrow Is Yesterday, veteran negotiators Hussein Agha and Robert Malley offer a personal and bracing perspective on how the hopes of the Oslo Peace Process became the horrors of the present. Drawing on their experience advising the Palestinian leadership (Arafat and Abbas) and US presidents (Clinton, Obama, and Biden) and their participation in secret talks over decades, Agha and Malley offer candid portraits of leading figures and an interpretation of the conflict that exposes the delusions of all sides. They stress that the two-state solution became a global goal only when it was no longer viable; that U.S. officials preferred technical schemes to a frank reckoning with the past; that Hamas’s onslaught and Israel’s war of destruction were not historical exceptions but historical reenactments; and that the gaps separating Israelis and Palestinians have less to do with territorial allocation than with history and emotions.
The New Yorker • Foreign Affairs • NPR • Foreign Policy • Responsible Statecraft
Two insiders explain why the Israeli–Palestinian peace process failed, and anticipate what lies ahead.
On October 7, 2023, Hamas fighters killed more than eleven hundred Israelis and took more than two hundred hostages, prompting an Israeli response that has in turn taken tens of thousands of lives and devastated the Gaza Strip. Why did this happen, and can anything be done to grant peace and justice to Israelis and Palestinians alike?
In Tomorrow Is Yesterday, veteran negotiators Hussein Agha and Robert Malley offer a personal and bracing perspective on how the hopes of the Oslo Peace Process became the horrors of the present. Drawing on their experience advising the Palestinian leadership (Arafat and Abbas) and US presidents (Clinton, Obama, and Biden) and their participation in secret talks over decades, Agha and Malley offer candid portraits of leading figures and an interpretation of the conflict that exposes the delusions of all sides. They stress that the two-state solution became a global goal only when it was no longer viable; that U.S. officials preferred technical schemes to a frank reckoning with the past; that Hamas’s onslaught and Israel’s war of destruction were not historical exceptions but historical reenactments; and that the gaps separating Israelis and Palestinians have less to do with territorial allocation than with history and emotions.
249 pages, Kindle Edition
First published September 16, 2025
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 104 reviews
Did Not Finish
March 2, 2026Right on the cover flap, the publisher's blurb say that Israel responded to Oct. 7 (2023) with a "war of destruction."
"Israelis want genuine acceptance and normalcy; they want eternal security, which is hard to distinguish from eternal dominance," -- Prologue
"They seek refuge in violence: Palestinians in a raw expression of pent-up rage and and desire for vengeance; Israelis in the unleashing of prodigious force, modern technology in the service of age-old ferociousness."... "Despair has sprung from illusions and lies; hope can come from discarding deceit and facing truth." -- Prologue
"In scope and brutality, Hamas's assault on Israelis exceeded any prior Palestinian act. Israel's military attacks in Gaza were an onslaught governed by unusual rules, in which the death of Palestinian fighters seemed like collateral damage, while the massive indiscriminate slaughter of tens of thousands of civilians, many of them women and children, appeared the main event. Killing was the purpose." ... "Horror also came at the hands of the West's collusion and Arab governments' indifference...." ... "The war..unleashed a regional escalation that spread to Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, the Red Sea, and Iran."... ("T)he war...restored the Palestinian question to the center of world politics." -- Beginnings
The statement that the Palestinians have been held captive in the Gaza strip, blockaded (that is, in an 'open-air prison').
The book equates the opinions and feelings of Hamas with those of Palestinians in general.
Also equates self-defense with ethnic cleansing and genocide; equates resistance with terrorism.
Says pinning the problem on Netanyahu and his right-wingers is not accurate, nor, similarly, can the blame be put on Hamas/Yahya Sinwar -- because most Israelis accept the allegedly genocidal goals of Netanyahu, and most Palestinians accept Sinwar's goals.
The authors make a moral as well as a historical equivalence.
The indignity of the Palestine predicament (since most do not accept Israel's legitimacy or concede the right of return) -- that is, their disgrace -- and the way most of their leaders negotiated.
The equating of Hajj Amin Husseini and David Ben Gurion, of Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat, of Sinwar and Netanyahu, and indeed of all three of those pairs
The assumption that Zionism was racism, that Israel was actually a settler colonial state, and that the key fact of history to know is that America's strongest civil rights activists supported the Palestinian cause--all taken from Beginnings. These latter assumptions constitute cherry-picking of history to confuse and mislead the reader.
All these quotes and points are taken from the publisher's blurb (on the flap), the Prologue, and the section "Beginnings." They're taken from the book flap and the pages up to the top of p. 13.
The authors speak of facing truth, but the book is crafted in the service of a narrative rather than the truth. No, the purpose of the war was not ethnic cleansing, i.e., to kill as many civilians as possible. No, all Palestinians don't share Hamas's view. Nor are the dynamics of Israel and Hamas equivalent, either currently or historically. Nor did Zionists from the get-go want to exclude all Arabs from the land.
Re that latter allegation, AI may currently tell you it's true, based on one entry in Theodor Hertzl's manic brainstorming in his diary after he had first hit on the idea of a Jewish state. That allegation is currently being promulgated by the usual suspects, similar to scholarship attempting to show that there never was a historical Israelite presence in the Levant.
However, much can be learned from historical study, for those who wish to learn. But first give up the inversion by which the loudest accusations come from those who are themselves doing what they accuse others of doing.
Here's an instructive 1939 quote from Yusuf Hanna, the editor of Filastin:
For the curious, there's a lot to learn.
So that why I say, enough of this book. No need to read multiple books along the same line.
Palestinians should follow the example of the Zionists: stop avenging the past and start building the future. Until then, they are being colonized by Islamists. More accurately, they are being sacrificed by the Islamists.
To coin a phrase,
Thanks to my public library for making this book available.
"Israelis want genuine acceptance and normalcy; they want eternal security, which is hard to distinguish from eternal dominance," -- Prologue
"They seek refuge in violence: Palestinians in a raw expression of pent-up rage and and desire for vengeance; Israelis in the unleashing of prodigious force, modern technology in the service of age-old ferociousness."... "Despair has sprung from illusions and lies; hope can come from discarding deceit and facing truth." -- Prologue
"In scope and brutality, Hamas's assault on Israelis exceeded any prior Palestinian act. Israel's military attacks in Gaza were an onslaught governed by unusual rules, in which the death of Palestinian fighters seemed like collateral damage, while the massive indiscriminate slaughter of tens of thousands of civilians, many of them women and children, appeared the main event. Killing was the purpose." ... "Horror also came at the hands of the West's collusion and Arab governments' indifference...." ... "The war..unleashed a regional escalation that spread to Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, the Red Sea, and Iran."... ("T)he war...restored the Palestinian question to the center of world politics." -- Beginnings
The statement that the Palestinians have been held captive in the Gaza strip, blockaded (that is, in an 'open-air prison').
The book equates the opinions and feelings of Hamas with those of Palestinians in general.
Also equates self-defense with ethnic cleansing and genocide; equates resistance with terrorism.
Says pinning the problem on Netanyahu and his right-wingers is not accurate, nor, similarly, can the blame be put on Hamas/Yahya Sinwar -- because most Israelis accept the allegedly genocidal goals of Netanyahu, and most Palestinians accept Sinwar's goals.
The authors make a moral as well as a historical equivalence.
The indignity of the Palestine predicament (since most do not accept Israel's legitimacy or concede the right of return) -- that is, their disgrace -- and the way most of their leaders negotiated.
The equating of Hajj Amin Husseini and David Ben Gurion, of Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat, of Sinwar and Netanyahu, and indeed of all three of those pairs
The assumption that Zionism was racism, that Israel was actually a settler colonial state, and that the key fact of history to know is that America's strongest civil rights activists supported the Palestinian cause--all taken from Beginnings. These latter assumptions constitute cherry-picking of history to confuse and mislead the reader.
All these quotes and points are taken from the publisher's blurb (on the flap), the Prologue, and the section "Beginnings." They're taken from the book flap and the pages up to the top of p. 13.
The authors speak of facing truth, but the book is crafted in the service of a narrative rather than the truth. No, the purpose of the war was not ethnic cleansing, i.e., to kill as many civilians as possible. No, all Palestinians don't share Hamas's view. Nor are the dynamics of Israel and Hamas equivalent, either currently or historically. Nor did Zionists from the get-go want to exclude all Arabs from the land.
Re that latter allegation, AI may currently tell you it's true, based on one entry in Theodor Hertzl's manic brainstorming in his diary after he had first hit on the idea of a Jewish state. That allegation is currently being promulgated by the usual suspects, similar to scholarship attempting to show that there never was a historical Israelite presence in the Levant.
However, much can be learned from historical study, for those who wish to learn. But first give up the inversion by which the loudest accusations come from those who are themselves doing what they accuse others of doing.
Here's an instructive 1939 quote from Yusuf Hanna, the editor of Filastin:
There is not an Arab who wants to see himself ruled by the Jews, but there is not also an Arab with sense who wants to see himself ruled by assassins."
For the curious, there's a lot to learn.
So that why I say, enough of this book. No need to read multiple books along the same line.
Palestinians should follow the example of the Zionists: stop avenging the past and start building the future. Until then, they are being colonized by Islamists. More accurately, they are being sacrificed by the Islamists.
To coin a phrase,
Build it and they will come
Thanks to my public library for making this book available.
October 15, 2025
Good explanation of why a two-state solution has historically been something imposed on the situation from outside, despite not making any sense and despite it being something neither Palestinians nor Israelis really want.
Good for insight into how Palestinians and Israelis think, the logic behind their views and their historical contexts presented in a clear, comprehensive, objective manner.
Good, I suppose, if you’re a reader who needed convincing that this is not a hard conflict to understand, it’s just something that fundamentally can’t be solved by American chauvinism; it, in fact, has been hurt by it.
But not good at all for saying anything of substance about why readers should care, or perhaps do something to pressure our government to stop perpetuating it; not good at all, by presenting the Palestinian view (of the Nakba and everything following as a genocide) as just one of many ways to view it, as if it could be argued any other way. At least the authors had the balls to additionally use the words “apartheid,” “ethnic cleansing,” “settler-colonialism.” I just wish they meant it when they said it.
Mainly, good for the overall history of the peace process since the Camp David Accords. which is as interesting as it is infuriating.
Good for insight into how Palestinians and Israelis think, the logic behind their views and their historical contexts presented in a clear, comprehensive, objective manner.
Good, I suppose, if you’re a reader who needed convincing that this is not a hard conflict to understand, it’s just something that fundamentally can’t be solved by American chauvinism; it, in fact, has been hurt by it.
But not good at all for saying anything of substance about why readers should care, or perhaps do something to pressure our government to stop perpetuating it; not good at all, by presenting the Palestinian view (of the Nakba and everything following as a genocide) as just one of many ways to view it, as if it could be argued any other way. At least the authors had the balls to additionally use the words “apartheid,” “ethnic cleansing,” “settler-colonialism.” I just wish they meant it when they said it.
Mainly, good for the overall history of the peace process since the Camp David Accords. which is as interesting as it is infuriating.
June 28, 2025
This may have suffered from reading it so closely to a book that acknowledges the Palestinian struggle, but this delves (to a point) to the US mediated peace process between Israel and Palestine over the last thirty years or so, given that our two authors were intimately involved, and why they failed on both sides and then conveniently fails to look too closely at the last three years or so. I understand that's because they haven't been too involved in the last three years, but it still feels pretty cowardly to give your perspective on everything happening up till that point, because they clearly have one. Solid read but isnt willing to take a stand.
October 30, 2025
a good read that adds to the knowledge, the context, and in shaping how we all got here.
saying that, having read 6 or 7 recent books recently in trying to better understand things, this one was simply Good.
several other reviewers speak about the middle-of-the-road approach.. and the seeming reticence in taking any meaty or substantive position on much of anything throughout.. .. . . while i admire their attempts to give insight and perspective to 'both sides' along with other players in this historical tragic reality.. in posturing to be Informative and Factual and Unbiased... they lost whatever voice they really had.
a bland and attempted-impartiality is all well and good.. unless, or until, it isn't.
then, it simply seems week. and shallow attempt to be helpful in any real way.
certain things are not impartial. some things are simply black or white-- or, at least, tinged with some human moral reality. avoiding calling something what it really is... is simply not helpful.
definitely informative. absolutely adds to the conversation and informative.
just lacking an ample dose of confidence in its own voice. and losing its import through its overly-bland and overly-neutral handling of things.
saying that, i am tempered by 6 or 7 other reads and perspectives recently. each one of which has shared a TON of insight and learning that has been huge. this one very much included.
saying that, having read 6 or 7 recent books recently in trying to better understand things, this one was simply Good.
several other reviewers speak about the middle-of-the-road approach.. and the seeming reticence in taking any meaty or substantive position on much of anything throughout.. .. . . while i admire their attempts to give insight and perspective to 'both sides' along with other players in this historical tragic reality.. in posturing to be Informative and Factual and Unbiased... they lost whatever voice they really had.
a bland and attempted-impartiality is all well and good.. unless, or until, it isn't.
then, it simply seems week. and shallow attempt to be helpful in any real way.
certain things are not impartial. some things are simply black or white-- or, at least, tinged with some human moral reality. avoiding calling something what it really is... is simply not helpful.
definitely informative. absolutely adds to the conversation and informative.
just lacking an ample dose of confidence in its own voice. and losing its import through its overly-bland and overly-neutral handling of things.
saying that, i am tempered by 6 or 7 other reads and perspectives recently. each one of which has shared a TON of insight and learning that has been huge. this one very much included.
October 17, 2025
interesting descriptions of the actors involved based on their insider information, very heavy on narratives (with focus on one side's); it is hard for me to believe that they are as central to the conflict as the book seems to imply, although they must play a major role
-3/4 for not distinguishing radical ideas and actors from moderate ones, and lack of estimates about their spreads
-3/4 for not distinguishing radical ideas and actors from moderate ones, and lack of estimates about their spreads
September 9, 2025
I just finished reading “Tomorrow Is Yesterday: Life, Death, and the Pursuit of Peace in Israel/Palestine” by Robert Malley and Hussein Agha. It is a book that I wish I had had at my desk as a young reporter covering the Middle East.
For anyone watching the news from Israel and Palestine and wondering, "How did we get here?", this book provides an essential perspective and answers. “Tomorrow Is Yesterday: Life, Death, and the Pursuit of Peace in Israel/Palestine, a compelling and eloquently written firsthand account of the conflict's history, is authored by two individuals with deep, personal ties to the peace process: Hussein Agha and Robert Malley.
Both Agha and Malley are respected scholars and diplomats with more than four decades of experience in the Middle East. Hussein Agha, an associate at St. Antony's College, University of Oxford, was a principal behind-the-scenes negotiator for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and an advisor to its chairman, Yasser Arafat. Robert Malley, a lecturer at Yale University, has served as a key U.S. envoy for the region under the Clinton, Obama, and Biden administrations.
Their upbringings almost destined them for this work. Malley's father, a prominent Egyptian-Jewish journalist and anti-Zionist, introduced his son to Yasser Arafat. Agha was a close advisor to Arafat himself. This unique access provides the book with an unparalleled view of the events.
Tomorrow is Yesterday takes you behind the scenes of the Israel-Palestine conflict, from the Oslo Accords to the present day. It guides you through the intimate details of events on the highest political stage that led to high hopes and shattered dreams, missed opportunities, and repeated betrayals and promises with no guarantees.
The book is a persuasive and insightful tool for anyone seeking answers and a glimpse into the future. The authors show us that even amid devastation and the impossible "two-state" or multinational single-state solutions, there is a possible, albeit painful and costly, path forward.
For anyone watching the news from Israel and Palestine and wondering, "How did we get here?", this book provides an essential perspective and answers. “Tomorrow Is Yesterday: Life, Death, and the Pursuit of Peace in Israel/Palestine, a compelling and eloquently written firsthand account of the conflict's history, is authored by two individuals with deep, personal ties to the peace process: Hussein Agha and Robert Malley.
Both Agha and Malley are respected scholars and diplomats with more than four decades of experience in the Middle East. Hussein Agha, an associate at St. Antony's College, University of Oxford, was a principal behind-the-scenes negotiator for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and an advisor to its chairman, Yasser Arafat. Robert Malley, a lecturer at Yale University, has served as a key U.S. envoy for the region under the Clinton, Obama, and Biden administrations.
Their upbringings almost destined them for this work. Malley's father, a prominent Egyptian-Jewish journalist and anti-Zionist, introduced his son to Yasser Arafat. Agha was a close advisor to Arafat himself. This unique access provides the book with an unparalleled view of the events.
Tomorrow is Yesterday takes you behind the scenes of the Israel-Palestine conflict, from the Oslo Accords to the present day. It guides you through the intimate details of events on the highest political stage that led to high hopes and shattered dreams, missed opportunities, and repeated betrayals and promises with no guarantees.
The book is a persuasive and insightful tool for anyone seeking answers and a glimpse into the future. The authors show us that even amid devastation and the impossible "two-state" or multinational single-state solutions, there is a possible, albeit painful and costly, path forward.
January 21, 2026
More an extended, often repetitive, essay about the failure (inevitable) of the two state proposal for Jewish Israeli and Palestinian national ambitions. Worth reading for cutting through the bullshit of mainstream media and politicians. The authors do not provide a roadmap out, other than try something else, something both peoples actually want.
May 31, 2026
The great irony of Tomorrow is Yesterday is that the book attempts to portray an unvarnished, insider account of the peace process, but the only real takeaway here is: Guess what, it's complicated! (Yeah, no shit?) And we have no idea what the path forward is! (So we're stuck in this cycle forever?)
For the first 50 pages or so I was suckered in by the book's linguistically poetic gut-punches, but by page 200+ I became frustrated upon realizing I hadn't really learned any new facts or calls to action; the authors favor lyrical, self-righteous mic-drops over actual understandable fact.
It's funny reading some of the other reviews of this book and realizing most people think the book didn't go far enough to condemn Israel. Meanwhile, in my circles, just using the word "genocide" -- and almost half-heartedly meaning it-- is revolutionary. As such, I appreciate how this book opened my eyes to some of the history and intentions that I was blinded to in my educational upbringing. And as much as it bothers me on intellectual grounds, I admit that the emotional language did serve to put me unflinchingly in the shoes of Palestinians in terms of understanding quite how deep the generational trauma and historical scars run in those communities.
However. Big, captial-H However! It is striking that this book was co-written by an American and a man with Middle Eastern-Arab roots / ingrained Palestinian sympathies. Both men are unequivocally qualified to be writing about this conflict. But there is a massive, Israeli-sized hole in the authorship here. For a book that purports to offer a clear-eyed look at all sides of the conflict and negotiations, it's frustrating to be missing a massive slice of that narrative pie. Ironically, my one big take-away from this book was that it is actually America that continuously and chauvinistically Fucks Things Up -- surprise! -- so maybe Mr. Malley should have removed himself from the narrative, hmm?? (One could argue perhaps that it is indeed more convincing to hear the mea culpa come from inside the house; though that being the case, the missing Israeli POV here is even more glaring.)
Having said that, I'm impressed that the authors managed to offer even some degree of sympathy to the Israeli narrative, though I wish they had used the same evocative, hyper-emotional language to describe the horrific violence enacted by Palestinians that they did to the horrific violence inflicted by Israelis.
Quotes:
~"Israelies want genuine acceptance and normalcy; they want eternal security, which is hard to distinguish from eternal dominace. Palestinians want justice and redemption, dignity and self-determination they want a return to a life that is no longer there."
~"Palestinians and Israeli Jews also came to regard the other side's actions as fulfillments of their own national nightmares, ethnic cleansing for one and extermination for the other. It is no surprise that they both so freely bandied about historical metaphors of yesteryear; a reprise of the 1948 Nakba for Palestinians; another Holocaust for Israelis. Residents of southern Israel paid for all the pain and humiliation Palestinians had suffered at Israeli hands. The people of Gaza paid not only for Hamas's actions but for Nazi crimes as well. History does not move forward. It slips sideways. In, in the very darkest of ways, repeats itself."
~"Tomorrow is yesterday: Israel has a brush with devastation, but emerges victorious. The peril validates its existential fears and the image it has of Palestinians; the military conquest justifies the faith it places in the power of its arms; the world's reaction confirms that, although it must seek the support of others, it can truly count only on itself."
For the first 50 pages or so I was suckered in by the book's linguistically poetic gut-punches, but by page 200+ I became frustrated upon realizing I hadn't really learned any new facts or calls to action; the authors favor lyrical, self-righteous mic-drops over actual understandable fact.
It's funny reading some of the other reviews of this book and realizing most people think the book didn't go far enough to condemn Israel. Meanwhile, in my circles, just using the word "genocide" -- and almost half-heartedly meaning it-- is revolutionary. As such, I appreciate how this book opened my eyes to some of the history and intentions that I was blinded to in my educational upbringing. And as much as it bothers me on intellectual grounds, I admit that the emotional language did serve to put me unflinchingly in the shoes of Palestinians in terms of understanding quite how deep the generational trauma and historical scars run in those communities.
However. Big, captial-H However! It is striking that this book was co-written by an American and a man with Middle Eastern-Arab roots / ingrained Palestinian sympathies. Both men are unequivocally qualified to be writing about this conflict. But there is a massive, Israeli-sized hole in the authorship here. For a book that purports to offer a clear-eyed look at all sides of the conflict and negotiations, it's frustrating to be missing a massive slice of that narrative pie. Ironically, my one big take-away from this book was that it is actually America that continuously and chauvinistically Fucks Things Up -- surprise! -- so maybe Mr. Malley should have removed himself from the narrative, hmm?? (One could argue perhaps that it is indeed more convincing to hear the mea culpa come from inside the house; though that being the case, the missing Israeli POV here is even more glaring.)
Having said that, I'm impressed that the authors managed to offer even some degree of sympathy to the Israeli narrative, though I wish they had used the same evocative, hyper-emotional language to describe the horrific violence enacted by Palestinians that they did to the horrific violence inflicted by Israelis.
Quotes:
~"Israelies want genuine acceptance and normalcy; they want eternal security, which is hard to distinguish from eternal dominace. Palestinians want justice and redemption, dignity and self-determination they want a return to a life that is no longer there."
~"Palestinians and Israeli Jews also came to regard the other side's actions as fulfillments of their own national nightmares, ethnic cleansing for one and extermination for the other. It is no surprise that they both so freely bandied about historical metaphors of yesteryear; a reprise of the 1948 Nakba for Palestinians; another Holocaust for Israelis. Residents of southern Israel paid for all the pain and humiliation Palestinians had suffered at Israeli hands. The people of Gaza paid not only for Hamas's actions but for Nazi crimes as well. History does not move forward. It slips sideways. In, in the very darkest of ways, repeats itself."
~"Tomorrow is yesterday: Israel has a brush with devastation, but emerges victorious. The peril validates its existential fears and the image it has of Palestinians; the military conquest justifies the faith it places in the power of its arms; the world's reaction confirms that, although it must seek the support of others, it can truly count only on itself."
January 7, 2026
Less of a history of the conflict, and more a deep look at the feelings held by both sides and the inconsistent ideas that make progress difficult. I thought it was really interesting to hear about their concept of the "dual-mind" that many Palestinians and Israelis hold where the ideas of violence and peace coexist in a way, and are not mutually exclusive, and how that concept is extremely difficult for many outsiders looking in to accept. I also found it to be the most illuminating book I've read on the Palestinian national movement, its inner workings, and the deep held beliefs that make it what it is today - in other books I've read about the conflict this topic has only been explored from a factual, historical perspective and less so from the subjective perspective of the people involved.
February 11, 2026
Like many books I have read on recent history and current affairs, I thought that this book did not tell me very much more than I have already learned from my other reading and could have been condensed to about 25% of its length, so I ended up reading the first two chapters, the last two chapters and skimmed the rest.
I thought it gave a good statement of the complexity of solving the problems of Israel and the Palestinians and presented some good thinking on alternative structures to the two state solution. The fact that it is "unrealistic" in the immediate future does not make it naive or unwanted. The world and peoples' opinions about what is possible, good or desirable can change in surprising ways in shorter time spans than we think possible at the time.
One point I read in this book and elsewhere that I have never understood is the assertion that the extremists make deals with fellow extremists on the other side more productively than with moderates. I just don't see this actually happening. Yes, Nixon went to China, Begin did a deal with Sadat and Reagan got Mr Gorbachev to "tear down the wall" (a year after Reagan left office, though not really through negotiation), but did any of them succeed in making the kinds of transformational rearrangements that lasted? The Middle East is still in turmoil, and Russia and China and the US are still fundamentally at odds. They produced a cold peace subject to continuing high defense expenditures and flare-ups. Contrast this with the peace negotiated by Clinton and Blair in Northern Ireland, and the transformation of Europe under the Marshall Plan. I'm open to counter-argument, but I just don't see it.
I thought it gave a good statement of the complexity of solving the problems of Israel and the Palestinians and presented some good thinking on alternative structures to the two state solution. The fact that it is "unrealistic" in the immediate future does not make it naive or unwanted. The world and peoples' opinions about what is possible, good or desirable can change in surprising ways in shorter time spans than we think possible at the time.
One point I read in this book and elsewhere that I have never understood is the assertion that the extremists make deals with fellow extremists on the other side more productively than with moderates. I just don't see this actually happening. Yes, Nixon went to China, Begin did a deal with Sadat and Reagan got Mr Gorbachev to "tear down the wall" (a year after Reagan left office, though not really through negotiation), but did any of them succeed in making the kinds of transformational rearrangements that lasted? The Middle East is still in turmoil, and Russia and China and the US are still fundamentally at odds. They produced a cold peace subject to continuing high defense expenditures and flare-ups. Contrast this with the peace negotiated by Clinton and Blair in Northern Ireland, and the transformation of Europe under the Marshall Plan. I'm open to counter-argument, but I just don't see it.
December 13, 2025
Two long-time peace process advisors, one to the United States, the other to the Palestinians, provide an insider's account of the many missteps that have occurred in Israel-Palestine peace negotiations over the past 40 years. They argue that the two-state solution never stood a chance given the often obliquely communicated preferences of the two parties and the United States' reluctance and/or inability to understand the their wishes. They also highlight the failure of the Israelis to anticipate the attacks of October 7 despite clear and public telegraphing by Hamas. Hindsight provides clarity, but their arguments suggest that peace mechanisms that were less bold than a two-state solution could have yielded results, but the time for those options may have passed.
September 24, 2026
This book does a great job laying out the history of this conflict and how/why past efforts to achieve peace have failed. It does not, however, offer future solutions. But that’s by design: “The details and prescriptive nature of the proposals matter little at this stage. It would make no sense to suggest a general outline of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement because the prospect is holy academic, detached from reality.” It’s hard to sit with no solutions offered but maybe that’s the point.
May 16, 2026
A comprehensive yet somewhat dry recounting of the failure of the two state ‘solution’, written by a Jewish American and a Palestinian diplomat. Basically, the US has to stop lying: that it’s impartial, while its arms continue to fuel genocide. Good and depressing.
December 16, 2025
Very biased answer one sided view of the conflict. if you don't have much background or knowledge on the history of the region, it can be be very misleading....
January 15, 2026
If you're going to read a book about Israel/Palestine, it's this. It is by far the best book I have read on the topic. Both of their expertise is unmatched to the extent that they can give inside perspectives into peace talks without having to worry about their political images in the way that Jimmy Carter's book would have. They gave such a good synopsis of the history of the conflict with the key points and painted a full picture of each leader's character. Additionally, there ideas for possible ways to move forward were very innovative without the assumption that it is the end all be all the same way the two-state solution is.
October 7, 2025
Game over for American imperialism
Read
August 15, 2026Kind of a challenging read, but did add a lot of color to the conflict for me.
October 25, 2025
I found this book to be one of the more honest and knowledgable appraisals of the prospects for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Today its prospects are nil. Not today. Not tomorrow. Not in 1,000 years.
The book is also an honest appreciation of America as a broker for peace in the Middle East. America has for a variety of reasons been a terrible broker for peace. For one: its presidential election cycle is too short. For another: American perceptions of the Palestinian catastrophe have never been taken seriously. And for a third: for domestic politics, America must always give in to the Israeli prime minister no matter who he or she is.
I personally have almost never been a champion of a two state solution and I remain antagonistic to the idea to this day.
On a simple, practical level, in this world, the land we are talking about is simply too small and resource poor to sustain two independent states. Government costs money. A lot of it. And it’s hard to get right.
I’ve spent time there. Believe me: it’s a small place.
I come from a big place with lots of resources: Canada. We struggle to enforce our sovereignty, and support the aspirations of our people.
Contrary to popular belief: we need the cooperation of each other to make it work. Even (especially?) Canada depends on the goodwill of its neighbours.
Here’s another reason I remain opposed to a two state solution: my reading of the Middle East is that it has a lot of such disputes, maybe not exactly the same as this one but many which are longstanding and many in which subdividing the land further (I’m thinking Kurds, Yazidis, Yemenese, to quote a few examples) doesn’t really help people. It just further divides affections.
Although the big powers created mirrors of their states following WWI, the model never made sense and is making less sense by the day.
Small blocks of very rich people control the Middle East and that’s not likely to change any time soon.
In the city I grew up in many, many different people have learned to get along in small blocks with a few basic rules. When people play by the rules everybody gets to sleep in peace. It’s when the rules become ends in themselves that, I believe, is when things go off the rails.
Today its prospects are nil. Not today. Not tomorrow. Not in 1,000 years.
The book is also an honest appreciation of America as a broker for peace in the Middle East. America has for a variety of reasons been a terrible broker for peace. For one: its presidential election cycle is too short. For another: American perceptions of the Palestinian catastrophe have never been taken seriously. And for a third: for domestic politics, America must always give in to the Israeli prime minister no matter who he or she is.
I personally have almost never been a champion of a two state solution and I remain antagonistic to the idea to this day.
On a simple, practical level, in this world, the land we are talking about is simply too small and resource poor to sustain two independent states. Government costs money. A lot of it. And it’s hard to get right.
I’ve spent time there. Believe me: it’s a small place.
I come from a big place with lots of resources: Canada. We struggle to enforce our sovereignty, and support the aspirations of our people.
Contrary to popular belief: we need the cooperation of each other to make it work. Even (especially?) Canada depends on the goodwill of its neighbours.
Here’s another reason I remain opposed to a two state solution: my reading of the Middle East is that it has a lot of such disputes, maybe not exactly the same as this one but many which are longstanding and many in which subdividing the land further (I’m thinking Kurds, Yazidis, Yemenese, to quote a few examples) doesn’t really help people. It just further divides affections.
Although the big powers created mirrors of their states following WWI, the model never made sense and is making less sense by the day.
Small blocks of very rich people control the Middle East and that’s not likely to change any time soon.
In the city I grew up in many, many different people have learned to get along in small blocks with a few basic rules. When people play by the rules everybody gets to sleep in peace. It’s when the rules become ends in themselves that, I believe, is when things go off the rails.
December 8, 2025
It was okay. Wasn't as worth the hype that the *liberal intelligentsia* was touting. The first 3/4 of it was a look at history of the conflict generally, history of the negotiations and the US role in that, along with criticisms of how things have turned. The writing in this wasn't very gripping. The last fourth of the book was probably the best part. The authors, involved in negotiations for the last few decades, I believe tried their best to stay neutral and analytical of both camp's genuine emotions, fears, and desires, although I believe some who read this would see it as leaning toward a "pro-palestine" viewpoint, which is a bit simplistic in the grand scheme of things. Especially considering the consistent criticism the authors have toward Palestinian negotiators and actors. Important to remember, especially in the way things are discussed today in such black and white terms, that explaining something is not excusing or justifying something. It did feel like the book spent more time on the psyche of the Palestinian viewpoint, which is reasonable in many ways, but could have maybe been a more complete work if a bit evened out in the area of explaining both group's aspirations and how that drives things. Overall, fine. I would go 2.5/5 if possible. But closer to a 3 than a 2.
November 6, 2025
horribly biased without supporting data/evidence.
February 20, 2026
I found this to be a super frustrating read. There’s a palpable bitterness throughout—fair enough given the situation and the authors’ roles in it. But they criticize the groups they were part of endlessly without addressing what they did individually to change any of it. (I understand they were individuals in larger hierarchical groups and likely did not have the power to unilaterally change anything. It just feels a little unfair to use personal experience as a platform from which to direct so much bitterness at others while simultaneously skipping over your own failures.)
I also didn’t like the structure at all. Skips around in time, dropping anecdotes here and there. Doesn’t seem to be building much of a coherent case apart from “everything that happened was bad and wrong and we would have done it differently but we won’t say how.” Obviously the U.S. has handled this terribly from the beginning. Not a revelation to say that. But what would the authors have done differently if they could have controlled it? Not really clear.
I also didn’t like the structure at all. Skips around in time, dropping anecdotes here and there. Doesn’t seem to be building much of a coherent case apart from “everything that happened was bad and wrong and we would have done it differently but we won’t say how.” Obviously the U.S. has handled this terribly from the beginning. Not a revelation to say that. But what would the authors have done differently if they could have controlled it? Not really clear.
April 16, 2026
The book focuses on a topic that is deeply personal and complex that I wanted to learn more about. I was excited to read it but left disappointed.
Peak
• After reading, definitely feel more informed about the subject and its history over the last really 30 years and with some prior context sprinkled in.
Weak
• I definitely think it suffers from being written in 2023 and published in 2025 because within that two years has been one of the more horrific humanitarian events in history and probably kills the optimism they tried to convey at the end.
The book definitely highlighted that the US probably made things worse trying to facilitate peace talks and solutions which isn’t surprising, our country loves to make it look like we are doing things to help people when it’s just for show.
3 stars
Peak
• After reading, definitely feel more informed about the subject and its history over the last really 30 years and with some prior context sprinkled in.
Weak
• I definitely think it suffers from being written in 2023 and published in 2025 because within that two years has been one of the more horrific humanitarian events in history and probably kills the optimism they tried to convey at the end.
The book definitely highlighted that the US probably made things worse trying to facilitate peace talks and solutions which isn’t surprising, our country loves to make it look like we are doing things to help people when it’s just for show.
3 stars
Did Not Finish
March 13, 2026Soooo dense….its an 11 hour listen…I lasted an hour. It’s well written…but I can’t imagine enduring 10 more hours. What I did get from the first hour of listening-neither Israel or Palestine has ever wanted a two state solution. It has always been a lot of “words” for other nations to hear…for those other nations to feel like the peace process was going somewhere…but neither side has had a ruler that ever wanted…or thought a two state solution could work.
I applaud the tenacity of anyone who finishes this one. It’s important information…and we would all be better off with a deeper understanding of events, and motives….but I will have to garner my understanding of this complex relationship from other sources.
I applaud the tenacity of anyone who finishes this one. It’s important information…and we would all be better off with a deeper understanding of events, and motives….but I will have to garner my understanding of this complex relationship from other sources.
March 14, 2026
Such a well-conceived and masterfully executed book. The co-authors have unquestionable experience on the subject matter, emerging diverse from the region and assuming roles in key camps involved in the conflict. Their diagnostic lens is encouraging and refreshing---there is no reduction of complexity here, just an arduous appreciation for it---but, duly, all the more heartbreaking. So much fear, such devastation.
August 19, 2026
This is probably the best Israel-Palestine book I have read thus far. The authors bring both academic experience and practical involvement in the peace processes (mainly in the 1990s) to bear in a thoughtful, balanced analysis. I think I disagree with the core argument but agree with many of the sub-claims.
Let me try to explain that: Agha and Malley (AM) argue that the core problem with US peace process efforts (aside from favoritism to Israel) is the substitution of technical solutions (land swaps, conditional sovereignty, security agreements) for substantive considerations of how history shapes each side's perspectives and desires. The authors are critical of Oslo, Camp David, and similar efforts for not getting to the heart of each side's emotional perspective and identities, which ultimately derive from their historical experiences. The fact that Israel has been repeatedly rewarded with additional violence after withdrawing from southern Lebanon and Gaza, its longstanding experience of terrorism, and its sense of existential insecurity, will always get in the way of a meaningful peace agreement. For Palestinians, technical solutions cannot redress the pain of the Nakba, the humiliation and oppression of occupation, and the desire to return to what they see as their homeland.
However, this is exactly where I divide from AM, even if I think I share much of their perspective. This may be weird to say as a historian, but trying to redress past wrongs is exactly the wrong approach to this conflict. The past cannot be undone, certain injustices can never be rectified, and history has created a series of faits accompli in the Middle East that, while not abstractly fair, are real and unlikely to change. I think diplomacy is best guided not by constant referral to the past but by selective forgetting and the appraisal of realistic, politically sustainable solutions. I agree that the focus on technicalities in Oslo, Camp David, the Mitchell Plan, and other proposals is insufficient, but the kind of historical and identity claims that AM want the participants to wrestle with are even more irreconcilable.
For example, AM fault Camp David for not dealing with the right of return, but the right of return ain't happening; Israel simply will not allow it, and they have decent reasons for not doing so. It has been 75 years since the Nakba; it is time to give up this plank and look to other solutions that enable sovereignty, dignity, and opportunity for Palestinians. Israel has a similar choice with settlements: it can continue to eat up the WB and create a 1-state, apartheid-like system, or it can choose to be a Jewish majority democracy within a reasonably sized territory. Each side must give up core myths and goals to achieve something remotely just and feasible. AM, furthermore, never explain what historical reckoning would actually look like and how it would facilitate peace rather than, as I expect, further entrenching each side in its myths, fears, and hatreds.
This critique aside, this book has many excellent insights. One point that is especially sharp in this book is the imbalance of interests and capabilities in this conflict. Politicians have been saying forever that "the status quo is unsustainable," but AM show that this is false. The status quo is quite sustainable for Israel, which has vastly more power and the ability to dominate most of Palestinian life and deter other adversaries. Both sides have to take certain actions and changes of perspective to make this conflict solvable, but it is undeniable that Israel has to do more (actually freeze the settlements, allow Gaza to exist and rebuild, permit meaningful sovereignty/statehood in the WB, etc) to make a settlement possible. And yet, the authors note, US diplomacy has rarely acknowledged this imbalance or put much pressure on Israel to change policy (beyond rhetoric).
Another good point is that there is no solution that doesn't involve the extremists. This is hard to swallow, but on both sides extremists have become more powerful over time, not less. And yet, the peace process has always sought to freeze them out and focus on "responsible" actors like the Palestinian Authority or PLO and the mainstream Israeli negotiators like Rabin or Barak. However, without involving the extremists, from Hamas to the increasingly dominant Israeli right, the "moderates" don't have enough power to create a deal that will stick against these veto-holders. This is much easier said than done, but it's also true that freezing out extremists simply has not worked.
A few other problems: this book's organization is kind of odd. It isn't chronological, but the thematic choices for each chapter don't seem coherent, and it ends up retreading a lot of the same ground. Furthermore, AM like to chew on problems rather than offer solutions; I'm genuinely interested in hearing what they think all parties to this conflict should do moving forward, but they don't really say. Finally, the book is often lacking in detail. Camp David 2000, for example, is dismissed without much examination of what actually happened at Camp David.
Still, this is one of the few books I've read since 10/7 that attempts balance, sobriety, and historical perspective on this most intractable of conflicts. It has many great insights, and it should be read widely.
Let me try to explain that: Agha and Malley (AM) argue that the core problem with US peace process efforts (aside from favoritism to Israel) is the substitution of technical solutions (land swaps, conditional sovereignty, security agreements) for substantive considerations of how history shapes each side's perspectives and desires. The authors are critical of Oslo, Camp David, and similar efforts for not getting to the heart of each side's emotional perspective and identities, which ultimately derive from their historical experiences. The fact that Israel has been repeatedly rewarded with additional violence after withdrawing from southern Lebanon and Gaza, its longstanding experience of terrorism, and its sense of existential insecurity, will always get in the way of a meaningful peace agreement. For Palestinians, technical solutions cannot redress the pain of the Nakba, the humiliation and oppression of occupation, and the desire to return to what they see as their homeland.
However, this is exactly where I divide from AM, even if I think I share much of their perspective. This may be weird to say as a historian, but trying to redress past wrongs is exactly the wrong approach to this conflict. The past cannot be undone, certain injustices can never be rectified, and history has created a series of faits accompli in the Middle East that, while not abstractly fair, are real and unlikely to change. I think diplomacy is best guided not by constant referral to the past but by selective forgetting and the appraisal of realistic, politically sustainable solutions. I agree that the focus on technicalities in Oslo, Camp David, the Mitchell Plan, and other proposals is insufficient, but the kind of historical and identity claims that AM want the participants to wrestle with are even more irreconcilable.
For example, AM fault Camp David for not dealing with the right of return, but the right of return ain't happening; Israel simply will not allow it, and they have decent reasons for not doing so. It has been 75 years since the Nakba; it is time to give up this plank and look to other solutions that enable sovereignty, dignity, and opportunity for Palestinians. Israel has a similar choice with settlements: it can continue to eat up the WB and create a 1-state, apartheid-like system, or it can choose to be a Jewish majority democracy within a reasonably sized territory. Each side must give up core myths and goals to achieve something remotely just and feasible. AM, furthermore, never explain what historical reckoning would actually look like and how it would facilitate peace rather than, as I expect, further entrenching each side in its myths, fears, and hatreds.
This critique aside, this book has many excellent insights. One point that is especially sharp in this book is the imbalance of interests and capabilities in this conflict. Politicians have been saying forever that "the status quo is unsustainable," but AM show that this is false. The status quo is quite sustainable for Israel, which has vastly more power and the ability to dominate most of Palestinian life and deter other adversaries. Both sides have to take certain actions and changes of perspective to make this conflict solvable, but it is undeniable that Israel has to do more (actually freeze the settlements, allow Gaza to exist and rebuild, permit meaningful sovereignty/statehood in the WB, etc) to make a settlement possible. And yet, the authors note, US diplomacy has rarely acknowledged this imbalance or put much pressure on Israel to change policy (beyond rhetoric).
Another good point is that there is no solution that doesn't involve the extremists. This is hard to swallow, but on both sides extremists have become more powerful over time, not less. And yet, the peace process has always sought to freeze them out and focus on "responsible" actors like the Palestinian Authority or PLO and the mainstream Israeli negotiators like Rabin or Barak. However, without involving the extremists, from Hamas to the increasingly dominant Israeli right, the "moderates" don't have enough power to create a deal that will stick against these veto-holders. This is much easier said than done, but it's also true that freezing out extremists simply has not worked.
A few other problems: this book's organization is kind of odd. It isn't chronological, but the thematic choices for each chapter don't seem coherent, and it ends up retreading a lot of the same ground. Furthermore, AM like to chew on problems rather than offer solutions; I'm genuinely interested in hearing what they think all parties to this conflict should do moving forward, but they don't really say. Finally, the book is often lacking in detail. Camp David 2000, for example, is dismissed without much examination of what actually happened at Camp David.
Still, this is one of the few books I've read since 10/7 that attempts balance, sobriety, and historical perspective on this most intractable of conflicts. It has many great insights, and it should be read widely.
January 1, 2026
Hussein Agha and Robert Malley's Tomorrow is Yesterday is frustrating because it's kind of both redundant AND necessary. It’s diffuse and incisive, elegiac and diagnostic.
The title captures their thesis: "Tomorrow is yesterday because yesterday—before the pretense that history matters little and before sanitized negotiations between two unequal parties mediated by a powerful third that sides with the stronger of them—is where Israelis and Palestinians are." The Oslo peace process was an aberration, a "foreign, externally promoted notion" that became a "historical detour leading to a political dead end." October 7 wasn't an anomaly but "the past's formidable revenge."
For anyone who’s followed the news for the past thirty years, the first half of this book feels like reading back issues of The New York Review of Books. The Camp David revisionism, the critique of American mediation, and the documentation of settlement expansion have all been said before, often by Agha and Malley themselves. And yet the value lies in the work’s comprehensiveness. The book is an authoritative record written by insiders who can cite the history of the negotiations chapter and verse.
One of the book's strengths is its portrait of American mediators as catastrophically ineffectual. Biased toward Israel, impatient with history and narrative, focused on technical fixes, limited by the ticking clock of four-year terms. The United States "showed undue deference to Israel, excessive bias against Palestinians, a constant desire to exert regional primacy." Clinton could be a "master of words yet at a loss when it came to their deeper meaning."
Reading their critique of America’s role in the conflict, I couldn’t help thinking of an article I recently read that argued that if America withdraws from the conflict entirely, we'll be left with a zero-sum game between Palestinians and Israelis with no one to tell the Israelis to stop.
The book's thesis feels a little elusive. Firstly, it’s diagnostic: The two-state solution is dead. It was always an "outsider's image" designed for "Israeli liberal Zionists and secular Palestinian moderates" but unable to spread beyond narrow ranks. Secondly, it is prescriptive, and this is where Agha and Malley become maddeningly vague: They call for rethinking participants, including hard-liners excluded from Oslo, considering unconventional alternatives like Jordanian confederation or binational arrangements. But they refuse to endorse specifics: "It would make no sense to suggest a general outline of an Israeli–Palestinian agreement because the prospect is wholly academic, detached from reality."
They're right that focusing on 1967 is arbitrary, that American impatience with "narrative issues" was catastrophic, that excluding religious Zionists and Islamists guaranteed failure. But what does this mean in practice? Truth commissions? Open-ended talks? They don't argue one way or the other.
Reading Tomorrow is Yesterday after Sari Nusseibeh's Once Upon a Country made the sadness of the situation all the more acute. Nusseibeh was exactly the kind of Palestinian moderate Agha and Malley describe as unable to spread beyond narrow ranks. His book ends with the same recognition: the fairy tale about awakening the sleeping Crusader knight remains unfinished "because after decades of effort, the magical formula for solving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict seemed more elusive than ever."
Agha and Malley's answer is less a solution than an acceptance of irresolution. "Optimists are pessimists if they can promise only more of the same. Pessimists are optimists if they break free of orthodoxy." The search for a solution with clean borders and clear sovereignty is itself the problem. The conflict doesn't resolve; it transforms.
Nusseibeh mourns specific lost opportunities. Agha and Malley mourn the entire framework. The peace process wasn't a noble effort that failed; it was flawed from the start. By excluding history, negotiating through unrepresentative moderates, treating it as bilateral when it's regional, and rushing toward solutions when wounds needed acknowledgment, the entire enterprise was doomed.
Agha and Malley offer no alternative except to wait for new conditions, think new thoughts, include new voices. "Time horizons will stretch out, impervious to foreign calendars or US presidential terms, eyes fixed where they long gazed: on the ancient past and faraway future. Jews did not forget their attachment to the Holy Land after two thousand years; Palestinians will not forget in a few decades."
The book left me feeling a little unmoored. Agha and Malley demolish the peace process without replacing it. But perhaps that's the point. Perhaps we need to sit in the ruins without the comfort of solutions before anything new can emerge.
"Only then might tomorrow be sweeter than yesterday."
The title captures their thesis: "Tomorrow is yesterday because yesterday—before the pretense that history matters little and before sanitized negotiations between two unequal parties mediated by a powerful third that sides with the stronger of them—is where Israelis and Palestinians are." The Oslo peace process was an aberration, a "foreign, externally promoted notion" that became a "historical detour leading to a political dead end." October 7 wasn't an anomaly but "the past's formidable revenge."
For anyone who’s followed the news for the past thirty years, the first half of this book feels like reading back issues of The New York Review of Books. The Camp David revisionism, the critique of American mediation, and the documentation of settlement expansion have all been said before, often by Agha and Malley themselves. And yet the value lies in the work’s comprehensiveness. The book is an authoritative record written by insiders who can cite the history of the negotiations chapter and verse.
One of the book's strengths is its portrait of American mediators as catastrophically ineffectual. Biased toward Israel, impatient with history and narrative, focused on technical fixes, limited by the ticking clock of four-year terms. The United States "showed undue deference to Israel, excessive bias against Palestinians, a constant desire to exert regional primacy." Clinton could be a "master of words yet at a loss when it came to their deeper meaning."
Reading their critique of America’s role in the conflict, I couldn’t help thinking of an article I recently read that argued that if America withdraws from the conflict entirely, we'll be left with a zero-sum game between Palestinians and Israelis with no one to tell the Israelis to stop.
The book's thesis feels a little elusive. Firstly, it’s diagnostic: The two-state solution is dead. It was always an "outsider's image" designed for "Israeli liberal Zionists and secular Palestinian moderates" but unable to spread beyond narrow ranks. Secondly, it is prescriptive, and this is where Agha and Malley become maddeningly vague: They call for rethinking participants, including hard-liners excluded from Oslo, considering unconventional alternatives like Jordanian confederation or binational arrangements. But they refuse to endorse specifics: "It would make no sense to suggest a general outline of an Israeli–Palestinian agreement because the prospect is wholly academic, detached from reality."
They're right that focusing on 1967 is arbitrary, that American impatience with "narrative issues" was catastrophic, that excluding religious Zionists and Islamists guaranteed failure. But what does this mean in practice? Truth commissions? Open-ended talks? They don't argue one way or the other.
Reading Tomorrow is Yesterday after Sari Nusseibeh's Once Upon a Country made the sadness of the situation all the more acute. Nusseibeh was exactly the kind of Palestinian moderate Agha and Malley describe as unable to spread beyond narrow ranks. His book ends with the same recognition: the fairy tale about awakening the sleeping Crusader knight remains unfinished "because after decades of effort, the magical formula for solving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict seemed more elusive than ever."
Agha and Malley's answer is less a solution than an acceptance of irresolution. "Optimists are pessimists if they can promise only more of the same. Pessimists are optimists if they break free of orthodoxy." The search for a solution with clean borders and clear sovereignty is itself the problem. The conflict doesn't resolve; it transforms.
Nusseibeh mourns specific lost opportunities. Agha and Malley mourn the entire framework. The peace process wasn't a noble effort that failed; it was flawed from the start. By excluding history, negotiating through unrepresentative moderates, treating it as bilateral when it's regional, and rushing toward solutions when wounds needed acknowledgment, the entire enterprise was doomed.
Agha and Malley offer no alternative except to wait for new conditions, think new thoughts, include new voices. "Time horizons will stretch out, impervious to foreign calendars or US presidential terms, eyes fixed where they long gazed: on the ancient past and faraway future. Jews did not forget their attachment to the Holy Land after two thousand years; Palestinians will not forget in a few decades."
The book left me feeling a little unmoored. Agha and Malley demolish the peace process without replacing it. But perhaps that's the point. Perhaps we need to sit in the ruins without the comfort of solutions before anything new can emerge.
"Only then might tomorrow be sweeter than yesterday."
July 11, 2026
Sometimes, you come across a text that has so much information, requires so much context, that it feels daunting to even try to understand. This was one of those texts for me.
I'm better read than the average person on the history of Palestinian struggle - but the average person likely has not picked up any books on the topic. I've some historical knowledge of the political pursuit of the Israeli state, of the Nakba that followed, how deliberate policy choices towards and away from justice have shaped negotiations, re-negotiations, hope, and bombings. Even with this, it is hard to absorb all the information in this book.
Agha and Malley lay out a history of peace, and I believe paint a compelling picture of the history of peace negotiations (which heavy emphasis on negotiations, as that is clearly the expertise they bring). I found their insight into what caused the negotiations to fail as a reasonable, measured, and compelling narrative. However, throughout the text, I found myself thinking - if these lessons were there, why are they not being learnt? Something that stuck with me was the lack of understanding on dignity, religiosity, and messianic thinking that plagued Western negotiators educated in hallowed Ivey League universities. This rings true, as I often envision the personalities and ideological paradigms that these institutions produce as ones that value the cold and rational weighing of costs and benefits, risk calculation, and leverage; technocratic skills that succeed in Western technocratic institutions. Skills that fall flat in a different institutional paradigm, which requires the understanding of a history of humiliation, fear, and religiosity that drives at something deeper than numbers and plans on paper, that drives at belief. I think about this a lot in my own life, and what perspectives that I perhaps am missing myself.
As is common with books on this topic, a key contention is whether or not you can trust the narrator. Rob Malley is a veteran negotiator, and since I've learned his name I've noticed it used as shorthand by those in the DC Right (a tweet from Sen. Cruz comes to mind) how every deal he touches is tainted. People I've come to trust, in media and otherwise, have recommended this book (and my own politics pushed me away from Ted Cruz) so I choose to believe this book is an honest retelling of truth.
I've been steeped in the moral language of the Palestinian struggle, how dignity has been erased, how those in power choose to look away, how one day everyone would have always been against this. This book was a good step away from this, not that it does not relay humanity, but rather that we can use new pragmatic, technical steps can build upon previous failed pragmatic and technical efforts.
I'm better read than the average person on the history of Palestinian struggle - but the average person likely has not picked up any books on the topic. I've some historical knowledge of the political pursuit of the Israeli state, of the Nakba that followed, how deliberate policy choices towards and away from justice have shaped negotiations, re-negotiations, hope, and bombings. Even with this, it is hard to absorb all the information in this book.
Agha and Malley lay out a history of peace, and I believe paint a compelling picture of the history of peace negotiations (which heavy emphasis on negotiations, as that is clearly the expertise they bring). I found their insight into what caused the negotiations to fail as a reasonable, measured, and compelling narrative. However, throughout the text, I found myself thinking - if these lessons were there, why are they not being learnt? Something that stuck with me was the lack of understanding on dignity, religiosity, and messianic thinking that plagued Western negotiators educated in hallowed Ivey League universities. This rings true, as I often envision the personalities and ideological paradigms that these institutions produce as ones that value the cold and rational weighing of costs and benefits, risk calculation, and leverage; technocratic skills that succeed in Western technocratic institutions. Skills that fall flat in a different institutional paradigm, which requires the understanding of a history of humiliation, fear, and religiosity that drives at something deeper than numbers and plans on paper, that drives at belief. I think about this a lot in my own life, and what perspectives that I perhaps am missing myself.
As is common with books on this topic, a key contention is whether or not you can trust the narrator. Rob Malley is a veteran negotiator, and since I've learned his name I've noticed it used as shorthand by those in the DC Right (a tweet from Sen. Cruz comes to mind) how every deal he touches is tainted. People I've come to trust, in media and otherwise, have recommended this book (and my own politics pushed me away from Ted Cruz) so I choose to believe this book is an honest retelling of truth.
I've been steeped in the moral language of the Palestinian struggle, how dignity has been erased, how those in power choose to look away, how one day everyone would have always been against this. This book was a good step away from this, not that it does not relay humanity, but rather that we can use new pragmatic, technical steps can build upon previous failed pragmatic and technical efforts.
March 3, 2026
2.65
Content wise, there is a lot of times focused on the logistics and ultimate futility of the Oslo Accords and 2000 Camp David Summit, and their ramifications on the present day region. Both authors were in many of these diplomatic sessions. They make good if not obvious points on why all of these "attempts" for peace failed. Over time their opinions on the two state solution has soured, and they make a lot of good arguments about how improbable it is a solution and how it definitely is not the panacea for almost a century's worth of conflict that Western/Liberal actors make it out to be.
The writing made this quite a slog to get through. For context, I have read two other books and a few Wikipedia rabbit holes on this subject which by no means makes me an expert or well versed, but I feel like it gives me a good chance at digesting works about Palestine/Israel. Their verbose, academic prose, inconsistent structuring/timeline, and constant call backs and anecdotes at times makes the works frustrating but more frequently than not it makes it boring or bland. The boring/bland is not helped by the fact that they take an almost overly-neutral tone on most things. They employ a device of weighing their perception of Israel/Palestine/Any relevant parties' points of views on literally every subject matter as a form of 'both sides'ing (at times this helped me better understand other potential view points) which sometimes unequally weighs two actions or beliefs against each other that are orders of magnitudes different like Israel's existential fear of being attacked and Gazan's being forced to live in an open air prison. This impartiality just makes the arguments of the book feel so weak and voiceless. They sometimes brush up against phrases like "apartheid" and "ethnic cleansing", but their neutrality honestly makes the words ring hollow.
I learned quite a bit of more specific history and arguments, but I was ultimately disappointed at the spirit or lack there of in this work.
Content wise, there is a lot of times focused on the logistics and ultimate futility of the Oslo Accords and 2000 Camp David Summit, and their ramifications on the present day region. Both authors were in many of these diplomatic sessions. They make good if not obvious points on why all of these "attempts" for peace failed. Over time their opinions on the two state solution has soured, and they make a lot of good arguments about how improbable it is a solution and how it definitely is not the panacea for almost a century's worth of conflict that Western/Liberal actors make it out to be.
The writing made this quite a slog to get through. For context, I have read two other books and a few Wikipedia rabbit holes on this subject which by no means makes me an expert or well versed, but I feel like it gives me a good chance at digesting works about Palestine/Israel. Their verbose, academic prose, inconsistent structuring/timeline, and constant call backs and anecdotes at times makes the works frustrating but more frequently than not it makes it boring or bland. The boring/bland is not helped by the fact that they take an almost overly-neutral tone on most things. They employ a device of weighing their perception of Israel/Palestine/Any relevant parties' points of views on literally every subject matter as a form of 'both sides'ing (at times this helped me better understand other potential view points) which sometimes unequally weighs two actions or beliefs against each other that are orders of magnitudes different like Israel's existential fear of being attacked and Gazan's being forced to live in an open air prison. This impartiality just makes the arguments of the book feel so weak and voiceless. They sometimes brush up against phrases like "apartheid" and "ethnic cleansing", but their neutrality honestly makes the words ring hollow.
I learned quite a bit of more specific history and arguments, but I was ultimately disappointed at the spirit or lack there of in this work.
September 21, 2026
The New Yorker, NPR, and others called it a best book of 2025
I couldn’t put it down. It’s really dense. Not text book dry, but there’s tons of excellent information. You know me, I care about people not the shit show that is big government and propaganda, for example I didn’t know Abbas was the president of Palestine after the death of Arafat because I’m focused on the families being slaughtered and the doctors being imprisoned, but I also think knowledge is important and it was time for me to broaden that part of my knowledge base.
These guys are just people with their own biases but I enjoy learning about events I lived through watching on the news with that filter of propaganda at least partially removed.
There’s no comparison between the number of Palestinians Israel has killed compared to Israelis Palestinians have killed. Israelis death numbers are routinely mentioned in the press but there’s no context, nothing is said about Palestinian deaths being tens of times more…This book provides the context.
In a chapter about lies, including a very compelling section about the United States, they somehow neglect to mention the lies Israel has told to justify its existence, for example, the land they took was unoccupied when they took it, I will say it’s addressed at least a little bit in the final chapter.
The US funds Israeli weapons because we want the technology and information, they’re our monster, we are Dr Frankenstein. Israel continues to grow its settlements even though it’s been told to stop for decades, compromise and reasonableness aren’t on the table for them, they’re like some power hungry super villain in a movie. And it isn’t that this information isn’t in the book, but it’s glossed over, and to me they’re main points. Call things what they are.
I couldn’t put it down. It’s really dense. Not text book dry, but there’s tons of excellent information. You know me, I care about people not the shit show that is big government and propaganda, for example I didn’t know Abbas was the president of Palestine after the death of Arafat because I’m focused on the families being slaughtered and the doctors being imprisoned, but I also think knowledge is important and it was time for me to broaden that part of my knowledge base.
These guys are just people with their own biases but I enjoy learning about events I lived through watching on the news with that filter of propaganda at least partially removed.
There’s no comparison between the number of Palestinians Israel has killed compared to Israelis Palestinians have killed. Israelis death numbers are routinely mentioned in the press but there’s no context, nothing is said about Palestinian deaths being tens of times more…This book provides the context.
In a chapter about lies, including a very compelling section about the United States, they somehow neglect to mention the lies Israel has told to justify its existence, for example, the land they took was unoccupied when they took it, I will say it’s addressed at least a little bit in the final chapter.
The US funds Israeli weapons because we want the technology and information, they’re our monster, we are Dr Frankenstein. Israel continues to grow its settlements even though it’s been told to stop for decades, compromise and reasonableness aren’t on the table for them, they’re like some power hungry super villain in a movie. And it isn’t that this information isn’t in the book, but it’s glossed over, and to me they’re main points. Call things what they are.
August 19, 2026
It's another Israel is at fault book. It will be a huge hit amongst people who hate Israel yet a dud for any neutrals or just looking for an overview.
I don't know if the authors are correct about the Israel claims where they claim Israel messed up peace deals by refusing to take it seriously. It's so extremely one-sided I constantly felt there was something iffy. Israel was always at fault? In all these negotiations and peace deals? It's a nice little theory, but they don't present any evidence.
The analysis is always "I think the negotiators were thinking this way about it". The author is analyzing and presenting ideas yet doesn't do any actual work warranting the claims. Americans are presented as ignorant manipulative pro-Israelis. Every single one. Their thoughts are presented blindly without evidence and all presidents are gullible fools. And when a negotiation fails or does not bring complete peace the authors have a simple solution that would have fixed it all. Presented in a single snarky remark without much analysis. Since they can read minds and know all possible outcomes why not put them in power? Even Palestinian leaders are called out. Not for being at fault, but for failing their people by not bringing in enough land to the Arabs.
The issue is that this is an analysis book not presenting anything to analyze. There is not enough history presented, not enough human interactions we can analyze alongside the authors, not clear overviews of laws and agreements we can judge as clear failures like the authors do. We don't know if the authors are correct or not. Unless you are already anti-Israel and just need to feel something is correct this is not good enough. It won't give you ammunition for any point of view.
I don't know if the authors are correct about the Israel claims where they claim Israel messed up peace deals by refusing to take it seriously. It's so extremely one-sided I constantly felt there was something iffy. Israel was always at fault? In all these negotiations and peace deals? It's a nice little theory, but they don't present any evidence.
The analysis is always "I think the negotiators were thinking this way about it". The author is analyzing and presenting ideas yet doesn't do any actual work warranting the claims. Americans are presented as ignorant manipulative pro-Israelis. Every single one. Their thoughts are presented blindly without evidence and all presidents are gullible fools. And when a negotiation fails or does not bring complete peace the authors have a simple solution that would have fixed it all. Presented in a single snarky remark without much analysis. Since they can read minds and know all possible outcomes why not put them in power? Even Palestinian leaders are called out. Not for being at fault, but for failing their people by not bringing in enough land to the Arabs.
The issue is that this is an analysis book not presenting anything to analyze. There is not enough history presented, not enough human interactions we can analyze alongside the authors, not clear overviews of laws and agreements we can judge as clear failures like the authors do. We don't know if the authors are correct or not. Unless you are already anti-Israel and just need to feel something is correct this is not good enough. It won't give you ammunition for any point of view.
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