Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East

by Jubin Goodarzi

The alliance between Syria and Iran has proved to be an enduring feature on the political landscape of the Middle East. This book traces the critical stages in the evolution and consolidation of the alliance in the 1980s, and offers explanations for its longevity into the 21st century.

Genres: Middle East

288 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2006

Reviews

[Abdullah Mushtaq · Rating 5 out of 5]

A meticulously researched and exhaustive book on the subject of Syrian–Iranian diplomatic alliance. The author delineates three key phases in their diplomatic relations:

1. 1979–82: the emergence of the Syrian–Iranian alliance
2. 1982–85: the achievements and limits of Syrian–Iranian power
3. 1985–88: intra-alliance tensions and consolidation of the axis

Overall, Tehran valued its strategic alliance with Syria more between 1979–82 and 1985–88, particularly against the backdrop of the poor state of US–Iranian relations throughout the 1980s and the erratic nature of its ties with the USSR and Western Europe during that period. For Syria, the years from 1982 to 1985 represented the height of its reliance on Iran to undo the achievements of its foes in Lebanon.

Phase I: 1979–1982 — The Emergence of the Alliance

Against the backdrop of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the diplomatic relations of Ba’athist Syria with its neighbors make it easier to understand why Syria welcomed the Iranian Revolution.

Pahlavi Iran perceived Ba’thist Syria, with its close ties with the USSR and support for radical Arab movements, as a menace in the region. Egypt’s betrayal in the 1973 Arab–Israeli war and its unilateral efforts following the war to work out a separate peace agreement with Israel increased the feeling of vulnerability among the Syrians. The evolution of the US-approved Saudi–Iranian–Egyptian axis, Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, and the Camp David accords in March 1979 further isolated Damascus. Between October 1978 and July 1979 a rapprochement between Syria and Iraq seemed a distinct possibility, but irreconcilable differences kept it from materializing. But in the summer of 1979, when Iraq accused Syria of involvement in a coup attempt to topple the Ba’thist regime in Baghdad (despite Syrian denials), it killed any hopes of a union between Syria and Iraq once and for all.

It was thus no surprise that by 1979/80, the betrayals and disappointments of the past had killed any lingering Syrian hope of relying on fellow Arabs, and they watched the events unfolding in Iran in 1979 with great interest.

Phase II: 1982–1985 — Achievements and Limits of Power

After the Iranian Revolution, Syria was the first country to recognize the revolutionary regime. With the Iranian seizure of the US Embassy in 1979 and the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980, an internationally isolated Iran became extremely dependent on Hafez Assad’s diplomatic and military support. This was necessary to avoid defeat and regional isolation at a time when Saddam was on the offensive and trying to depict the war as an Arab–Persian conflict.

By mid-1982, Iraq’s expulsion from the areas it held in Iran in subsequent well-planned Iranian counter-offensives and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 changed the dynamics of this alliance the other way, with Syria requiring Iranian assistance to keep Iraq in check and mobilize Lebanon’s Shiites to expel Israeli and Western forces from its backyard between 1982–1985. In June 1982, Saddam, facing the threat of an imminent Iranian counter-invasion, announced a unilateral ceasefire. The Iranian regime was divided on how to respond to this Iraqi initiative. Khomeini and Rafsanjani favored taking the war inside Iraq, while Khamenei, Musavi, and the top military brass were against prolonging the conflict with Iraq. Instead, they supported sending Iranian troops to Lebanon to aid Syria. Hafez al-Assad rejected the Iranian offer in a bid to avoid a direct confrontation with Israel, already having a significant portion of his military destroyed by Israel in the ensuing conflict. He insisted on Iran continuing its effort to unseat Saddam, further strengthening the hawks’ position. The Iranian decision to continue the conflict after 1982 was flawed and did not bear any significant gains for them. Assad pursued unconventional means through his proxies to subdue Israeli and Western forces in Lebanon with the help of Iran. By 1984, Western forces were out of Lebanon, and in 1985 Israel decided to fall back to the south of the Litani River.

During this crucial phase of 1982–85, the Islamic Republic of Iran cooperated with the Syrian Arab Republic for the following reasons:

— To maintain an economic stranglehold over Iraq.
— To receive military, political, and intelligence support.
— To create a constituency among the Shiites in Lebanon to fight the Israelis, Americans, and the French.
— To gain some leverage over Syria in its backyard due to the asymmetry in the alliance.
— To dispel Iraqi claims that the Gulf War was an Arab–Persian war.
— To counter the Baghdad–Amman–Cairo axis.

For the Syrian Arab Republic, the liaison with the Islamic Republic of Iran had a variety of purposes:

— To check Iraqi power at a time when Syria was confronting Israel and its allies in Lebanon.
— To receive generous Iranian oil shipments to compensate for the shutdown of the IPC pipeline.
— To utilize Iranian influence to forge an alliance and control the Lebanese Shiites.
— To use the Shiites as an instrument to expel the Israelis, Americans, and French from Lebanon.
— To counter the emergent Egyptian–Jordanian–Iraqi axis.
— To act as a mediator in the Gulf to extract concessions from Saudi Arabia and Gulf states and increase its influence in the area.

Phase III: 1985–1988 — Tensions and Consolidation

The period between spring 1985 and summer 1988 was the most turbulent and problematic in the history of the Syrian–Iranian alliance. Clashes of interest and disagreements arose in almost every area in which the two states had previously cooperated. The prolonging of hostilities and Iran’s attack on Gulf-bound tankers during the “war of tankers” increased the chances for internationalization of the conflict and isolated Iran from its neighbors. Syria was pinned in an awkward position, where it had to face accusations of betraying the pan-Arab cause by supporting a non-Arab state against an Arab one.

By spring 1985, the power vacuum created after Israel’s withdrawal to the southern line prompted both Iran and Syria to play an active role in the Lebanese conflict. Palestinian fighters began to trickle into Lebanon with the help of other Lebanese parties, threatening the position that Amal enjoyed in Beirut. Amal, backed by Syria, started to clamp down on pro-Arafat Palestinians and their allies, thus starting the brutal “war of camps” that continued to rage until the late 1980s.

Syria and Iran found themselves on opposite sides of the conflict, with Syria backing Amal militias while Iran supported Hezbollah and Palestinian Sunnis. Several other factions threw their weight behind the Palestinian fighters, including Jumblatt's Druze PSP, the once pro-Syrian PNSF, and the Tripoli-based Sunni Islamist IUF. The subsequent fighting weakened Amal, allowing Hezbollah to gain hold among the Lebanese Shi’ites. The ensuing Shi’ite Civil War between Amal and Hezbollah brought Syrian–Iranian relations to a critical point. Through intense diplomatic activity, Iran and Syria were able to reach an agreement between the conflicting parties, avoiding a direct confrontation between Syria and Iranian-backed Hezbollah.

Iran failed to achieve its major objective of toppling the Ba’thist regime in Iraq. Despite a few gains, Iran was unable to penetrate the resolute defenses of Iraq. As the conflict dragged on, Iran was further isolated due to its retaliatory attacks on GCC tankers and the mine-laying in international waters. Syria kept its support, thwarting any united Arab stance against Iran in several Arab League summits. In the last few months of the Iran–Iraq war in 1988, Iran lost virtually all the gains it had made in Iraq since 1984 under constant successful Iraqi counter-offensives. This prompted the Iranian regime to accept the ceasefire.

Conclusion

By the summer of 1988, at the end of the third phase in the evolution of the Syrian–Iranian axis, the partnership between the two sides had become consolidated. It had survived numerous intra-alliance tensions and serious disputes between 1985 and 1988. The incessant speculation that the days of the Syrian–Iranian nexus were numbered proved unfounded: many analysts had failed to recognize that the two allies’ continual consultations and ability to compromise on key issues, build mutual trust, and maintain cooperative links during the troubled years of 1985–88 had consolidated the alliance. Their mutual ability over time to assess the evolving regional situation, to recognize the limits of their power, and to set feasible goals lent stability to the alliance. Both Damascus and Tehran also understood that their activities in the other’s sphere of influence had to be within certain limits and subject to the other’s approval, particularly if vital interests were at stake.