I have finished reading “The Provos: The IRA and Sinn Fein” by Peter Taylor.
“Our Struggle has reached a defining moment”
Gerry Adams to the IRA Convention in 2005.
The split from the main (Official) Irish Republican Army (IRA) to form the Provisional IRA, known as the Provos, was sparked by the violent start of The Troubles. Nationalists, those in Northern Ireland who yearned for Irish unity, chose to protest in civil rights campaigns for their rights provoking Unionist/Loyalist reactions. Violence from the Northern Irish security forces and Loyalist militias provoked a debate within the Republican movement. The leadership of the IRA wanted to move away from armed struggle to far left political engagement. Those who became the Provisionals saw defenceless nationalists attacked in the street and agitated to have the IRA pursue it’s traditional role; using it’s arms in defence of it’s community. The divisions proved irreconcilable and the Provos were born, soon leaving the Officials to wither away.
The Provisional IRA’s fortunes and moral changed as the times did. The early deployment of British troops heralded a “wait and see” period that gave way to all out assault on the ‘occupiers’, with the first British soldier shot by the Provos in 1971. Bloody Sunday led to a propaganda bonanza for the group, leading them to believe they could conquer all before them. However, the group was less sure of itself during tactical truces and ceasefires. The mid-1970s truce led to an existential crisis within the Provos leading to a group of Young Turks in the Maze Prison in Cage 11 to plot a new course for the group. Most prominent among this group was Gerry Adams.
Gerry Adams is probably the most influential figure in the Provos history, regardless of how you feel about his methods (many are alleged). Alongside his paramilitary partner Martin McGuinness in Derry he helped lay the course for the Republican movement’s ‘Long War’ military doctrine as well as the “Armalite and Ballot Box” political doctrine. The latter very simply justified the re-entry of the Republican Movement into formal politics as a supportive structure to the armed struggle. Sinn Fein (ourselves alone), as the political wing of the Provos underwent a process of reforming and becoming the shop window of Irish Republicanism. However, it was not long until the armed campaign and the political campaigns could not coincide neatly beside each other. It is highly likely that this was the intention of those behind the “Armalite and Ballot Box” strategy all along.
It is easily forgotten how violent the 1990s were in terms of The Troubles. The Republican movement was already in two minds about being fully committed to the Peace Process. UK PM John Major, under pressure from the NI Unionists, applied pressure on their behalf leading to the 1994 ceasefire to collapse temporarily. Eventually the Republicans came back to the table. It is taken for granted nowadays how big an achievement the 1998 Good Friday Agreement was. There was drama right up until the end of the progress.
Overall, I enjoyed this book. Given the subject matter it is clearly written to allow it to be accessible to both those familiar to The Troubles and Irish Republicanism and newcomers. It was well considered in terms of structure and conveying the Irish Republican’s point of view. Their worldview needs to be seen in the context of Irish Republican folklore and first hand experiences of living in Northern Ireland as a state which has long been oppressive to them. Fortunately, that is now widely accepted to be no longer the case. The book did well to convey the drama in the negotiation room and the violence and strife outside during the Good Friday Agreement negotiations. It seemed at times that the ceasefires on both the Republican and Loyalist sides were hanging by a thread. The fact that they hung at all is testament to the fact that both sides knew that they staked too much on the Peace Process to let it fail. There also seemed to be a recognition on the Provisional IRA’s Army Council that militarily they were fought to a stalemate at best. In some ways it is frustrating that this book’s timeline only extends a little way beyond the Good Friday Agreement, but the reward was for the above focus. I would welcome a second edition of this book covering the period from this point and beyond the Provisional IRA’s decommissioning in 2005.