Originally published in 1998. Describing Britain's troubled relationship with Europe and the issues which have remained unanswered since the end of the Second World War. Queries whether Britain is a European country, looks at the launch of the single currency, and how it splits the political parties.
Great Britain's relationship with Europe is the classic approach-avoidance conflict. Britain initially supported European union as much as a way to prevent a return to war as anything. As the various countries of Europe recovered, economic union became more attractive to foster British trade, particularly in a post-colonial commonwealth. The sticking point, however, grasped from the very beginning but never resolved, was how to enjoy the advantages of the European Economic Community, which Great Britain entered in 1973 under the Heath government without surrendering its sovereignty and parliamentary power, and the British pound. That is true to this day. In January 2013, the Cameron government promised a referendum if they remained in power beyond 2015 on whether Great Britain would remain in the European Union. Euro-skepticism is alive and well.
Hugo Young's book is a chronicle of this history from Churchill's post-war government up to the beginnings of Tony Blair's Labor Movement in 1999. Young gives us a detailed account of both the international and internal political maneuverings around Union, including de Gaulle's pre-emptive refusal to vote for Britain's admittance during the 60s, the successful entrance under Heath followed by the fall of his government, the MacMillan referendum in 1975 in which the British people voted to stay in and the ambivalence of the Thatcher and Major regimes which negotiated Maastricht which took further steps toward the euro while leaving Britain with an opt-out. He concludes with the beginnings of the Blair government and a much more warm-hearted embrace of Europe. It is plain in the conclusion that Young hoped this would succeed in overcoming the ambivalent relationship. Sadly, it appears he was wrong.
I suspect that the 500 pages of detail would be interesting for those fascinated with Britain's relationship with Europe. A briefer account that didn't give every tortuous detail would have been fine with me. All the detail is probably valuable as a historical record but it didn't add to my understanding.
This is a very clear account of the history of the UK's tortured love/hate relationship with Europe, starting with Churchill's Zurich speech and ending with the advent of the Blair government.
The author was clearly an enthusiastic Europhile and his partisanship becomes more strident as the book progresses through the final chapters, dealing with the Thatcher, Major and Blair governments. The author died in 2003 and thus did not live to see the disaster which the imposition of the Euro has brought to the so-called PIIGS countries. I am sure that these little local difficulties would not have changed his mind one iota.
This was a very enjoyable book, and useful for understanding Britain's troubled relationship with Europe from Churchill onwards. Some points that stood out to me:
1. Lots of people complain that Young is such a europhile that the book's content is irreparably tainted. Saying this as a 'eurosceptic', I disagree. I think that, because Young is a zealot of the first rank, it is quite easy to see when he moves from his analysis of basic facts in the story to an opinion about those facts (some might argue that I commit the error of not realising that the 'facts' as presented are probably subject to their own teleological master, but whig points aside, I think my point remains). Reading this book is as if you are watching Fox news or reading the Guardian (indeed, he's a Guardian journalist) vs listening to the BBC: the more insidious truth twisting comes from the latter organisation because, with the former, you were pre-warned, as I was with this book, caveat emptor.
2. I wish I had read this book pre-Brexit referendum. Much of Brexit was history simply repeating itself, or history being ignored at the ignoramus' peril. Some examples stood out to me (in no particular order): (i) Blair telling Whitehall to prepare for what would happen if the EMU referendum did not go 'his' way (cf. Cameron doing zero preparation for an 'out' outcome); (ii) Roy Jenkins v Harold Wilson, two big beasts of the Labour party who had never agreed on Europe who now decided that they would litigate their personal issues in the open (cf. Cameron v Johnson); (iii) Tony Benn's suggestion to Wilson that, to solve the deadlock in the Labour party, a referendum was the way forward (the eventual 1975 European Communities membership referendum - cf. Cameron trying to solve Tory and UKIP problems with a 'final say'); (iv) Gaitskell's ultimately incoherent position on Europe despite being in opposition (cf. Corbyn); (v) Wilson's governing majority sat at three and this massively increased the power of the eurosceptics in his own party (cf. Cameron and May); (vi) Wilson conducting a Potemkin renegotiation of Heath's terms of entry into the EEC so that he could present his 'victory' to the people prior to the referendum with the German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, promising Wilson enough to help him succeed (cf. Cameron's failure to secure materially better terms prior to Brexit vote, despite having pinned his hopes on Chancellor Merkel saving him); (vii) Europe generally eating the Tory party, despite it not being high on voters' list of priorities.
3. The book also demonstrates it is a product of its time (perhaps unfairly leading me to dock a star) and certain premises that Young takes for granted have been falsified by 'events, dear boy, events' (Macmillan). For instance, in reference to the 1975 EC membership referendum, Young notes that "missing from the mix was any ballast from an institution the public could respect and understand". And later on, when talking about Blair's commitment to an EMU referendum (which never happened), Young notes that the "critical pattern" on Europe was that "the people tended to go wherever they were led by the political class". The premise underneath both of these statements is that 'the people' once trusted institutions, broadly defined. But thanks to their duplicity on topics like immigration, that faith has been fatally undermined and forces which are outside political leaderships' bureaucratic control have taken over.
4. It is sad that Young did not live to write his third chapter in this history; not least so that I could have read more of his outstanding prose (a view I held throughout the 600 pages).
Really well written work, with the beautiful flourish of a late, great journalist. Covers the history of 'This Blessed Plot' in Europe from Churchill to the early days of Blair. I guess the title says that. Early on, the book portrays a series of errors by the foreign office and ministers, made off of a fading Commonwealth and global notion, to shun the European project. From an overly confident position of power, Britain attempted to circumvent Europe as lesser. Growth (of European identity) and decay (of British Empire, rather than simple repetition was inconceivable to the civil service, and a non-starter for politicians. Once the reality of both became apparent, slow movement and arrogant posturing from both sides, delayed Britain's entry as a desperate attempt made a decade or more too late. Getting it's way, was left to the second Wilson, Callaghan, and Thatcher governments. These continue to tell a story of less than ideal partnership, with strong arming clashing with ideals, ultimately creating a Britain portion of the political class hostile to Europe. This circumventing of the class seems to be a conundrum to the Wilson/Callaghan government and at least partially the fatal blow for the Thatcher and Major administrations. The Blair positivity seems overblown at the end, but one could hope for something more concrete than the scathing detachment of what Young terms a Euro-'Skeptic'. Though Young identifies the anti-Europe posturing as a political class disease from sovereign power displacement, the public is identified as indifferent. It is fascinating how this changed so starkly in the two decades after, while the European body continued forth. Overall, the splendid language of Young heightens the readers involvement in the story and creates a clear narrative of shifty characters finding their way in systems they refuse to challenge, change, praise or work with.
Young's classic recounts the history of Britain's tortuous relationship with Europe from 1945 to 1998, the date of publication. Oh for an updated edition, to include the 22 years which followed.
Young views this history through the eyes of many key players, such as Churchill, McMillan, Heath, Thatcher and Blair, as well as other minor players, and discerns several threads. In the immediate post-war era, the British establishment looked down on the embryonic European project with benign indifference: supportive of Franco-German reconciliation, but not sensing a need to belong. Suez brought home the belated realisation that Britain was not longer a global power and, combined with an economy in decline, brought about an establishment view that Britain's post-Empire place lay in the (then) Common Market, to arrest decline. Act One thus ends with accession to the European Economic Community in 1973.
Act Two - membership - starts with the 1975 referendum, in which Margaret Thatcher, as leader of the opposition, played a key role, alongside Labour stalwarts such as Roy Jenkins. Mrs Thatcher was subsequently instrumental in the establishment of the Singe Market, but fell out with Jacques Delors, whom she viewed as a socialist fifth columnist, and EMU, which she opposed. These led to her downfall but ultimately energised the Tory right, which hitherto had supported Community membership on economic grounds but became opposed on political grounds. Act Two ends in optimistic terms, with Blair in Downing Street, proclaiming Britain's place within the European project.
Young died shortly after completing this book and so never saw Act Three - The Fall. It thus falls to a new talent to complete this historical masterpiece.
This books gives a clear account of the Euroscepticism and how UK wanted to keep the cake as well as eat it. It had a love/hate relationship with EU. But it had to give up owing to it’s own troubles back home and conflicting priorities i.e. recession, American involvement and losing power. It also explains the power tussle in the Labor party. There is a very interesting account of how Britain faced resistance in joining EU. Highly recommend for those who wanted to know why their relationship is complicated.
impressive array of facts and immensely research book into how Britain's relationship with Europe has always been one of immense conflict and difficulty.
This book had potential, but unfortunately fails to live up to it. Young is often quoted by other studies of Britain and Europe, as an 'accessible' author (with a background in journalism) who nonetheless combines deep primary research and first-hand interviews with key actors for a well argued history. These elements shine through at times, but the primary research has been done better by other historians - especially as more documents are released - and only rarely did the interviews carried out by the author add anything.
Some issues are structural. The book is split into chapters named after important figures in the history of Britain's relationship with European integration. This doesn't quite work - this is a story of a nation, after all, and each chapter necessarily has to take a very broad approach in which the role of the eponymous character is far from the full story. More importantly, it is incredibly long - nearly 600 pages of extremely dense text. Other historians have told the same story, just as effectively, with half the number of words. Young repeats himself constantly, and his verbose writing style is odd in a history that is supposed to be written for a general audience.
Other issues stem from Young's own strongly-held views on Europe. He was ardently pro-European, and is too focused on the present (i.e. 1998) to be able to make fair judgements on the past. In almost every chapter, he criticises politicians for chasing their minds, portraying this as a simple and easy process for them rather than one that can entail loss of support from colleagues, friends, constituents .... He is also blind to the possibility that feeling around European integration could become even more Eurosceptic, thinking that it could only go in the opposite direction. The world presented is one in which Britain will be a member of the EU for all of eternity. This is odd, because he makes the argument well that Britain's relationship with European integration is messy and full of contradictions, with unalloyed pro- or anti-Europeanism a rarity.
Some of his arguments are also, in my view, not supported by the evidence. For example, he complains about British leaders having always tried to secure what is best for the country, rather than what is best for Europe. But is this in anyway unique? Leaders of other European countries may be less brazen about doing this, covering their motivations in rhetoric, yet all are motivated almost entirely by national interest. Young is also wrong to argue that sovereignty was not discussed at all in the debate surrounding British entry to the EEC in 1970-72 - it was, and at some length. Pro-European politicians naturally couched it in terms most beneficial to them (e.g. 'pooling sovereignty') but that does not mean the issue was not discussed. He's on stronger ground in recognising the continued failure of the pro-European cause to make their case effectively, and especially in their lack of obvious enthusiasm or idealism (with the exception of Edward Heath, who was magnificent in the 1975 referendum).
If you're wanting to read a single book on the history of Britain and European integration, you'd be far better served by seeking out Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon's Continental Drift, which is both scholarly and accessible.
the depth of knowledge in this book is very impressive - although certainly not a book for someone who does not have a fundamental grasp of postwar European politics, certainly felt a little bit out of my depth reading this book (in parts) - non the less the scholarship is impressive.