Замки, битви й авіабомби. Як економічна теорія тлумачить військову історію

by Jurgen Brauer, Hubert van Tuyll, Юрґен Бравер

Автори перед читачем інтердисциплінарний підхід до розуміння причин подій і процесів у військовій історії минулого тисячоліття. Застосовуючи інструментарій економічної теорії, автори розглядають деякі ключові епізоди військової історії – із вражаючими результатами, що дозволяють краще проникнути у глибинне підґрунтя цих подій, – від зведення замків у Середньовіччі до стратегічного бомбардування Німеччини під час Другої світової війни та рішення Франції розробити власну ядерну зброю. В останньому розділі автори пропонують уроки, які могли б стати у пригоді під час нинішніх воєнних дій – від стратегії боротьби з тероризмом до використання приватних військових компаній. Багато сторінок цієї книги примусять особливо замислитися українського читача, приміряючи думки авторів на власну військову історію, що розгортається прямо на наших очах

Genres: History, Economics, Military History, Nonfiction

456 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2008

About the author

Prof. J. Brauer, PhD, Professor of Economics

Reviews

[Jeffrey · Rating 1 out of 5]

This was the first of two books in a row that made me want to throw it against the wall without even finishing the preface. I'm glad I finished the book, as I think I understand how this came to be. For the short version of my thoughts on the book. There wasn't economics and there wasn't rigor (how a Nobel Laureate in the subject could have come to say that for the books blurb is beyond me). The book goes like this.
Economics is the study of decisions. Decisions were made by military leaders in history. Ooooh, pretty.

So, the bombing campaign chapter is a pretty okay article, and I suspect that that was where the whole thing started. It was the only chapter where any attempt at rigor was made. I figure they wrote an article, looked at it and said "hey, this could be a book" and nobody stopped them in time. Having said that, the other purpose the book clearly serves is to point out 245 research papers they would be happy to sponsor a Graduate Student to work on, as each chapter ended with a matrix of ways to apply decision making to the topic of the chapter.

[William · Rating 3 out of 5]

Strategy requires a head of state to match his means against his ends, hoping to obtain a desired outcome. So why is it that when a country is confronted with a problem, the strategy that was pursued seems baffling to the reader? Looking at military history from the viewpoint of economics, Jurgen Brauer and Hubert van Tuyll come up with some rational answers that a reader may not expect in their work, "Castles, Battles and Bombs."

More of a collection of case studies, the authors give examples of basic problems in economics as they relate to national security. Take castles. The authors offer them up as a study in opportunity costs. A medieval ruler has the means to build them, or build an army, but not both. Which is a more cost-effective way of controlling the countryside? The castles are expensive to build, but once they are up, cost little to maintain and man--as opposed to keeping an army of thousands in the field for the same span of time.

And so the authors trip down their list of illustrations--the principal vs. agent problem (mercenary recruitment), battle (cost-benefit analisys), the cost of information (reconnaissance), the law of diminishing returns (strategic bombing), and economy of force (France's modest nuclear arsenal standing in for a larger army). The authors struggle to make ends meet in some of their end-of-chapter matrices that cross-check economic with military factors. Overlook this--the real meat is in the chapters. While an economic viewpoint of warfare is not the last word in strategic analysis, readers should be cognizant of economics as a major factor among many that define strategic choices. Brauer and Van Tuyll succeed in explaining economics in layman's terms, thus challenging the reader to look at military history from this angle. Choices that may seem puny and baffling make sense (French nuclear forces), while strategies that seemed necessary and urgent are made to look like folly (bombing Germany in WWII).

If the reader comes away from this book with second thoughts, then the authors did their job right.

[Rich · Rating 3 out of 5]

I really like this book because it approaches theory from a multi-disciplinary position. I do, however, have some serious qualms when the book tends to stray too far into an economic focus upon efficiency -- which largely ignores, or fails to contrast -- it with efficacy. When the authors do this, they tend to misunderstand that the ultimate goal for theory isn't efficiency (although that is important), but rather the efficacy in how political goals are achieved. Compared to efficacy, although still very important, generally efficiency is absolutely less important.

[Casey · Rating 5 out of 5]

A great book, providing a framework for applying economic principles to military theory. The authors, economist Jurgen Brauer and historian Hubert Van Tuyll, apply the classical economic principles of opportunity cost, marginal cost-benefits, substitution, diminishing returns, and information asymmetry to six case studies in western military history. The case studies range from medieval castle building to the development of the French nuclear force, with additional analysis on other military topics in the lengthy conclusion. Brauer and Tuyll make a convincing case that given warfare’s inherent need for resource decision making under conditions of uncertainty a knowledge of economic principles can clarify military history analysis and point the way to better application of military theory. However, they also accept that warfare’s Clausewitzian chance and passion negate the “ceteris paribus” (all else being equal) assumption at the heart of classical economic calculations. A great book for better understanding the relationships between costs, benefits, information, and resource apportionment which are fundamental to military decision making. Highly recommended for anyone tasked with making strategic decisions and needing a complementary framework to understand the methods of calculation available.

[Joseph Guido · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Castles, Battles, and Bombs” is the curious but impactful cross-fertilization of military history with economics. Cowritten by the pacifist Professor of Economics Jurgen Brauer who specializes in the proliferation of small arms along with Military Historian Professor Hubert Van Tuyll who specializes in the military history of the Soviet Union, “Castles, Battles, and Bombs” is a very readable and concise travel through military history in Europe from the Middle Ages to the present with a particular emphasis on market forces and choice. Approachable for both the specialist as well as casual reader, this book presents some unique and significant insights into European history, such as the role of contracts in Mercenary armies of Renaissance Italy or the use of mathematical modeling by armies during the Age of Enlightenment in attempts to optimize battlefield performance. The authors use six historical cases throughout but this book is a great bridge across academic fields. So, if you like economics, European history, or military history-it is worth checking out!

[Grace Dittrich · Rating 3 out of 5]

If you have a good grasp on economics and a lacking context of military history, this may not be the book for you. Geared more towards history buffs wanting to branch into economics, I wouldn’t say it’s a good book for economists to be introduced to military history, or at least its a high cost way to do so.

[Ron Me]

This book is great. Some of the ideas in here directly led to some of my own work. I *do* think it takes quite a bit of mathematical sophistication to properly appreciate it, perhaps that's why it got some poor reviews (although that in turn makes me wonder who the target audience is).

[Mark Uberuaga · Rating 3 out of 5]

In Castles, Battles, and Bombs economist Jurgen Brauer and historian Hubert van Tuyll, team up to demonstrate the applicability of using economic principles to explain military history. The team applies six economic principles in explanation of six historical examples.

• Opportunity Cost: Medieval Castles. It was cheaper and more effective to build a castle than it was to maintain an army and you couldn’t afford to do both.

• Expected Marginal Costs and Benefits: 17th Century Age of Battle-Adolphus, Marlborough, and Napoleon. As armies grew and became more expensive to create and maintain, these generals conducted cost-benefit analysis to determine their best time to fight.

• Substitution: France Nuclear Program. France chose to pursue an independent nuclear program instead of fielding a suboptimal army. De Galle believed the bomb would get France a seat at the table and contribute to his goal of grandeur.

• Diminishing Marginal Returns: WWII Combined Bombing Campaign. After a point, more bombs didn’t equal a reduction in aircraft production capability.

• Asymmetric Information and Hidden Characteristics: American Civil War. The confederates worked hard to deceive the Union. The army with the more accurate information won each battle.

• Hidden Actions and Incentive Alignment: Renaissance condottieri were contracted mercenaries. The situation illuminates the principal-agent problem, which identifies the conflicts of interest between the mercenaries and those who hired them.

The takeaway from this book is that economic principles can be useful lenses in which to look at history and evaluate past and current decisions. The arguments are grounded in neoclassical and institutional economics theories, which claim actions of people and institutions are predictable because they act rationally, consistently choosing their preference when faced with a decision.

[Clif · Rating 2 out of 5]

The first chapter of this book is the best. It does a good job of explaining the ideas from economics that it will develop in the following pages.

After that, it is a painful elaboration of the obvious. The authors appear to be well informed on their topics of history and the military but isn't it obvious that there is "opportunity cost" in every decision a general may make? If you choose one thing, you can't choose another at the same time so you must weigh what is most advantageous.

Duh!

I couldn't get through the book, because I wasn't learning anything by reading it.

[Nate Huston · Rating 2 out of 5]

Intent is to apply scientific rigor/framework/analysis not routinely engaged in in the field of historiography. Applies microeconomics as one of many that one could choose from. I really wanted the economic model to fit, but found it really reaching in many of the areas. Bias of the authors shown through in the strategic bombing chapter in particular. With that said, provides a good example of how interdisciplinary study can illuminate lessons perhaps otherwise unseen.

[Michele · Rating 2 out of 5]

Target reader for this book appears to be military history buffs who want to learn something about economic concepts.

[Glen · Rating 2 out of 5]

If you're looking for a short primer on basic economic principles, the first chapter of this book does a fairly decent job, but their historic examples seemed forced and are not very well organized.

[Amy · Rating 2 out of 5]

Intermittently interesting, but most of the economic insights seemed extremely basic for the periods with which I was familiar.

[Jon · Rating 3 out of 5]

Occasionally insightful, but obscenely repetitive.

[Jason Zumwalt · Rating 2 out of 5]

Mehhh. It's ok.

[Blain]

From WQ