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Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy
This is a book for scholars of Western philosophy who wish to engage with Buddhist philosophy, or who simply want to extend their philosophical horizons. It is also a book for scholars of Buddhist studies who want to see how Buddhist theory articulates with contemporary philosophy. Engaging Buddhism: Why it Matters to Philosophy articulates the basic metaphysical framework common to Buddhist traditions. It then explores questions in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, phenomenology, epistemology, the philosophy of language and ethics as they are raised and addressed in a variety of Asian Buddhist traditions. In each case the focus is on philosophical problems; in each case the connections between Buddhist and contemporary Western debates are addressed, as are the distinctive contributions that the Buddhist tradition can make to Western discussions. Engaging Buddhism is not an introduction to Buddhist philosophy, but an engagement with it, and an argument for the importance of
that engagement. It does not pretend to comprehensiveness, but it does address a wide range of Buddhist traditions, emphasizing the heterogeneity and the richness of those traditions. The book concludes with methodological reflections on how to prosecute dialogue between Buddhist and Western traditions.
"Garfield has a unique talent for rendering abstruse philosophical concepts in ways that make them easy to grasp. This is an important book, one that can profitably be read by scholars of Western and non-Western philosophy, including specialists in Buddhist philosophy. This is in my estimation the most important work on Buddhist philosophy in recent memory. It covers a wide range of topics and provides perhaps the clearest analysis of some core Buddhist ideas to date. This is landmark work. I think it's the best cross-cultural analysis of the relevance of Buddhist thought for contemporary philosophy in the present literature."-C. John Powers, Professor, School of Culture, History & Language, Australian National University
that engagement. It does not pretend to comprehensiveness, but it does address a wide range of Buddhist traditions, emphasizing the heterogeneity and the richness of those traditions. The book concludes with methodological reflections on how to prosecute dialogue between Buddhist and Western traditions.
"Garfield has a unique talent for rendering abstruse philosophical concepts in ways that make them easy to grasp. This is an important book, one that can profitably be read by scholars of Western and non-Western philosophy, including specialists in Buddhist philosophy. This is in my estimation the most important work on Buddhist philosophy in recent memory. It covers a wide range of topics and provides perhaps the clearest analysis of some core Buddhist ideas to date. This is landmark work. I think it's the best cross-cultural analysis of the relevance of Buddhist thought for contemporary philosophy in the present literature."-C. John Powers, Professor, School of Culture, History & Language, Australian National University
376 pages, Paperback
First published November 23, 2014
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March 6, 2022
A World of Pure Particularity
Jay Garfield’s Engaging Buddhism is an extraordinary book in several respects. At a basic level it is an attempt to show the relevance of Buddhist metaphysics to Western philosophical discussion. This it does very well. At another level, it is a demonstration of that same Buddhist metaphysics in practice through its constant emphasis on the power of basic vocabulary, our “cognitive architecture,” to isolate philosophical traditions from each other. And, finally, through its poetic suggestiveness, it makes perhaps the most significant contribution possible to those unfamiliar with Buddhist philosophy, namely imagination.
My imagination in particular has been stimulated and provoked in a number of directions while reading the book. But it is the specific problem of universals, a constant theme of European philosophy since the 13th century, for which I find Buddhist metaphysics immediately apt. It is this issue of particulars (I, you, that-over-there, Vladimir Putin) and universals (person, thing, cow, psychopath) which is the inherent subject of the modern philosophy of language, particularly that of Wittgenstein. Most remarkably, Buddhism anticipated Wittgenstein and the Western philosophical turn toward language by several thousand years.
From Garfield I understand that Buddhism cannot be understood as a faith, but is rather constituted as a set of ‘commitments’ which vary among its schools and which have evolved over time. These commitments can be summarised as:
Suffering (dukkha)- as the basic fact of existence - certainly undesirable, it is not associated with evil but with an inaccurate appreciation of reality (the primal confusion). This is the foundation of Buddhist ontology, that is ideas about the nature of being itself.
Impermanence - there is no ‘intrinsic nature’ or essence, to anything. Failure to realise this is the primary cause of suffering. We project properties, including continuity, onto the world as a matter of linguistically enabled cognition. This is the fundamental principle of Buddhist epistemology, the connections between reality and language (and not dissimilar from the Process Theology of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne).
Beneficence - a commitment to the welfare of other sentient beings, who are fellow-sufferers. Buddhist metaphysics implies the necessity for an ethics of empathy.
It is impermanence, I think, which is the pivotal characteristic in Buddhist metaphysics since any lack of appreciation of its importance is the source of both suffering and the lack of empathy. Among other things, impermanence means that there is no ontological foundation. As the American pragmatist, Richard Rorty, said: “Everything is surface, all the way down.” That surface Rorty refers to is language. And as the Swiss theologian, Karl Barth, expressed in a way that conforms perfectly with Buddhist thought, “Language about God [the Christian/Western ultimate reality] conceals more than it reveals.”
Buddhists agree with Barth. While language is essential, the best it can supply is some kind of conventional reality in which we live and work together. But language cannot describe or encompass ultimate reality:
To appreciate this claim, it is essential to understand that Buddhist philosophy is a “world of pure particularity” That is to say, “Buddhist philosophers regard universals of all kinds as conceptual projections, and as entirely unreal.” Therefore conventional reality is a useful fiction but must never be used as a standard of ultimate truth.
The reason for this is that almost all of language consists of universals which actually have no existential content at all. They are abstractions that make a certain kind of logic (Western) possible but fatally misleading. So says Garfield,
This key concept of apoha has its own complex meaning which is almost impossible to translate but which has a relatively straightforward logic of its own. Take the universal ‘cow.’ There is no such thing as ‘cowness’ which can identify a particular Daisy as a cow. Yet we all agree she’s a cow. In Buddhist philosophy, this feat of perception is not accomplished by reference to some set of properties assigned to the animal in question. Quite the opposite, as Garfield says, “apoha theory is, to a first—and startlingly unilluminating—approximation, that Daisy is not a non-cow. The double negation is the apoha.”
If I understand this correctly, an apoha, as in ‘not a non-cow’, is a particular which is arrived at by a process of rapid elimination of alternatives. This seems to be a sort of double classification, almost a linguistic cross-referencing which combines, for example, Owen Barfield’s beta and alpha-thinking and C.S. Peirce’s Second and Third into a single ‘representational moment’ in cognition. And as Garfield notes, this is not dissimilar to Wittgenstein’s logic of representation and the prototype categorisation theory of the influential cognitive psychologist, Eleanor Rosch.
The implications of this extreme Buddhist nominalism are wide-ranging. From the philosophy of language to theodicy, it provides an enormous number of possible paths for development. But it also does something else. The ultimate ‘emptiness’ referred to above in the citation from Garfield is a crucial reminder that language is always misleading when discussing reality, including the reality of language itself. Hence the idea of ultimate reality is a linguistic expression which cannot escape this constraint. Emptiness, too, is a universal. Therefore conventional and ultimate reality end up being identical, and identically ‘empty.’
Another way of saying this is that emptiness is a lack of intrinsic nature. But emptiness, like existence, is not a property.* Perhaps, indeed, emptiness is another name for existence, for being, which might well be the inspiration for Heidegger’s idea of language as the House of Being. And as Garfield says, “language—designation—is indispensible for expressing that inexpressible truth. This is not an irrational mysticism, but rather a rational, analytically grounded embrace of inconsistency.” In short: the world of language is paradoxical, get over it!
* Another important implication of the lack of intrinsic properties in reality arises for the theory of measurement. See here for a discussion of what might well be a Buddhist theory of measurement: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
Jay Garfield’s Engaging Buddhism is an extraordinary book in several respects. At a basic level it is an attempt to show the relevance of Buddhist metaphysics to Western philosophical discussion. This it does very well. At another level, it is a demonstration of that same Buddhist metaphysics in practice through its constant emphasis on the power of basic vocabulary, our “cognitive architecture,” to isolate philosophical traditions from each other. And, finally, through its poetic suggestiveness, it makes perhaps the most significant contribution possible to those unfamiliar with Buddhist philosophy, namely imagination.
My imagination in particular has been stimulated and provoked in a number of directions while reading the book. But it is the specific problem of universals, a constant theme of European philosophy since the 13th century, for which I find Buddhist metaphysics immediately apt. It is this issue of particulars (I, you, that-over-there, Vladimir Putin) and universals (person, thing, cow, psychopath) which is the inherent subject of the modern philosophy of language, particularly that of Wittgenstein. Most remarkably, Buddhism anticipated Wittgenstein and the Western philosophical turn toward language by several thousand years.
From Garfield I understand that Buddhism cannot be understood as a faith, but is rather constituted as a set of ‘commitments’ which vary among its schools and which have evolved over time. These commitments can be summarised as:
Suffering (dukkha)- as the basic fact of existence - certainly undesirable, it is not associated with evil but with an inaccurate appreciation of reality (the primal confusion). This is the foundation of Buddhist ontology, that is ideas about the nature of being itself.
Impermanence - there is no ‘intrinsic nature’ or essence, to anything. Failure to realise this is the primary cause of suffering. We project properties, including continuity, onto the world as a matter of linguistically enabled cognition. This is the fundamental principle of Buddhist epistemology, the connections between reality and language (and not dissimilar from the Process Theology of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne).
Beneficence - a commitment to the welfare of other sentient beings, who are fellow-sufferers. Buddhist metaphysics implies the necessity for an ethics of empathy.
It is impermanence, I think, which is the pivotal characteristic in Buddhist metaphysics since any lack of appreciation of its importance is the source of both suffering and the lack of empathy. Among other things, impermanence means that there is no ontological foundation. As the American pragmatist, Richard Rorty, said: “Everything is surface, all the way down.” That surface Rorty refers to is language. And as the Swiss theologian, Karl Barth, expressed in a way that conforms perfectly with Buddhist thought, “Language about God [the Christian/Western ultimate reality] conceals more than it reveals.”
Buddhists agree with Barth. While language is essential, the best it can supply is some kind of conventional reality in which we live and work together. But language cannot describe or encompass ultimate reality:
“Conventional reality is the everyday world, with its own standards of truth and knowledge—the world of dependently originated phenomena we inhabit. Ultimate reality is emptiness. They sound entirely different. Nāgārjuna argues that they are entirely different, but also that they are identical.”
To appreciate this claim, it is essential to understand that Buddhist philosophy is a “world of pure particularity” That is to say, “Buddhist philosophers regard universals of all kinds as conceptual projections, and as entirely unreal.” Therefore conventional reality is a useful fiction but must never be used as a standard of ultimate truth.
The reason for this is that almost all of language consists of universals which actually have no existential content at all. They are abstractions that make a certain kind of logic (Western) possible but fatally misleading. So says Garfield,
“Buddhist commitments to interdependence and impermanence entail nominalism with respect to universals, and nominalism with respect to universals requires some fancy footwork in semantics and the theory of cognition. Apoha is that tango.”
This key concept of apoha has its own complex meaning which is almost impossible to translate but which has a relatively straightforward logic of its own. Take the universal ‘cow.’ There is no such thing as ‘cowness’ which can identify a particular Daisy as a cow. Yet we all agree she’s a cow. In Buddhist philosophy, this feat of perception is not accomplished by reference to some set of properties assigned to the animal in question. Quite the opposite, as Garfield says, “apoha theory is, to a first—and startlingly unilluminating—approximation, that Daisy is not a non-cow. The double negation is the apoha.”
If I understand this correctly, an apoha, as in ‘not a non-cow’, is a particular which is arrived at by a process of rapid elimination of alternatives. This seems to be a sort of double classification, almost a linguistic cross-referencing which combines, for example, Owen Barfield’s beta and alpha-thinking and C.S. Peirce’s Second and Third into a single ‘representational moment’ in cognition. And as Garfield notes, this is not dissimilar to Wittgenstein’s logic of representation and the prototype categorisation theory of the influential cognitive psychologist, Eleanor Rosch.
The implications of this extreme Buddhist nominalism are wide-ranging. From the philosophy of language to theodicy, it provides an enormous number of possible paths for development. But it also does something else. The ultimate ‘emptiness’ referred to above in the citation from Garfield is a crucial reminder that language is always misleading when discussing reality, including the reality of language itself. Hence the idea of ultimate reality is a linguistic expression which cannot escape this constraint. Emptiness, too, is a universal. Therefore conventional and ultimate reality end up being identical, and identically ‘empty.’
Another way of saying this is that emptiness is a lack of intrinsic nature. But emptiness, like existence, is not a property.* Perhaps, indeed, emptiness is another name for existence, for being, which might well be the inspiration for Heidegger’s idea of language as the House of Being. And as Garfield says, “language—designation—is indispensible for expressing that inexpressible truth. This is not an irrational mysticism, but rather a rational, analytically grounded embrace of inconsistency.” In short: the world of language is paradoxical, get over it!
* Another important implication of the lack of intrinsic properties in reality arises for the theory of measurement. See here for a discussion of what might well be a Buddhist theory of measurement: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
December 7, 2015
Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy
This is a bit long. Read at your peril.
First, just a note to say that for the last couple of years, I have reserved a 5 Star rating for books that succeed in altering my worldview to some degree. Engaging Buddhism has done so.
Now for the disclaimer: the blurb for the book states that it "... is a book for scholars of Western philosophy who wish to engage with Buddhist philosophy, or who simply want to extend their philosophical horizons. It is also a book for scholars of Buddhist studies who want to see how Buddhist theory articulates with contemporary philosophy." In the memorable words of the great sage of the sixties, Bob Dylan, "It ain't me, Babe."
While far from being a scholar, I do have a history of some 45 years of muddling about in the nooks (books?) and crannies of Western thought. I have taken a very undisciplined approach, thus enjoying certain favourite schools of thought at the expense of others.
As for Buddhism, dilettante would be gross overstatement. I decided to read this after my encounter with Panaïoti's 'Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy'. In any event my knowledge, such as it is, and Jay Garfield's superior writing skills got me through, more or less. I averaged about 5 pages a day over 60 days. So who should or shouldn't read this book?
Don't read this book if: You listed Coehlo's 'The Alchemist' under Philosophy on GR; You think that Hesse's 'Siddhartha' is the real story of the Buddha (but a great read nonetheless); You are looking for a book on transcendental meditation; Your only knowledge of Western philosophy comes exclusively from Gaarder's 'Sophie's World' (again, not to criticize the book.).
Read Engaging Buddhism if: you have a basic knowledge of philosophers (particularly analytic types) such as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Husserl, Wittgenstein and some idea of contemporary directions on their philosophies. You don't need to be a scholar, just diligent.
So this is a philosophy book in the western tradition which deals with Buddhism with the aim of interesting Western academics (and me, possibly you) in cross fertilizing Western and Buddhist traditions. The book works not as comparative philosophy but as a 'cross-cultural' exercise. Garfield succeeded far beyond what I expected.
I won't drag this out by listing all of my ahha! moments, just a sense of the book itself. After a brief overview of Buddhist philosophy, Garfield presents Buddhism within the main categories of Western academic philosophy - metaphysics; the self; consciousness; phenomenology; epistemology; logic and philosophy of language; and, ethics.
So briefly, my epiphanies:
1. Metaphysics - something I have generally avoided getting into because I have found most metaphysics to border on nonsense. My own concepts of our world have generally been rejected by others as reductive, perspectivist or on the verge of idealism, not my intention. Here Garfield has given me a whole set of tools to take a fresh (2 000 year old) approach. Tools: impermanence, interdependence, emptiness and concept of 'two truths'. This last one being a true revelation that I have long known ( maybe Socrates was right).
2. The self - is not something that I deeply believed in. Just a convenient convention that gets in the way of understanding our place in this world. Tool: "... focus on the manner in which our sense of ourselves is constructed, on the consequences of those processes and of that sense, and on how we might best conceive of the nature of our lives on rational reflection."
3. Consciousness - Make sure you're not "... doing something akin to the biology of unicorns." I was already there because Wittgenstein speaks to me constantly.
4. Phenomenology - Basically, "... the more we can shed the myth of subject-object duality and the immediacy of our relation to subjectivity, the more honestly we can understand our participation in the reality we inhabit." Again, I have seen our attachment to 'subject-object' perception as a blockage to understanding, but have lacked a framework.
5. Logic and Language - Language "... Functions at the broadest level not as a vehicle for reference and predication, but as a complex complex cognitive tool for social coordination, for cognition and the expression of cognition." Wittgenstein, '... language can be can be used non-deceptively to the extent that we are not taken in by the "picture that holds us captive." Works for me.
6. Ethics - I'm a fan of David Hume's basic thesis that we cannot base our ethics on reason, that reason is a "slave to the passions". Garfield makes the point that much in Hume is similar, but not identical, to Buddhist ethics. Buddhist ethical theory is much broader than Hume's (and my) dependence on the 'sentiments' (empathy). Apparently, I should be reading some of that Schopenhauer sitting on my shelves also.
Anyone who has read this far has to be congratulated for perseverance. (Echo. Echo)
Now, having written the above, I must admit that there is much in this book which l have not understood or have misconstrued. I should reread it but, first, I will read some of the other books on Madhyamaka philosophy, written by Garfield and/or his friends, that I have acquired in the two months I spent reading this.
I have gleaned much here and shall be spending a great deal of time pursuing this topic. After all, I already own the books. But just for the record:
1. Have I decided to become a Buddhist? Definitely not.
2. Has my worldview shifted? Definitely but is not fixed in place.
3. Will I keep reading Western philosophy? Certainly. This is, after all, a cross-cultural exercise. And I'm currently having fun delving into Medieval - Christian and Muslim - philosophy and history.
__
__
Just a note on Buddhist 'jargon' in this book. Of course, Garfield uses it but, where possible, he prefers to use English equivalents. He always explains clearly how the words are used. He also has the wonderful habit of reminding the reader or that meaning when the same word comes up later. He is a natural teacher.
__
__
Highly recommended for those who meet the criteria above and, if you are like me, are willing to 'read deeply'. I had fun with this.
Enough words spilt.
This is a bit long. Read at your peril.
First, just a note to say that for the last couple of years, I have reserved a 5 Star rating for books that succeed in altering my worldview to some degree. Engaging Buddhism has done so.
Now for the disclaimer: the blurb for the book states that it "... is a book for scholars of Western philosophy who wish to engage with Buddhist philosophy, or who simply want to extend their philosophical horizons. It is also a book for scholars of Buddhist studies who want to see how Buddhist theory articulates with contemporary philosophy." In the memorable words of the great sage of the sixties, Bob Dylan, "It ain't me, Babe."
While far from being a scholar, I do have a history of some 45 years of muddling about in the nooks (books?) and crannies of Western thought. I have taken a very undisciplined approach, thus enjoying certain favourite schools of thought at the expense of others.
As for Buddhism, dilettante would be gross overstatement. I decided to read this after my encounter with Panaïoti's 'Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy'. In any event my knowledge, such as it is, and Jay Garfield's superior writing skills got me through, more or less. I averaged about 5 pages a day over 60 days. So who should or shouldn't read this book?
Don't read this book if: You listed Coehlo's 'The Alchemist' under Philosophy on GR; You think that Hesse's 'Siddhartha' is the real story of the Buddha (but a great read nonetheless); You are looking for a book on transcendental meditation; Your only knowledge of Western philosophy comes exclusively from Gaarder's 'Sophie's World' (again, not to criticize the book.).
Read Engaging Buddhism if: you have a basic knowledge of philosophers (particularly analytic types) such as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Husserl, Wittgenstein and some idea of contemporary directions on their philosophies. You don't need to be a scholar, just diligent.
So this is a philosophy book in the western tradition which deals with Buddhism with the aim of interesting Western academics (and me, possibly you) in cross fertilizing Western and Buddhist traditions. The book works not as comparative philosophy but as a 'cross-cultural' exercise. Garfield succeeded far beyond what I expected.
I won't drag this out by listing all of my ahha! moments, just a sense of the book itself. After a brief overview of Buddhist philosophy, Garfield presents Buddhism within the main categories of Western academic philosophy - metaphysics; the self; consciousness; phenomenology; epistemology; logic and philosophy of language; and, ethics.
So briefly, my epiphanies:
1. Metaphysics - something I have generally avoided getting into because I have found most metaphysics to border on nonsense. My own concepts of our world have generally been rejected by others as reductive, perspectivist or on the verge of idealism, not my intention. Here Garfield has given me a whole set of tools to take a fresh (2 000 year old) approach. Tools: impermanence, interdependence, emptiness and concept of 'two truths'. This last one being a true revelation that I have long known ( maybe Socrates was right).
2. The self - is not something that I deeply believed in. Just a convenient convention that gets in the way of understanding our place in this world. Tool: "... focus on the manner in which our sense of ourselves is constructed, on the consequences of those processes and of that sense, and on how we might best conceive of the nature of our lives on rational reflection."
3. Consciousness - Make sure you're not "... doing something akin to the biology of unicorns." I was already there because Wittgenstein speaks to me constantly.
4. Phenomenology - Basically, "... the more we can shed the myth of subject-object duality and the immediacy of our relation to subjectivity, the more honestly we can understand our participation in the reality we inhabit." Again, I have seen our attachment to 'subject-object' perception as a blockage to understanding, but have lacked a framework.
5. Logic and Language - Language "... Functions at the broadest level not as a vehicle for reference and predication, but as a complex complex cognitive tool for social coordination, for cognition and the expression of cognition." Wittgenstein, '... language can be can be used non-deceptively to the extent that we are not taken in by the "picture that holds us captive." Works for me.
6. Ethics - I'm a fan of David Hume's basic thesis that we cannot base our ethics on reason, that reason is a "slave to the passions". Garfield makes the point that much in Hume is similar, but not identical, to Buddhist ethics. Buddhist ethical theory is much broader than Hume's (and my) dependence on the 'sentiments' (empathy). Apparently, I should be reading some of that Schopenhauer sitting on my shelves also.
Anyone who has read this far has to be congratulated for perseverance. (Echo. Echo)
Now, having written the above, I must admit that there is much in this book which l have not understood or have misconstrued. I should reread it but, first, I will read some of the other books on Madhyamaka philosophy, written by Garfield and/or his friends, that I have acquired in the two months I spent reading this.
I have gleaned much here and shall be spending a great deal of time pursuing this topic. After all, I already own the books. But just for the record:
1. Have I decided to become a Buddhist? Definitely not.
2. Has my worldview shifted? Definitely but is not fixed in place.
3. Will I keep reading Western philosophy? Certainly. This is, after all, a cross-cultural exercise. And I'm currently having fun delving into Medieval - Christian and Muslim - philosophy and history.
__
__
Just a note on Buddhist 'jargon' in this book. Of course, Garfield uses it but, where possible, he prefers to use English equivalents. He always explains clearly how the words are used. He also has the wonderful habit of reminding the reader or that meaning when the same word comes up later. He is a natural teacher.
__
__
Highly recommended for those who meet the criteria above and, if you are like me, are willing to 'read deeply'. I had fun with this.
Enough words spilt.
May 26, 2019
Garfield elucidates views in Mahayana and Yogacara Buddhism on metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, logic, phenomenology, and the self. He does this in an incredibly clear and concise manner. (He also has a fantastic style and sense of humor!) Garfield shows that the philosophical problems to which these Buddhist philosophers responded have resemblances to those found in the Western tradition. But these Buddhist philosophers start off from radically different assumptions than those in Western philosophy. Thus, Western philosophers can learn a lot by appreciating these Buddhist views.
In reading this book, we (as in people who have been exposed mainly to Western philosophy and culture) realize that we've taken certain assumptions for granted. We realize not only that it is possible to form coherent views without these assumptions, which previously might've seen as necessary. But also we realize challenging our assumptions might be preferable, allowing for philosophical positions that are more naturalistic and ethical than those in the Western mainstream. (Garfield doesn't aim to show that Buddhist philosophy is superior in any way; this is just my own opinion, as a philosopher who has always been sympathetic with Continental approaches, or philosophy that acknowledges that historical-social conditions constrain the possibilities of theorizing).
For example, Buddhist philosophy starts off with the assumption that there is an ultimate reality and a conventional reality, whose contents are totally independent of each other. Conventional reality refers to everything we can possibly think about and experience; it includes objects and properties, persons and emotions.
Conventional reality is deceptive. Ultimately, there are no objects or properties at all, but everything depends on its relations to everything else, and all is in flux. Moreover, any definitive identity, of a particular or universal, depends on our socially-contingent concepts. But this also means the very distinction between conventional reality and ultimate reality is yet another conventional distinction; these two planes of reality are identical in a sense, and all is conventional. And yet conventional reality can be distinguished from the ultimate. Being itself is inherently paradoxical.
This metaphysical starting point has huge implications on views across philosophical domains. Garfield examines how our Western views on topics from modal logic to selfhood would be impacted by taking this metaphysical view seriously.
As another example, Buddhist philosophy starts from the assumption that the lives of all sentient beings are permeated with dukkha (translated loosely as suffering or frustration); suffering is a necessary condition of conscious experience. Suffering originates in the gap between conventional reality and ultimate reality. We experience ourselves as individuals, see enduring, real objects before us, and desire those objects. But in reality our identity is collective, or distributed not only socially but across nature; and objects depend on our attitudes toward them, among myriads of other factors. So desires can never be satisfied by such changeable objects.
This starting point leads to an ethics that is very different than what we know in Western culture. On this Buddhist view, it is positively irrational to be egoistic. When we think we are individuals and wish to act for our own interests, independently of the interests of others, we are acting in opposition to ultimate reality; it is literally irrational. On the flipside, acting for the sake of all beings is rational.
Garfield also does a good job showing the diversity of different Buddhist traditions, and particular philosophers within a given tradition. It is ignorant to think there is a monolithic 'Buddhist philosophy'; there is as much plurality there as there is in Western philosophy. Garfield's purpose, however, is not to give an introduction to the primary traditions in Buddhism. His purpose is to show that studying these Buddhist traditions is very interesting and useful for Western philosophers; since his background is strongest in Mahayana and Yogacara philosophy, he draws on those traditions as examples. Garfield offers a terrific bibliography and particular recommendations for readers interested in getting a more comprehensive introduction to different Buddhist traditions, or in exploring a particular philosophical problem in greater detail.
I think this book is a must-read for not only people interested in Buddhist philosophy; it's important for anyone who is serious about philosophy, but only primarily knows Western philosophy.
In reading this book, we (as in people who have been exposed mainly to Western philosophy and culture) realize that we've taken certain assumptions for granted. We realize not only that it is possible to form coherent views without these assumptions, which previously might've seen as necessary. But also we realize challenging our assumptions might be preferable, allowing for philosophical positions that are more naturalistic and ethical than those in the Western mainstream. (Garfield doesn't aim to show that Buddhist philosophy is superior in any way; this is just my own opinion, as a philosopher who has always been sympathetic with Continental approaches, or philosophy that acknowledges that historical-social conditions constrain the possibilities of theorizing).
For example, Buddhist philosophy starts off with the assumption that there is an ultimate reality and a conventional reality, whose contents are totally independent of each other. Conventional reality refers to everything we can possibly think about and experience; it includes objects and properties, persons and emotions.
Conventional reality is deceptive. Ultimately, there are no objects or properties at all, but everything depends on its relations to everything else, and all is in flux. Moreover, any definitive identity, of a particular or universal, depends on our socially-contingent concepts. But this also means the very distinction between conventional reality and ultimate reality is yet another conventional distinction; these two planes of reality are identical in a sense, and all is conventional. And yet conventional reality can be distinguished from the ultimate. Being itself is inherently paradoxical.
This metaphysical starting point has huge implications on views across philosophical domains. Garfield examines how our Western views on topics from modal logic to selfhood would be impacted by taking this metaphysical view seriously.
As another example, Buddhist philosophy starts from the assumption that the lives of all sentient beings are permeated with dukkha (translated loosely as suffering or frustration); suffering is a necessary condition of conscious experience. Suffering originates in the gap between conventional reality and ultimate reality. We experience ourselves as individuals, see enduring, real objects before us, and desire those objects. But in reality our identity is collective, or distributed not only socially but across nature; and objects depend on our attitudes toward them, among myriads of other factors. So desires can never be satisfied by such changeable objects.
This starting point leads to an ethics that is very different than what we know in Western culture. On this Buddhist view, it is positively irrational to be egoistic. When we think we are individuals and wish to act for our own interests, independently of the interests of others, we are acting in opposition to ultimate reality; it is literally irrational. On the flipside, acting for the sake of all beings is rational.
Garfield also does a good job showing the diversity of different Buddhist traditions, and particular philosophers within a given tradition. It is ignorant to think there is a monolithic 'Buddhist philosophy'; there is as much plurality there as there is in Western philosophy. Garfield's purpose, however, is not to give an introduction to the primary traditions in Buddhism. His purpose is to show that studying these Buddhist traditions is very interesting and useful for Western philosophers; since his background is strongest in Mahayana and Yogacara philosophy, he draws on those traditions as examples. Garfield offers a terrific bibliography and particular recommendations for readers interested in getting a more comprehensive introduction to different Buddhist traditions, or in exploring a particular philosophical problem in greater detail.
I think this book is a must-read for not only people interested in Buddhist philosophy; it's important for anyone who is serious about philosophy, but only primarily knows Western philosophy.
June 4, 2019
Awesome second time around
August 31, 2022
Years ago I taught a college course entitled “Literature of Western Civilization” which was a standard humanities requirement. At one point, one of my students, who was of Korean descent, took over the course and distributed handouts from the Tao Te Ching. I was torn between wanting to regain control of my class and wanting to allow a bright student to speak his mind. I learned a valuable lesson that day. Those of us who think of ourselves as citizens of the world cannot afford to be provincial or Eurocentric about what our heritage is.
Jay Garfield addresses this concern by writing about Buddhism in a way that is intelligible to, and that can interrogate, those trained in the western philosophy originating in Greece. Garfield, who in addition to his American credentials is also affiliated with the Central University for Tibetan Studies in India, has also done the opposite task of writing a book explaining European philosophy to an Asian constituency. Garfield is passionate in arguing that European and anglophone philosophers can only gain from being in dialogue with other philosophical traditions, in this case with the Buddhist heritage of two and a half millennia.
Garfield explores some central concepts of Buddhism and shows how they relate to concerns in the history of western philosophy. I will bump over some high points. The starting point in Buddhism is the concept of suffering or “dukkha” (Sanskrit). Garfield points out that this is not only suffering, but the general unsatisfactory or uncomfortable aspect of life. When I was a Peace Corps Volunteer in Nepal, I remember talking with friends in my village about some awkward social situation (which I can’t remember). One of my village friends said (in Nepali), “Dukkha lagyo.” “You felt bad.” The term can include all of the regrets, guilt, shame, pains and frustrations which afflict our lives. It is the basis of the first of the “four truths,” that all of life is suffering.
The solution to the problem of dukkha is to recognize that it is caused by confused thinking, the second of the “four truths.” We think that there is an enduring self, which leads to attachment and aversion. But Buddhism holds that there is “no self,” in that if one seeks to identify the self, one finds thoughts, feelings, one’s body, etc. but nothing which is distinctively one’s self. This anticipates the lines of David Hume’s thinking, as well as contemporary accounts such as Sartre’s concept of “nothingness.”
What there is, is the conventional experience of a world full of people (including ourselves), who are causally interdependent, and who interact and suffer dukkha. If we recognize that there is nothing uniquely enduring about our “self,” then we can let go of attachment and aversion, which lead to dukkha, and attain “bodhicitta,” an awakened mind that looks on the world with equanimity, and is concerned with the welfare of all beings.
According to Garfield, Buddhism posits two ways of looking at the world, the conventional way, in which we differentiate individual people, and the enlightened way, in which we have let go of our idea of ourselves as unique and enduring selves. Both are legitimate, and each has its area of usefulness. This leads to an interesting “tetralemma” (analogous to a dilemma, but with four alternatives instead of two): The world is real. The world is not real. The world is both real and not real. The world is neither real nor not real.
This can be characterized as a “four-valuational” logic, and can be made consistent with the logic of Boole and Frege, familiar to western philosophers. After rephrasing, the four values would be: true, false, both true and false, neither true nor false. There are western journal articles on this logic, and it can be handled by truth-tables. Gaylord points out that the Buddhist conception of language anticipates Wittgenstein’s conception of language in that “language can be used non-deceptively to the extent that we are not taken in by the ‘picture that holds us captive.’”
This has been a fast and bumpy ride through Buddhism with highlights suggesting how Buddhism can be in dialogue with western philosophy. I found it inspiring to me as a philosophy student and I hope to follow up on the references in which the dialogue continues. In the twenty-first century, Buddhism is part of the intellectual heritage of the whole world.
Jay Garfield addresses this concern by writing about Buddhism in a way that is intelligible to, and that can interrogate, those trained in the western philosophy originating in Greece. Garfield, who in addition to his American credentials is also affiliated with the Central University for Tibetan Studies in India, has also done the opposite task of writing a book explaining European philosophy to an Asian constituency. Garfield is passionate in arguing that European and anglophone philosophers can only gain from being in dialogue with other philosophical traditions, in this case with the Buddhist heritage of two and a half millennia.
Garfield explores some central concepts of Buddhism and shows how they relate to concerns in the history of western philosophy. I will bump over some high points. The starting point in Buddhism is the concept of suffering or “dukkha” (Sanskrit). Garfield points out that this is not only suffering, but the general unsatisfactory or uncomfortable aspect of life. When I was a Peace Corps Volunteer in Nepal, I remember talking with friends in my village about some awkward social situation (which I can’t remember). One of my village friends said (in Nepali), “Dukkha lagyo.” “You felt bad.” The term can include all of the regrets, guilt, shame, pains and frustrations which afflict our lives. It is the basis of the first of the “four truths,” that all of life is suffering.
The solution to the problem of dukkha is to recognize that it is caused by confused thinking, the second of the “four truths.” We think that there is an enduring self, which leads to attachment and aversion. But Buddhism holds that there is “no self,” in that if one seeks to identify the self, one finds thoughts, feelings, one’s body, etc. but nothing which is distinctively one’s self. This anticipates the lines of David Hume’s thinking, as well as contemporary accounts such as Sartre’s concept of “nothingness.”
What there is, is the conventional experience of a world full of people (including ourselves), who are causally interdependent, and who interact and suffer dukkha. If we recognize that there is nothing uniquely enduring about our “self,” then we can let go of attachment and aversion, which lead to dukkha, and attain “bodhicitta,” an awakened mind that looks on the world with equanimity, and is concerned with the welfare of all beings.
According to Garfield, Buddhism posits two ways of looking at the world, the conventional way, in which we differentiate individual people, and the enlightened way, in which we have let go of our idea of ourselves as unique and enduring selves. Both are legitimate, and each has its area of usefulness. This leads to an interesting “tetralemma” (analogous to a dilemma, but with four alternatives instead of two): The world is real. The world is not real. The world is both real and not real. The world is neither real nor not real.
This can be characterized as a “four-valuational” logic, and can be made consistent with the logic of Boole and Frege, familiar to western philosophers. After rephrasing, the four values would be: true, false, both true and false, neither true nor false. There are western journal articles on this logic, and it can be handled by truth-tables. Gaylord points out that the Buddhist conception of language anticipates Wittgenstein’s conception of language in that “language can be used non-deceptively to the extent that we are not taken in by the ‘picture that holds us captive.’”
This has been a fast and bumpy ride through Buddhism with highlights suggesting how Buddhism can be in dialogue with western philosophy. I found it inspiring to me as a philosophy student and I hope to follow up on the references in which the dialogue continues. In the twenty-first century, Buddhism is part of the intellectual heritage of the whole world.
May 26, 2016
The best book I have read examining Buddhism from a western philosophical perspective. He does get carried away with subordinate clauses at times but he is packing a lot in and the best way to read this book is slowly, one sentence at a time.
June 8, 2020
You won't find a better start point for engagement between Buddhism and western philosophy. Garfield brings his expertise in both to convincingly show that western philosophy will be far better off if it engages with Buddhist philosophy.
Garfield's breadth of knowledge is somewhat mind-blowing. Particularly in the western tradition, he is as comfortable talking about the continental greats (Heidegger, Husserl, Nietzsche) as the analytic giants (Wittgenstein, Kripke). Garfield's study under Tibetans has equipped him well for a deep understanding of the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophical tradition, although Garfield openly admits Chinese and Japanese Buddhist philosophy isn't his expertise.
There are some worries I have about Garfield's project, however, one could argue that Garfield's project is one of integration of Buddhist voices into primarily analytic debate. One might wonder whether Buddhist philosophy has anything to contribute to the often under-discussed questions of philosophy: theres no discussion of philosophy of gender, race, or even of political philosophy in this book.
Garfield's breadth of knowledge is somewhat mind-blowing. Particularly in the western tradition, he is as comfortable talking about the continental greats (Heidegger, Husserl, Nietzsche) as the analytic giants (Wittgenstein, Kripke). Garfield's study under Tibetans has equipped him well for a deep understanding of the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophical tradition, although Garfield openly admits Chinese and Japanese Buddhist philosophy isn't his expertise.
There are some worries I have about Garfield's project, however, one could argue that Garfield's project is one of integration of Buddhist voices into primarily analytic debate. One might wonder whether Buddhist philosophy has anything to contribute to the often under-discussed questions of philosophy: theres no discussion of philosophy of gender, race, or even of political philosophy in this book.
August 7, 2024
Буддійська філософія завдяки цій книзі виглядає набагато чіткішою, аніж на основі великої кількості сміття, яким наповнений інтернет.
У рекомендований список літератури.
У рекомендований список літератури.
July 12, 2016
Difficult, but rewarding overall—
This is a difficult book to engage with, not just because of Garfield's liberal use of academic jargon (abstracta, relata, explanans, explanandum, sequelae, etc.), but because so much of his discussions assumes a pretty intimate knowledge of contemporary Western philosophical topics on the part of the reader. I majored in (Western) philosophy in college and although I haven't read contemporary philosophy intensively since then, I consider myself sufficiently informed about it (having read Wittgenstein, Dennett, Sextus Empiricus, and some philosophy of law stuff for fun), but I still had a lot of trouble following many of Garfield's discussions (especially in the consciousness and self chapters—HOT, HOP, IFO, Phenomenological and Reflexive models, anyone?). In a word, this is a book for graduate students in philosophy (Western or Eastern) or written for professors in philosophy. I would DEFINITELY not recommend this book as an introduction to the topic (and neither does the author expect you to read this as an introduction) or to anyone without a strong background in philosophy.
Aside from that, whatever morsels of wisdom I've managed to glean from it is quite rewarding, as I feel definitely equipped to understand and engage with obscure & difficult Buddhist philosophical concepts, like:
1) The doctrine of two truths (conventional vs. ultimate) and how they are conventionally the same (via the metaphor of seeing a mirage in a desert): "Ultimately, since all phenomena, even ultimate truth, exist only conventionally, conventional truth is all the truth there is, and that is an ultimate, and therefore, a conventional truth. To fail to take conventional truth seriously as truth is therefore not only to deprecate the conventional in favor of the ultimate, but to deprecate truth, per se" (240).
2) apoha: a special negation meant to do away with universal properties by excluding something from being, say a non-cow. One important point is the relationship between negation and absence; saying "there are no angels on my desk" does not commit one to the existence of angels, or for that matter, non-angels at all. The mature form of this doctrine is found in Dharmakīrti who proposes a two-stage model: first, we must have a paradigm instance of a particular that satisfies the concept in question (which reminds me of Lakoff & Johnson's concept of "prototype" or experiential gestalt we use to classify things), and second, we must have the capacity to distinguish things that are similar to the paradigm from things that are not;
3) Nagarjuna's coherentist approach to epistemology: "We are entitled to rely on epistemic instruments [such as perception, inference, witness/scripture, and analogy] just because they deliver epistemic objects; we are entitled in turn to have confidence in our judgments about our epistemic objects just because they are delivered by these epistemic instruments. For instance, you are entitled to believe that your vision is good just because it delivers visible objects to you; in the same way, you are entitled to believe that those objects are present just because your vision is good" (236).
4) Vajra hermeneutics as a Buddhist conception of what language does: "much language is used in order to cause things to happen, as opposed to convey meaning" (274). So on this view, meaning "is nothing more than a special case of natural causal efficacy...as a kind of functional classification" (276).
5) Buddhist action theory. Any action has three parts: intention, act, and completion (or immediate consequence), and any action can be assigned positive or negative "karma" (consequence) with respect to each of these three parts. Interdependence also means what I do to others also affects me morally and so ultimately, "there is no morally significant distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding actions" (285);
6) The centrality of karunā, or "care." Again, due to interdependence, "one cannot solve even the problem of one's own suffering without caring about that of others...not to care about others is to suffer from profound alienation" (289). Also interesting is, contra rational egoism, "the irrationality of failing to be able to give a reason for any distinction between the treatment of similar cases. Once I grasp the fact that suffering is bad, that is by itself a reason for its alleviation. It is therefore simply irrelevant whose suffering it is" (313).
As far as ethics is concerned, I've always felt the Western approach is limited, even bankrupt, in terms of its effectiveness in orienting people and motivating them to act morally. I mean think of utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, and Aristotelean virtue ethics—to me they present a gibberish of well reasoned (but impractical) arguments that amount to, ultimately, nothing. Too calculating, too rational, too theoretical, or just a bunch of what in Japanese is called "rikutsu"—reasons in their most vacuous sense. And what I like about Buddhist philosophy is its acceptance of uncertainty and great complexity via interdependence and falliblism, its epistemic humility coupled with the coherence/unity of the worldview (metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and ethics all have their proper places in it), instead of the fragmented, ineffective, abstract thing called Western philosophy.
Overall, difficult, but definitely a good resource for understanding how Buddhist philosophy works and can engage in dialogue with Western philosophy.
This is a difficult book to engage with, not just because of Garfield's liberal use of academic jargon (abstracta, relata, explanans, explanandum, sequelae, etc.), but because so much of his discussions assumes a pretty intimate knowledge of contemporary Western philosophical topics on the part of the reader. I majored in (Western) philosophy in college and although I haven't read contemporary philosophy intensively since then, I consider myself sufficiently informed about it (having read Wittgenstein, Dennett, Sextus Empiricus, and some philosophy of law stuff for fun), but I still had a lot of trouble following many of Garfield's discussions (especially in the consciousness and self chapters—HOT, HOP, IFO, Phenomenological and Reflexive models, anyone?). In a word, this is a book for graduate students in philosophy (Western or Eastern) or written for professors in philosophy. I would DEFINITELY not recommend this book as an introduction to the topic (and neither does the author expect you to read this as an introduction) or to anyone without a strong background in philosophy.
Aside from that, whatever morsels of wisdom I've managed to glean from it is quite rewarding, as I feel definitely equipped to understand and engage with obscure & difficult Buddhist philosophical concepts, like:
1) The doctrine of two truths (conventional vs. ultimate) and how they are conventionally the same (via the metaphor of seeing a mirage in a desert): "Ultimately, since all phenomena, even ultimate truth, exist only conventionally, conventional truth is all the truth there is, and that is an ultimate, and therefore, a conventional truth. To fail to take conventional truth seriously as truth is therefore not only to deprecate the conventional in favor of the ultimate, but to deprecate truth, per se" (240).
2) apoha: a special negation meant to do away with universal properties by excluding something from being, say a non-cow. One important point is the relationship between negation and absence; saying "there are no angels on my desk" does not commit one to the existence of angels, or for that matter, non-angels at all. The mature form of this doctrine is found in Dharmakīrti who proposes a two-stage model: first, we must have a paradigm instance of a particular that satisfies the concept in question (which reminds me of Lakoff & Johnson's concept of "prototype" or experiential gestalt we use to classify things), and second, we must have the capacity to distinguish things that are similar to the paradigm from things that are not;
3) Nagarjuna's coherentist approach to epistemology: "We are entitled to rely on epistemic instruments [such as perception, inference, witness/scripture, and analogy] just because they deliver epistemic objects; we are entitled in turn to have confidence in our judgments about our epistemic objects just because they are delivered by these epistemic instruments. For instance, you are entitled to believe that your vision is good just because it delivers visible objects to you; in the same way, you are entitled to believe that those objects are present just because your vision is good" (236).
4) Vajra hermeneutics as a Buddhist conception of what language does: "much language is used in order to cause things to happen, as opposed to convey meaning" (274). So on this view, meaning "is nothing more than a special case of natural causal efficacy...as a kind of functional classification" (276).
5) Buddhist action theory. Any action has three parts: intention, act, and completion (or immediate consequence), and any action can be assigned positive or negative "karma" (consequence) with respect to each of these three parts. Interdependence also means what I do to others also affects me morally and so ultimately, "there is no morally significant distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding actions" (285);
6) The centrality of karunā, or "care." Again, due to interdependence, "one cannot solve even the problem of one's own suffering without caring about that of others...not to care about others is to suffer from profound alienation" (289). Also interesting is, contra rational egoism, "the irrationality of failing to be able to give a reason for any distinction between the treatment of similar cases. Once I grasp the fact that suffering is bad, that is by itself a reason for its alleviation. It is therefore simply irrelevant whose suffering it is" (313).
As far as ethics is concerned, I've always felt the Western approach is limited, even bankrupt, in terms of its effectiveness in orienting people and motivating them to act morally. I mean think of utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, and Aristotelean virtue ethics—to me they present a gibberish of well reasoned (but impractical) arguments that amount to, ultimately, nothing. Too calculating, too rational, too theoretical, or just a bunch of what in Japanese is called "rikutsu"—reasons in their most vacuous sense. And what I like about Buddhist philosophy is its acceptance of uncertainty and great complexity via interdependence and falliblism, its epistemic humility coupled with the coherence/unity of the worldview (metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and ethics all have their proper places in it), instead of the fragmented, ineffective, abstract thing called Western philosophy.
Overall, difficult, but definitely a good resource for understanding how Buddhist philosophy works and can engage in dialogue with Western philosophy.
January 16, 2026
if you like this review, i now have website: www.michaelkamakana.com
241021: according to gr I have now read 128 phil-indic-buddhism. though not 'studying' or 'enacting' it, I feel that I have read some to offer critique. perhaps not of vast buddhist/eastern thought territory (read 192 Indic), but of the various introductory, intermediate, advanced, works in this living tradition. if you want more introductory there is Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Contemporary Indian Philosophy, for historical analysis there is , A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities, Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings, Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation, some favourites Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy, The Vimalakirti Sutra, Buddhism: A Philosophical Approach...
this follows the brief of Indian Buddhist Philosophy: Metaphysics as Ethics, but I find it more tenable, more open, more relevant and cross-cultural critique, that includes some reflection on what pa
AT THIS POINT I LOSE MY REVIEW: I MUST AGAIN BE TOO LONG! AARRGH!
basic argument, relevant to each chapter, 4. self, 5. consciousness, 6. phenomenology, 7. epistemology. 8. logic, language, 9. ethics, 10. methodological potscript... returns to chapter 1. what is bd philosophy. 2. metaphysics 1: interdependence, impermanence.3. metaphysics 2: emptiness... this is 'virtuous circle' argument works for me. read this book, he helps make it all connect probably even to western insular philosophers...
I will continue this review on my website: www.michaelkamakana.com
continuation of review:
basic argument, relevant to each chapter, 4. self, 5. consciousness, 6. phenomenology, 7. epistemology. 8. logic, language, 9. ethics, 10. methodological postscript... returns to chapter 1. what is bd philosophy. 2. metaphysics 1: interdependence, impermanence.3. metaphysics 2: emptiness... this is 'virtuous circle' argument works for me. read this book, he helps make it all connect probably even to western insular philosophers...
what is bd philosophy: this is extended argument of why, from 'western', particularly 'analytic' perspective, buddhist thought is to be considered not simply religion but also philosophy. this is not something i question. i have read about 128 books that involve bd as philosophy. while less than phenomenologists french and german this is more than anglo-american analytics so prevalent in this oxford text. i would alter subtitle to: what bd means to (western) analytic philosophy. in fact, i would entirely reverse the order of investigation: what does (western) analytic philosophy offer bd philosophy, but that is another book. for this chapter does express just how very different these attitudes are, as evidence in language, concerns, style of argument, as exemplified here where an assertion is not approached in any linear pattern but recursive, in repetition, in refocusing on central metaphysical concepts...
metaphysics one, assumed, underlying or overarching, of buddhist thought is first 'interdependence' and 'impermanence'. in one point one, on any reflection it is not difficult to see that ourselves, our worlds, our universe, are all interdependent, as perhaps western texts also argue but i read first through bd: for here the key assertion is that there need be no ground, no absolute, no origin, but that interdependence 'goes all the way down'... this is possible when there is no transcendent source such as God or Being... metaphysics one point two is impermanence, again not difficult concept, which is implied by the first point, for how does the ten thousand things come to interact interdependently without some arising, others departing, for point one is in time as well as more familiar space: i read that an example is the usefulness of death, for how does sprout come without death of seed, how does grass come without death of sprout, how does animal come without death of grass...
metaphysics two is subsequently implied, is truly rather more difficult concept, but finally inescapable conclusion of metaphysics one, assumed, underlying or overarching, and this is 'emptiness'. it is important this is not 'nothingness' or 'lack of existence', but lack of 'essence', that favourite descriptive matrix for western thought. emptiness is misunderstood as claims toward that big bad of nihilism, but is in fact, paradoxically, against such interpretation of the real: for how can there be individual essence if all is interdependent, for how can there be essence that persists though universal impermanence. emptiness is refusal of 'inherent essence' as it conflicts with metaphysics one and two... emptiness is ultimate truth, not the 'conventional' real through which we navigate our human lives of convenient truth, grass is green, snow is cold etc. though there will be some argument it is only though convention we can know ultimate, that convention is 'truth' as well, and emptiness should be conceived in terms of vessel to be filled with real rather than illusory absence...
this is when we begin to elaborate consequences of thinking through implications of 2 and 3 above, 4. self, which is psychologically considered 'essential' to western thought from an egoistic insistence, which falls against the arguments or three above, not difficult concept but wholly other impression of healthy human... who integrates, understands, enacts the outcomes of two and three above
consciousness, which is the last bastion westerners claim as definite proof of existence of 'essential' self, which is found vulnerable to simply more subtle variations on the metaphysics one, two, three... for what is this persisting thing we call 'consciousness' but ongoing stream of mental events, and how can this be identified with persisting something like self, as ultimate truth...
phenomenology, here the author admits the historically-determined multiple definitions of the term, which is for me not hegel but husserl, though my attitudes are those of french philosopher merleau-ponty, he finds connections with wittgenstein, strawson etc. (of whom i have read little)... but this is primarily demonstrating these ancient and more recent indic philosophers precede western thinkers in many ways, which is where i would reverse emphasis of subtitle as mentioned above...
epistemology is the contrast of western concept of knowledge as 'justified true belief' with bd concern with two levels of truth, conventional and ultimate, first asserting bd works without universals, with pure particularity, with 'nominalism' (here is frustrating aspect of westerners trying to render bd terms in their thought-universes, with variable exactness), next by investigating how bd thought understands 'true illusions' such as mirages...
logic, language, further proof i should try more wittgenstein (7)...
ethics, returns to metaphysics one and two and three, to interdependence and impermanence, to all subsequent implications in chapters 4. self, 5. consciousness, 6. phenomenology, 7. epistemology. 8. logic, language, 9. ethics...
methodological postscript, returns to chapter one with final exhortation to (western) philosophers, to take budddhist philosophy as livng, breathing as well as venerable source for whatever analytic thought they employ. for me, the application goes the other way. for me, it is, here like any art, limitations of the media which i find most unfortunate: it is clear that the argument(s) for buddhist philosophy is (are) virtuous circle, so why are we unable to express this in form, like the infinite book posited by borges? this returns to chapter one...
if you want more: Wisdom Beyond Words: The Buddhist Vision of Ultimate Reality
Why Buddhism is True: The Science and Philosophy of Meditation and Enlightenment
more technical:
The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
more:
Innovative Buddhist Women: Swimming Against the Stream
Women in the Footsteps of the Buddha: Struggle for Liberation in the Therigatha
Gender Equality in Buddhism
Why Buddhism is True: The Science and Philosophy of Meditation and Enlightenment
Buddhism: A Philosophical Approach
What the Buddha Thought
Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy
Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis
Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction
Ethics Embodied: Rethinking Selfhood Through Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies
After Buddhism: Rethinking the Dharma for a Secular Age
What the Buddha Thought
Why Buddhism is True: The Science and Philosophy of Meditation and Enlightenment
Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings
Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction
Self, No Self?: Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions
After Buddhism: Rethinking the Dharma for a Secular Age
Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School
The Kyoto School
Nishida And Western Philosophy
Buddhism: A Philosophical Approach
What the Buddha Thought
Wisdom Beyond Words: The Buddhist Vision of Ultimate Reality
Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction
An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy
Why I Am Not a Buddhist
Why I Am a Buddhist: No-Nonsense Buddhism with Red Meat and Whiskey
Indian Buddhist Philosophy: Metaphysics as Ethics
The Vimalakirti Sutra
241021: according to gr I have now read 128 phil-indic-buddhism. though not 'studying' or 'enacting' it, I feel that I have read some to offer critique. perhaps not of vast buddhist/eastern thought territory (read 192 Indic), but of the various introductory, intermediate, advanced, works in this living tradition. if you want more introductory there is Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Contemporary Indian Philosophy, for historical analysis there is , A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities, Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings, Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation, some favourites Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy, The Vimalakirti Sutra, Buddhism: A Philosophical Approach...
this follows the brief of Indian Buddhist Philosophy: Metaphysics as Ethics, but I find it more tenable, more open, more relevant and cross-cultural critique, that includes some reflection on what pa
AT THIS POINT I LOSE MY REVIEW: I MUST AGAIN BE TOO LONG! AARRGH!
basic argument, relevant to each chapter, 4. self, 5. consciousness, 6. phenomenology, 7. epistemology. 8. logic, language, 9. ethics, 10. methodological potscript... returns to chapter 1. what is bd philosophy. 2. metaphysics 1: interdependence, impermanence.3. metaphysics 2: emptiness... this is 'virtuous circle' argument works for me. read this book, he helps make it all connect probably even to western insular philosophers...
I will continue this review on my website: www.michaelkamakana.com
continuation of review:
basic argument, relevant to each chapter, 4. self, 5. consciousness, 6. phenomenology, 7. epistemology. 8. logic, language, 9. ethics, 10. methodological postscript... returns to chapter 1. what is bd philosophy. 2. metaphysics 1: interdependence, impermanence.3. metaphysics 2: emptiness... this is 'virtuous circle' argument works for me. read this book, he helps make it all connect probably even to western insular philosophers...
what is bd philosophy: this is extended argument of why, from 'western', particularly 'analytic' perspective, buddhist thought is to be considered not simply religion but also philosophy. this is not something i question. i have read about 128 books that involve bd as philosophy. while less than phenomenologists french and german this is more than anglo-american analytics so prevalent in this oxford text. i would alter subtitle to: what bd means to (western) analytic philosophy. in fact, i would entirely reverse the order of investigation: what does (western) analytic philosophy offer bd philosophy, but that is another book. for this chapter does express just how very different these attitudes are, as evidence in language, concerns, style of argument, as exemplified here where an assertion is not approached in any linear pattern but recursive, in repetition, in refocusing on central metaphysical concepts...
metaphysics one, assumed, underlying or overarching, of buddhist thought is first 'interdependence' and 'impermanence'. in one point one, on any reflection it is not difficult to see that ourselves, our worlds, our universe, are all interdependent, as perhaps western texts also argue but i read first through bd: for here the key assertion is that there need be no ground, no absolute, no origin, but that interdependence 'goes all the way down'... this is possible when there is no transcendent source such as God or Being... metaphysics one point two is impermanence, again not difficult concept, which is implied by the first point, for how does the ten thousand things come to interact interdependently without some arising, others departing, for point one is in time as well as more familiar space: i read that an example is the usefulness of death, for how does sprout come without death of seed, how does grass come without death of sprout, how does animal come without death of grass...
metaphysics two is subsequently implied, is truly rather more difficult concept, but finally inescapable conclusion of metaphysics one, assumed, underlying or overarching, and this is 'emptiness'. it is important this is not 'nothingness' or 'lack of existence', but lack of 'essence', that favourite descriptive matrix for western thought. emptiness is misunderstood as claims toward that big bad of nihilism, but is in fact, paradoxically, against such interpretation of the real: for how can there be individual essence if all is interdependent, for how can there be essence that persists though universal impermanence. emptiness is refusal of 'inherent essence' as it conflicts with metaphysics one and two... emptiness is ultimate truth, not the 'conventional' real through which we navigate our human lives of convenient truth, grass is green, snow is cold etc. though there will be some argument it is only though convention we can know ultimate, that convention is 'truth' as well, and emptiness should be conceived in terms of vessel to be filled with real rather than illusory absence...
this is when we begin to elaborate consequences of thinking through implications of 2 and 3 above, 4. self, which is psychologically considered 'essential' to western thought from an egoistic insistence, which falls against the arguments or three above, not difficult concept but wholly other impression of healthy human... who integrates, understands, enacts the outcomes of two and three above
consciousness, which is the last bastion westerners claim as definite proof of existence of 'essential' self, which is found vulnerable to simply more subtle variations on the metaphysics one, two, three... for what is this persisting thing we call 'consciousness' but ongoing stream of mental events, and how can this be identified with persisting something like self, as ultimate truth...
phenomenology, here the author admits the historically-determined multiple definitions of the term, which is for me not hegel but husserl, though my attitudes are those of french philosopher merleau-ponty, he finds connections with wittgenstein, strawson etc. (of whom i have read little)... but this is primarily demonstrating these ancient and more recent indic philosophers precede western thinkers in many ways, which is where i would reverse emphasis of subtitle as mentioned above...
epistemology is the contrast of western concept of knowledge as 'justified true belief' with bd concern with two levels of truth, conventional and ultimate, first asserting bd works without universals, with pure particularity, with 'nominalism' (here is frustrating aspect of westerners trying to render bd terms in their thought-universes, with variable exactness), next by investigating how bd thought understands 'true illusions' such as mirages...
logic, language, further proof i should try more wittgenstein (7)...
ethics, returns to metaphysics one and two and three, to interdependence and impermanence, to all subsequent implications in chapters 4. self, 5. consciousness, 6. phenomenology, 7. epistemology. 8. logic, language, 9. ethics...
methodological postscript, returns to chapter one with final exhortation to (western) philosophers, to take budddhist philosophy as livng, breathing as well as venerable source for whatever analytic thought they employ. for me, the application goes the other way. for me, it is, here like any art, limitations of the media which i find most unfortunate: it is clear that the argument(s) for buddhist philosophy is (are) virtuous circle, so why are we unable to express this in form, like the infinite book posited by borges? this returns to chapter one...
if you want more: Wisdom Beyond Words: The Buddhist Vision of Ultimate Reality
Why Buddhism is True: The Science and Philosophy of Meditation and Enlightenment
more technical:
The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
more:
Innovative Buddhist Women: Swimming Against the Stream
Women in the Footsteps of the Buddha: Struggle for Liberation in the Therigatha
Gender Equality in Buddhism
Why Buddhism is True: The Science and Philosophy of Meditation and Enlightenment
Buddhism: A Philosophical Approach
What the Buddha Thought
Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy
Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis
Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction
Ethics Embodied: Rethinking Selfhood Through Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies
After Buddhism: Rethinking the Dharma for a Secular Age
What the Buddha Thought
Why Buddhism is True: The Science and Philosophy of Meditation and Enlightenment
Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings
Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction
Self, No Self?: Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions
After Buddhism: Rethinking the Dharma for a Secular Age
Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School
The Kyoto School
Nishida And Western Philosophy
Buddhism: A Philosophical Approach
What the Buddha Thought
Wisdom Beyond Words: The Buddhist Vision of Ultimate Reality
Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction
An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy
Why I Am Not a Buddhist
Why I Am a Buddhist: No-Nonsense Buddhism with Red Meat and Whiskey
Indian Buddhist Philosophy: Metaphysics as Ethics
The Vimalakirti Sutra
June 8, 2022
I am not a philosopher and I am definitely not interested in comparing philosophy of the West vs. Buddhism.
But Chapter 6 "Phenomenology" is pure gold if you want to contemplate Ego separation / Oneness for your self. It contains an analytical / logic approach why self as perceived separation is not existent and before that realization: exists only as constructed assumption.
If you want to read a book just for pleasure, you should avoid this one. This one is one you'll have to work on by thinking a lot after reading one sentence or two. I assume, I'll read at least chapter 6 again three or four times because it is so valuable for oneness' homecoming.
But Chapter 6 "Phenomenology" is pure gold if you want to contemplate Ego separation / Oneness for your self. It contains an analytical / logic approach why self as perceived separation is not existent and before that realization: exists only as constructed assumption.
If you want to read a book just for pleasure, you should avoid this one. This one is one you'll have to work on by thinking a lot after reading one sentence or two. I assume, I'll read at least chapter 6 again three or four times because it is so valuable for oneness' homecoming.
April 23, 2023
I love this book and it can be hard to move through at times. A LOT is covered in it and it's awesome to get an idea of how Buddhist thought interacts with western philosophy. It does get a but messy though because it is trying to cover so much and I found that you really need to go slowly to get the most out of it.
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September 18, 2022Self-satisfied, unreflective, provincial, man-with-a-hammer stuff. Literally engaging at every step in the very style of thinking Buddhist thought abjures. In short, American.
July 13, 2015
To be fair, I am not a scholar of philosophy or a scholar of anything else. I had to read this book for class and found it too difficult for me to really follow what was being said.
November 26, 2017
Decent book but really let down by poor editing/ inaccuracies in the spelling of Tibetan names and terms.
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