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Rain of Ruin: Tokyo, Hiroshima and the Surrender of Japan
'A short but quietly devastating book, in which Overy adds new perspectives to a subject that has often been approached from a narrowly American angle... Overy's book is a sombre reminder that the border between civilisation and savagery is wafer-thin.' - Philip Snow, Literary Review
A remarkable account of the terrible climax of the Second World War in Asia, published to coincide with the 80th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing.
In the closing months of the Second World War hundreds of thousands of Japanese, mostly civilians, died in a final outburst of violence from the air. American planes were beginning to run low on plausible targets when it was decided to use two atomic weapons in a final, terrible flourish to try to end the war.
Richard Overy’s remarkable new book rethinks how we should regard this last stage of the war and the role of the bombing. This book explores the way in which the willingness to kill civilians and destroy cities became normalized in the course of a horrific war as moral concerns were blunted and scientists, airmen, and politicians followed a strategy of mass destruction they would never have endorsed before the war began. But it also engages with the new scholarship that shows how complex the effort to end the war was in Japan, where ‘surrender’ was entirely foreign to Japanese culture.
A remarkable account of the terrible climax of the Second World War in Asia, published to coincide with the 80th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing.
In the closing months of the Second World War hundreds of thousands of Japanese, mostly civilians, died in a final outburst of violence from the air. American planes were beginning to run low on plausible targets when it was decided to use two atomic weapons in a final, terrible flourish to try to end the war.
Richard Overy’s remarkable new book rethinks how we should regard this last stage of the war and the role of the bombing. This book explores the way in which the willingness to kill civilians and destroy cities became normalized in the course of a horrific war as moral concerns were blunted and scientists, airmen, and politicians followed a strategy of mass destruction they would never have endorsed before the war began. But it also engages with the new scholarship that shows how complex the effort to end the war was in Japan, where ‘surrender’ was entirely foreign to Japanese culture.
210 pages, Hardcover
First published March 6, 2025
About the author
Richard Overy
150 books367 followersRichard James Overy is a British historian who has published extensively on the history of World War II and the Third Reich.
Educated at Caius College, Cambridge and awarded a research fellowship at Churchill College, Professor Overy taught history at Cambridge from 1972 to 1979, as a fellow of Queens' College and from 1976 as a university assistant lecturer. In 1980 he moved to King's College London, where he became professor of modern history in 1994. He was appointed to a professorship at the University of Exeter in 2004.
His work on World War II has been praised as "highly effective in the ruthless dispelling of myths" (A. J. P. Taylor), "original and important" (New York Review of Books) and "at the cutting edge" (Times Literary Supplement.)[
Educated at Caius College, Cambridge and awarded a research fellowship at Churchill College, Professor Overy taught history at Cambridge from 1972 to 1979, as a fellow of Queens' College and from 1976 as a university assistant lecturer. In 1980 he moved to King's College London, where he became professor of modern history in 1994. He was appointed to a professorship at the University of Exeter in 2004.
His work on World War II has been praised as "highly effective in the ruthless dispelling of myths" (A. J. P. Taylor), "original and important" (New York Review of Books) and "at the cutting edge" (Times Literary Supplement.)[
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 81 reviews
March 13, 2025
I think the thing I find most fascinating about books like this is that the facts are given and you can draw your own conclusions rather than having the author force theirs upon you.
And my conclusion is that it still strikes me as utterly incredible that we, in the west, still believe that if we do something in the name of war its fine but if an opposing country does it then it's disgusting and a war crime. Double standards reign supreme.
I wrote a lot of notes while I was listening to this book which is basically a summary of what led up to and the after effects of the indiscrimate fire bombing of Tokyo and the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Various quotes stick in my mind. I do not recall which US general said either of these but the first refers to the effects of the A-bomb "I hear it's a nice way to die" and the second refers to the fire bombing of Tokyo "we knew we would kill a lot of women and kids but it had to be done".
Civilian casualties were supposed to be avoided or kept to a minimum. The US referred to the Japanese as monsters for the attack on Pearl Harbour (assuredly a military base) where 49 civilians lost their lived. In Tokyo 100,000 civilians died in one night. It begs the question of who the monsters really were.
The rights and wrongs of dropping the atomic bombs on Japan will be debated forever and a conclusion is impossible to reach because there are so many unknowns in war. However the quaint idea that the horror of these bombs would put us off war forever (as Oppenheimer hoped) never came to fruition. All we are guaranteed now is mutually assured destruction.
I'm still firmly of the opinion that the US only used the bombs because they could and they wanted to know exactly what effect they would have. However I'm also not naive enough to believe that if Britain, Germany, Russia or Japsn had developed the bomb first that they wouldn't also have used it.
This is a good book with not too much technical jargon to confuse. However it is utterly sickening to read of man's inhumanity to man in such stark terms.
I listened to the audio which was ably read by Ralph Lister although his delivery was a little slow so I did speed it up a bit. Otherwise a good clear narration that I found easy to listen to.
Thankyou to Netgalley and Penguin Audio for the audio advance review copy.
And my conclusion is that it still strikes me as utterly incredible that we, in the west, still believe that if we do something in the name of war its fine but if an opposing country does it then it's disgusting and a war crime. Double standards reign supreme.
I wrote a lot of notes while I was listening to this book which is basically a summary of what led up to and the after effects of the indiscrimate fire bombing of Tokyo and the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Various quotes stick in my mind. I do not recall which US general said either of these but the first refers to the effects of the A-bomb "I hear it's a nice way to die" and the second refers to the fire bombing of Tokyo "we knew we would kill a lot of women and kids but it had to be done".
Civilian casualties were supposed to be avoided or kept to a minimum. The US referred to the Japanese as monsters for the attack on Pearl Harbour (assuredly a military base) where 49 civilians lost their lived. In Tokyo 100,000 civilians died in one night. It begs the question of who the monsters really were.
The rights and wrongs of dropping the atomic bombs on Japan will be debated forever and a conclusion is impossible to reach because there are so many unknowns in war. However the quaint idea that the horror of these bombs would put us off war forever (as Oppenheimer hoped) never came to fruition. All we are guaranteed now is mutually assured destruction.
I'm still firmly of the opinion that the US only used the bombs because they could and they wanted to know exactly what effect they would have. However I'm also not naive enough to believe that if Britain, Germany, Russia or Japsn had developed the bomb first that they wouldn't also have used it.
This is a good book with not too much technical jargon to confuse. However it is utterly sickening to read of man's inhumanity to man in such stark terms.
I listened to the audio which was ably read by Ralph Lister although his delivery was a little slow so I did speed it up a bit. Otherwise a good clear narration that I found easy to listen to.
Thankyou to Netgalley and Penguin Audio for the audio advance review copy.
May 11, 2025
At a Molecular Level
The development and then dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are well documented, trodden paths. So you may wonder what can Richard Overy offer in 150 pages on the subject? The answer is a concise and thought-provoking analysis of the event understanding the political and cultural systems of both the USA and the Empire of Japan in 1945. Known for his sharp analysis and clear prose, Overy distills complex military, political, and moral debates into an accessible narrative that is both informative and sobering.
Rain of Ruin excels in its ability to place the bombings within the broader context of aerial warfare during World War II. Overy traces the evolution of strategic bombing, making it clear that the attacks on Japan were not sudden anomalies, but the culmination of a longer trend toward total war and civilian targeting. His command of archival material and historiography lends weight to his arguments without overwhelming the reader.
For me, where the book earns its 4-star rating rather than 5 is in its brevity. As I have mentioned above, it is just over 150 pages, and so occasionally feels too compressed, particularly when addressing the deeper ethical questions or the lived experiences of Japanese civilians. A more expansive look into post-war memory and international reactions could have enriched the narrative further. I am saying that I wanted more, Overy is good and writes well, this could have easily been another 200 pages and it still would have feel like breeze.
Nonetheless, this is a compelling, well-argued introduction to the topic. For readers seeking a clear and concise account of how and why the atomic bomb was used, and what it meant for the world that followed; Overy’s work is a solid and sobering starting point. I have read a few books on the subject and I was still able to pick things up and say ‘I didn’t know that’ and as a result the book is worth a read in my opinion.
The development and then dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are well documented, trodden paths. So you may wonder what can Richard Overy offer in 150 pages on the subject? The answer is a concise and thought-provoking analysis of the event understanding the political and cultural systems of both the USA and the Empire of Japan in 1945. Known for his sharp analysis and clear prose, Overy distills complex military, political, and moral debates into an accessible narrative that is both informative and sobering.
Rain of Ruin excels in its ability to place the bombings within the broader context of aerial warfare during World War II. Overy traces the evolution of strategic bombing, making it clear that the attacks on Japan were not sudden anomalies, but the culmination of a longer trend toward total war and civilian targeting. His command of archival material and historiography lends weight to his arguments without overwhelming the reader.
For me, where the book earns its 4-star rating rather than 5 is in its brevity. As I have mentioned above, it is just over 150 pages, and so occasionally feels too compressed, particularly when addressing the deeper ethical questions or the lived experiences of Japanese civilians. A more expansive look into post-war memory and international reactions could have enriched the narrative further. I am saying that I wanted more, Overy is good and writes well, this could have easily been another 200 pages and it still would have feel like breeze.
Nonetheless, this is a compelling, well-argued introduction to the topic. For readers seeking a clear and concise account of how and why the atomic bomb was used, and what it meant for the world that followed; Overy’s work is a solid and sobering starting point. I have read a few books on the subject and I was still able to pick things up and say ‘I didn’t know that’ and as a result the book is worth a read in my opinion.
April 12, 2025
interesting book looking at bombing tactics towards the end of the war with Japan
July 7, 2025
Short but devastating
Richard Overy's Rain of Ruin is a short but impressive 150 page study on the final months of WW2 and shows how the devastating destruction of Japanese cities by conventional bombing progressed into the use of the atom bombs and the strategic and moral issues it uncovered.
I really liked how Overy goes beyond the standard Western narrative by using the Japanese perspective on the bombing. It was interesting to read about the Japanese views on honour, the imperial autority and the collective sacrifices that influenced the process on the decision to surrender.
He also delves into the sometimes surprisingly fierce debate within the American militairy and political elite and shows how the use of the atom bomb was not obvious and the moral boundaries were constantly shifted.
It was the moral dilemma that forced me to think about questions that are (unfortunately) still relevant today: How far should a society go in pursuit of security and at what human cost?
Richard Overy's Rain of Ruin is a short but impressive 150 page study on the final months of WW2 and shows how the devastating destruction of Japanese cities by conventional bombing progressed into the use of the atom bombs and the strategic and moral issues it uncovered.
I really liked how Overy goes beyond the standard Western narrative by using the Japanese perspective on the bombing. It was interesting to read about the Japanese views on honour, the imperial autority and the collective sacrifices that influenced the process on the decision to surrender.
He also delves into the sometimes surprisingly fierce debate within the American militairy and political elite and shows how the use of the atom bomb was not obvious and the moral boundaries were constantly shifted.
It was the moral dilemma that forced me to think about questions that are (unfortunately) still relevant today: How far should a society go in pursuit of security and at what human cost?
April 11, 2025
Richard Overy’s “Rain of Ruin: Tokyo, Hiroshima, and the Surrender of Japan” offers a concise yet deeply nuanced exploration of the final months of World War II in the Pacific. Known for his incisive historical analysis, Overy shifts focus from moral judgments to understanding the strategic and political decisions made during the U.S. bombing campaign against Japan, including the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This approach allows readers to engage with the history on its own terms, offering a fresh perspective on a well-trodden subject. One of the book’s strengths lies in its integration of Japanese sources, which enriches its narrative by providing insights into Japan’s internal struggles during this period. Overy meticulously examines Japan’s political factions, constitutional practices, and societal dynamics, portraying a nation grappling with immense pressure and division. His treatment of Japan’s surrender is particularly compelling, as he unpacks the convoluted decision-making process that ultimately ended the war. Overy also reframes the American air war as a single, interconnected campaign rather than isolating the atomic bombings from earlier conventional raids. This perspective underscores the continuity in U.S. strategy and highlights how urban destruction was employed to break Japanese morale. However, some critics argue that Overy’s reluctance to engage in moral analysis limits the book’s impact. While he justifies this choice as an effort to understand decisions “at the time,” it leaves readers yearning for a deeper exploration of ethical implications. Despite these critiques, “Rain of Ruin” succeeds as an accessible and thought-provoking account. Its succinct prose and focus on historical context make it essential reading for those seeking to understand the complexities of wartime decision-making. As we approach the 80th anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Overy’s work serves as a timely reminder of how history continues to shape our understanding of morality in conflict.
February 23, 2026
This is a book written from 30,000 feet, which is about 25,000 feet higher than what the Americans would bomb Japan at. There seemed to be a source or two missing, but overall an acceptable introduction to the topic. However, one thing to note about Rain of Ruin is that it’s open to question as to what positions Overy takes. It feels more like a statement of arguments that might be slanted a certain way… …or might not, so I try to take care in stating Overy’s opinions.
The Bombing
In Downfall I mentioned that one position you can take is that you consider virtually all Allied bombing raids as war crimes – i.e. the atomic bombings are merely another step well beyond your red line.
Overy raises more a nuanced position than that the American bombing of Japan differed from the “precision bombing” campaign in Europe, particularly by the Americans (the British “de-housing” of Hamburg probably is more open to debate). As Overy recounts, Curtis LeMay switched to low level firebombing wide swathes of Japanese cities. Overy doesn’t exactly commit to why, listing possible causes including but not limited the USAAF’s desire to contribute in the Pacific; racially motivated revenge; to depress civilian morale; and/or to hit suburban industry. On the last point (which I have seen online as a defence to area bombing), Overy uses a little bit of sleight of hand, putting in the same paragraph the following.
The Committee of Operation Analysts, however, concluded from the postwar research that it had been misleading to suggest area attacks against urban zones, which the committee had assumed during the war were filled with home workshops. The British Mission sent to Japan to report on the bombing suggested that the idea of home industry was a propaganda front by the Americans to show that raids on city residential areas had an industrial significance, “which American critics had denied to similar raids [by the RAF] in Europe.”
…which says less that might initially appear – as a matter of timing nothing in the first part of the paragraph supports the position in the second part.
Overall, it’s a summary of the motivations and impacts of the bombing without committing to anything, and a stronger review from a legal perspective would have added novelty.
Surrender
While there is some interesting discussions around the motivations for dropping bomb – and here Overy is willing to stand his ground and say it was not primarily to make a demonstration to the Soviets – probably the key element to me is whether the atomic bombings caused Japan to surrender.
Overy compares poorly with Frank in Downfall as to discussing the Japanese terms of negotiation via the Soviets as a mediator. Overy does advance that there was a cultural leap necessary for Japan to contemplate surrender, which I guess has elements of truth, though do wonder to what extent cultural traditions provided cover to avoid accountability for losing the war. I can imagine a military leadership willing to contemplate fighting an invasion as a chance for redemption.
Putting the timing from the firebombing, to Potsdam Declaration, to the atomic bombing, to the Soviet invasion of Manchuria does help clarify that the Japanese were dealing with a lot in relatively short succession and that probably no one event forced its surrender. It’s an easy thing to write though, and Overy doesn’t add anything new.
I am fine with this book as a precis of the last months of the war in the Pacific (minus any actual campaigns like Burma or Okinawa), but it is very much an introduction. Absolutely a book to get from the library than one to buy and have on your shelf for immediate reference. Probably the most damning thing about it was I couldn’t muster the energy to argue for or against its conclusions, as it is all rather tepid.
The Bombing
In Downfall I mentioned that one position you can take is that you consider virtually all Allied bombing raids as war crimes – i.e. the atomic bombings are merely another step well beyond your red line.
Overy raises more a nuanced position than that the American bombing of Japan differed from the “precision bombing” campaign in Europe, particularly by the Americans (the British “de-housing” of Hamburg probably is more open to debate). As Overy recounts, Curtis LeMay switched to low level firebombing wide swathes of Japanese cities. Overy doesn’t exactly commit to why, listing possible causes including but not limited the USAAF’s desire to contribute in the Pacific; racially motivated revenge; to depress civilian morale; and/or to hit suburban industry. On the last point (which I have seen online as a defence to area bombing), Overy uses a little bit of sleight of hand, putting in the same paragraph the following.
The Committee of Operation Analysts, however, concluded from the postwar research that it had been misleading to suggest area attacks against urban zones, which the committee had assumed during the war were filled with home workshops. The British Mission sent to Japan to report on the bombing suggested that the idea of home industry was a propaganda front by the Americans to show that raids on city residential areas had an industrial significance, “which American critics had denied to similar raids [by the RAF] in Europe.”
…which says less that might initially appear – as a matter of timing nothing in the first part of the paragraph supports the position in the second part.
Overall, it’s a summary of the motivations and impacts of the bombing without committing to anything, and a stronger review from a legal perspective would have added novelty.
Surrender
While there is some interesting discussions around the motivations for dropping bomb – and here Overy is willing to stand his ground and say it was not primarily to make a demonstration to the Soviets – probably the key element to me is whether the atomic bombings caused Japan to surrender.
Overy compares poorly with Frank in Downfall as to discussing the Japanese terms of negotiation via the Soviets as a mediator. Overy does advance that there was a cultural leap necessary for Japan to contemplate surrender, which I guess has elements of truth, though do wonder to what extent cultural traditions provided cover to avoid accountability for losing the war. I can imagine a military leadership willing to contemplate fighting an invasion as a chance for redemption.
Putting the timing from the firebombing, to Potsdam Declaration, to the atomic bombing, to the Soviet invasion of Manchuria does help clarify that the Japanese were dealing with a lot in relatively short succession and that probably no one event forced its surrender. It’s an easy thing to write though, and Overy doesn’t add anything new.
I am fine with this book as a precis of the last months of the war in the Pacific (minus any actual campaigns like Burma or Okinawa), but it is very much an introduction. Absolutely a book to get from the library than one to buy and have on your shelf for immediate reference. Probably the most damning thing about it was I couldn’t muster the energy to argue for or against its conclusions, as it is all rather tepid.
March 20, 2026
Nach einem Urlaub in Japan und angeregt durch einen Besuch im sehr beeindruckenden Museum in Hiroshima, wollte ich mein Wissen über die Atombombenabwürfe auf Hiroshima und Nagasaki etwas vertiefen.
Das ist mir mit diesem Buch sehr gut gelungen. Es hat zwar nur 240 Seiten, von denen auch noch fünfzig Seiten auf Anmerkungen, Literaturverzeichnis, Register und Ähnliches entfallen, ist aber sehr konzentriert geschrieben und steckt voller Details. Es ist nicht “nur” aus der Sicht der Amerikaner, sondern auch der Briten und vor allem der Japaner geschrieben.
Das Buch erklärt, wie die Entscheidung, die Atombomben tatsächlich einzusetzen, eingebettet war in den Kriegsverlauf. Die Amerikaner hatten erst während des Krieges große Bomber entwickelt, mit denen sie Japan überhaupt angreifen konnten. Dann begannen sie damit, die japanischen Städte mit Brandbomben zu überziehen: Im April 1945 wurde mehr als die Hälfte von Tokio verbrannt! Die entsprechenden Beschreibungen lesen sich fürchterlich. Der Einsatz der Brandbomben war Teil einer “Radikalisierung der Kriegsstrategie”, die schließlich zu den Schrecken der Atombomben führte. Am Schluss spricht der Autor von “moralischen Relativierungen”, die einen rücksichtslosen totalen Krieg rechtfertigen sollten.
Sehr interessant fand ich das Kapitel über die Wissenschaftler, unter denen es wenig Widerstand gegen einen Einsatz gab. Die Frage, ob die Atombomben die Kapitulation Japans verursacht haben, wird in einem eigenen Kapitel genauer betrachtet und ist auch nicht einfach zu beantworten. Dazu gehört eine Analyse der Handlungen der japanischen Seite, sowie der komplexen Beziehungen zwischen Kaiser und Regierung in Japan und der Probleme einer Kultur, die eine Kapitulation eigentlich nicht kennt, eine Niederlage zu akzeptieren. Außerdem (vereinfacht gesagt) verstanden die Amerikaner diese Kultur nicht.
Der anfängliche Umgang mit den Opfern ist eine Schande und dass außer Barack Obama sich bisher kein US-Präsident traute, Hiroshima zu besuchen, auch.
Zum Schluss:
“Die Schlussfolgerung aus den Bombenangriffen auf Japan im Jahr 1945 besteht nicht darin, zu verstehen, ob sie notwendig waren oder nicht, sondern zu verstehen, warum man sie damals für notwendig hielt."
Das ist mir mit diesem Buch sehr gut gelungen. Es hat zwar nur 240 Seiten, von denen auch noch fünfzig Seiten auf Anmerkungen, Literaturverzeichnis, Register und Ähnliches entfallen, ist aber sehr konzentriert geschrieben und steckt voller Details. Es ist nicht “nur” aus der Sicht der Amerikaner, sondern auch der Briten und vor allem der Japaner geschrieben.
Das Buch erklärt, wie die Entscheidung, die Atombomben tatsächlich einzusetzen, eingebettet war in den Kriegsverlauf. Die Amerikaner hatten erst während des Krieges große Bomber entwickelt, mit denen sie Japan überhaupt angreifen konnten. Dann begannen sie damit, die japanischen Städte mit Brandbomben zu überziehen: Im April 1945 wurde mehr als die Hälfte von Tokio verbrannt! Die entsprechenden Beschreibungen lesen sich fürchterlich. Der Einsatz der Brandbomben war Teil einer “Radikalisierung der Kriegsstrategie”, die schließlich zu den Schrecken der Atombomben führte. Am Schluss spricht der Autor von “moralischen Relativierungen”, die einen rücksichtslosen totalen Krieg rechtfertigen sollten.
Sehr interessant fand ich das Kapitel über die Wissenschaftler, unter denen es wenig Widerstand gegen einen Einsatz gab. Die Frage, ob die Atombomben die Kapitulation Japans verursacht haben, wird in einem eigenen Kapitel genauer betrachtet und ist auch nicht einfach zu beantworten. Dazu gehört eine Analyse der Handlungen der japanischen Seite, sowie der komplexen Beziehungen zwischen Kaiser und Regierung in Japan und der Probleme einer Kultur, die eine Kapitulation eigentlich nicht kennt, eine Niederlage zu akzeptieren. Außerdem (vereinfacht gesagt) verstanden die Amerikaner diese Kultur nicht.
Der anfängliche Umgang mit den Opfern ist eine Schande und dass außer Barack Obama sich bisher kein US-Präsident traute, Hiroshima zu besuchen, auch.
Zum Schluss:
“Die Schlussfolgerung aus den Bombenangriffen auf Japan im Jahr 1945 besteht nicht darin, zu verstehen, ob sie notwendig waren oder nicht, sondern zu verstehen, warum man sie damals für notwendig hielt."
May 6, 2026
A decent primer, extremely short, but a decent enough balance of facts and horror I suppose.
April 11, 2026
....Ovvero non solo Hiroshima e Nagasaki.
Negli ultimi mesi di guerra il Giappone fu oggetto di bombardamenti "convenzionali" terrificanti con intere città (tra cui Tokyo) devastate da tempeste di fuoco quasi altrettanto distruttivi e crudeli che _forse ancora più dell'atomica_ rappresentarono l'incubo della popolazione giapponese tanto da risultare uno degli elementi che portarono a "sopportare l'insopporrabile" per un popolo che non ammetteva psicologicamente l'esistenza di una "resa senza condizioni" e la cui ostinazione e resistenza non aveva modo di essere minimamente compresa dal punto di vista degli americani.
Libro rigoroso ed estremamente interessante per niente consolatorio e che non intende offrire risposte definitive.
Credo di aver iniziato a leggere questo libro per il titolo che _secondo me_ rappresenta (intendo la "pioggia di distruzione") una delle eredità piu sentite in Giappone della guerra, ancora oggi scena madre (o comunque presente) in molti famosi anime giapponesi.
Negli ultimi mesi di guerra il Giappone fu oggetto di bombardamenti "convenzionali" terrificanti con intere città (tra cui Tokyo) devastate da tempeste di fuoco quasi altrettanto distruttivi e crudeli che _forse ancora più dell'atomica_ rappresentarono l'incubo della popolazione giapponese tanto da risultare uno degli elementi che portarono a "sopportare l'insopporrabile" per un popolo che non ammetteva psicologicamente l'esistenza di una "resa senza condizioni" e la cui ostinazione e resistenza non aveva modo di essere minimamente compresa dal punto di vista degli americani.
Libro rigoroso ed estremamente interessante per niente consolatorio e che non intende offrire risposte definitive.
Credo di aver iniziato a leggere questo libro per il titolo che _secondo me_ rappresenta (intendo la "pioggia di distruzione") una delle eredità piu sentite in Giappone della guerra, ancora oggi scena madre (o comunque presente) in molti famosi anime giapponesi.
January 17, 2026
This study of the American bombing of Japanese's cities in 1945, culminating in the twin atom bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of that year, is impressively incisive, authoritative and succinct. Most importantly, it is history as it should be: a dispassionate and even handed identification of the origins of, and motivations for, the decision of the United States to alter its approach to aerial warfare from precision to area bombing before offering a convincing response to the key question of whether the use of atomic bombs did indeed lead to a shortening of the Pacific war.
Along the way, Overy gives deserved emphasis to the incendiary bombing raids on Tokyo and other cities, the desire of the US air force to prove itself as a military arm separate from the US army and, if course, the perceived threat from the Red Army as the war drew to a close and Cold War tensions began to emerge.
An outstanding and important contribution to this longstanding historical debate.
Along the way, Overy gives deserved emphasis to the incendiary bombing raids on Tokyo and other cities, the desire of the US air force to prove itself as a military arm separate from the US army and, if course, the perceived threat from the Red Army as the war drew to a close and Cold War tensions began to emerge.
An outstanding and important contribution to this longstanding historical debate.
November 3, 2025
⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️
Un interessante disamina della strategia militare aerea americana nel pacifico, in particolare la strategia aerea nel 1945 con acurata analisi delle scelte belliche americane che portarono ai bombardamenti a tappeto su Tokyo e altre città giapponesi fino all'uso delle bombe atomiche di giugno 1945.
Questa opera di R. Overy riesce a inquadrare nitidamente la guerra aerea contro il Giappone e come si inserisca il bombardamento atomico nella strategia complessiva.
Risulta interessante anche le vicende che portarono il Giappone alla resa; personalmente avrei preferito una maggiore trattazione dei movimenti pacifisti e contro ordigni nucleari da parte dei sopravvissuti nella parte conclusiva dell'opera.
Questo è un saggio ben scritto e preciso, che nonostante le tragedie e distruzioni di cui parla, si legge in maniera scorrevole e offre ottimi spunti di riflessione.
《Il raid di Tokyo fu solo l'inizio di una campagna di massiccia a distruzione urbana. Oltre ai 25,4 chilometri quadrati incendie ti a Tokyo il 9 e ro marzo, furono devastati altri 260 chilomet quadrati in sessantasei aree urbane, uccidendo, secondo lecit,e ufficiali un totale di 269 187 persone in poco Piú di cinque me ^ IS di incursioni aereess Di tutti quegli attacchi, il k Grande raid . incendiario del Kanto>, come venne chiamato in Giapponei bombardamento di Tokyo, fu il piu eccezionale. La quantitid morti in appena tre ore al centro della pianura del Kanto rappre sentò il maggior numero di civili uccisi in un solo giorno in tutt le guerre del xx secolo. In effetti, i morti furono piú del doppio di quelli registrati durante i nove mesi della campagna Blitzin Gran Bretagna e piu del triplo dei caduti nel raid su Dresda,i piu micidiale tra le incursioni sul palcoscenico europeo. Sebbe ne il bombardamento di Tokyo sia passato in secondo piano rl spetto alle due bombe atomiche sia nella memoria sia nellalkt: teratura storica postbellica, merita piú di ogni altro attacco " chiarimento che sia all'` altezza dell'enormità dell'evento.》pag. 34 cap.2
Un interessante disamina della strategia militare aerea americana nel pacifico, in particolare la strategia aerea nel 1945 con acurata analisi delle scelte belliche americane che portarono ai bombardamenti a tappeto su Tokyo e altre città giapponesi fino all'uso delle bombe atomiche di giugno 1945.
Questa opera di R. Overy riesce a inquadrare nitidamente la guerra aerea contro il Giappone e come si inserisca il bombardamento atomico nella strategia complessiva.
Risulta interessante anche le vicende che portarono il Giappone alla resa; personalmente avrei preferito una maggiore trattazione dei movimenti pacifisti e contro ordigni nucleari da parte dei sopravvissuti nella parte conclusiva dell'opera.
Questo è un saggio ben scritto e preciso, che nonostante le tragedie e distruzioni di cui parla, si legge in maniera scorrevole e offre ottimi spunti di riflessione.
《Il raid di Tokyo fu solo l'inizio di una campagna di massiccia a distruzione urbana. Oltre ai 25,4 chilometri quadrati incendie ti a Tokyo il 9 e ro marzo, furono devastati altri 260 chilomet quadrati in sessantasei aree urbane, uccidendo, secondo lecit,e ufficiali un totale di 269 187 persone in poco Piú di cinque me ^ IS di incursioni aereess Di tutti quegli attacchi, il k Grande raid . incendiario del Kanto>, come venne chiamato in Giapponei bombardamento di Tokyo, fu il piu eccezionale. La quantitid morti in appena tre ore al centro della pianura del Kanto rappre sentò il maggior numero di civili uccisi in un solo giorno in tutt le guerre del xx secolo. In effetti, i morti furono piú del doppio di quelli registrati durante i nove mesi della campagna Blitzin Gran Bretagna e piu del triplo dei caduti nel raid su Dresda,i piu micidiale tra le incursioni sul palcoscenico europeo. Sebbe ne il bombardamento di Tokyo sia passato in secondo piano rl spetto alle due bombe atomiche sia nella memoria sia nellalkt: teratura storica postbellica, merita piú di ogni altro attacco " chiarimento che sia all'` altezza dell'enormità dell'evento.》pag. 34 cap.2
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
September 5, 2025
A short but informative examination of Allied (American) bombing campaigns against Japan during the end of World War II. Overy begins by informing us of the logistics and organisation of the American bombing units, such as the Twentieth Air Force humping its way over the Himalayas. Then he critically evaluates conventional firebombing, using that of Tokyo as his principal example, before comparing (intentionally or not) to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. He ends by examining the effects of these bombing campaigns and their influence, or perhaps lack thereof, on Japan’s decision to ‘terminate hostilities’ before looking at how the usage of the Atomic bombs has been interpreted differently than the initial reaction in subsequent generations.
This was a very interesting read, albeit a bit too short at under 200 pages, although perhaps this is not a bad thing as there is plenty of other literature on the atomic bombings out there. Speaking of that, Overy has managed to carve himself a niche, especially in regards to stating some British perspectives during wartime. There are no deep anecdotes such as in John Hersey’s Hiroshima, no play by play of the Manhattan project like in Richard Rhode’s books. This is more of an overview, with particular focus to bombing campaigns themselves.
All in all I would definitely recommend. 4.1/5, rounded down
This was a very interesting read, albeit a bit too short at under 200 pages, although perhaps this is not a bad thing as there is plenty of other literature on the atomic bombings out there. Speaking of that, Overy has managed to carve himself a niche, especially in regards to stating some British perspectives during wartime. There are no deep anecdotes such as in John Hersey’s Hiroshima, no play by play of the Manhattan project like in Richard Rhode’s books. This is more of an overview, with particular focus to bombing campaigns themselves.
All in all I would definitely recommend. 4.1/5, rounded down
April 5, 2025
This was a haunting story American people should read about. We don't get taught this type of history in schools in the US, it's usually tailored. This story is a precautionary tale and hopefully reminds future government of how easily the thread of trust and power can be broken. There were a lot of facts that i did not know and am glad i learned by listening to this powerful audio. History has a way of repeating itself and given the state of affairs in our country it can serve as a precautionary tale. The narrator spoke well and it made me feel like i was watching a PBS documentary. A must listen if you're into history.
I want to thank @NetGalley @RBMedia @RichardOvery for allowing me to listen to this educational audio, Thank You!
I want to thank @NetGalley @RBMedia @RichardOvery for allowing me to listen to this educational audio, Thank You!
August 17, 2026
Finalista Premio Friuli Storia 2026.
Finito solo e unicamente perché alla fine dovevo votare il saggio migliore tra quelli proposti.
145 pagine che son sembrate mille. Capitoli lunghissimi. Paragrafi lunghissimi. Narrazione asciuttissima. Troppo sintetico a volte. Non una parola di troppo.
La prima parte, che porta alla costruzione della bomba, e di una noia mortale che figure storiche che vanno e vengono. La secondo parte, che si concentra un po' più sul Giappone, è un po' meglio ma non basta a sollevare la valutazione del libro.
Che anno fiappo per il Premio Friuli Storia.
Finito solo e unicamente perché alla fine dovevo votare il saggio migliore tra quelli proposti.
145 pagine che son sembrate mille. Capitoli lunghissimi. Paragrafi lunghissimi. Narrazione asciuttissima. Troppo sintetico a volte. Non una parola di troppo.
La prima parte, che porta alla costruzione della bomba, e di una noia mortale che figure storiche che vanno e vengono. La secondo parte, che si concentra un po' più sul Giappone, è un po' meglio ma non basta a sollevare la valutazione del libro.
Che anno fiappo per il Premio Friuli Storia.
August 15, 2026
This is a slower build, and it took me a little while to get into it, but I think that ultimately becomes one of the book’s greatest strengths. Rather than treating Hiroshima and Nagasaki as isolated moral questions, it builds the political, military and legal context necessary to understand the much more interesting question: not simply whether we believe the atomic bombings were justified today, but how they came to be regarded as necessary, legitimate and ultimately acceptable at the time.
What I found particularly fascinating was the book’s treatment of strategic bombing more broadly. Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not emerge from nowhere. By 1945, the destruction of cities had become increasingly normalized through years of aerial warfare, culminating in the extraordinary firebombing campaigns against Germany and Japan. Yet after the war, Allied strategic bombing was never subjected to anything approaching the legal scrutiny imposed upon the defeated powers at Nuremberg and Tokyo.
That creates one of the most uncomfortable questions running through the book: who actually gets to define the laws of war?
It is impossible to read about the postwar prosecution of war crimes without wondering how differently those laws might have been interpreted had the victors and the defeated been reversed. That does not remotely diminish the extraordinary crimes committed by Imperial Japan or Nazi Germany. Rather, it raises the harder proposition that condemning their atrocities should not exempt the victorious powers from examining their own conduct.
The book is particularly compelling when examining the arguments surrounding the necessity of the atomic bombs, the disagreements among scientists, military officers and political figures over their use, and the subsequent management of information about their human consequences. It is striking how much the historical memory of Hiroshima became dominated by a relatively simple narrative of necessity when the contemporary debate was considerably more complicated.
But perhaps the most powerful thing about reading this now is how little some of the language has changed.
Again and again, attacks on overwhelmingly civilian environments are justified by identifying military functions embedded within them: a factory contributing to military production, a railway carrying troops, a bridge used by military vehicles, a communications network supporting command structures, or workshops dispersed through an urban area. Individually, some of these can unquestionably constitute legitimate military objectives. Collectively, however, the concept can become extraordinarily elastic. Once almost everything sustaining a modern state can potentially contribute to its military capacity, where exactly does the civilian economy end and the battlefield begin?
It is difficult not to think about Gaza, where Israeli attacks have devastated civilian infrastructure and repeatedly struck schools being used as shelters. Human Rights Watch has documented unlawfully indiscriminate attacks and described serious violations there as war crimes, while also documenting the war crimes committed by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups. The legal arguments surrounding these attacks repeatedly return to military necessity, proportionality, distinction and claims that military personnel or infrastructure were operating among civilians.
The parallel feels even more immediate in Iran. In February 2026, during the US-Israeli campaign, a primary school at Minab was struck, killing scores of civilians, including a very large number of children. Subsequent investigations raised deeply disturbing questions about outdated American targeting intelligence and the failure to recognize that a functioning school had been separated from an adjacent Revolutionary Guard facility years earlier. Human Rights Watch has called for the attack to be investigated as a possible war crime.
The subsequent American attacks on Iranian civilian infrastructure make the historical comparison even harder to ignore. Bridges, roads, power infrastructure and other ostensibly civilian objects have again been discussed through the language of their potential military use. A bridge can certainly become a legitimate military objective under international humanitarian law if its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and destroying it offers a definite military advantage. But that is precisely where the questions raised by this book become relevant. The existence of some conceivable military utility cannot simply erase the civilian character of everything surrounding the target, nor does describing something as “dual use” eliminate the requirements of distinction, proportionality and precautions. Legal experts have consequently raised serious concerns about aspects of the US campaign against Iranian civilian infrastructure.
And then there is Ukraine. Russia has repeatedly justified attacks on energy, transport and industrial infrastructure through their alleged contribution to the Ukrainian war effort. Yet UN investigators continue to document the enormous consequences for civilians, including systematic attacks on energy infrastructure and missile and drone attacks deep inside populated areas. In June 2026 alone, the UN recorded 293 civilians killed and 1,990 injured, the highest monthly total of civilian casualties since April 2022.
These conflicts are obviously not identical, and equating them too neatly would undermine the argument. Their legal circumstances, intentions, weapons, scale and political contexts differ enormously. What is striking is the recurrence of the reasoning.
There is a military target nearby. The bridge has military uses. The electrical network supports the military. The factory contributes to the war economy. Combatants operate among civilians. The civilian deaths were unintended. The expected military advantage justified the risk.
Sometimes those arguments are legally and morally persuasive. Sometimes they are not. The important question the book leaves you asking is who gets to decide, how much evidence we demand before accepting the justification, and whether we apply the same standard when the bombs are being dropped by our allies as when they are being dropped by our enemies.
That, for me, is what makes the book much more than a history of Hiroshima.
The progression from the firebombing of Germany and Japan, through Hiroshima and Nagasaki, into Korea and Vietnam, and ultimately to Gaza, Ukraine and Iran, forces you to confront something much larger about modern warfare. Technological precision has increased enormously, but the underlying moral problem has never disappeared. We have become extraordinarily sophisticated at describing why particular pieces of civilian infrastructure might also constitute military objectives. We remain much less comfortable confronting what happens when those individual justifications accumulate until enormous parts of civilian society have effectively become targetable.
And perhaps the most unsettling question is still the simplest one: would we accept the same justification from the other side?
If Russia destroys a bridge in Ukraine because Ukrainian forces use it, if Israel strikes a building in Gaza because Hamas is allegedly operating from it, or if the United States destroys a bridge in Iran because it contributes to Iranian military logistics, international humanitarian law is supposed to provide a common framework for judging each case. The identity of the country launching the weapon is not supposed to change the rules.
That principle sounds obvious. The history in this book demonstrates how extraordinarily difficult it has been to maintain in practice.
It is therefore not really a book about whether America was “good” or “bad” for dropping the atomic bomb. It is a book about something far more interesting: how states convince themselves that extraordinary violence is necessary, how military necessity interacts with morality and law, how victors shape the legal and historical interpretation of their own actions, and how easily exceptional measures become precedents for the next war.
It is not always an easy book to get into, but it rewards the effort enormously. Even if you already have a strong understanding of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Pacific War, it provides a much wider framework for thinking about strategic bombing, international law, propaganda, military necessity and civilian protection.
Most importantly, it encourages perhaps the hardest intellectual discipline when thinking about war: applying the moral and legal standards we use to condemn our enemies just as rigorously to ourselves and our allies. Nearly eighty years after Hiroshima, that question feels anything but historical.
What I found particularly fascinating was the book’s treatment of strategic bombing more broadly. Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not emerge from nowhere. By 1945, the destruction of cities had become increasingly normalized through years of aerial warfare, culminating in the extraordinary firebombing campaigns against Germany and Japan. Yet after the war, Allied strategic bombing was never subjected to anything approaching the legal scrutiny imposed upon the defeated powers at Nuremberg and Tokyo.
That creates one of the most uncomfortable questions running through the book: who actually gets to define the laws of war?
It is impossible to read about the postwar prosecution of war crimes without wondering how differently those laws might have been interpreted had the victors and the defeated been reversed. That does not remotely diminish the extraordinary crimes committed by Imperial Japan or Nazi Germany. Rather, it raises the harder proposition that condemning their atrocities should not exempt the victorious powers from examining their own conduct.
The book is particularly compelling when examining the arguments surrounding the necessity of the atomic bombs, the disagreements among scientists, military officers and political figures over their use, and the subsequent management of information about their human consequences. It is striking how much the historical memory of Hiroshima became dominated by a relatively simple narrative of necessity when the contemporary debate was considerably more complicated.
But perhaps the most powerful thing about reading this now is how little some of the language has changed.
Again and again, attacks on overwhelmingly civilian environments are justified by identifying military functions embedded within them: a factory contributing to military production, a railway carrying troops, a bridge used by military vehicles, a communications network supporting command structures, or workshops dispersed through an urban area. Individually, some of these can unquestionably constitute legitimate military objectives. Collectively, however, the concept can become extraordinarily elastic. Once almost everything sustaining a modern state can potentially contribute to its military capacity, where exactly does the civilian economy end and the battlefield begin?
It is difficult not to think about Gaza, where Israeli attacks have devastated civilian infrastructure and repeatedly struck schools being used as shelters. Human Rights Watch has documented unlawfully indiscriminate attacks and described serious violations there as war crimes, while also documenting the war crimes committed by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups. The legal arguments surrounding these attacks repeatedly return to military necessity, proportionality, distinction and claims that military personnel or infrastructure were operating among civilians.
The parallel feels even more immediate in Iran. In February 2026, during the US-Israeli campaign, a primary school at Minab was struck, killing scores of civilians, including a very large number of children. Subsequent investigations raised deeply disturbing questions about outdated American targeting intelligence and the failure to recognize that a functioning school had been separated from an adjacent Revolutionary Guard facility years earlier. Human Rights Watch has called for the attack to be investigated as a possible war crime.
The subsequent American attacks on Iranian civilian infrastructure make the historical comparison even harder to ignore. Bridges, roads, power infrastructure and other ostensibly civilian objects have again been discussed through the language of their potential military use. A bridge can certainly become a legitimate military objective under international humanitarian law if its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and destroying it offers a definite military advantage. But that is precisely where the questions raised by this book become relevant. The existence of some conceivable military utility cannot simply erase the civilian character of everything surrounding the target, nor does describing something as “dual use” eliminate the requirements of distinction, proportionality and precautions. Legal experts have consequently raised serious concerns about aspects of the US campaign against Iranian civilian infrastructure.
And then there is Ukraine. Russia has repeatedly justified attacks on energy, transport and industrial infrastructure through their alleged contribution to the Ukrainian war effort. Yet UN investigators continue to document the enormous consequences for civilians, including systematic attacks on energy infrastructure and missile and drone attacks deep inside populated areas. In June 2026 alone, the UN recorded 293 civilians killed and 1,990 injured, the highest monthly total of civilian casualties since April 2022.
These conflicts are obviously not identical, and equating them too neatly would undermine the argument. Their legal circumstances, intentions, weapons, scale and political contexts differ enormously. What is striking is the recurrence of the reasoning.
There is a military target nearby. The bridge has military uses. The electrical network supports the military. The factory contributes to the war economy. Combatants operate among civilians. The civilian deaths were unintended. The expected military advantage justified the risk.
Sometimes those arguments are legally and morally persuasive. Sometimes they are not. The important question the book leaves you asking is who gets to decide, how much evidence we demand before accepting the justification, and whether we apply the same standard when the bombs are being dropped by our allies as when they are being dropped by our enemies.
That, for me, is what makes the book much more than a history of Hiroshima.
The progression from the firebombing of Germany and Japan, through Hiroshima and Nagasaki, into Korea and Vietnam, and ultimately to Gaza, Ukraine and Iran, forces you to confront something much larger about modern warfare. Technological precision has increased enormously, but the underlying moral problem has never disappeared. We have become extraordinarily sophisticated at describing why particular pieces of civilian infrastructure might also constitute military objectives. We remain much less comfortable confronting what happens when those individual justifications accumulate until enormous parts of civilian society have effectively become targetable.
And perhaps the most unsettling question is still the simplest one: would we accept the same justification from the other side?
If Russia destroys a bridge in Ukraine because Ukrainian forces use it, if Israel strikes a building in Gaza because Hamas is allegedly operating from it, or if the United States destroys a bridge in Iran because it contributes to Iranian military logistics, international humanitarian law is supposed to provide a common framework for judging each case. The identity of the country launching the weapon is not supposed to change the rules.
That principle sounds obvious. The history in this book demonstrates how extraordinarily difficult it has been to maintain in practice.
It is therefore not really a book about whether America was “good” or “bad” for dropping the atomic bomb. It is a book about something far more interesting: how states convince themselves that extraordinary violence is necessary, how military necessity interacts with morality and law, how victors shape the legal and historical interpretation of their own actions, and how easily exceptional measures become precedents for the next war.
It is not always an easy book to get into, but it rewards the effort enormously. Even if you already have a strong understanding of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Pacific War, it provides a much wider framework for thinking about strategic bombing, international law, propaganda, military necessity and civilian protection.
Most importantly, it encourages perhaps the hardest intellectual discipline when thinking about war: applying the moral and legal standards we use to condemn our enemies just as rigorously to ourselves and our allies. Nearly eighty years after Hiroshima, that question feels anything but historical.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
June 12, 2026
A very concise account of the broader context to the Japanese surrender.
Possibly like many people brought up in the West, I am more familiar with events in Europe in WW2. I was keen to explore the Japanese perspective. The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki clearly have an enduring impact on our imagination and their devastating effects and legacy that led to the Cold War. It was interesting to learn more about the geopolitical circumstances. The Soviet influence, the factors that contributed to US decision making and the political machinations of the Japanese government and Emperor.
It also explores some of the moral questions. The US invented Napalm for this campaign that then was used in many other conflicts with unimaginable loss of life in horrific circumstances. Although the Japanese clearly do not have the moral high ground for the treatment of many Asians and Western PoWs, the US does have questionable motives and should have more accountability for their actions.
Possibly like many people brought up in the West, I am more familiar with events in Europe in WW2. I was keen to explore the Japanese perspective. The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki clearly have an enduring impact on our imagination and their devastating effects and legacy that led to the Cold War. It was interesting to learn more about the geopolitical circumstances. The Soviet influence, the factors that contributed to US decision making and the political machinations of the Japanese government and Emperor.
It also explores some of the moral questions. The US invented Napalm for this campaign that then was used in many other conflicts with unimaginable loss of life in horrific circumstances. Although the Japanese clearly do not have the moral high ground for the treatment of many Asians and Western PoWs, the US does have questionable motives and should have more accountability for their actions.
September 10, 2025
The atomic bombings of Japan in 1945 continue to incite controversy and argument, focused on whether the bombings were necessary to end the war or not. That is certainly the justification advanced at the time, and since. Overy examines a different, and more significant question: What made them (Truman and his advisors, military and civilian) think it was necessary to use the bombs? That is a more relevant issue for history, and for understanding how and why the decisions were made.
Overy lays out the events, decision points, rationales of both sides in the final months of the war. He does not opine, but he does objectively explain and describe the processes, the events that provided both reasons and incentives for decisions, and the social, cultural and political realities on both sides of the war that inexorably drove each side independently of the other.
The Allies in the Pacific war (more precisely, the US) were faced with terrible choices. Invade Japan and incur vast casualties at a time the American public was increasingly tiring of the sacrifices, made more acute by the cessation of hostilities in Europe. Secondly, opt for a naval blockade and continued conventional bombing, which had devolved into carpet incendiary raids - starve them out and burn them out until they quit. The incendiary campaign had been in full flower for months prior to dropping the atomic bombs and the casualties inflicted, and being inflicted, on the Japanese populace were horrific, in excess of the A-bomb casualties by themselves. Had it continued – as was intended – the numbers would have been staggering. Starvation would have added millions more.
The US had severe morale issues. Troops in Europe who had spent literally years at war on the promise they would go home when it was over were now being redeployed to the Pacific and the daunting prospect of invading Japan and the enormous casualties that would ensue. There were real worries of mutinies, not to mention incalculable loss of public support back home.
Meanwhile, the Japanese still had undefeated armies in place in China, the Philippines, and Southeast Asia, not to mention extensive forces throughout homeland Japan. Civilian deaths in those occupied territories were aggregating roughly 400,000 a month. A significant segment of the Japanese government, the military and much of the population fervently believed that death was honorable, surrender was not. That was a reality throughout the course of the Pacific war, much overlooked and down-played today. US experience on Saipan, Iwo and Okinawa was daunting. There was a peace faction within the government that wanted to end the war, but they had no idea how to do so. Even they rejected ‘surrender’ and visualized negotiated ends to the hostilities that might include conceding foreign territories. To this day, Japan does not speak of "surrender" ending WWII.
The incendiary bombing campaign caused a huge migration of the urban populations outward to rural areas, exacerbating the already difficult problems of feeding and housing the populace. The government feared revolution. Critics of the atomic bombings argue that the war was ending – but they cannot point to a timeline. They argue that peace initiatives through the Soviet Union should have been pursued, but Stalin abrogated Japanese initiatives. Stalin did not want the war to end before the Soviet Union got into it and could occupy and keep coveted territory in Manchuria, Korea, and northern Japan proper. He wanted Tokyo to be divided into zones of influence as was done in Berlin. The Japanese initiatives never took serious form – even the peace faction within the government did not consider surrender, or defeat – they had in a mind an armistice similar to that which ended WWI.
The argument that the atomic bombs were singularly instrumental to the end of the war is not so clear. The war ended because a series of events and factors merged into effect – the bombs were one, of course, but also the intense incendiary campaign; the Soviet declaration of war; the increasing willingness of Emperor Hirohito to encourage an end to the war (which predated the use of the atomic bombs); the prospects of popular revolution to the detriment if not the destruction of the Imperial institution. The latter was not a minor concern. Survival of the imperial institution was a driving factor for much of the resolve to fight to the end. It was a deeply held, religious and cultural ethos never well understood in the West, even today.
Overy makes no conclusory judgments, but he does give the reader an objective, unbiased and clear explanation of the realities, the actual pressures and situations, the reasons decisions were made, and the events that happened. It is a superb, concise, revelatory book. Ultimately, although I agree with Overy that although the atomic bombs were a factor in Japan’s surrender, they were not the only factor, arguably not the most decisive factor.
More importantly, against the moral question of their use (the one constant critique of the bombings) must be counterposed the simple fact that the war ended then, as a result of those bombs in concert with the array of other, equally important, events and elements. Had it not, the human costs would have been staggeringly greater than they were: the war continuing for an indeterminant period of time (months to even a year or more), Allied losses invading and conquering, Japanese losses resisting invasion and conquer, continued incendiary bombing, continued losses in areas under Japanese control (seldom recognized or accounted for), Soviet occupation of parts of Japan and Tokyo (see North Korea and Eastern Europe for examples of how bad that would have been). Ultimately, it was a very good thing the war did in fact end when it did. To the extent that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki contributed to that, it was both necessary in the circumstances then present and beneficial in the longer term.
Overy lays out the events, decision points, rationales of both sides in the final months of the war. He does not opine, but he does objectively explain and describe the processes, the events that provided both reasons and incentives for decisions, and the social, cultural and political realities on both sides of the war that inexorably drove each side independently of the other.
The Allies in the Pacific war (more precisely, the US) were faced with terrible choices. Invade Japan and incur vast casualties at a time the American public was increasingly tiring of the sacrifices, made more acute by the cessation of hostilities in Europe. Secondly, opt for a naval blockade and continued conventional bombing, which had devolved into carpet incendiary raids - starve them out and burn them out until they quit. The incendiary campaign had been in full flower for months prior to dropping the atomic bombs and the casualties inflicted, and being inflicted, on the Japanese populace were horrific, in excess of the A-bomb casualties by themselves. Had it continued – as was intended – the numbers would have been staggering. Starvation would have added millions more.
The US had severe morale issues. Troops in Europe who had spent literally years at war on the promise they would go home when it was over were now being redeployed to the Pacific and the daunting prospect of invading Japan and the enormous casualties that would ensue. There were real worries of mutinies, not to mention incalculable loss of public support back home.
Meanwhile, the Japanese still had undefeated armies in place in China, the Philippines, and Southeast Asia, not to mention extensive forces throughout homeland Japan. Civilian deaths in those occupied territories were aggregating roughly 400,000 a month. A significant segment of the Japanese government, the military and much of the population fervently believed that death was honorable, surrender was not. That was a reality throughout the course of the Pacific war, much overlooked and down-played today. US experience on Saipan, Iwo and Okinawa was daunting. There was a peace faction within the government that wanted to end the war, but they had no idea how to do so. Even they rejected ‘surrender’ and visualized negotiated ends to the hostilities that might include conceding foreign territories. To this day, Japan does not speak of "surrender" ending WWII.
The incendiary bombing campaign caused a huge migration of the urban populations outward to rural areas, exacerbating the already difficult problems of feeding and housing the populace. The government feared revolution. Critics of the atomic bombings argue that the war was ending – but they cannot point to a timeline. They argue that peace initiatives through the Soviet Union should have been pursued, but Stalin abrogated Japanese initiatives. Stalin did not want the war to end before the Soviet Union got into it and could occupy and keep coveted territory in Manchuria, Korea, and northern Japan proper. He wanted Tokyo to be divided into zones of influence as was done in Berlin. The Japanese initiatives never took serious form – even the peace faction within the government did not consider surrender, or defeat – they had in a mind an armistice similar to that which ended WWI.
The argument that the atomic bombs were singularly instrumental to the end of the war is not so clear. The war ended because a series of events and factors merged into effect – the bombs were one, of course, but also the intense incendiary campaign; the Soviet declaration of war; the increasing willingness of Emperor Hirohito to encourage an end to the war (which predated the use of the atomic bombs); the prospects of popular revolution to the detriment if not the destruction of the Imperial institution. The latter was not a minor concern. Survival of the imperial institution was a driving factor for much of the resolve to fight to the end. It was a deeply held, religious and cultural ethos never well understood in the West, even today.
Overy makes no conclusory judgments, but he does give the reader an objective, unbiased and clear explanation of the realities, the actual pressures and situations, the reasons decisions were made, and the events that happened. It is a superb, concise, revelatory book. Ultimately, although I agree with Overy that although the atomic bombs were a factor in Japan’s surrender, they were not the only factor, arguably not the most decisive factor.
More importantly, against the moral question of their use (the one constant critique of the bombings) must be counterposed the simple fact that the war ended then, as a result of those bombs in concert with the array of other, equally important, events and elements. Had it not, the human costs would have been staggeringly greater than they were: the war continuing for an indeterminant period of time (months to even a year or more), Allied losses invading and conquering, Japanese losses resisting invasion and conquer, continued incendiary bombing, continued losses in areas under Japanese control (seldom recognized or accounted for), Soviet occupation of parts of Japan and Tokyo (see North Korea and Eastern Europe for examples of how bad that would have been). Ultimately, it was a very good thing the war did in fact end when it did. To the extent that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki contributed to that, it was both necessary in the circumstances then present and beneficial in the longer term.
April 11, 2025
Overy's publications are extensive and several of them are really must-reads for people with an interest in military history, including "The Bombing War" which focuses on the campaigns in Europe. In comparison "Rain of Ruin" feels a little bit like it is plugging a gap in Overy's coverage of World War II. A necessary contribution, and a good one, but not one that contains many new insights. Still, if you need to start anywhere on the bombing of Japan, this is a better place than most.
The author tracks, step-by-step, the development of US plans to bomb Japan and the events that finally lead to the decision to burn Japanese cities with large volumes of fire bombs, thus killing Japanese civilians indiscriminately and in very large numbers. This decision upended the principles of the American strategic bombardment offensive and entangled the US leadership in actions that, by earlier or later legal standards, were certainly war crimes. But perhaps for that very reason, the path to that decision remained murky. Neither FDR nor Truman were ever presented with a stark choice that would have made their responsibility for it clear. Instead the decision was taken at the middle levels of air force leadership and wrapped in obfuscating (but not very) language. Overy writes that, rather than judging the events, he sees it as his role as a historian to understand them. He lays it out clear enough, which results in a redistribution of responsibility. General Le May made the fatal decision, but he was largely supported in it by his superiors and peers.
Overy sees the main cause in the need that the air force command felt to do anything at all that would hasten the end of the war and perhaps avoid the need for an invasion of Japan. He makes clear enough that anti-Japanese racism played a significant role in removing any inhibitions that Americans felt about bombing Japan. So did the heavy casualties that the US military suffered as it fought to occupy bases closer to Japan for the final offensive. But in the end, Overy sees the institutional interests of the US Army Air Force as a major driver behind the killing. Too much had been invested in the B-29 and the strategic bomber offensive, and it just had to deliver.
The use of atomic bombs to destroy Hiroshima and Nagasaki was, in the author's view, a logical consequence of decisions already taken. As others have already observed, it wasn't so much that a decision was made to use the nuclear bombs, as that no decision was made not to do it. By 1945, the point had been reached at which a decision not to obliterate entire cities would have been remarkable, courageous and highly controversial, and probably deeply unpopular. The political and military leadership was thus far more concerned with framing it in such a way as to make it look justified, than it was willing to question the act itself. Overy highlights one tragic consequence of this: Between 1945 and 1952, the authorities deliberately ignored the plight of the survivors, and suppressed news about the long-term consequences of the bombing. Worse, American scientists studied the survivors to understand the long-term effect of radioactivity on their health, but offered them no help or treatment.
The author carefully summarises the legal and public controversies surrounding the use of the nuclear bombs, but also avoids expressing any definitive judgment. There is reason enough to see this as very dangerous ground. Overall, this is a good study of a difficult subject. You could say that Overy tries to let the facts speak for themselves, but obviously selecting the facts for such a book involves clear choices as well.
But he avoids the what-if scenarios and I think this is wise. The summer of 1945 was a moment in which history could have swung between wildly different tracks. In the best case scenario, a relatively quick end of the war; in the worst case scenario, a full-scale invasion with hundreds of thousands of American casualties and potentially millions or even tens of millions of Japanese (military and civilian) dead. Perhaps what really happened, bad as it was, was not the worst.
The author tracks, step-by-step, the development of US plans to bomb Japan and the events that finally lead to the decision to burn Japanese cities with large volumes of fire bombs, thus killing Japanese civilians indiscriminately and in very large numbers. This decision upended the principles of the American strategic bombardment offensive and entangled the US leadership in actions that, by earlier or later legal standards, were certainly war crimes. But perhaps for that very reason, the path to that decision remained murky. Neither FDR nor Truman were ever presented with a stark choice that would have made their responsibility for it clear. Instead the decision was taken at the middle levels of air force leadership and wrapped in obfuscating (but not very) language. Overy writes that, rather than judging the events, he sees it as his role as a historian to understand them. He lays it out clear enough, which results in a redistribution of responsibility. General Le May made the fatal decision, but he was largely supported in it by his superiors and peers.
Overy sees the main cause in the need that the air force command felt to do anything at all that would hasten the end of the war and perhaps avoid the need for an invasion of Japan. He makes clear enough that anti-Japanese racism played a significant role in removing any inhibitions that Americans felt about bombing Japan. So did the heavy casualties that the US military suffered as it fought to occupy bases closer to Japan for the final offensive. But in the end, Overy sees the institutional interests of the US Army Air Force as a major driver behind the killing. Too much had been invested in the B-29 and the strategic bomber offensive, and it just had to deliver.
The use of atomic bombs to destroy Hiroshima and Nagasaki was, in the author's view, a logical consequence of decisions already taken. As others have already observed, it wasn't so much that a decision was made to use the nuclear bombs, as that no decision was made not to do it. By 1945, the point had been reached at which a decision not to obliterate entire cities would have been remarkable, courageous and highly controversial, and probably deeply unpopular. The political and military leadership was thus far more concerned with framing it in such a way as to make it look justified, than it was willing to question the act itself. Overy highlights one tragic consequence of this: Between 1945 and 1952, the authorities deliberately ignored the plight of the survivors, and suppressed news about the long-term consequences of the bombing. Worse, American scientists studied the survivors to understand the long-term effect of radioactivity on their health, but offered them no help or treatment.
The author carefully summarises the legal and public controversies surrounding the use of the nuclear bombs, but also avoids expressing any definitive judgment. There is reason enough to see this as very dangerous ground. Overall, this is a good study of a difficult subject. You could say that Overy tries to let the facts speak for themselves, but obviously selecting the facts for such a book involves clear choices as well.
But he avoids the what-if scenarios and I think this is wise. The summer of 1945 was a moment in which history could have swung between wildly different tracks. In the best case scenario, a relatively quick end of the war; in the worst case scenario, a full-scale invasion with hundreds of thousands of American casualties and potentially millions or even tens of millions of Japanese (military and civilian) dead. Perhaps what really happened, bad as it was, was not the worst.
March 17, 2025
The author's aim with this book is to reexamine the oft touted statement that the 2 nuclear bombs made the Japanese surrender at the end of WW2. The first few chapters describe the lead up including the large-scale fire bombing of Toyko, the fire bombing of many other urban areas, the fatigue setting in that wanted to end the war quickly, the expectation that the invasion of Japan would cost 1 million US lives and the costs of building the bombs. By the time the bombs were dropped, the US had already hardened itself to the large scale destruction of urban areas - the difference is that this was just one bomb rather than tonnes and tonnes of individual fire bombs.
The narrative then shifts to the Japanese perspective, split between those wanting a glorious annihilation and those wanting peace but unsure how to surrender constitutionally. When the atomic bomb was dropped on hiroshima, the Japanese scientists weren't sure it was an atomic bomb and came up with alternative explanations. When the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, they were in the midst of constitutionally agreeing how to surrender so the bomb didn't actually hasten their hand. This was all in the context of the US not understanding just how tortuous these internal negotiations were so feeling they needed to keep the violence up to force the Japanese hand.
The book concludes by tracing the rememberance of these events and the (understandable) extraction of the nuclear bombs from the history to be standalone epic defining events. By tracing the wider history and context, the author seek not to downplay the atomic bombs but rather to understand all the factors which caused them to be dropped and for the victims of the firebombs to be remembered too.
I received an advance review copy for free, and I am leaving this review voluntarily.
The narrative then shifts to the Japanese perspective, split between those wanting a glorious annihilation and those wanting peace but unsure how to surrender constitutionally. When the atomic bomb was dropped on hiroshima, the Japanese scientists weren't sure it was an atomic bomb and came up with alternative explanations. When the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, they were in the midst of constitutionally agreeing how to surrender so the bomb didn't actually hasten their hand. This was all in the context of the US not understanding just how tortuous these internal negotiations were so feeling they needed to keep the violence up to force the Japanese hand.
The book concludes by tracing the rememberance of these events and the (understandable) extraction of the nuclear bombs from the history to be standalone epic defining events. By tracing the wider history and context, the author seek not to downplay the atomic bombs but rather to understand all the factors which caused them to be dropped and for the victims of the firebombs to be remembered too.
I received an advance review copy for free, and I am leaving this review voluntarily.
August 7, 2026
I really appreciated this book for its brevity, a feat the author achieves while still giving you a uniquely distilled understanding of the Pacific war, that being, obviously, the bombing campaign against Japan.
Look here for an exceptionally cogent and capsulized description of the Japanese political factions in play, as their war prospects turned decisively bleak. See with specific precision the constitutional role played by the Emperor. See the knots they tied themselves in over constitutional principles that the Western mind finds merely arcane. Conversely, observe how vagaries of translation caused the Japanese response to the Potsdam Declaration to be materially misapprehended in the West.
(What the Japanese effectively said, concerning the declaration: “we pass over this without comment, since it’s not really different from previous policy, and since it was merely broadcast over the radio and not formally presented as a document.” The general sense of the English translation: “We spit on your policy and fart in your general direction. Banzai!”)
This also shows the trajectory of LeMay’s bombing campaign without getting into all the mission details, and lightly passes over the horror while acknowledging it as a central topic. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are positioned here as, from a Japanese perspective, mostly just another bombing. It wasn’t totally clear to them that there was anything all that different from the bombing of other cities, such as Toyoma.
Most importantly, Overy shows the drift of American thinking, starting from a moralistic opposition to “area bombing”, integrating the notion of “artisanal” Japanese manufacturing practices, and ending with a stance summed up as “there are no civilians in Japan.”
Look here for an exceptionally cogent and capsulized description of the Japanese political factions in play, as their war prospects turned decisively bleak. See with specific precision the constitutional role played by the Emperor. See the knots they tied themselves in over constitutional principles that the Western mind finds merely arcane. Conversely, observe how vagaries of translation caused the Japanese response to the Potsdam Declaration to be materially misapprehended in the West.
(What the Japanese effectively said, concerning the declaration: “we pass over this without comment, since it’s not really different from previous policy, and since it was merely broadcast over the radio and not formally presented as a document.” The general sense of the English translation: “We spit on your policy and fart in your general direction. Banzai!”)
This also shows the trajectory of LeMay’s bombing campaign without getting into all the mission details, and lightly passes over the horror while acknowledging it as a central topic. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are positioned here as, from a Japanese perspective, mostly just another bombing. It wasn’t totally clear to them that there was anything all that different from the bombing of other cities, such as Toyoma.
Most importantly, Overy shows the drift of American thinking, starting from a moralistic opposition to “area bombing”, integrating the notion of “artisanal” Japanese manufacturing practices, and ending with a stance summed up as “there are no civilians in Japan.”
March 23, 2025
Richard Overy’s **Rain of Ruin]** delivers a masterful and deeply nuanced account of the final months of World War II, offering an incisive look at the Allied bombing campaigns and their profound effects on both Japan and the wider war effort. Unlike many accounts that focus primarily on American strategy, Overy presents a balanced perspective, giving due attention to the internal struggles and decision-making within Japan. His exploration of Japanese leadership, including the role of Emperor Hirohito and the factional disputes within the cabinet, provides critical depth to the narrative.
One of the book’s greatest strengths is its ability to contextualize the devastating firebombing of Tokyo and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki beyond just their physical destruction. Overy presents these events not only as military actions but as key moments in a broader geopolitical and psychological struggle. He skillfully integrates the Soviet Union’s entry into the war, arguing that it played a crucial role in Japan’s decision to surrender, adding layers to a history often told in simpler terms.
The audiobook version is particularly engaging, with the narrator delivering a clear and compelling performance that enhances the depth and gravity of the subject matter. The pacing is well-balanced, making even the complex political and military discussions accessible to listeners. Whether one is well-versed in World War II history or approaching it for the first time, Overy’s work is both enlightening and essential, offering a truly comprehensive view of the war’s dramatic conclusion.
One of the book’s greatest strengths is its ability to contextualize the devastating firebombing of Tokyo and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki beyond just their physical destruction. Overy presents these events not only as military actions but as key moments in a broader geopolitical and psychological struggle. He skillfully integrates the Soviet Union’s entry into the war, arguing that it played a crucial role in Japan’s decision to surrender, adding layers to a history often told in simpler terms.
The audiobook version is particularly engaging, with the narrator delivering a clear and compelling performance that enhances the depth and gravity of the subject matter. The pacing is well-balanced, making even the complex political and military discussions accessible to listeners. Whether one is well-versed in World War II history or approaching it for the first time, Overy’s work is both enlightening and essential, offering a truly comprehensive view of the war’s dramatic conclusion.
June 13, 2025
"Rain of Ruin" is a rare book that is not only interesting, but compels you to re-think basic assumptions. One of those assumptions in American history is that the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in 1945 spared a bloody invasion of the Japanese islands and represented the fatal blow to the Japanese war effort before its surrender. Richard Overy largely dispels that myth, showing that Japanese rulers reviewed the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings within the wider context of the area-bombing of Japan in 1945, including the horrific fire-bombing of Tokyo and other cities. Japan was more worried in some respects about Soviet intrusions into Manchuria and depleted materiel for its war effort than the immediate horrors of atomic fall-out.
American strategy on bombing Japan is equally as fascinating, as Curtis LeMay and other air commanders unleashed area bombing on Japan every bit as devastating as the British indiscriminate bombing against Germany (which, ironically, Americans criticized as less valuable than targeting military targets). In essence, it appears the American thinking on Japan was Thucydidean in the most horrific way: the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must; in this case, the suffering was on a city-wide scale and of a nature unknown to humanity.
There are of course valid counter-arguments, and it is in little doubt that an invasion of Japan would be costly in terms of American lives. What seems most clear is that war, almost always, is a race to the bottom levels of humanity, and commanders of high and low repute both will often arrive at the most lethal option in search of rapid victory.
American strategy on bombing Japan is equally as fascinating, as Curtis LeMay and other air commanders unleashed area bombing on Japan every bit as devastating as the British indiscriminate bombing against Germany (which, ironically, Americans criticized as less valuable than targeting military targets). In essence, it appears the American thinking on Japan was Thucydidean in the most horrific way: the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must; in this case, the suffering was on a city-wide scale and of a nature unknown to humanity.
There are of course valid counter-arguments, and it is in little doubt that an invasion of Japan would be costly in terms of American lives. What seems most clear is that war, almost always, is a race to the bottom levels of humanity, and commanders of high and low repute both will often arrive at the most lethal option in search of rapid victory.
March 16, 2025
One important note about this book is that it offers only a brief recap of the US bombing operations against Japan between 1944 and 1946. It isn’t intended to be a comprehensive history of all WWII events in Japan, nor does it provide an in-depth analysis of specific operations. Instead, the author promises to discuss American and Japanese perspectives on bombing in a way that is rarely addressed offering insights that are often overlooked.
The first part of the book explains why certain decisions were made by the Allies not just from a retrospective view of whether they made sense, but, as the author puts it, to explain “why people thought they had to do it,” particularly with regard to nuclear bombing. This section is quite detailed and covers different aspects such as the pressure on US leadership by 1945, the development of the nuclear program, and the overall exhaustion from the war.
In the second part, the focus shifts to the Japanese perspective. And although the author does cover their position, the narrative feels rushed. The cultural differences, while mentioned, are not fully explored.
Ultimately, if you’re looking for groundbreaking insights, this book may not deliver. It serves as a good summary of the events toward the end of WWII, but it doesn’t offer much in the way of new details or depth. Overall, it’s a decent quick read for getting acquainted with the subject, but if you’re seeking a detailed analysis, you might find better options elsewhere.
Thank you NetGalley for ARC audiobook!
The first part of the book explains why certain decisions were made by the Allies not just from a retrospective view of whether they made sense, but, as the author puts it, to explain “why people thought they had to do it,” particularly with regard to nuclear bombing. This section is quite detailed and covers different aspects such as the pressure on US leadership by 1945, the development of the nuclear program, and the overall exhaustion from the war.
In the second part, the focus shifts to the Japanese perspective. And although the author does cover their position, the narrative feels rushed. The cultural differences, while mentioned, are not fully explored.
Ultimately, if you’re looking for groundbreaking insights, this book may not deliver. It serves as a good summary of the events toward the end of WWII, but it doesn’t offer much in the way of new details or depth. Overall, it’s a decent quick read for getting acquainted with the subject, but if you’re seeking a detailed analysis, you might find better options elsewhere.
Thank you NetGalley for ARC audiobook!
March 17, 2025
Richad Overy's Rain of Ruin: Tokyo, Hiroshima, and the Surrender of Japan is a brief but insightful examination of the Allied strategies and policies for the bombing campaign of Japan that culminated with the dropping of the atomic bombs. One of its key points is that the United States was the only active party, as Britain was included in the planning and were building up their strength in the Pacific in the final months of the war.
Overy argues much was theoretical through 1943, until capture of islands in 1944 allowed the launching of plane based attacks. The Allied bomber campaign, much as against Nazi Germany, argues for sustained bombing campaigns to deny the enemy the use of their industrial infrastructure. The major difference is that it was believed Japanese industry relied on small scale, home based production, opening the options to more directly target civilians.
It represents a definite hypocrisy of the resolutions of the Second World War, Nazi German crimes against humanity were put on trial but the mass bombing of both Germany and Japanese cities were rationalized as legitimate strategy.
The audiobook narrator is Ralph Lister, a British audiobook narrator active since 2010 and has narrated over 500 titles. His reading is clear and comprehensive, with a style that matches the writers tone.
Recommended to readers and researchers of World War II, technology in warfare and the morality of war.
I received a free digital version of this book via NetGalley thanks to the publisher.
Overy argues much was theoretical through 1943, until capture of islands in 1944 allowed the launching of plane based attacks. The Allied bomber campaign, much as against Nazi Germany, argues for sustained bombing campaigns to deny the enemy the use of their industrial infrastructure. The major difference is that it was believed Japanese industry relied on small scale, home based production, opening the options to more directly target civilians.
It represents a definite hypocrisy of the resolutions of the Second World War, Nazi German crimes against humanity were put on trial but the mass bombing of both Germany and Japanese cities were rationalized as legitimate strategy.
The audiobook narrator is Ralph Lister, a British audiobook narrator active since 2010 and has narrated over 500 titles. His reading is clear and comprehensive, with a style that matches the writers tone.
Recommended to readers and researchers of World War II, technology in warfare and the morality of war.
I received a free digital version of this book via NetGalley thanks to the publisher.
October 20, 2025
I'm of multiple minds on this one. I appreciate the fresh look at the behind the scenes on both American and Japanese thinking in the run up to the decision to drop the bomb and Japanese attitudes towards surrender.
But I'm not entirely convinced by the arguments he makes that 1) the bomb was less impactful (no pun intended) on the Japanese decision to surrender than the broader bombing campaign, and 2) that the decision was far less in Truman's hands and had been decided by military leadership.
Every step of the air war against the home islands contributed in meaningful ways towards the Japanese decision; no argument from me that practically speaking the raids on Tokyo were more meaningful and caused as much or more damage.
I just think the eventual surrender took serious note of the damage caused by two single bombs; based on other reading it seems that Japanese in Hiroshima recognized that it was a single plane overhead and assumed it was nothing meaningful. I'd think that the faction in Japan that was prepared to give up understood the calculation that continued fighting would mean more of these, and grasped that it meant the end of life in Japan should they carry on.
I think it's a thought provoking book, and recommend it, not sure I agree with all of its conclusions.
But I'm not entirely convinced by the arguments he makes that 1) the bomb was less impactful (no pun intended) on the Japanese decision to surrender than the broader bombing campaign, and 2) that the decision was far less in Truman's hands and had been decided by military leadership.
Every step of the air war against the home islands contributed in meaningful ways towards the Japanese decision; no argument from me that practically speaking the raids on Tokyo were more meaningful and caused as much or more damage.
I just think the eventual surrender took serious note of the damage caused by two single bombs; based on other reading it seems that Japanese in Hiroshima recognized that it was a single plane overhead and assumed it was nothing meaningful. I'd think that the faction in Japan that was prepared to give up understood the calculation that continued fighting would mean more of these, and grasped that it meant the end of life in Japan should they carry on.
I think it's a thought provoking book, and recommend it, not sure I agree with all of its conclusions.
March 15, 2025
Overy gives a fair comprehensive view looking back at what did the trick to make Japan surrender unconditionally by the order of Hirohito against the wishes of the Military Leaders. It helps if you have read ten or more books about the war in the Pacific if you want to fully appreciate this book, but it could stand on its own as a summary. I would like to (spoiler) mention a few facts from other books that were not explored in this book that would give the reader a better understanding of other factors involved in the surrender as well as why the atom bombs needed to be dropped. Marcus McDilda, while captured, "confessed" that we had 100 atom bombs and Tokyo was next. The Military had ordered that all POW's were to be executed upon an invasion. The military ordered that all Japanese be armed even with spears or shovels and fight to the death upon an invasion, which means there were no civilians in the bombings. First hand personal accounts in books by the bombers and by the surviving Japanese who were bombed lend an authentic touch as well as first hand experience. I've had friends whose fathers were tortured and killed by the Japanese military and in grade school we had air raid drills where we hid under our desks. Different times from now.
March 29, 2025
A short but punchy account which completely changed my understanding of the end of World War Two. Overy argues that the decision to surrender had almost been made by the Japanese and that the two atom bomb strikes made no difference. They were seen as part of the months long and effective 'area bombing' campaign, that is the indiscriminate bombing of cities leading to the largest ever loss of civilian life in one day in a raid of Tokyo. The atom bombs weren't seen as anything different in kind by the Japanese, just especially bombs. If anything they correctly feared that late entry into the war of the Soviet Union which was determined to grab and keep as much territory as possible. At the time it was the Americans who turned cartwheels trying to explain away the atom bombs while telling themselves that they weren't guilty of bombing civilians in the way they condemned the RAF for doing in Germany. President Truman told the America people that Hiroshima had been a purely military target, though 20,000 soldiers died out of a total of 140,000 deaths. His conscience caught up with him though after Nagasaki and felt he couldn't face killing 'any more kids'.
A remarkable book and I also recommend Judgement at Tokyo by Bass.
A remarkable book and I also recommend Judgement at Tokyo by Bass.
March 15, 2025
Rain of Ruin: Tokyo, Hiroshima, and the Surrender of Japan by Richard Overy takes the reader through a methodical and linear journey of the events, coordination and decision processes of the US’ decision for the following events during WWII:
Firebombing of Tokyo, March 10, 1945
Nuclear Bombing of Hiroshima, August 6, 1945
Nuclear Bombing of Nagasaki, August 9, 1945
As neither a history or military buff, I was easily able to follow the narration provided by Ralph Lister. The pacing keeps the listener engaged without being bogged down with the wealth of facts and strategy leading to these events. I really enjoyed learning all of these details and the players involved in this book, and I strongly recommend it.
Thank you, RBmedia | Recorded Books and W. W. Norton & Company, and NetGalley for the opportunity to listen to this ALC. All opinions are my own.
Rating: 5 stars
Audio Release Date: Mar 04 2025
Tags:
#RBMedia
#RainofRuin
#RichardOvery
#RalphLister
#YarisBookNook
#netgalley
Firebombing of Tokyo, March 10, 1945
Nuclear Bombing of Hiroshima, August 6, 1945
Nuclear Bombing of Nagasaki, August 9, 1945
As neither a history or military buff, I was easily able to follow the narration provided by Ralph Lister. The pacing keeps the listener engaged without being bogged down with the wealth of facts and strategy leading to these events. I really enjoyed learning all of these details and the players involved in this book, and I strongly recommend it.
Thank you, RBmedia | Recorded Books and W. W. Norton & Company, and NetGalley for the opportunity to listen to this ALC. All opinions are my own.
Rating: 5 stars
Audio Release Date: Mar 04 2025
Tags:
#RBMedia
#RainofRuin
#RichardOvery
#RalphLister
#YarisBookNook
#netgalley
July 2, 2026
A thought-provoking pamphlet among the novellas of atomic history books - an analysis really that stirs conventional wisdom. Overy weaves together the timeline of US bombings with Japan’s “termination of war” discussions in a way that I haven’t seen before, and with it, a suspenseful brain exercise as you witness the world lose grip on its humanity.
My only critique is that I felt the author arrives at his thesis best on the very last page. Perhaps a linear development of thought is his style, but for me, it reads a tad like this is the 2nd draft of a manuscript in need of one more 3rd round for revisiting structure and some flow. It almost leaves you wanting to read the book again now that you feel you fully grasp what the author’s point is.
Beginners should be aware that this one is probably best fit for those who come with prior knowledge of the workings and kitchen table names behind the events leading up to the summer of 1945 (Scott’s “Target Tokyo,” Hearsey’s “Hiroshima,” Thomas’ “Road to Surrender” to suggest a few).
My only critique is that I felt the author arrives at his thesis best on the very last page. Perhaps a linear development of thought is his style, but for me, it reads a tad like this is the 2nd draft of a manuscript in need of one more 3rd round for revisiting structure and some flow. It almost leaves you wanting to read the book again now that you feel you fully grasp what the author’s point is.
Beginners should be aware that this one is probably best fit for those who come with prior knowledge of the workings and kitchen table names behind the events leading up to the summer of 1945 (Scott’s “Target Tokyo,” Hearsey’s “Hiroshima,” Thomas’ “Road to Surrender” to suggest a few).
May 8, 2025
Thankfully, it was short; otherwise, I would have DNF'd it.
I expected more lively writing and more thoughtful analysis from an esteemed historian. This was dry and bogged down with too many statistics; whole paragraphs ran like, "The U.S. military dropped 2,123 bombs on 183 targets, damaging 4.3 square miles of land and killing 783 Japanese." No, that is not a real quote from the book, but that is what much of this book reads like. While there is some analysis, it's just interspersed in the descriptions of what happened. I expected to have chapters dedicated to specific topics like the Japanese aversion to surrender, with historical context, not just snippets of analysis here and there. I also felt like the chapters were too long, and the author meandered to topics that were not the focus of that chapter.
Overall, I had a hard time getting through this, and it was only 150 pages. I would not recommend it.
I expected more lively writing and more thoughtful analysis from an esteemed historian. This was dry and bogged down with too many statistics; whole paragraphs ran like, "The U.S. military dropped 2,123 bombs on 183 targets, damaging 4.3 square miles of land and killing 783 Japanese." No, that is not a real quote from the book, but that is what much of this book reads like. While there is some analysis, it's just interspersed in the descriptions of what happened. I expected to have chapters dedicated to specific topics like the Japanese aversion to surrender, with historical context, not just snippets of analysis here and there. I also felt like the chapters were too long, and the author meandered to topics that were not the focus of that chapter.
Overall, I had a hard time getting through this, and it was only 150 pages. I would not recommend it.
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