'A short but quietly devastating book, in which Overy adds new perspectives to a subject that has often been approached from a narrowly American angle... Overy's book is a sombre reminder that the border between civilisation and savagery is wafer-thin.' - Philip Snow, Literary Review
A remarkable account of the terrible climax of the Second World War in Asia, published to coincide with the 80th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing.
In the closing months of the Second World War hundreds of thousands of Japanese, mostly civilians, died in a final outburst of violence from the air. American planes were beginning to run low on plausible targets when it was decided to use two atomic weapons in a final, terrible flourish to try to end the war.
Richard Overy’s remarkable new book rethinks how we should regard this last stage of the war and the role of the bombing. This book explores the way in which the willingness to kill civilians and destroy cities became normalized in the course of a horrific war as moral concerns were blunted and scientists, airmen, and politicians followed a strategy of mass destruction they would never have endorsed before the war began. But it also engages with the new scholarship that shows how complex the effort to end the war was in Japan, where ‘surrender’ was entirely foreign to Japanese culture.
Richard James Overy is a British historian who has published extensively on the history of World War II and the Third Reich.
Educated at Caius College, Cambridge and awarded a research fellowship at Churchill College, Professor Overy taught history at Cambridge from 1972 to 1979, as a fellow of Queens' College and from 1976 as a university assistant lecturer. In 1980 he moved to King's College London, where he became professor of modern history in 1994. He was appointed to a professorship at the University of Exeter in 2004.
His work on World War II has been praised as "highly effective in the ruthless dispelling of myths" (A. J. P. Taylor), "original and important" (New York Review of Books) and "at the cutting edge" (Times Literary Supplement.)[
I think the thing I find most fascinating about books like this is that the facts are given and you can draw your own conclusions rather than having the author force theirs upon you. And my conclusion is that it still strikes me as utterly incredible that we, in the west, still believe that if we do something in the name of war its fine but if an opposing country does it then it's disgusting and a war crime. Double standards reign supreme.
I wrote a lot of notes while I was listening to this book which is basically a summary of what led up to and the after effects of the indiscrimate fire bombing of Tokyo and the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Various quotes stick in my mind. I do not recall which US general said either of these but the first refers to the effects of the A-bomb "I hear it's a nice way to die" and the second refers to the fire bombing of Tokyo "we knew we would kill a lot of women and kids but it had to be done".
Civilian casualties were supposed to be avoided or kept to a minimum. The US referred to the Japanese as monsters for the attack on Pearl Harbour (assuredly a military base) where 49 civilians lost their lived. In Tokyo 100,000 civilians died in one night. It begs the question of who the monsters really were.
The rights and wrongs of dropping the atomic bombs on Japan will be debated forever and a conclusion is impossible to reach because there are so many unknowns in war. However the quaint idea that the horror of these bombs would put us off war forever (as Oppenheimer hoped) never came to fruition. All we are guaranteed now is mutually assured destruction.
I'm still firmly of the opinion that the US only used the bombs because they could and they wanted to know exactly what effect they would have. However I'm also not naive enough to believe that if Britain, Germany, Russia or Japsn had developed the bomb first that they wouldn't also have used it.
This is a good book with not too much technical jargon to confuse. However it is utterly sickening to read of man's inhumanity to man in such stark terms.
I listened to the audio which was ably read by Ralph Lister although his delivery was a little slow so I did speed it up a bit. Otherwise a good clear narration that I found easy to listen to.
Thankyou to Netgalley and Penguin Audio for the audio advance review copy.
The development and then dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are well documented, trodden paths. So you may wonder what can Richard Overy offer in 150 pages on the subject? The answer is a concise and thought-provoking analysis of the event understanding the political and cultural systems of both the USA and the Empire of Japan in 1945. Known for his sharp analysis and clear prose, Overy distills complex military, political, and moral debates into an accessible narrative that is both informative and sobering.
Rain of Ruin excels in its ability to place the bombings within the broader context of aerial warfare during World War II. Overy traces the evolution of strategic bombing, making it clear that the attacks on Japan were not sudden anomalies, but the culmination of a longer trend toward total war and civilian targeting. His command of archival material and historiography lends weight to his arguments without overwhelming the reader.
For me, where the book earns its 4-star rating rather than 5 is in its brevity. As I have mentioned above, it is just over 150 pages, and so occasionally feels too compressed, particularly when addressing the deeper ethical questions or the lived experiences of Japanese civilians. A more expansive look into post-war memory and international reactions could have enriched the narrative further. I am saying that I wanted more, Overy is good and writes well, this could have easily been another 200 pages and it still would have feel like breeze.
Nonetheless, this is a compelling, well-argued introduction to the topic. For readers seeking a clear and concise account of how and why the atomic bomb was used, and what it meant for the world that followed; Overy’s work is a solid and sobering starting point. I have read a few books on the subject and I was still able to pick things up and say ‘I didn’t know that’ and as a result the book is worth a read in my opinion.
Richard Overy's Rain of Ruin is a short but impressive 150 page study on the final months of WW2 and shows how the devastating destruction of Japanese cities by conventional bombing progressed into the use of the atom bombs and the strategic and moral issues it uncovered.
I really liked how Overy goes beyond the standard Western narrative by using the Japanese perspective on the bombing. It was interesting to read about the Japanese views on honour, the imperial autority and the collective sacrifices that influenced the process on the decision to surrender.
He also delves into the sometimes surprisingly fierce debate within the American militairy and political elite and shows how the use of the atom bomb was not obvious and the moral boundaries were constantly shifted.
It was the moral dilemma that forced me to think about questions that are (unfortunately) still relevant today: How far should a society go in pursuit of security and at what human cost?
Richard Overy’s “Rain of Ruin: Tokyo, Hiroshima, and the Surrender of Japan” offers a concise yet deeply nuanced exploration of the final months of World War II in the Pacific. Known for his incisive historical analysis, Overy shifts focus from moral judgments to understanding the strategic and political decisions made during the U.S. bombing campaign against Japan, including the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This approach allows readers to engage with the history on its own terms, offering a fresh perspective on a well-trodden subject. One of the book’s strengths lies in its integration of Japanese sources, which enriches its narrative by providing insights into Japan’s internal struggles during this period. Overy meticulously examines Japan’s political factions, constitutional practices, and societal dynamics, portraying a nation grappling with immense pressure and division. His treatment of Japan’s surrender is particularly compelling, as he unpacks the convoluted decision-making process that ultimately ended the war. Overy also reframes the American air war as a single, interconnected campaign rather than isolating the atomic bombings from earlier conventional raids. This perspective underscores the continuity in U.S. strategy and highlights how urban destruction was employed to break Japanese morale. However, some critics argue that Overy’s reluctance to engage in moral analysis limits the book’s impact. While he justifies this choice as an effort to understand decisions “at the time,” it leaves readers yearning for a deeper exploration of ethical implications. Despite these critiques, “Rain of Ruin” succeeds as an accessible and thought-provoking account. Its succinct prose and focus on historical context make it essential reading for those seeking to understand the complexities of wartime decision-making. As we approach the 80th anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Overy’s work serves as a timely reminder of how history continues to shape our understanding of morality in conflict.
⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️ Un interessante disamina della strategia militare aerea americana nel pacifico, in particolare la strategia aerea nel 1945 con acurata analisi delle scelte belliche americane che portarono ai bombardamenti a tappeto su Tokyo e altre città giapponesi fino all'uso delle bombe atomiche di giugno 1945. Questa opera di R. Overy riesce a inquadrare nitidamente la guerra aerea contro il Giappone e come si inserisca il bombardamento atomico nella strategia complessiva. Risulta interessante anche le vicende che portarono il Giappone alla resa; personalmente avrei preferito una maggiore trattazione dei movimenti pacifisti e contro ordigni nucleari da parte dei sopravvissuti nella parte conclusiva dell'opera. Questo è un saggio ben scritto e preciso, che nonostante le tragedie e distruzioni di cui parla, si legge in maniera scorrevole e offre ottimi spunti di riflessione.
《Il raid di Tokyo fu solo l'inizio di una campagna di massiccia a distruzione urbana. Oltre ai 25,4 chilometri quadrati incendie ti a Tokyo il 9 e ro marzo, furono devastati altri 260 chilomet quadrati in sessantasei aree urbane, uccidendo, secondo lecit,e ufficiali un totale di 269 187 persone in poco Piú di cinque me ^ IS di incursioni aereess Di tutti quegli attacchi, il k Grande raid . incendiario del Kanto>, come venne chiamato in Giapponei bombardamento di Tokyo, fu il piu eccezionale. La quantitid morti in appena tre ore al centro della pianura del Kanto rappre sentò il maggior numero di civili uccisi in un solo giorno in tutt le guerre del xx secolo. In effetti, i morti furono piú del doppio di quelli registrati durante i nove mesi della campagna Blitzin Gran Bretagna e piu del triplo dei caduti nel raid su Dresda,i piu micidiale tra le incursioni sul palcoscenico europeo. Sebbe ne il bombardamento di Tokyo sia passato in secondo piano rl spetto alle due bombe atomiche sia nella memoria sia nellalkt: teratura storica postbellica, merita piú di ogni altro attacco " chiarimento che sia all'` altezza dell'enormità dell'evento.》pag. 34 cap.2
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
A short but informative examination of Allied (American) bombing campaigns against Japan during the end of World War II. Overy begins by informing us of the logistics and organisation of the American bombing units, such as the Twentieth Air Force humping its way over the Himalayas. Then he critically evaluates conventional firebombing, using that of Tokyo as his principal example, before comparing (intentionally or not) to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. He ends by examining the effects of these bombing campaigns and their influence, or perhaps lack thereof, on Japan’s decision to ‘terminate hostilities’ before looking at how the usage of the Atomic bombs has been interpreted differently than the initial reaction in subsequent generations.
This was a very interesting read, albeit a bit too short at under 200 pages, although perhaps this is not a bad thing as there is plenty of other literature on the atomic bombings out there. Speaking of that, Overy has managed to carve himself a niche, especially in regards to stating some British perspectives during wartime. There are no deep anecdotes such as in John Hersey’s Hiroshima, no play by play of the Manhattan project like in Richard Rhode’s books. This is more of an overview, with particular focus to bombing campaigns themselves.
All in all I would definitely recommend. 4.1/5, rounded down
This was a haunting story American people should read about. We don't get taught this type of history in schools in the US, it's usually tailored. This story is a precautionary tale and hopefully reminds future government of how easily the thread of trust and power can be broken. There were a lot of facts that i did not know and am glad i learned by listening to this powerful audio. History has a way of repeating itself and given the state of affairs in our country it can serve as a precautionary tale. The narrator spoke well and it made me feel like i was watching a PBS documentary. A must listen if you're into history.
I want to thank @NetGalley @RBMedia @RichardOvery for allowing me to listen to this educational audio, Thank You!
The atomic bombings of Japan in 1945 continue to incite controversy and argument, focused on whether the bombings were necessary to end the war or not. That is certainly the justification advanced at the time, and since. Overy examines a different, and more significant question: What made them (Truman and his advisors, military and civilian) think it was necessary to use the bombs? That is a more relevant issue for history, and for understanding how and why the decisions were made.
Overy lays out the events, decision points, rationales of both sides in the final months of the war. He does not opine, but he does objectively explain and describe the processes, the events that provided both reasons and incentives for decisions, and the social, cultural and political realities on both sides of the war that inexorably drove each side independently of the other.
The Allies in the Pacific war (more precisely, the US) were faced with terrible choices. Invade Japan and incur vast casualties at a time the American public was increasingly tiring of the sacrifices, made more acute by the cessation of hostilities in Europe. Secondly, opt for a naval blockade and continued conventional bombing, which had devolved into carpet incendiary raids - starve them out and burn them out until they quit. The incendiary campaign had been in full flower for months prior to dropping the atomic bombs and the casualties inflicted, and being inflicted, on the Japanese populace were horrific, in excess of the A-bomb casualties by themselves. Had it continued – as was intended – the numbers would have been staggering. Starvation would have added millions more.
The US had severe morale issues. Troops in Europe who had spent literally years at war on the promise they would go home when it was over were now being redeployed to the Pacific and the daunting prospect of invading Japan and the enormous casualties that would ensue. There were real worries of mutinies, not to mention incalculable loss of public support back home.
Meanwhile, the Japanese still had undefeated armies in place in China, the Philippines, and Southeast Asia, not to mention extensive forces throughout homeland Japan. Civilian deaths in those occupied territories were aggregating roughly 400,000 a month. A significant segment of the Japanese government, the military and much of the population fervently believed that death was honorable, surrender was not. That was a reality throughout the course of the Pacific war, much overlooked and down-played today. US experience on Saipan, Iwo and Okinawa was daunting. There was a peace faction within the government that wanted to end the war, but they had no idea how to do so. Even they rejected ‘surrender’ and visualized negotiated ends to the hostilities that might include conceding foreign territories. To this day, Japan does not speak of "surrender" ending WWII.
The incendiary bombing campaign caused a huge migration of the urban populations outward to rural areas, exacerbating the already difficult problems of feeding and housing the populace. The government feared revolution. Critics of the atomic bombings argue that the war was ending – but they cannot point to a timeline. They argue that peace initiatives through the Soviet Union should have been pursued, but Stalin abrogated Japanese initiatives. Stalin did not want the war to end before the Soviet Union got into it and could occupy and keep coveted territory in Manchuria, Korea, and northern Japan proper. He wanted Tokyo to be divided into zones of influence as was done in Berlin. The Japanese initiatives never took serious form – even the peace faction within the government did not consider surrender, or defeat – they had in a mind an armistice similar to that which ended WWI.
The argument that the atomic bombs were singularly instrumental to the end of the war is not so clear. The war ended because a series of events and factors merged into effect – the bombs were one, of course, but also the intense incendiary campaign; the Soviet declaration of war; the increasing willingness of Emperor Hirohito to encourage an end to the war (which predated the use of the atomic bombs); the prospects of popular revolution to the detriment if not the destruction of the Imperial institution. The latter was not a minor concern. Survival of the imperial institution was a driving factor for much of the resolve to fight to the end. It was a deeply held, religious and cultural ethos never well understood in the West, even today.
Overy makes no conclusory judgments, but he does give the reader an objective, unbiased and clear explanation of the realities, the actual pressures and situations, the reasons decisions were made, and the events that happened. It is a superb, concise, revelatory book. Ultimately, although I agree with Overy that although the atomic bombs were a factor in Japan’s surrender, they were not the only factor, arguably not the most decisive factor.
More importantly, against the moral question of their use (the one constant critique of the bombings) must be counterposed the simple fact that the war ended then, as a result of those bombs in concert with the array of other, equally important, events and elements. Had it not, the human costs would have been staggeringly greater than they were: the war continuing for an indeterminant period of time (months to even a year or more), Allied losses invading and conquering, Japanese losses resisting invasion and conquer, continued incendiary bombing, continued losses in areas under Japanese control (seldom recognized or accounted for), Soviet occupation of parts of Japan and Tokyo (see North Korea and Eastern Europe for examples of how bad that would have been). Ultimately, it was a very good thing the war did in fact end when it did. To the extent that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki contributed to that, it was both necessary in the circumstances then present and beneficial in the longer term.
Overy's publications are extensive and several of them are really must-reads for people with an interest in military history, including "The Bombing War" which focuses on the campaigns in Europe. In comparison "Rain of Ruin" feels a little bit like it is plugging a gap in Overy's coverage of World War II. A necessary contribution, and a good one, but not one that contains many new insights. Still, if you need to start anywhere on the bombing of Japan, this is a better place than most.
The author tracks, step-by-step, the development of US plans to bomb Japan and the events that finally lead to the decision to burn Japanese cities with large volumes of fire bombs, thus killing Japanese civilians indiscriminately and in very large numbers. This decision upended the principles of the American strategic bombardment offensive and entangled the US leadership in actions that, by earlier or later legal standards, were certainly war crimes. But perhaps for that very reason, the path to that decision remained murky. Neither FDR nor Truman were ever presented with a stark choice that would have made their responsibility for it clear. Instead the decision was taken at the middle levels of air force leadership and wrapped in obfuscating (but not very) language. Overy writes that, rather than judging the events, he sees it as his role as a historian to understand them. He lays it out clear enough, which results in a redistribution of responsibility. General Le May made the fatal decision, but he was largely supported in it by his superiors and peers.
Overy sees the main cause in the need that the air force command felt to do anything at all that would hasten the end of the war and perhaps avoid the need for an invasion of Japan. He makes clear enough that anti-Japanese racism played a significant role in removing any inhibitions that Americans felt about bombing Japan. So did the heavy casualties that the US military suffered as it fought to occupy bases closer to Japan for the final offensive. But in the end, Overy sees the institutional interests of the US Army Air Force as a major driver behind the killing. Too much had been invested in the B-29 and the strategic bomber offensive, and it just had to deliver.
The use of atomic bombs to destroy Hiroshima and Nagasaki was, in the author's view, a logical consequence of decisions already taken. As others have already observed, it wasn't so much that a decision was made to use the nuclear bombs, as that no decision was made not to do it. By 1945, the point had been reached at which a decision not to obliterate entire cities would have been remarkable, courageous and highly controversial, and probably deeply unpopular. The political and military leadership was thus far more concerned with framing it in such a way as to make it look justified, than it was willing to question the act itself. Overy highlights one tragic consequence of this: Between 1945 and 1952, the authorities deliberately ignored the plight of the survivors, and suppressed news about the long-term consequences of the bombing. Worse, American scientists studied the survivors to understand the long-term effect of radioactivity on their health, but offered them no help or treatment.
The author carefully summarises the legal and public controversies surrounding the use of the nuclear bombs, but also avoids expressing any definitive judgment. There is reason enough to see this as very dangerous ground. Overall, this is a good study of a difficult subject. You could say that Overy tries to let the facts speak for themselves, but obviously selecting the facts for such a book involves clear choices as well.
But he avoids the what-if scenarios and I think this is wise. The summer of 1945 was a moment in which history could have swung between wildly different tracks. In the best case scenario, a relatively quick end of the war; in the worst case scenario, a full-scale invasion with hundreds of thousands of American casualties and potentially millions or even tens of millions of Japanese (military and civilian) dead. Perhaps what really happened, bad as it was, was not the worst.
The author's aim with this book is to reexamine the oft touted statement that the 2 nuclear bombs made the Japanese surrender at the end of WW2. The first few chapters describe the lead up including the large-scale fire bombing of Toyko, the fire bombing of many other urban areas, the fatigue setting in that wanted to end the war quickly, the expectation that the invasion of Japan would cost 1 million US lives and the costs of building the bombs. By the time the bombs were dropped, the US had already hardened itself to the large scale destruction of urban areas - the difference is that this was just one bomb rather than tonnes and tonnes of individual fire bombs.
The narrative then shifts to the Japanese perspective, split between those wanting a glorious annihilation and those wanting peace but unsure how to surrender constitutionally. When the atomic bomb was dropped on hiroshima, the Japanese scientists weren't sure it was an atomic bomb and came up with alternative explanations. When the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, they were in the midst of constitutionally agreeing how to surrender so the bomb didn't actually hasten their hand. This was all in the context of the US not understanding just how tortuous these internal negotiations were so feeling they needed to keep the violence up to force the Japanese hand.
The book concludes by tracing the rememberance of these events and the (understandable) extraction of the nuclear bombs from the history to be standalone epic defining events. By tracing the wider history and context, the author seek not to downplay the atomic bombs but rather to understand all the factors which caused them to be dropped and for the victims of the firebombs to be remembered too.
I received an advance review copy for free, and I am leaving this review voluntarily.
Richard Overy’s **Rain of Ruin]** delivers a masterful and deeply nuanced account of the final months of World War II, offering an incisive look at the Allied bombing campaigns and their profound effects on both Japan and the wider war effort. Unlike many accounts that focus primarily on American strategy, Overy presents a balanced perspective, giving due attention to the internal struggles and decision-making within Japan. His exploration of Japanese leadership, including the role of Emperor Hirohito and the factional disputes within the cabinet, provides critical depth to the narrative.
One of the book’s greatest strengths is its ability to contextualize the devastating firebombing of Tokyo and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki beyond just their physical destruction. Overy presents these events not only as military actions but as key moments in a broader geopolitical and psychological struggle. He skillfully integrates the Soviet Union’s entry into the war, arguing that it played a crucial role in Japan’s decision to surrender, adding layers to a history often told in simpler terms.
The audiobook version is particularly engaging, with the narrator delivering a clear and compelling performance that enhances the depth and gravity of the subject matter. The pacing is well-balanced, making even the complex political and military discussions accessible to listeners. Whether one is well-versed in World War II history or approaching it for the first time, Overy’s work is both enlightening and essential, offering a truly comprehensive view of the war’s dramatic conclusion.
"Rain of Ruin" is a rare book that is not only interesting, but compels you to re-think basic assumptions. One of those assumptions in American history is that the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in 1945 spared a bloody invasion of the Japanese islands and represented the fatal blow to the Japanese war effort before its surrender. Richard Overy largely dispels that myth, showing that Japanese rulers reviewed the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings within the wider context of the area-bombing of Japan in 1945, including the horrific fire-bombing of Tokyo and other cities. Japan was more worried in some respects about Soviet intrusions into Manchuria and depleted materiel for its war effort than the immediate horrors of atomic fall-out.
American strategy on bombing Japan is equally as fascinating, as Curtis LeMay and other air commanders unleashed area bombing on Japan every bit as devastating as the British indiscriminate bombing against Germany (which, ironically, Americans criticized as less valuable than targeting military targets). In essence, it appears the American thinking on Japan was Thucydidean in the most horrific way: the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must; in this case, the suffering was on a city-wide scale and of a nature unknown to humanity.
There are of course valid counter-arguments, and it is in little doubt that an invasion of Japan would be costly in terms of American lives. What seems most clear is that war, almost always, is a race to the bottom levels of humanity, and commanders of high and low repute both will often arrive at the most lethal option in search of rapid victory.
One important note about this book is that it offers only a brief recap of the US bombing operations against Japan between 1944 and 1946. It isn’t intended to be a comprehensive history of all WWII events in Japan, nor does it provide an in-depth analysis of specific operations. Instead, the author promises to discuss American and Japanese perspectives on bombing in a way that is rarely addressed offering insights that are often overlooked. The first part of the book explains why certain decisions were made by the Allies not just from a retrospective view of whether they made sense, but, as the author puts it, to explain “why people thought they had to do it,” particularly with regard to nuclear bombing. This section is quite detailed and covers different aspects such as the pressure on US leadership by 1945, the development of the nuclear program, and the overall exhaustion from the war. In the second part, the focus shifts to the Japanese perspective. And although the author does cover their position, the narrative feels rushed. The cultural differences, while mentioned, are not fully explored. Ultimately, if you’re looking for groundbreaking insights, this book may not deliver. It serves as a good summary of the events toward the end of WWII, but it doesn’t offer much in the way of new details or depth. Overall, it’s a decent quick read for getting acquainted with the subject, but if you’re seeking a detailed analysis, you might find better options elsewhere.
Richad Overy's Rain of Ruin: Tokyo, Hiroshima, and the Surrender of Japan is a brief but insightful examination of the Allied strategies and policies for the bombing campaign of Japan that culminated with the dropping of the atomic bombs. One of its key points is that the United States was the only active party, as Britain was included in the planning and were building up their strength in the Pacific in the final months of the war.
Overy argues much was theoretical through 1943, until capture of islands in 1944 allowed the launching of plane based attacks. The Allied bomber campaign, much as against Nazi Germany, argues for sustained bombing campaigns to deny the enemy the use of their industrial infrastructure. The major difference is that it was believed Japanese industry relied on small scale, home based production, opening the options to more directly target civilians.
It represents a definite hypocrisy of the resolutions of the Second World War, Nazi German crimes against humanity were put on trial but the mass bombing of both Germany and Japanese cities were rationalized as legitimate strategy.
The audiobook narrator is Ralph Lister, a British audiobook narrator active since 2010 and has narrated over 500 titles. His reading is clear and comprehensive, with a style that matches the writers tone.
Recommended to readers and researchers of World War II, technology in warfare and the morality of war.
I received a free digital version of this book via NetGalley thanks to the publisher.
I'm of multiple minds on this one. I appreciate the fresh look at the behind the scenes on both American and Japanese thinking in the run up to the decision to drop the bomb and Japanese attitudes towards surrender.
But I'm not entirely convinced by the arguments he makes that 1) the bomb was less impactful (no pun intended) on the Japanese decision to surrender than the broader bombing campaign, and 2) that the decision was far less in Truman's hands and had been decided by military leadership.
Every step of the air war against the home islands contributed in meaningful ways towards the Japanese decision; no argument from me that practically speaking the raids on Tokyo were more meaningful and caused as much or more damage.
I just think the eventual surrender took serious note of the damage caused by two single bombs; based on other reading it seems that Japanese in Hiroshima recognized that it was a single plane overhead and assumed it was nothing meaningful. I'd think that the faction in Japan that was prepared to give up understood the calculation that continued fighting would mean more of these, and grasped that it meant the end of life in Japan should they carry on.
I think it's a thought provoking book, and recommend it, not sure I agree with all of its conclusions.
Overy gives a fair comprehensive view looking back at what did the trick to make Japan surrender unconditionally by the order of Hirohito against the wishes of the Military Leaders. It helps if you have read ten or more books about the war in the Pacific if you want to fully appreciate this book, but it could stand on its own as a summary. I would like to (spoiler) mention a few facts from other books that were not explored in this book that would give the reader a better understanding of other factors involved in the surrender as well as why the atom bombs needed to be dropped. Marcus McDilda, while captured, "confessed" that we had 100 atom bombs and Tokyo was next. The Military had ordered that all POW's were to be executed upon an invasion. The military ordered that all Japanese be armed even with spears or shovels and fight to the death upon an invasion, which means there were no civilians in the bombings. First hand personal accounts in books by the bombers and by the surviving Japanese who were bombed lend an authentic touch as well as first hand experience. I've had friends whose fathers were tortured and killed by the Japanese military and in grade school we had air raid drills where we hid under our desks. Different times from now.
A short but punchy account which completely changed my understanding of the end of World War Two. Overy argues that the decision to surrender had almost been made by the Japanese and that the two atom bomb strikes made no difference. They were seen as part of the months long and effective 'area bombing' campaign, that is the indiscriminate bombing of cities leading to the largest ever loss of civilian life in one day in a raid of Tokyo. The atom bombs weren't seen as anything different in kind by the Japanese, just especially bombs. If anything they correctly feared that late entry into the war of the Soviet Union which was determined to grab and keep as much territory as possible. At the time it was the Americans who turned cartwheels trying to explain away the atom bombs while telling themselves that they weren't guilty of bombing civilians in the way they condemned the RAF for doing in Germany. President Truman told the America people that Hiroshima had been a purely military target, though 20,000 soldiers died out of a total of 140,000 deaths. His conscience caught up with him though after Nagasaki and felt he couldn't face killing 'any more kids'.
A remarkable book and I also recommend Judgement at Tokyo by Bass.
Rain of Ruin: Tokyo, Hiroshima, and the Surrender of Japan by Richard Overy takes the reader through a methodical and linear journey of the events, coordination and decision processes of the US’ decision for the following events during WWII:
Firebombing of Tokyo, March 10, 1945 Nuclear Bombing of Hiroshima, August 6, 1945 Nuclear Bombing of Nagasaki, August 9, 1945
As neither a history or military buff, I was easily able to follow the narration provided by Ralph Lister. The pacing keeps the listener engaged without being bogged down with the wealth of facts and strategy leading to these events. I really enjoyed learning all of these details and the players involved in this book, and I strongly recommend it.
Thank you, RBmedia | Recorded Books and W. W. Norton & Company, and NetGalley for the opportunity to listen to this ALC. All opinions are my own.
Thankfully, it was short; otherwise, I would have DNF'd it.
I expected more lively writing and more thoughtful analysis from an esteemed historian. This was dry and bogged down with too many statistics; whole paragraphs ran like, "The U.S. military dropped 2,123 bombs on 183 targets, damaging 4.3 square miles of land and killing 783 Japanese." No, that is not a real quote from the book, but that is what much of this book reads like. While there is some analysis, it's just interspersed in the descriptions of what happened. I expected to have chapters dedicated to specific topics like the Japanese aversion to surrender, with historical context, not just snippets of analysis here and there. I also felt like the chapters were too long, and the author meandered to topics that were not the focus of that chapter.
Overall, I had a hard time getting through this, and it was only 150 pages. I would not recommend it.
Rain of Ruin is a short history of the role aerial bombing played in the surrender of Japan during WW2.
The focus is very much on the military - from the decision-making to the aftermath - rather than the impact on civilians more widely. Dense and tautological, it sometimes feels as if you are reading an endless rolecall of names and ranks, although Overy also captures a keen sense of the key characters involved.
While Overy presents both sides of the story behind Japan's surrender, and provides a careful overview of the voices for and against the use of atomic weapons, he allows the irony of wartime double-standards to speak for itself. Presented with the evidence, the reader is able to form their own opinion whether the use of atomic weapons was (and can ever be) justified.
A grim and thought-provoking read.
*Thank you to Netgalley for the arc in exchange for an honest review*
History Happy Hour podcast 090725 --"This Week on History Happy Hour: Eighty years ago, Japan surrendered to the Allies after three of the most devastating bombing attacks of the war – two nuclear weapons and the fire-bombing of Tokyo. What was the decision-making process in this endgame of World War II? Was it just the atomic bomb that brought about Japan’s surrender? This week, Chris and Rick will chat with HHH Alum, Richard Overy, author of Rain of Ruin: Tokyo, Hiroshima and the Surrender of Japan. Richard Overy is Professor of History at the University of Exeter, one of Britain's most distinguished historians and an internationally renowned scholar of World War II. (He’s also a History Happy Hour Alum!) He is the recipient of the Hessell-Tiltman Prize, the Wolfson History Prize, the Samuel Eliot Morison Prize and is a Fellow of the British Academy and the Royal Historical Society. His many works include The Bombing War, Dictators and The Morbid Age."
For starters, I listened to the audiobook version and my poor experience of the book might be due to the awful narrator - Ralph Lister.
I’m a history geek. Love it. And recently visited Hiroshima, so wanted to learn more than was available there (which I did find quite biased with lots of glaring gaps).
This book was really dull. Not simply because it was historical in nature, but because it did not give me a sense of the time and era, I never felt connected to the historical figures, how they grappled with key decisions, the awful challenges they faced. Furthermore the appalling nature of the victims was never brought to life, I found myself almost apathetic whilst listening to it recount the statistics and suffering.
Maybe reading it would have brought it all more to life. But sadly I couldn’t wait for it to end.
The path to mass destruction leads past obscure acronyms and military abbreviations, but Richard Overy is an experienced guide and familiar with this terrain.
Numbers, names and technical terms gallore. Obviosuly Overy has done a lot of research. He knows his military mumbo jumbo. Yet, it all feels very (pseudo)scientific and masculine. Overy excels in facts and data. The suffering of the countless victims remains largely unwritten. Come to think of it, maybe that's for the best, but it does not make this book a very engaging read.
Rain of Ruin does force you to face some awkward truths, however. The bombings of Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the three deadliest bombings ever (by far), were all carried out by the United States, all for reasons unclear, and these mass bombings took the lives of some 300,000 innocent civilians. At least.
World War II enthusiasts will appreciate this well-researched, multidimensional, and nonconventional recounting of the bombings that led to Japan's surrender. This text examines the strategic firebombings and the nuclear bombings, key philosophical views of Japanese society, and the larger Pacific theater in general to present a more comprehensively sound explanation of Japan's surrender than most typically learn. The history as a whole was extremely interesting and informative. The narrator, Ralph Lister, lends himself to this type of audiobook, as he sounds very learned and leaves room for little doubt about the facts he presents.
A short book that delved into the purposes and impact of America's use of incendiary and atomic bombing on Japan during World War II.
I would have preferred to give this book three and a half stars. The author is skilled at exploring not just the attacks but the decision making that lead to them as well as the aftermath. Overy also never injects his opinion into the text, but rather allows the reader to draw their own conclusions from the research that he has compiled. The book would have benefited from a longer length, but it was nevertheless impressive that the text contained so much information.
Overy states that no issue in the history of the United States war effort has brought greater debate than the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While the question asked is normally “was it necessary?, Overy makes the case that the question should really be “why was it thought to be necessary at the time?” There is little doubt that the answer is to end the war as quickly as possible to save American lives.
This is a very interesting insight on the events before the culmination with the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It can be at times a bit difficult to read/listen to for prolonged periods as there is a lot of information on dates/numbers but the narration is smooth and flies well. Thank you to the publishers for an ALC via NetGalley. Opinions remain my own.
We know about the dropping of the atomic bomb, used to end WWII. Through this book, the author takes us deeper into the event, sharing tactical and analytical views.
I truly loved this read. It was such a great deep dive into the before and after of the atomic bomb. Learn more about the military build-up, and much more. I highly recommend this book!