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34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon
This is the first comprehensive account of the progression of the Second Lebanese War, from the border abduction of an Israeli soldier on the morning of July 12, 2006, through the hasty decision for an aggressive response; the fateful discussions in the Cabinet and the senior Israeli command; to the heavy fighting in south Lebanon and the raging diplomatic battles in Paris, Washington and New York. The book answers the following has Israel learned the right lessons from this failed military confrontation? What can Western countries learn from the IDF's failure against a fundamentalist Islamic terror organization? And what role did Iran and Syria play in this affair? 34 Days delivers the first blow-by-blow account of the Lebanon war and new insights for the future of the region and its effects on the West.
304 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2008
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
October 29, 2014
This conflict has clearly put a dent in the legend of the IDF’s fighting prowess. This book chronicles the frequent missteps by the Israeli government and the IDF high command in the “Second Lebanon War” on the diplomatic and tactical levels.
While some of these mistakes can easily be put down to “the fog of war”, others can only be described as negligence; especially in regards to the ignorance of the state of the IDF’s ground forces by Defense Minister Peretz (no clue), Prime Minister Olmert (also no clue), and IDF Chief of Staff Halutz (not interested in getting a clue).
The initial airstrikes mounted by the IAF successfully took out Hezbollah’s medium range missiles. Hezbollah was politically “on the ropes” in Lebanon and was under intense pressure to disarm. However the Israeli government gave up its high ground with the 2nd Qana massacre and its inability to decide on the actual goals of its military campaign. This dithering resulted in wasteful operations against Hezbollah that did little real damage and squandered the lives of IDF servicemen (and 1 woman) in order to achieve objectives that sometimes merely symbolic. This account is also reminiscent of [book:Israel's Lebanon War|1523943 in that the Israeli cabinet appears to be willfully ignorant of the military operations that it authorizes.
This book focuses primarily on the political and diplomatic aspects of the war. Many of the military references are vague. Despite this, the book still gives a clear picture of a great opportunity that was lost by people who should have known better.
While some of these mistakes can easily be put down to “the fog of war”, others can only be described as negligence; especially in regards to the ignorance of the state of the IDF’s ground forces by Defense Minister Peretz (no clue), Prime Minister Olmert (also no clue), and IDF Chief of Staff Halutz (not interested in getting a clue).
The initial airstrikes mounted by the IAF successfully took out Hezbollah’s medium range missiles. Hezbollah was politically “on the ropes” in Lebanon and was under intense pressure to disarm. However the Israeli government gave up its high ground with the 2nd Qana massacre and its inability to decide on the actual goals of its military campaign. This dithering resulted in wasteful operations against Hezbollah that did little real damage and squandered the lives of IDF servicemen (and 1 woman) in order to achieve objectives that sometimes merely symbolic. This account is also reminiscent of [book:Israel's Lebanon War|1523943 in that the Israeli cabinet appears to be willfully ignorant of the military operations that it authorizes.
This book focuses primarily on the political and diplomatic aspects of the war. Many of the military references are vague. Despite this, the book still gives a clear picture of a great opportunity that was lost by people who should have known better.
September 13, 2011
A history of the Israel-Hizbollah War of July 2006 written by two Israeli authors.
This conflict was started by a Hezbollah raid into Israel that killed wounded or captured members of an Israeli border patrol who were on the Israeli side of the border. The raid appears to have been motivated by a number of domestic Hezbollah and Iranian issues. The Israelis decided to escalate the situation. Most western and middle eastern nations detested Hezbollah and acquiesced to the escalation. However, the Israeli military operations were not executed in the context of a plan, a strategy, or even a vision of goals. The result was a poorly conceived, poor executed, and fruitless exercise. The result was that Hezbollah survived the onslaught, but badly damaged. Nasrallah supposedly stated tha he had not expected the Israeli's to respond so forcefully. From that perspective Hezbollah has been mostly quiet, although the Iranians and Syrians have made good on most of the organization's losses. The Israelis relieved the military leadership involved in this war down to Brigade and Battalion level. They have also begun training their military to face other military forces rather than in counter-insurgency.
The book mostly covers the Israeli Political echelon during the war. And in particular, on the actions of the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert. Secondarily, it covers the actions of the senior Israeli Military leadership. Minimally, it covers the the Israeli military operations. Finally, it occasionally mentions something about the Hezbollah, both political and military spheres.
It is well written and a relatively easy read in English. However, it concentrates on the political and strategic leadership and decision making rather than on the actual military operations. And coverage from the Hezbollah side is extremely limited.
This conflict was started by a Hezbollah raid into Israel that killed wounded or captured members of an Israeli border patrol who were on the Israeli side of the border. The raid appears to have been motivated by a number of domestic Hezbollah and Iranian issues. The Israelis decided to escalate the situation. Most western and middle eastern nations detested Hezbollah and acquiesced to the escalation. However, the Israeli military operations were not executed in the context of a plan, a strategy, or even a vision of goals. The result was a poorly conceived, poor executed, and fruitless exercise. The result was that Hezbollah survived the onslaught, but badly damaged. Nasrallah supposedly stated tha he had not expected the Israeli's to respond so forcefully. From that perspective Hezbollah has been mostly quiet, although the Iranians and Syrians have made good on most of the organization's losses. The Israelis relieved the military leadership involved in this war down to Brigade and Battalion level. They have also begun training their military to face other military forces rather than in counter-insurgency.
The book mostly covers the Israeli Political echelon during the war. And in particular, on the actions of the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert. Secondarily, it covers the actions of the senior Israeli Military leadership. Minimally, it covers the the Israeli military operations. Finally, it occasionally mentions something about the Hezbollah, both political and military spheres.
It is well written and a relatively easy read in English. However, it concentrates on the political and strategic leadership and decision making rather than on the actual military operations. And coverage from the Hezbollah side is extremely limited.
May 5, 2020
An excellent and detailed account of a war that was mishandled from the beginning. The author who is also the writer for Fauda should turn this into a script for a TV series. Many of the mistakes made were inexcusable and unnecessary. As Hezbollah remains a grave threat this war will come again. For those who seek not to repeat the makes of the past in that coming conflict this book is a must read.
January 24, 2011
A chilling insight into the boondoggle known as the Second Lebanon War. Sad to see how the people of lebanon are the victims of Iranian politics, Hezbollah greed for fame, Syrian interference and Israeli haughtiness. ANd there is yet no end in sight...
August 7, 2026
Too much politic - not enough combat
A very well written book but it may be primarily for an Israeli/middle-east politics readership? There is very little re-telling of the combat that took place save for the repeated Israeli air campaign and Hezbollah’s (Soviet and Iran supplied, via Syria) rocket attacks on northern Israel - arguably the cause of it all.
Following repeated attacks on Israel by Hezbollah (one of Iran’s regional terrorist surrogates) via small group assaults on Israeli outposts along the Lebanese border and their continued use of the unguided, indiscriminate, ‘fire and forget’ - Katyusha rockets on the civilian population in northern Israel, the Israeli government and military came under increasing pressure to react. When an IDF soldier was abducted in a tunnel cross-border raid by Hamas (another Iranian terrorist surrogate) near Gaza and then two more were abducted by Hezbollah whilst on patrol on the Lebanese border (two other IDF soldiers were killed during the attack on their unarmored (cut backs) vehicle) Israel reacted and war ensued. Initially Israel sought to damage Hezbollah solely via the use of its Air Force (IAF) but it became clear that soldiers had to take the areas from which Hezbollah launched their rockets. All with the support of the Lebanese - initially.
The book pays plenty of attention to the poor condition of the IDF following years of cut-backs and minimal - almost zero - training. It also repeatedly highlights the failure of the Israeli PM, Defence Minister and military Chief of Staff: all of whom were ill-equipped for their roles when taking their nation to war. Their ability to protect themselves whilst soldiers died in terribly conceived and executed conflict - is shameful. Surprising that the three survived as long as they did. The book does not hide-away from this and shows the Israeli leadership as arrogant and incompetent. The author even draws a comparison between the British Charge of the Light Brigade in Crimea to Israel’s PM insisting on the final ground assault that led to 30 dead Israeli soldiers with zero gain.
A detailed re-telling of the actual combat this is not. Lots of personality clashes, politics between Israel and Lebanon, the UN, Syria, France, USA, the Soviet Union - indeed, the usual ‘players’. However, the poor IDF soldiers who suffered the incredible incompetence of senior (political and military) leadership, (the chief of staff, for example was only, ever, Air Force and never understood ‘boots on the ground’ combat - and it showed to great cost in lives on both sides). The IDF Army also had a severe lack of readiness training and equipment. Senior commanders testified to having never exercised at Brigade or Divisional level and then being thrown into Lebanon completely unprepared for the tasks given them. Units arrived late, kit was missing, and the whole thing was a shambles. Israel could have so easily lost ten times as many dead and wounded. The final debacle came on the final weekend (bloody Sabbath) - hinted at above - when the Army was tasked with one more assault in pursuit of Hezbollah’s hidden rocket stashes. This assault was forced upon the Army, when their Political leadership knew the UN brokered cease-fire (UN Resolution 1701) was hours away from coming into effect. It was madness.
Then there is the cost paid by the poor Lebanese general public - whilst Hezbollah, having created the maelstrom sat back and watched as towns and villages were destroyed and innocents killed. Israel claimed that up to five hundred Hezbollah terrorists were killed. But as for the three kidnapped Israeli soldiers? Both sides claimed ‘victory’ but all I could detect was the terrible losses caused by Hezbollah’s aggression against Israel. As one Israeli military commentator stated, ‘if you allow terrorists to store military hardware (rockets) in your home, don’t be surprised when they blow up.’ Simplistic but sadly true. Israel missed a significant opportunity to end the conflict with Hezbollah - with full Lebanese military and civilian support - as a result, in 2026, it is happening again…
A very well written book but it may be primarily for an Israeli/middle-east politics readership? There is very little re-telling of the combat that took place save for the repeated Israeli air campaign and Hezbollah’s (Soviet and Iran supplied, via Syria) rocket attacks on northern Israel - arguably the cause of it all.
Following repeated attacks on Israel by Hezbollah (one of Iran’s regional terrorist surrogates) via small group assaults on Israeli outposts along the Lebanese border and their continued use of the unguided, indiscriminate, ‘fire and forget’ - Katyusha rockets on the civilian population in northern Israel, the Israeli government and military came under increasing pressure to react. When an IDF soldier was abducted in a tunnel cross-border raid by Hamas (another Iranian terrorist surrogate) near Gaza and then two more were abducted by Hezbollah whilst on patrol on the Lebanese border (two other IDF soldiers were killed during the attack on their unarmored (cut backs) vehicle) Israel reacted and war ensued. Initially Israel sought to damage Hezbollah solely via the use of its Air Force (IAF) but it became clear that soldiers had to take the areas from which Hezbollah launched their rockets. All with the support of the Lebanese - initially.
The book pays plenty of attention to the poor condition of the IDF following years of cut-backs and minimal - almost zero - training. It also repeatedly highlights the failure of the Israeli PM, Defence Minister and military Chief of Staff: all of whom were ill-equipped for their roles when taking their nation to war. Their ability to protect themselves whilst soldiers died in terribly conceived and executed conflict - is shameful. Surprising that the three survived as long as they did. The book does not hide-away from this and shows the Israeli leadership as arrogant and incompetent. The author even draws a comparison between the British Charge of the Light Brigade in Crimea to Israel’s PM insisting on the final ground assault that led to 30 dead Israeli soldiers with zero gain.
A detailed re-telling of the actual combat this is not. Lots of personality clashes, politics between Israel and Lebanon, the UN, Syria, France, USA, the Soviet Union - indeed, the usual ‘players’. However, the poor IDF soldiers who suffered the incredible incompetence of senior (political and military) leadership, (the chief of staff, for example was only, ever, Air Force and never understood ‘boots on the ground’ combat - and it showed to great cost in lives on both sides). The IDF Army also had a severe lack of readiness training and equipment. Senior commanders testified to having never exercised at Brigade or Divisional level and then being thrown into Lebanon completely unprepared for the tasks given them. Units arrived late, kit was missing, and the whole thing was a shambles. Israel could have so easily lost ten times as many dead and wounded. The final debacle came on the final weekend (bloody Sabbath) - hinted at above - when the Army was tasked with one more assault in pursuit of Hezbollah’s hidden rocket stashes. This assault was forced upon the Army, when their Political leadership knew the UN brokered cease-fire (UN Resolution 1701) was hours away from coming into effect. It was madness.
Then there is the cost paid by the poor Lebanese general public - whilst Hezbollah, having created the maelstrom sat back and watched as towns and villages were destroyed and innocents killed. Israel claimed that up to five hundred Hezbollah terrorists were killed. But as for the three kidnapped Israeli soldiers? Both sides claimed ‘victory’ but all I could detect was the terrible losses caused by Hezbollah’s aggression against Israel. As one Israeli military commentator stated, ‘if you allow terrorists to store military hardware (rockets) in your home, don’t be surprised when they blow up.’ Simplistic but sadly true. Israel missed a significant opportunity to end the conflict with Hezbollah - with full Lebanese military and civilian support - as a result, in 2026, it is happening again…
July 4, 2024
"34 Days" by Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, translated by Ora Cummings and Moshe Tlamim, is a meticulously detailed account of the 2006 Lebanon War, offering readers an in-depth analysis of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. This book stands out for its comprehensive examination of the military, political, and social dimensions of the war, providing a balanced perspective that is both informative and engaging.
Harel and Issacharoff, both esteemed journalists, bring their expertise to the forefront, weaving together firsthand accounts, military strategies, and political maneuverings. Their narrative is both accessible and authoritative, making complex military operations and political decisions understandable for a wide audience. The translation by Cummings and Tlamim captures the urgency and gravity of the original text, ensuring that the essence of the story is preserved for English-speaking readers.
One of the book's strengths is its exploration of the human impact of the war. Through vivid descriptions and personal stories, the authors highlight the experiences of soldiers and civilians, bringing a human face to the conflict. This approach not only enhances the reader's understanding of the war's complexities but also evokes a deeper emotional response.
"34 Days" is an essential read for me as someone interested in modern warfare, Middle Eastern politics, and military history. Its thorough analysis and balanced reporting provide a valuable resource for understanding the broader implications of the 2006 Lebanon War. Harel and Issacharoff have crafted a compelling narrative that I found both informative and thought-provoking, solidifying their reputation as leading voices in the field of military journalism.
Harel and Issacharoff, both esteemed journalists, bring their expertise to the forefront, weaving together firsthand accounts, military strategies, and political maneuverings. Their narrative is both accessible and authoritative, making complex military operations and political decisions understandable for a wide audience. The translation by Cummings and Tlamim captures the urgency and gravity of the original text, ensuring that the essence of the story is preserved for English-speaking readers.
One of the book's strengths is its exploration of the human impact of the war. Through vivid descriptions and personal stories, the authors highlight the experiences of soldiers and civilians, bringing a human face to the conflict. This approach not only enhances the reader's understanding of the war's complexities but also evokes a deeper emotional response.
"34 Days" is an essential read for me as someone interested in modern warfare, Middle Eastern politics, and military history. Its thorough analysis and balanced reporting provide a valuable resource for understanding the broader implications of the 2006 Lebanon War. Harel and Issacharoff have crafted a compelling narrative that I found both informative and thought-provoking, solidifying their reputation as leading voices in the field of military journalism.
October 1, 2024
The editor of the English language book should be fired. So many basic mistakes. The poor editing made it difficult to trust the writers.
October 28, 2011
Interesting book but spends too much time on background. While it's important to know how Hezbollah came about book spends too much time on pointless details.
Good overview of Israeli decission making (both IDF and civilian).
Probably suffers from short time distance between publishing and actual war. No critical distance, things still classified etc.
Kudos to authors for not using "terrorist" label for Hezbollah something too many Israeli authors do almost atomatically.
The title should be "34 Days: Israel and war in Lebanon" as we learn almost nothing about Hezbollah, their decission making process and changing goals during war. Granted, one can expect unwillingness to talk from Hezbollah, specially to Israeli journalists but book shouldn't be advertised as such.
Overall a good analysis, though changes in Israel after the war such as Olmert trying to show himself as war leader after all by blasting Gaza and him loosing elections anyway made certain conclussions obsolete.
Good overview of Israeli decission making (both IDF and civilian).
Probably suffers from short time distance between publishing and actual war. No critical distance, things still classified etc.
Kudos to authors for not using "terrorist" label for Hezbollah something too many Israeli authors do almost atomatically.
The title should be "34 Days: Israel and war in Lebanon" as we learn almost nothing about Hezbollah, their decission making process and changing goals during war. Granted, one can expect unwillingness to talk from Hezbollah, specially to Israeli journalists but book shouldn't be advertised as such.
Overall a good analysis, though changes in Israel after the war such as Olmert trying to show himself as war leader after all by blasting Gaza and him loosing elections anyway made certain conclussions obsolete.
August 19, 2008
Written by two Israeli defense journalists, 34 DAYS is a relatively even-handed account of the 2006 2nd Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah. They are not kind to PM Olmert or Chief of Staff Dan Halutz for basically rushing into a conflict with no clear plan on how to end it. The authors also fault the IDF for getting away from it's conventional warfighting roots through near constant involvement in the low-intensity conflict with the Palestinians. While undoubtedly better books on this topic will appear, 34 DAYS is good for now.
P.S. Be aware the book was originally written in Hebrew and the translation can be a bit confusing.
P.S. Be aware the book was originally written in Hebrew and the translation can be a bit confusing.
March 10, 2024
It was ok. Biggest takeaway was the name of the final chapter: Until The Next War. Endless wars until salvation comes to the lands.
August 14, 2014
A rather boring book, focuses too much on the political aspects and very little military aspects,
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews