Very Special Intelligence

by Patrick Beesly

Chronicles the role of the intelligence center in World War II

Genres: History, War, Nonfiction, Espionage, World War II

281 pages, Mass Market Paperback

First published November 12, 1981

About the author

Patrick Beesly was a British author and intelligence officer during World War II.

Reviews

[Ed Crutchley · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a gripping and tortuous insider account of how a combination of talent, organisation and improving resources arrived at anticipating German navy moves during the WW2. It inevitably largely focuses on the 6-year Battle of the Atlantic and the struggle against the U-Boats and occasional sorties of equally deadly battleships. The book precedes most of what has been written on Ultra, but usefully talks extensively of how the information gleaned was used. Vital convoys dangerously travelled between the USA and Britain at a rate of one every two days, and others to Russia. In a competition of wits and resources, the man in charge of U-boat tracking, Godfrey Winn, developed the ability to read Admiral Donitz’s mind. As the U-boat population grew to several hundred, half of which might be operational at any one time, and in part supported for fuel and armament by underwater ‘Milch Cows’, a centralised operations room underneath the Admiralty sifted through a combination of radar direction tracking, secret reports of departures from German naval bases, code-breaking from Bletchley Park, and information from the Canadians and Americans, in order to see the picture. By grouping often vague and sometimes contradictory pieces of information from different sources, German moves became increasingly visible and predictable, but the pressure was relentless and marred by as many failures as successes. It reached a climax in March 1943 when 95 ships were lost, one grouped convoy losing 21 ships out of 100 to a forty U-boat Wolf Pack. The hidden struggle between cryptanalysts at Bletchley Park and B. Dienst met a close shave when the Germans changed from 3 to 4 rotors on their Enigma machines in March 1943, but the outage was fortunately short-lived. Allied successes thereafter increased, and for a while Donitz even gave up attacking convoys. New developments included German acoustic torpedoes (derogatorily referred to as Gnats), ‘Foxer’ devices towed by Allied ships in order to counter them, pressure-sensitive (oyster) mines developed by both sides, and Allied 10 cm radar capable of spotting small objects on the surface, and in the later stages, German introduction of snorkels and high-speed submarines. By the end of 1943 less than a quarter of U-Boat commanders were expected to last a year, and over the entire war German submariners suffered 28,000 casualties out of an effective of 39,000. The war of attrition gradually favoured the Allies, the Americans created their 10th Fleet (an organisational move rather than materiel), Iceland and the Azores counted among important staging posts. Terrific reading.

[Derek Nudd · Rating 4 out of 5]

Comparing this with Donald McLachlan's 'Room 39,' the other key insider's text on Naval Intelligence Division in WW2, Beesly's is better written and has the great advantage of being published late enough to admit out loud the role of Special Intelligence (the Bletchley Park cryptographers). He focusses on the Operational Intelligence Centre and takes it chronologically whereas McLachlan covers the whole of NID and uses a more thematic organisation. Refreshingly he gives full credit to the Kriegsmarine's B.Deinst, which for much of the early war gave the German navy better access to signals decrypts than ours - something we too easily forget in the dazzle of Bletchley's later achievements.

I wouldn't willingly be without either of these books, which combine serious intellectual insight with the authentic voice of someone who was there. Sadly the nine-year gap between McLachlan's and Beesly's books didn't make that much difference to what they were allowed to say (and McLachlan must have been sailing very close to the wind) so this doesn't add much hard information to the earlier work. The cross-bearing is still useful though.

[Thomas Ernst · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very good story by someone who lived through it

Much detail of the back and forth between intelligence groups (British) trying to sift through and make sense of the information they were accumulating on German U Boat and pocket battleships and merchant raiders attacks on Allied shipping.

Many dark days on both sides. I think the difference was the Allies were able to learn and recover from their dark days. The German side seemed to slip away after March 1943, as more and more U boats were sunk by Allied shipping and planes. The new torpedoes and use of snorkels to run faster underwater did not seem to be able to stem the huge losses to the Allies.

Author (Patrick Beesly) has a nice style that keeps your interest throughout the book

[Ariel Burbaickij · Rating 2 out of 5]

too thin on systematic overview of the events and description of general intelligence assessment work (e.g. convoy PQ-17 is described as being on suicide mission caused by Stalin's geopolitical whim but not a word is said about why previous or subsequent convoys managed through without such losses )and too thick on turf wars between different branches of British Armed Forces and interpersonal sensitivities.