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High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars
From 2001, Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. "Victory" in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust. For this, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were held responsible, and paid the price, but the role played by the High Command in the Ministry of Defence also bears examination. Critics have noted that the armed services were riven by internal rivalry and their leadership was dysfunctional, but the truth is more complicated.
In his book, General Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable. Often the opinion of a junior tactical commander led the entire strategy of the MoD, not the other way around, as it should have been. While Britain's senior officers, defense ministers and civil servants were undeniably competent and well intentioned, the conundrum remains why success on the battlefield proved so elusive.
In his book, General Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable. Often the opinion of a junior tactical commander led the entire strategy of the MoD, not the other way around, as it should have been. While Britain's senior officers, defense ministers and civil servants were undeniably competent and well intentioned, the conundrum remains why success on the battlefield proved so elusive.
286 pages, Hardcover
First published January 12, 2015
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May 12, 2022
This book is about the high command of the British forces (mostly the Army) in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the troops generally fought bravely and well, the British Army's performance was lamentable. Failings at senior level to develop a strategy and enunciate goals set the army up for costly and embarrassing failure in both theatres. The author, Christopher Leslie Elliott, was a career British Army officer Director of Military Operations in the UK Ministry of Defence from 1993 to 1995. The book doesn't cover the two wars in any detail; it is concerned with the high command.
The strength of the book lies in its analysis of the problems of high command. Some of these are specific to the British, but others are more familiar. There was the issue of whether the armed forces should be structured for the defence of the homeland—the most dangerous scenario, but also the least likely—or for what they have actually been doing for the last 75 years.
It is one thing to put the Prime Minister in overall charge, but he or she might not have any military experience. Then there is the dynamic between the Chief of the Defence Staff and the service chiefs. There was also the problem of the different backgrounds that the air, naval and army officers came from, and their frequent turnover, especially when the reasons for decisions were not recorded. In the British case, this was exacerbated by their training, which did not include university education or any training in strategy. These are issues that all countries have, and grapple with to some extent.
The British also had many problems of their own. They had created an organisational structure that presupposed that they would be fighting alone. This wasn't very realistic. In particular, it didn't correspond to the situation in Iraq or Afghanistan. They had a joint forces headquarters, but it was located in an underground bunker outside London. It was therefore out of touch with the tactical headquarters in the theatres, and curiously out of contact with MOD headquarters in London as well. This created numerous problems.
Furthermore, the MOD was subject to shrinking budgets. The role that the British forces attempted to undertake was beyond the resources available. Partly this was the result of Britain's peculiar self image of being a great power, which it no longer was, but there was also chronic misunderstanding on the part of the civilian components of the MOD and other branches of the government over how difficult the task was. This led to too few troops being committed. Fixing troop levels based on arbitrary numbers is an insidious problem that is by no means restricted to the UK. There was also a major and classic military failure: not providing a reserve in case things went west. While there are proposed solutions to some of the problems, other are more universal and intractable.
In all, a thought-provoking read for someone self-isolating at the moment.
The strength of the book lies in its analysis of the problems of high command. Some of these are specific to the British, but others are more familiar. There was the issue of whether the armed forces should be structured for the defence of the homeland—the most dangerous scenario, but also the least likely—or for what they have actually been doing for the last 75 years.
It is one thing to put the Prime Minister in overall charge, but he or she might not have any military experience. Then there is the dynamic between the Chief of the Defence Staff and the service chiefs. There was also the problem of the different backgrounds that the air, naval and army officers came from, and their frequent turnover, especially when the reasons for decisions were not recorded. In the British case, this was exacerbated by their training, which did not include university education or any training in strategy. These are issues that all countries have, and grapple with to some extent.
The British also had many problems of their own. They had created an organisational structure that presupposed that they would be fighting alone. This wasn't very realistic. In particular, it didn't correspond to the situation in Iraq or Afghanistan. They had a joint forces headquarters, but it was located in an underground bunker outside London. It was therefore out of touch with the tactical headquarters in the theatres, and curiously out of contact with MOD headquarters in London as well. This created numerous problems.
Furthermore, the MOD was subject to shrinking budgets. The role that the British forces attempted to undertake was beyond the resources available. Partly this was the result of Britain's peculiar self image of being a great power, which it no longer was, but there was also chronic misunderstanding on the part of the civilian components of the MOD and other branches of the government over how difficult the task was. This led to too few troops being committed. Fixing troop levels based on arbitrary numbers is an insidious problem that is by no means restricted to the UK. There was also a major and classic military failure: not providing a reserve in case things went west. While there are proposed solutions to some of the problems, other are more universal and intractable.
In all, a thought-provoking read for someone self-isolating at the moment.
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September 7, 2016Read as part of research for my book project...
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews