Bruce Hoffman's Inside Terrorism has remained a seminal work for understanding the historical evolution of terrorism and the terrorist mindset. In this revised edition of the classic text, Hoffman analyzes the new adversaries, motivations, and tactics of global terrorism that have emerged in recent years, focusing specifically on how al Qaeda has changed since 9/11; the reasons behind its resiliency, resonance, and longevity; and its successful use of the Internet and videotapes to build public support and gain new recruits. Hoffman broadens the discussion by evaluating the potential repercussions of the Iraqi insurgency, the use of suicide bombers, terrorist exploitation of new communications media, and the likelihood of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear terrorist strike.
Closer to home, Hoffman reconsiders the Timothy McVeigh case and the threats posed by American Christian white supremacists and abortion opponents as well as those posed by militant environmentalists and animal rights activists. He argues that the attacks on the World Trade Center fundamentally transformed the West's view of the terrorist threat. More relevant and necessary than ever, Inside Terrorism continues to be the definitive work on the history and future of global terrorism.
Professor Bruce Hoffman has been studying terrorism and insurgency for nearly forty years. He is currently Director of the Center for Security Studies, Director of the Security Studies Program, and a tenured professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Washington, DC. Professor Hoffman previously held the Corporate Chair in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency at the RAND Corporation and was also Director of RAND’s Washington, D.C. Office. From 2001 to 2004, he served as RAND’s Vice President for External Affairs and in 2004 he also was Acting Director of RAND’s Center for Middle East Public Policy. Professor Hoffman was recently appointed by the U.S. Congress to serve as a commissioner on the Independent Commission to Review the FBI’s Post-9/11 Response to Terrorism and Radicalization.
Professor Hoffman was Scholar-in-Residence for Counterterrorism at the Central Intelligence Agency between 2004 and 2006. He was also adviser on counterterrorism to the Office of National Security Affairs, Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad, Iraq during the spring of 2004 and from 2004-2005 was an adviser on counterinsurgency to the Strategy, Plans, and Analysis Office at Multi-National Forces-Iraq Headquarters, Baghdad. Professor Hoffman was also an adviser to the Iraq Study Group. Professor Hoffman is a member of the National Security Preparedness Group, the successor to the 9/11 Commission and again co-chaired by Governor Thomas H. Kean and Congressman Lee H. Hamilton.
Professor Hoffman is a Global Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.; a Senior Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY; a Visiting Professor at the Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel; and, a Visiting Professor at the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, Scotland. He is also a contributing editor to The National Interest.
Professor Hoffman is a member of the Jamestown Foundation’s Board of Directors; a member of the board of advisers to the FBI Intelligence Analysts Association; and, serves on the advisory boards to the Arms Sales Monitoring Project at the Federation of American Scientists and of Our Voices Together: September 11 Friends and Families to Help Build a Safer, More Compassionate World.
Professor Hoffman was the founding Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews in Scotland, where he was also Reader in International Relations and Chairman of the Department of International Relations. Professor Hoffman is Editor-in-Chief of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, the leading scholarly journal in the field. and a member of the advisory boards of Terrorism and Political Violence and the Review of International Studies. He is also editor of the new Columbia University Press Series on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare.
Professor Hoffman holds degrees in government, history, and international relations and received his doctorate from Oxford University. In November 1994, the Director of Central Intelligence awarded Professor Hoffman the United States Intelligence Community Seal Medallion the highest level of commendation given to a non-government employee, which recognizes sustained superior performance of high value that distinctly benefits the interests and national security of the United States.
Professor Hoffman has conducted field work on terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan, Argentina, Colombia, India (Kashmir and Assam), Indonesia, Israel, Iraq, Northern Ireland, Pakistan (North West Frontier Province), the Philippines (Mindanao), Pakistan, Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza Strip), Sri Lanka, and Turkey.
A revised and updated edition of his acclaimed 1998 book, Inside Terrorism, was published in May 2006 by Columbia University Press in the U.S. and S. Fischer
This is another book assigned to my Global Terrorism class. This book is very good. Hoffman goes into the history of terrorism and mentions little-known groups such as Narodnaya Volya, which makes it a gem. It doesn't stop at the status quo groups of modern terrorism, either, discussing early Israeli terrorism which assisted in the formation of the country and also a great discussion on White Supremacist groups as well. There are also discussions on the use of media by terrorist groups, which is exquisitely interesting. Later on in the book it gets boring because the author goes into the "future" of terrorism and begins to sound like a modern-day journalist, only keeping the great vocabulary found throughout the book, and only that makes it worth finishing.
Bruce Hoffman's expertly researched Inside Terrorism is apparent before even reading it-there are 130 pages of notes, bibliography, and index at the end of the book. However, the style isn't overly academic (read turgid). He starts out by "Defining Terrorism" and how terrorists differ from other types of criminals irregular fighters. He states there are: political aims and motives, violence or threats of violence, seeking far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond immediate targets, organization/individuals influenced by ideological or example of some terrorist movement-perpetrated by a non-state entity.
Then he moves onto the history of terrorism, internationalization, religion, suicide terrorism, old media, new media, "The Modern Terrorist Mind-set", and the implications for today and tomorrow. The historical examples are quite interesting. For example he points out that some of the first modern terrorist were Jewish Zionists who wanted Britain out of the Middle East and succeeded after killing two soldiers. As well as, chronicling the success of the PLO to legitimize itself to the extent that they went from the cold blooded murders of the 1972 Munich Olympics to where it now runs Palestine. He is particularly good on the old media which helped organizations like the PLO get publicity for their causes to the new media that allows many individuals to become self starters through information available on the internet. It was interesting and well-written adding some clarity to the of terrorism today.
One of the most widely read scholarly primers on terrorism, this book definitely holds up in the present. Hoffman doesn't have a major overarching thesis; his task, rather, is to conceptualize terrorism and summarize its history. The central underlying theme is that terrorism is strategic violence; it is not primarily about mayhem and murder, although he qualifies that point a bit halfway through the book. In this sense, Inside Terrorism is a Clausewitzean book.
Hoffman argues that modern terrorism really started in postcolonial struggles like Israel and Algeria. This was usually not mass casualty terrorism, but targeted violence against military and gov't personnel (Algeria less so). It was also generally secular nationalist violence. In the 1960s, the locus of terrorism shifted to the MIddle East, particularly the rise of the PLO and associated Palestinian groups. Their attacks were brutal, but they rarely fit the label of mass casualty terror. The PLO was, in a sense, a massive success story in getting international attention and forcing the UN, global powers, and other actors to pay attention and try to resolve the dispute. The PLO, and later Hezbollah, shaped the strategy and tactics of dozens of other groups, but few other groups were able to make the leap from terrorist group to quasi-state like these groups did.
So far, most of these terrorist groups fit the mode of using violence largely instrumentally for mostly finite, comprehensible goals. HOffman pivots, though, when religious terrorism became the norm in the 80s to today. We are talking Islamic groups but also white supremacists and cults like Aum Shinrikyo. Religious terrorist groups kind of changed the game; in a sense, they still used violence instrumentally, of course, but the goals were incredibly expansive, world transforming, overthrow the entire international system-level and bring about the apocalypse big. Thus, with that sense of religious justification and dehumanization of the infidel (or whatever dehumanized group) there was far more enthusiasm for enormous destruction (OK City, 911, Bali, Paris, etc) and a willingness to die in the process. Thus, Hoffman sees the terrorist problem as having morphed and in many ways worsened by the time he wrote this in the early 2000s, especially as AQ flattened from a classic model of a hierarchical group more of a transnational network.
I think the most interesting aspect of this book is the question of the strategic rationality of terrorism. One on hand, it is usually integrated into a strategy, and it often works, at least in the sense of catching media and gov't attention and keeping the people terrorized. However, Hoffman acknowledges that the dramatic, violent act of defiance, even self-immolation, can often be an end in itself for people who have felt oppressed and humiliated in some way. This is why I thought it was so compelling that Hoffman described terrorism as a form of altruism. While terrorists can be highly corrupt and self-aggrandizing (the PLO, hello), for the people carrying out the act, and for much of the leadership living constantly on the run, they are altruists in the very basic, denotational sense of one who gives without immediate likelihood of reward to the larger group. Is altruism rational? I think addressing that deeper question is the key to unpacking the rationality of terrorism. I would say that terrorism is "rational" only if you accept the possibly irrational viewpoint that change through any other means (like the political system) is impossible. Why would someone pursue the destructive and costly (to self and others) strategy of terrorism when there's a political system that holds out the possibility of change? Getting at why people make that decision is a deeper historical and psychological question that interests me greatly. In this sense, terrorism is both the negation of politics (change through the system) and its Clausewitzean continuation (use of force to achieve a political end).
This is definitely not a book for the general reader who wants to know about terrorism. It is quite dense and not always colorful. There are two overly long middle chapters about terrorist use of old and new media that are not thrilling and are probably a bit outdated now. If you are researching terrorism or need a volume for teaching, this is a go-to.
Can't remember why I ended up putting this on my Amazon wishlist, and when I got it for Christmas I was slightly regretting it, because it's the kind of textbook-type academic survey that is often, frankly, Very Boring. Even when dealing with an inherently dramatic subject like terrorism. It's the kind of book I buy because I feel like I should and then feel guilty about not finishing.
However, I did in fact finish this one and although dry it is well-written and interesting throughout. Like all of us I guess I have spent quite a bit of time over the years thinking and talking about terrorism, so it's interesting to read a book like this and realise how little I really know — or at least what a messy patchwork of facts, anecdotes and preconceptions went to make up my understanding. This book helped tie all that stuff into context: the history of terrorism, the way different terrorist groups are like or unlike each other, the different kinds of terrorism, the ways terrorists have been successful or not. It's good stuff.
I was afraid that all of the five assigned books for my Critical Trends classes would be dry reads, because I'm used to college books being extremely dry, plus many reviews of the course said the same thing. I decided to get a head start on the reading and read the first assigned book a week before classes start. While the writing wasn't very animated, I wouldn't say it was dry. The information was fascinating and covered in detail a range of subjects.
It gives a great background and definition to terrorism and the motives behind their attacks. I would highly recommend it to anyone who want to know about who these terrorists are and why are they doing what they are doing.
Bruce Hoffman’s Inside Terrorism has earned its reputation as the definitive academic introduction to terrorism not because it simplifies the subject, but because it refuses to caricature it.
Hoffman approaches terrorism neither as an abstract evil nor as a purely strategic phenomenon; instead, he treats it as a historically grounded, politically contingent, and psychologically complex method of violence.
The result is a work that remains indispensable decades after its first publication.
What distinguishes Hoffman’s study is its insistence on definitional rigour. Terrorism, he argues, is not simply violence, but violence designed to communicate — to intimidate audiences beyond the immediate victims.
This communicative dimension allows Hoffman to trace continuities between disparate movements: anarchists of the nineteenth century, anti-colonial insurgents, left-wing revolutionaries, ethno-nationalist groups, and religious extremists.
Rather than forcing these movements into a single explanatory box, Hoffman patiently examines how ideology, organisation, and historical context shape their methods.
The book’s historical sweep is one of its greatest strengths. Hoffman situates modern terrorism within a long genealogy, showing how tactics evolve in response to state countermeasures, media technologies, and political opportunity structures.
This prevents the common error of treating contemporary terrorism — especially Islamist militancy — as unprecedented or civilisationally unique.
Hoffman does not deny novelty, but he insists on continuity, particularly in the logic of terror as political theatre.
Equally important is Hoffman’s attention to organisational structure. He explores how terrorist groups recruit, train, finance, and maintain cohesion under extreme pressure.
His discussion of leadership, factionalism, and internal discipline reveals terrorism not as chaos but as an intensely managed enterprise. This perspective quietly dismantles the myth of terrorists as irrational fanatics, replacing it with a more disturbing truth: terrorism often functions through cold calculation.
Hoffman’s prose is clear, authoritative, and restrained. He avoids sensationalism even when addressing mass-casualty attacks, focusing instead on strategic intent and political consequences. This restraint enhances the book’s credibility and makes it suitable for both academic and policy audiences.
While critics have occasionally noted a Western security lens in Hoffman’s analysis, his commitment to evidence and the comparative method keeps the work from descending into ideological advocacy.
Ultimately, Inside Terrorism succeeds because it balances moral clarity with analytical discipline. Hoffman never excuses terrorism, but he refuses to explain it away through simplistic narratives of madness or hatred.
For students, researchers, policymakers, and serious readers seeking a foundational understanding of terrorism as a political phenomenon, this book remains unmatched.
From Terror to Terrorism: The attack on Charlie Hebdo and Inside Terrorism by Bruce Hoffman
The recent terrorist attack on the French satirical journal Charlie Hebdo brought to the foreground the threat of terrorism. On January 7, 2015, two Islamist gunmen armed with AK-47 assault rifles, a shotgun and a M80 Zolia forced their way into the offices of Charlie Hebdo and shot into the staff of the journal, wounding eleven people and killing twelve others, including Stéphane Charbobbier (“Charb”), one of its chief editors. This wasn’t the first time Charlie Hebdo, known for its left wing bent and daring satires of social and political issues, became the target of protests and attacks for its irreverent cartoons featuring the prophet Muhammad. The first reaction, on February 11 2006, was a peaceful Muslim march in Paris to protest the publication on February 9, 2006 caricature of Muhammad. The cartoon featured the prophet weeping along with the caption “C’est dur d’être aimé par des cons” (“It’s tough being loved by idiots”). The Grand Mosque of Paris sued the magazine (the lawsuit reached French courts in 2007), claiming that it included racist cartoons. In 2008 the executive editor of Charlie Hebdo, Philippe Val, was acquitted of the charge by the French court, which reasoned that the cartoon did not attack Islam per se, but rather Islamist fundamentalism. This wasn’t the end of the controversy, however. In 2011 Charlie Hebdo published an issue renamed “Charia Hebdo”, alluding to Sharia law, citing Muhammad as stating “100 lashes of the whip if you don’t die laughing”. This time the Muslim reaction was more menacing. On November 2011 the journal’s office was firebombed. Mohammed Moussaoui, the head of the French Council of the Muslim Faith, issued a statement condemning “the very mocking tone of the paper towards Islam and its prophet but [reaffirming] with force its total opposition to all acts and all forms of violence.” In 2012 the journal published satirical cartoons of Muhammad again, some of which featured the prophet naked. This too caused a lot of controversy, prompting the government to preemptively increase security at French embassies throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The journal defended its series of Muhammad cartoons in the name of the freedom of speech, stating that they caricaturize many different religions–including Catholicism and Judaism—rather than targeting Islam in particular. The deadly terrorist attack on January 7th generated widespread international support for Charlie Hebdo and for the freedom of speech in general. Millions gathered in Paris and other major cities around the world holding up the banner “Je suis Charlie” (“I am Charlie”). The day following the attack the journal announced that it would continue its publication. On January 14, it featured the prophet Mohammed on its cover once again, holding up a banner “Je suis Charlie” with the title “Tout est pardonné” (“All is forgiven”). This controversy raises important questions not only about protecting the freedom of speech in democratic societies, but also about the nature of terrorism itself. Many believe that the biggest threat to contemporary democracies comes not so much from totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, as from terrorism. What is terrorism? The concept isn’t easy to define. In his groundbreaking book, Inside Terrorism (originally published in 1999, revised edition, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006)-- a classic on the subject—Bruce Hoffman starts off by exploring the Oxford English Dictionary definitions of the term, which, he argues, prove unsatisfactory. The first set of definitions offered, “ a system of terror,” “a policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; methods of intimidation” are too broad and anachronistic. These descriptions apply equally to the terror instigated by Robespierre during the French revolution, to Stalin’s “Great Terror” and to contemporary terrorist attacks. One of the main reasons terrorism is so difficult to define, Hoffman explains, it’s because it’s an inherently historical concept, which has changed meaning drastically over the centuries. During the French Revolution of 1789, the term “regime de la terreur” had a positive connotation, associated with revolutionary government overthrowing the monarchy. The revolutionary leader—and tyrant—Maximilien Robespierre viewed terror as the only way to uproot the old social order and institute a new revolutionary regime. Once the revolution got out of hand, however, and practically everyone could be seen as its enemy and sentenced to death by guillotine, la terreur (terror) acquired the negative connotation we retain today. Edmund Burke’s description of the revolutionaries—“Thousands of those Hell hounds called Terrorists…let loose on the people”—strikes us as surprisingly modern. By the 1930’s, “Terror” became associated with the rise of totalitarian regimes—Nazism and Communism—which acquired almost total control over entire countries by instilling fear in the population. The democratic concepts of freedom of speech, human rights, and justice became meaningless. Hoffman cites the Nazi Minister of Interior Hermann Goering addressing the German people to announce measures against the communists and Jews: “My measures will not be crippled by any judicial thinking. My measures will not be crippled by any bureaucracy. Here I don’t have to worry about Justice; my mission is only to destroy and exterminate, nothing more.” Hoffman then continues to discuss how Stalin launched his fear-instilling purges in a deliberately arbitrary fashion, to instill fear not only in those who opposed to regime, but also those who could or might oppose it: in other words, in everyone. Following WWII, however, the term “terrorism” became, once again, associated with revolutionaries—fighting for national liberation or self-determination—usually working against the system and fighting against entrenched regimes. Many terrorist organizations, including the PLO, see themselves not as terrorists but as “freedom fighters” (as PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat called the PLO in 1974). Today, although “terrorism” is even more dissipated and difficult to define, it is not hard to identify. It pervades the news, from the 9/11 terrorist bombing of the World Trade Centers and Pentagon to the recent attack on Charlie Hebdo. An inherently negative term, “terrorism” refers to acts of violence and/or the threat of violence, particularly against civilians. Their target is not only their specific victims, but also all those who see their punishment, which potentially includes the entire world that reads the news: particularly citizens of the nations they declare “enemies”. Most importantly, Hoffman explains that terrorists do not observe the ethical codes laid out by the Geneva and Hague Conventions (from the 1860’s to right after WWII in 1949), which prohibit taking civilians as hostages; govern the humane treatment of surrendered prisoners of war; outlaw reprisals against civilians and POW’s; uphold the inviolability of diplomats and other government officials. Terrorists express a fundamental disregard for such rules and for the very concept of human rights. Usually terrorists defend their actions, stating that the means justify their ends. The concept of “terrorism” becomes much more murky when democratic societies also engage in acts of terror against civilian populations to further their political ends. Such actions risk diluting the concept of “terrorism” and taking away from the moral righteousness with which they condemn terrorist activities. But that is a whole other can of worms…
An in-depth discussion on terrorism and how this phenomena is currently shaping global politics and the geopolitical landscape.
Bruce Hoffman dissects the term terrorism and explains how terrorism changed throughout history. A terrorist is an amorphous and stateless opponent that lurks in the shadows. They come in many different forms: they can be religious; they can be cults; they can represent an ideology; they can represent an ethnic or racial group; they are separatist; or they are revolutionary. These different types of terrorists share one commonality, they are reactionary. They are a result of a perceived danger or grievance that forces them to take action.
Terrorist organizations conducts clandestine operations to strike their perceived enemy. But why do non-state organizations use terrorism? Because terrorism is a tool, used by a weaker opponent to equalize the playing field against a much stronger opponent. It is a tool that generates psychological fallout, which results in political consequences for the victim state. The ultimate goal of a terrorist organization is to win a war of attrition by prolonging the war until it reaches its culmination point. This culmination point is psychological turmoil that breaks the state's equilibrium and consumes the entire populace with fears of being victims to a terrorist attack.
Terrorism will never remain the same. It is an ever changing tool that transcends all aspects of war. Terrorist organizations will continue to implement both conventional and non-conventional warfare, and at the same time utilize the internet to wage informational warfare against states. A terrorist's longevity does not depend on the carnage they create, that's not what makes terrorism last long. Longevity relies on how terrorism promulgates their message into the hearts and minds of all people, and how fast they can replenish their dwindling ranks. A terrorist organization does not need the support of an entire population. As long there is a few who sympathize with them, they will always continue to exist.
Género. Ensayo. Lo que nos cuenta. El libro A mano armada (publicación original: Inside Terrorism, 1998), con el clarificador subtítulo Historia del terrorismo, es un acercamiento al fenómeno del terrorismo, al significado cambiante de la palabra y a sus características, especialmente centrado en las últimas décadas del siglo XX.
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As a complete “ non expert” I am reluctant to review this book. So this is a very personal response : details many many cases of terrorism , for various motivations at various times, but was missing a thoughtful big picture conclusion. Forest for the trees syndrome. But perhaps this book was never intended to provide that type of conclusion, and fulfills its purpose as a catalog of terrorism’s many faces.
An excellent, well-written and comprehensive review of terrorism. I would like to see an update, as the book was written in 2017 and a lot has changed since then. Nonetheless, this is an essential primer on terrorism and should be required reading for anyone interested in homeland or national security.
I had to read this book for a class. Though the writing was a little dry at times, it was very informative and enabled me to learn a lot about the subject and to excel in the class.
Hoffman provides an interesting take on terrorism while incorporating other writings and research. I found some of the chapters to be lengthy and a little boring, but it proved worthwhile.
This was an informative book about terrorism. I wouldn’t suggest reading if besides for academic and learning purposes. It is definitely informative and I learned a lot from it.
This book is a great resource to understand the beginning of many terrorist organizations and what might be motivating them to inflict pain on other humans.
This is a middle of the road (no sophistry from Chomsky and Hondrich to be found) book on terrorism. Preceding from a serviceable definition of terrorism that restricts it to non-state actors (although they may be state-sponsored like Hizbollah), it presents a useful description of the history (up to 2006) of modern terrorism, and a typology of terrorism by motivation: left-wing, right-wing, national or ethnic liberation movements, and religious extremists. It attempts to be balanced by spending an awful lot of time discussing American Christian and white supremacist militias, when current terrorism is almost entirely Islamic. It wades into the question of root causes. (Hint: there is no support for the contention that poverty causes terrorism.) The book basically pivots on the question of discrimination (the laws of war kind, not the civil rights kind). Left-Wing secular terrorists are on one side tend to be highly discriminatory as to the selection of victims and avoid mass killings of innocents. Terrorists motivated by religion tend to be indiscriminate, and ethnic/nationalist terrorists tend to fall in the middle. (Right-wing terrorism since the Second World War has mainly tended to be incompetent hooliganism.) White supremacist movements have been towards the religious end of the spectrum.
Terrorism is not mindless (may be random or finely targeted) but rather is a rational tactic chosen to achieve specific political goals. Terrorist organizations may be hierarchical or self-organizing cells. They learn from experience and from each other. The author discusses the proficiency that the Provisional IRA developed in building bombs over time, the outsourcing of terrorist training to the PLO by European Left-Wing terrorist groups, and the way suicide terrorism has been a tactic taken up by disparate groups since Hizbollah's famous attack against the U.S. Marine and French Paratrooper barracks in Lebanon. For those not old enough to remember the terrorism of the 1960s and 1970s there is a good primmer on Left-Wing terrorism and the PLO. The author expresses clear admiration for the PLO's success in achieving its political goals through masterful use of terrorism.
Los libros de investigación no suelen envejecer bien, al igual que algunos textos filosóficos hecho al vapor, una reacción ante un evento cuya importancia desapareció tan pronto acabó aquél. Este texto sufre de este mal. Lo triste es que no parece adquirir una virtud contraria: la importancia perenne de un documento que predice o que hace patente tendencias hodiernas, a pesar de haberse escrito hace décadas. Este poder predictivo brilla por su ausencia en este libro. Se habló al final de la posibilidad de que el terrorismo usase armas de destrucción masiva para sus actos, lo cual no ha pasado. Ojalá no ocurra nunca.
El libro "A mano armada" fue escrito antes del once de septiembre de 2001 y por tanto parece un texto superfluo, que incluso parece hablar de un mundo muy diferente del que vivimos. Ni siquiera parece intuir las tendencias que surgirían posteriormente. Hay breves menciones a AlQaeda, y nada del talibán (que no es un movimiento terrorista, cabe mencionar) lo cual hace de este título uno anacrónico. Considero que para colmo no tuvo la profundidad ni la erudición de obras como la de Walter Laqueur. Su introducción al tema fue muy vaga. Esta ambigüedad permanece en gran parte del libro. La parte más interesante pero a la vez más árida es la relación del terrorismo con las cámaras, de cómo el terrorismo se alimenta de la publicidad que recrea. Sin embargo fue el extracto que más tardé en leer.
Considero yo que uno podría prescindir de la lectura de este libro.
While huge in scope, and well researched, Hoffman's book lacks depth, especially in the religious terrorism part. His definition of terrorism is also lacking, giving no credible explanation on why he refuses to include state terrorism in the definition, and his classification of Timothy McVeigh as a christian religious terrorist is flat out wrong. All in all, though eloquently written and padded with a truckload of references, the book is rife with mistakes and interpretations which seem to have fallen out of a right-wing think tank textbook. However, I would not feel comfortable giving it only two stars for its number of mistakes and biases- if one can navigate through the book and recognize where it fails, it can be an outstanding tool for further research. My prefered grade would be between two and three stars, but since there is no such thing, I'll be generous and rate it with three stars.
The"Bible" of anti and counter terrorism. Anyone interested or working in the field should definitely avail themselves of this important and ground breaking work. The book traces the origins and development of terrorism from its earliest modern manifestations during the anti colonialism period up through to the present day. The terrorist mind set is examined in depth as is the relationship between the media and terrorism. This is an important book on an important subject. I would even recommend it to those with nothing more than a passing interest. I would have given 6 stars had they been offered.
Hoffman provides an explanation of the differences between secular, religious, transnational, and state sponsored terrorism with examples of each. He also covers motivations and operational procedures. He also discusses the phenomenon represented by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda representing an ideological movement rather than a structured organization.
This work will not help you gain a basic understanding of the subject. In essence, it's a discussion of political theory supported by outdated examples and generalizations; and it fails to provide any practical detailed investigation into the mechanisms of terrorism.