Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence, with its vigorous rejection of every appeal to the beyond, is often presumed to be indifferent to the concerns of religion. Daniel Barber shows that this is not the case. Addressing the intersection between Deleuze’s thought and the notion of religion, he proposes an alliance between immanence and the act of naming God. In doing so, he gives us a way out of the paralysing debate between religion and the secular. What matters is not to take one side or the other, but to create the new in this world.
Euangelion (Revolution): The Good News according to Deleuze
Given his previous publications, it should be no surprise that Daniel Barber, erudite and ingenious, is becoming an increasingly strong contributor to the advancement of Deluzian studies (thanks, in part, to his inclusion of wider than usual original sources), both philosophically (secular) and theologically (sacred).
He has not only delivered in this new publication refreshing explications on most key concepts of Deleuze (if you are not fully clear about D&R, you will enjoy this), but also has identified key theologically compatible thinkers, including refreshingly Adorno, and Yoder. Finally a crack has been opened via Deleuze to reveal a theology suitable for the 21st Century (although, Whitehead and Process Theology are previous pioneers, but perhaps not as comprehensively).
His project consists in nothing less than turning away from the false war between the secular and theology, away from the privileging of the transcendent which wants to shackle the creativity of life (and of God) to the reality of the disturbing, the suffering of this world, the immanent as revealed by Deleuze.
In the Introduction, we get Daniel's plan: to address the idea that "the act of imagining God--or of naming God, that is, theology--is brought into relation with the act of imagining and making the world." (p. 2). Daniel asserts that "God names the value of values, or the value in terms of which the world is evaluated." (p. 3). It is in the concept of immanence, the imagining and making of the world, versus the concept of transcendence, the abstracting and denial of the world, that Daniel makes the Deluzian appeal: "a discourse of the new that is proper to immanence should not be aligned with any project of secularization (much less with any project of Christianization)" (p. 9). Daniel addresses Christianity as a representative example of religion rather than as a privileged belief in order to contrast religion with the secular, each in contrast with Deleuze.
Chapter One is an examination of immanence and difference, tracing how they emerge in Heidegger, and become further developed by Derrida, but only become resolved by Deleuze's differential immanence--a very informative prehistory.
Chapter Two (The Difference that Immanence Makes) explores Deleuze's immanence, especially because it is differential, and always in need of re-expression, a central term in Daniel's project.
Chapter Three (Stuck in the Middle) is delimited to examining Christian theology's "analogy of being (where analogy refers to . . . the transcendent)", primarily via Hart and Milbank who stand against difference and immanence. Daniel argues that their critique is invalid and that they reject the contributions that "suffering and discord make to an account of immanent creation."
Chapter Four (Yoder: From the Particular to the Divine) is where it gets most interesting, raising the concern of mediation between the divine and the world, "the givenness of thisworldly and the exteriority of the otherworldly, " and the need to "understand mediation within immanence" as a break with the present and re-expression of the present. This chapter is possibly Daniel's magnus opus, his greatest contribution to theology via Deleuze, and has immanence written all over it, as Yoder says: "'the root meaning of the term euangelion would today best be translated 'revolution'. Originally it is not a religious or a persoanl term at all, but a secular one: 'good news,'"
Chapter Five (Adorno: A Metaphilosophy of Immanence) deals with what Daniel ascribes failure to Deleuze's inability to "conceive the relationship wetween the unconditioned nature of the future and the conditioned nature of the present. He thus turns to what he calls metaphilosophy via shame, "suffering, depression, wretchedness and senselessness," but he argues this to "resist the present's tendency to continue into the future," the negative sense of time which is Chronos (versus Aion, time "without thickness and without extension").
Chapter Six (Icons of Immanence) begins with the concept of immanent belief (versus transcendent belief), the affection of dissatisfaction precluding any reconciliation with the given. This is where Daniel unfortunately claims the necessity of "Icons of Immanence . . . produced by the re-expression of differential intensity . . . having now passed through a dissatisfaction that is utopic [a valuable term, and well developed] . . . and that remains senseless [also a well-developed valuable term] . . . and in this way made real." Given Deleuze's heavy emphasis on iconoclasm, perhaps a better phrase could have been "Iconoclasms of Immanence," but this is a minor issue.
Daniel masterfully succeeds in his purpose of putting theology on the trajectory of immanence and thereby avoiding the false war of the secular versus the theological. In so doing, he also inscribes in theology creativity and an ethical call to engage in the suffering of this world with eyes wide open.
For additional direction in Deleuze and theology, see: Iconoclastic Theology: Gilles Deleuze and the Secretion of Atheism (Plateaus - New Directions in Deleuze Studies) by F. LeRon Shults. In the Introduction, we get Daniel's plan: to address the idea that "the act of imagining God--or of naming God, that is, theology--is brought into relation with the act of imagining and making the world." (p. 2). Daniel asserts that "God names the value of values, or the value in terms of which the world is evaluated." (p. 3). It is in the concept of immanence, the imagining and making of the world, versus the concept of transcendence, the abstracting and denial of the world, that Daniel makes the Deluzian appeal: "a discourse of the new that is proper to immanence should not be aligned with any project of secularization (much less with any project of Christianization)" (p. 9). Daniel addresses Christianity as a representative example of religion rather than as a privileged belief in order to contrast religion with the secular, each in contrast with Deleuze.
Chapter One is an examination of immanence and difference, tracing how they emerge in Heidegger, and become further developed by Derrida, but only become resolved by Deleuze's differential immanence--a very informative prehistory.
Chapter Two (The Difference that Immanence Makes) explores Deleuze's immanence, especially because it is differential, and always in need of re-expression, a central term in Daniel's project.
Chapter Three (Stuck in the Middle) is delimited to examining Christian theology's "analogy of being (where analogy refers to . . . the transcendent)", primarily via Hart and Milbank who stand against difference and immanence. Daniel argues that their critique is invalid and that they reject the contributions that "suffering and discord make to an account of immanent creation."
Chapter Four (Yoder: From the Particular to the Divine) is where it gets most interesting, raising the concern of mediation between the divine and the world, "the givenness of thisworldly and the exteriority of the otherworldly, " and the need to "understand mediation within immanence" as a break with the present and re-expression of the present. This chapter is actually Daniel's magnus opus, his greatest contribution to theology via Deleuze, and has immanence written all over it, as Yoder says: "'the root meaning of the term euangelion would today best be translated 'revolution'. Originally it is not a religious or a persoanl term at all, but a secular one: 'good news,'"
Chapter Five (Adorno: A Metaphilosophy of Immanence) deals with what Daniel ascribes failure to Deleuze's inability to "conceive the relationship wetween the unconditioned nature of the future and the conditioned nature of the present. He thus turns to what he calls metaphilosophy via shame, "suffering, depression, wretchedness and senselessness," but he argues this to "resist the present's tendency to continue into the future," the negative sense of time which is Chronos (versus Aion).
Chapter Six (Icons of Immanence) begins with the concept of immanent belief (versus transcendent belief), the affection of dissatisfaction precluding any reconciliation with the given. This is where Daniel unfortunately claims the necessity of "Icons of Immanence . . . produced by the re-expression of differential intensity . . . having now passed through a dissatisfaction that is utopic [a valuable term, and well developed] . . . and that remains senseless [also a well-developed valuable term] . . . and in this way made real." Given Deleuze's heavy emphasis on iconoclasm, perhaps a better phrase could have been "Iconoclasms of Immanence," but this is a minor issue.
I suggest that Daniel is wholly on target except for his concept of icon (perhaps a minor issue), which reflects his failure to fully embrace Deluzian immanence, and marks a temporary setback to the transcendental which he stands against throughout his project. Hopefully he will see the incommensurability of the icon and crystalize his position.
For a clear position on the significance of icon in Deleuze, see Iconoclastic Theology: Gilles Deleuze and the Secretion of Atheism (Plateaus - New Directions in Deleuze Studies) by F. LeRon Shults.