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Demokrácia és populizmus: Félelem és gyűlölet
Merre visz a liberális demokrácia útja? John Lukacs 2005-ben megjelent esszéje szerint a populizmus felé, amit az elmúlt két évtized világpolitikai tendenciái is igazolni látszanak. Reneszánszát éli egy olyan politizálás, mely immáron a modern tömegmédia eszközeivel, végletekig leegyszerűsített üzenetekkel hajhássza a népszerűséget - "a nép" egyetlen hiteles képviseleteként fellépve, akár a gyűlölet szításától sem visszariadva.
A Demokrácia és populizmus közérthető és elgondolkodtató áttekintése annak, miképp változott a történelem során a politikai jobb- és baloldal, és hogy milyen veszélyeket rejt magában a "totális demokrácia".
"Az igazi hazafiság védelmező, a nacionalizmus támadó"
A Demokrácia és populizmus közérthető és elgondolkodtató áttekintése annak, miképp változott a történelem során a politikai jobb- és baloldal, és hogy milyen veszélyeket rejt magában a "totális demokrácia".
"Az igazi hazafiság védelmező, a nacionalizmus támadó"
288 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2005
12 people are currently reading
229 people want to read
About the author
John Lukacs
64 books116 followersLukacs was born in Budapest to a Roman Catholic father and Jewish mother. His parents divorced before the Second World War. During the Second World War he was forced to serve in a Hungarian labour battalion for Jews. During the German occupation of Hungary in 1944-45 he evaded deportation to the death camps, and survived the siege of Budapest. In 1946, as it became clear that Hungary was going to be a repressive Communist regime, he fled to the United States. In the early 1950s however, Lukacs wrote several articles in Commonweal criticizing the approach taken by Senator Joseph McCarthy, whom he described as a vulgar demagogue.[1]
Lukacs sees populism as the greatest threat to civilization. By his own description, he considers himself to be a reactionary. He claims that populism is the essence of both National Socialism and Communism. He denies that there is such a thing as generic fascism, noting for example that the differences between the political regimes of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy are greater than their similarities.[2]
A major theme in Lukacs's writing is his agreement with the assertion by the French historian Alexis de Tocqueville that aristocratic elites have been replaced by democratic elites, which obtain power via an appeal to the masses. In his 2002 book, At the End of an Age, Lukacs argued that the modern/bourgeois age, which began around the time of the Renaissance, is coming to an end.[3] The rise of populism and the decline of elitism is the theme of his experimental work, A Thread of Years (1998), a series of vignettes set in each year of the 20th century from 1900 to 1998, tracing the abandonment of gentlemanly conduct and the rise of vulgarity in American culture. Lukacs defends traditional Western civilization against what he sees as the leveling and debasing effects of mass culture.
By his own admission a dedicated Anglophile, Lukacs’s favorite historical figure is Winston Churchill, whom he considers to be the greatest statesman of the 20th century, and the savior of not only Great Britain, but also of Western civilization. A recurring theme in his writing is the duel between Winston Churchill and Adolf Hitler for mastery of the world. The struggle between them, whom Lukacs sees as the archetypical reactionary and the archetypical revolutionary, is the major theme of The Last European War (1976), The Duel (1991), Five Days in London (1999) and 2008's Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat, a book about Churchill’s first major speech as Prime Minister. Lukacs argues that Great Britain (and by extension the British Empire) could not defeat Germany by itself, winning required the entry of the United States and the Soviet Union, but he contends that Churchill, by ensuring that Germany failed to win the war in 1940, laid the groundwork for an Allied victory.
Lukacs holds strong isolationist beliefs, and unusually for an anti-Communist émigré, "airs surprisingly critical views of the Cold War from a unique conservative perspective."[4] Lukacs claims that the Soviet Union was a feeble power on the verge of collapse, and contended that the Cold War was an unnecessary waste of American treasure and life. Likewise, Lukacs has also condemned the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
In his 1997 book, George F. Kennan and the Origins of Containment, 1944-1946, a collection of letters between Lukacs and his close friend George F. Kennan exchanged in 1994-1995, Lukacs and Kennan criticized the New Left claim that the Cold War was caused by the United States. Lukacs argued however that although it was Joseph Stalin who was largely responsible for the beginning of the Cold War, the administration of Dwight Eisenhower missed a chance for ending the Cold War in 1953 after Stalin's death, and as a consequence the Cold War went on for many more decades.
Lukacs sees populism as the greatest threat to civilization. By his own description, he considers himself to be a reactionary. He claims that populism is the essence of both National Socialism and Communism. He denies that there is such a thing as generic fascism, noting for example that the differences between the political regimes of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy are greater than their similarities.[2]
A major theme in Lukacs's writing is his agreement with the assertion by the French historian Alexis de Tocqueville that aristocratic elites have been replaced by democratic elites, which obtain power via an appeal to the masses. In his 2002 book, At the End of an Age, Lukacs argued that the modern/bourgeois age, which began around the time of the Renaissance, is coming to an end.[3] The rise of populism and the decline of elitism is the theme of his experimental work, A Thread of Years (1998), a series of vignettes set in each year of the 20th century from 1900 to 1998, tracing the abandonment of gentlemanly conduct and the rise of vulgarity in American culture. Lukacs defends traditional Western civilization against what he sees as the leveling and debasing effects of mass culture.
By his own admission a dedicated Anglophile, Lukacs’s favorite historical figure is Winston Churchill, whom he considers to be the greatest statesman of the 20th century, and the savior of not only Great Britain, but also of Western civilization. A recurring theme in his writing is the duel between Winston Churchill and Adolf Hitler for mastery of the world. The struggle between them, whom Lukacs sees as the archetypical reactionary and the archetypical revolutionary, is the major theme of The Last European War (1976), The Duel (1991), Five Days in London (1999) and 2008's Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat, a book about Churchill’s first major speech as Prime Minister. Lukacs argues that Great Britain (and by extension the British Empire) could not defeat Germany by itself, winning required the entry of the United States and the Soviet Union, but he contends that Churchill, by ensuring that Germany failed to win the war in 1940, laid the groundwork for an Allied victory.
Lukacs holds strong isolationist beliefs, and unusually for an anti-Communist émigré, "airs surprisingly critical views of the Cold War from a unique conservative perspective."[4] Lukacs claims that the Soviet Union was a feeble power on the verge of collapse, and contended that the Cold War was an unnecessary waste of American treasure and life. Likewise, Lukacs has also condemned the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
In his 1997 book, George F. Kennan and the Origins of Containment, 1944-1946, a collection of letters between Lukacs and his close friend George F. Kennan exchanged in 1994-1995, Lukacs and Kennan criticized the New Left claim that the Cold War was caused by the United States. Lukacs argued however that although it was Joseph Stalin who was largely responsible for the beginning of the Cold War, the administration of Dwight Eisenhower missed a chance for ending the Cold War in 1953 after Stalin's death, and as a consequence the Cold War went on for many more decades.
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Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews
September 22, 2011
Flaws aside—the majority of which stem from Lukacs' occasionally superficial interpretations or broad generalizations of otherwise complex trends and developments in the realm of art, culture, morality, religion and politics—this is a truly perspicacious and enlightening read. Lukacs provides nothing in the way of notes, a bibliography, or references—apart from apposite quotations scattered throughout the thirteen score of pages—to offer in support of his thematic supposition; rather he is drawing upon the considerable experience acquired during a lifetime as an esteemed—if somewhat unconventional—historian and expects the reader to possess a sufficient knowledge of the events under discussion to draw their own conclusions as to the accuracy of the claims that have been put forth. For his part, the learned author has assembled a focussed but conversational volume—his desire is not so much to dictate his views to the reader as to provide them for usage on the reader's behalf in rendering judgements about the topics under discussion. Lukacs has some serious concerns and doubts about the direction and viability of western democracy, and he wishes to pass along a measure of this uneasy skepticism while something might still be done about it; a self-proclaimed reactionary striving from his perch in this twenty-first century to offer some historical interpretations in a Tocquevillian fashion. Now, right from the outset Professor Lukacs cautions that, as his career as an academic and historian has been centered entirely upon that of the Western Cultures and their immediate descendants, his cautionary exposition will only apply to the same; the future leanings of Central and Southeastern Asia, Africa, South America, the Middle East—to these he makes no claims of knowledge sufficient to render his opinions. Frankly, I find such forthright honesty refreshing in a work of this kind, and it was in a favorable state of mind that I was off to the races.
Of course, there is much in Lukacs' jeremiad that I have heard before, from the textual mouths of Delsol, Lasch, and Ortega y Gasset, to name a few; but Lukacs, possessed of his own idiosyncrasies, packages the entirety of his thought into a gem-studded goblet fashioned to draw deeply from the well of wisdom—and not of the conventional sort. In a nutshell, the author envisions a worrying process of devolution from Democracy to Populism across the board within Western Liberalism. As this ripening populism is flavored with Nationalist strains, it is one worthy of a closer inspection to discover exactly how this came about, and what it portends for the future—a Nationalist Socialism of the radical right caught fire and scorched a significant portion of the globe in the twentieth century, and Lukacs' book might offer helpful pointers as to the trends, similarities, and developments as things now stand for those who would prevent such a cataclysmic ideology from ever arising again.
In Lukacs' view, such shopworn labels as Conservative and Liberal have long lost their original meanings, and are now bandied about authoritatively by modern political and/or cultural tribes who seek to claim an inheritance from such categorical descriptives that isn't actually there. Seeing in Liberal Parliamentarism a lethargic and unappealing institution that long ago peaked in its achievements, he finds the masses more compellingly drawn towards Populism and Progressivism, which strains largely separated in the period posterior to the First World War. Lukacs believes that the categories of Right and Left do still maintain relevance for our modern situation, through which he traces the (de)evolution of a nationalist socialism and internationalist communism, originally of the Left, but of which the former has substantially bled over into the Right to the degree that the latter's original placeholders—Conservative and/or Catholic aristocrats, monarchists, landowners, the forces of Reaction to the revolutionary impulse of the early modern era—have been mostly relegated to the sidelines.
Lukacs works in a variety of fascinating movements and interpretations on his theory: the inclination for the working class, once it has tasted materialist wares, to opt for nationalist exceptionalism as opposed to an internationalist class conflict which would threaten to deprive them of their gains in goods and self-respect; the turn of democratic societies into ones in which publicity trumps privacy, and then sees celebrity emerge as an important property in generating new elites and guiding the views of the masses; the ephemeral nature of majority opinion, the manipulation of such through polls and a self-serving media in order to direct political agendas; the necessity for minorities to advance their legislative desires through the generation of sufficient noise to attract the entertainment and media eyes which will promote such needs; the general substitution of entertainment and demagoguery for education and informed opinion, with all of the vulgarization which ensues from that manner of change; the hazy boundaries of criminality within such a society and the history of co-optation and co-operation between the criminal element and the police services of the state; and the spread of a triumphant Socialism across the breadth of the political spectrum, existing and stretching its tendrils even as the distracting or confused hawking of the free-market champions vies to rise above the cacophony of a culture-altering global marketplace. In other words, the author is setting the stage for the evolutionary progression that saw aristocracy replaced by democracy, which is morphing into a mass-based system in which Popular Sovereignty has arisen to the point where the state is designed to serve the former's nebulous requirements, and the tools of the state are readily turned to a Nationalist Exceptionalism that taps into the roots of the anger, frustration, and confusion that abound in any such society in which formerly hard morals, values, and ideals have lost all of their rigidity and can therefore little support the rights-and-freedom-laden individual, promoted above all others on his own Liberal dais but wilting under the unrelenting glare of that fulgent spotlight.
Thus, it is a Nationalist Populism that worries Lukacs. As the Second World War and its bookending periods are his own particular field of expertise, he produces a truly insight-riddled analysis of the similarities and differences between Fascism and National Socialism and how each appeals to elements inherent in modern mass societies; the misuse of terms like totalitarianism and dictatorship, and the similarities between Hitler's Third Reich and Stalin's Soviet Russia; juxtaposes Patriotism against Nationalism to explain how the former, a property common amongst the older Right, has been superseded by the latter and its adherents amongst the new Right. In the latter he sees a turning point in Woodrow Wilson's vow to Make the world safe for Democracy and from which derived the later conviction amongst US Nationalists that America was meant to lead the entire globe forward into a Brave New Future. Lukacs believes rather that Democracy should be made safe for the World, which would mean channeling the current trend to barbarism within a rampant populism into something less vulgar, empty of values, and emotionally driven.
The endpoint of Lukacs' big-little-book is a thoughtful rumination on the general tendency of the modern extreme Right to operate from Hatred, the far Left from Fear. Whilst stressing that these two ugly sentiments are almost always intermingled in both their generation and operation, and that neither such bedrock instance of the Seven Deadlies necessarily endows violence or cowardice within their respective members, it is a generalization that he believes suits the current situation, especially in the United States. A Left operating from a pervasive fear of their aggressive Nationalist Populist opponents whom, they deem, are far more popular with the masses, and the Right inflamed by a hatred of their Internationalist Progressive opponents, traitors rotting the fabric of the home from within whilst in service to multinational interests, are two descriptors that the Professor deems a broadly accurate summation of where the political bifurcation of the extremes of Left and Right—recognizing that the charge of the extremes exerts an alluring pull upon the more centralist or moderate members of each respective side—are at this particular point in time. They are not, at the moment, in the majority anywhere. The great concern of the author is that this will change, and for the worse, if this trending is not somehow either contained or channeled. How? Here Lukacs brings in the optimism and the hope immanent within a historical process that can never be fully predicted nor directed; but it will definitely require helpful, course changing nudges from those parts of the populace who care about seeing that such a dangerous re-empowerment of National Socialism is not provided the opportunity to emerge triumphant holding the reins of any modern state and prepared to direct their hatred outwards, internally and abroad. For myself, the professor is scratching me right where I itch; and, having read a number of works recently that pursue in depth what Lukacs touches upon here—achieving a lucent and convincing expression in his succinctness—I am better placed to gauge the evidentiary framework that underlies his summational discourse: notwithstanding certain hedges and caveats, I'm sold.
Of course, there is much in Lukacs' jeremiad that I have heard before, from the textual mouths of Delsol, Lasch, and Ortega y Gasset, to name a few; but Lukacs, possessed of his own idiosyncrasies, packages the entirety of his thought into a gem-studded goblet fashioned to draw deeply from the well of wisdom—and not of the conventional sort. In a nutshell, the author envisions a worrying process of devolution from Democracy to Populism across the board within Western Liberalism. As this ripening populism is flavored with Nationalist strains, it is one worthy of a closer inspection to discover exactly how this came about, and what it portends for the future—a Nationalist Socialism of the radical right caught fire and scorched a significant portion of the globe in the twentieth century, and Lukacs' book might offer helpful pointers as to the trends, similarities, and developments as things now stand for those who would prevent such a cataclysmic ideology from ever arising again.
In Lukacs' view, such shopworn labels as Conservative and Liberal have long lost their original meanings, and are now bandied about authoritatively by modern political and/or cultural tribes who seek to claim an inheritance from such categorical descriptives that isn't actually there. Seeing in Liberal Parliamentarism a lethargic and unappealing institution that long ago peaked in its achievements, he finds the masses more compellingly drawn towards Populism and Progressivism, which strains largely separated in the period posterior to the First World War. Lukacs believes that the categories of Right and Left do still maintain relevance for our modern situation, through which he traces the (de)evolution of a nationalist socialism and internationalist communism, originally of the Left, but of which the former has substantially bled over into the Right to the degree that the latter's original placeholders—Conservative and/or Catholic aristocrats, monarchists, landowners, the forces of Reaction to the revolutionary impulse of the early modern era—have been mostly relegated to the sidelines.
Lukacs works in a variety of fascinating movements and interpretations on his theory: the inclination for the working class, once it has tasted materialist wares, to opt for nationalist exceptionalism as opposed to an internationalist class conflict which would threaten to deprive them of their gains in goods and self-respect; the turn of democratic societies into ones in which publicity trumps privacy, and then sees celebrity emerge as an important property in generating new elites and guiding the views of the masses; the ephemeral nature of majority opinion, the manipulation of such through polls and a self-serving media in order to direct political agendas; the necessity for minorities to advance their legislative desires through the generation of sufficient noise to attract the entertainment and media eyes which will promote such needs; the general substitution of entertainment and demagoguery for education and informed opinion, with all of the vulgarization which ensues from that manner of change; the hazy boundaries of criminality within such a society and the history of co-optation and co-operation between the criminal element and the police services of the state; and the spread of a triumphant Socialism across the breadth of the political spectrum, existing and stretching its tendrils even as the distracting or confused hawking of the free-market champions vies to rise above the cacophony of a culture-altering global marketplace. In other words, the author is setting the stage for the evolutionary progression that saw aristocracy replaced by democracy, which is morphing into a mass-based system in which Popular Sovereignty has arisen to the point where the state is designed to serve the former's nebulous requirements, and the tools of the state are readily turned to a Nationalist Exceptionalism that taps into the roots of the anger, frustration, and confusion that abound in any such society in which formerly hard morals, values, and ideals have lost all of their rigidity and can therefore little support the rights-and-freedom-laden individual, promoted above all others on his own Liberal dais but wilting under the unrelenting glare of that fulgent spotlight.
Thus, it is a Nationalist Populism that worries Lukacs. As the Second World War and its bookending periods are his own particular field of expertise, he produces a truly insight-riddled analysis of the similarities and differences between Fascism and National Socialism and how each appeals to elements inherent in modern mass societies; the misuse of terms like totalitarianism and dictatorship, and the similarities between Hitler's Third Reich and Stalin's Soviet Russia; juxtaposes Patriotism against Nationalism to explain how the former, a property common amongst the older Right, has been superseded by the latter and its adherents amongst the new Right. In the latter he sees a turning point in Woodrow Wilson's vow to Make the world safe for Democracy and from which derived the later conviction amongst US Nationalists that America was meant to lead the entire globe forward into a Brave New Future. Lukacs believes rather that Democracy should be made safe for the World, which would mean channeling the current trend to barbarism within a rampant populism into something less vulgar, empty of values, and emotionally driven.
The endpoint of Lukacs' big-little-book is a thoughtful rumination on the general tendency of the modern extreme Right to operate from Hatred, the far Left from Fear. Whilst stressing that these two ugly sentiments are almost always intermingled in both their generation and operation, and that neither such bedrock instance of the Seven Deadlies necessarily endows violence or cowardice within their respective members, it is a generalization that he believes suits the current situation, especially in the United States. A Left operating from a pervasive fear of their aggressive Nationalist Populist opponents whom, they deem, are far more popular with the masses, and the Right inflamed by a hatred of their Internationalist Progressive opponents, traitors rotting the fabric of the home from within whilst in service to multinational interests, are two descriptors that the Professor deems a broadly accurate summation of where the political bifurcation of the extremes of Left and Right—recognizing that the charge of the extremes exerts an alluring pull upon the more centralist or moderate members of each respective side—are at this particular point in time. They are not, at the moment, in the majority anywhere. The great concern of the author is that this will change, and for the worse, if this trending is not somehow either contained or channeled. How? Here Lukacs brings in the optimism and the hope immanent within a historical process that can never be fully predicted nor directed; but it will definitely require helpful, course changing nudges from those parts of the populace who care about seeing that such a dangerous re-empowerment of National Socialism is not provided the opportunity to emerge triumphant holding the reins of any modern state and prepared to direct their hatred outwards, internally and abroad. For myself, the professor is scratching me right where I itch; and, having read a number of works recently that pursue in depth what Lukacs touches upon here—achieving a lucent and convincing expression in his succinctness—I am better placed to gauge the evidentiary framework that underlies his summational discourse: notwithstanding certain hedges and caveats, I'm sold.
October 18, 2009
I think the author intended to write a "sweeping" and "literary" treatise on politics and history.
What he wrote is a lot of unsupported, arrogantly stated generalizations coupled with much foolishness.
What he wrote is a lot of unsupported, arrogantly stated generalizations coupled with much foolishness.
December 6, 2020
In una serie di brevi capitoletti, l'autore illustra di volta in volta le differenza fra conservatori, reazionari, populisti, nazionalisti, progressisti, liberali, totalitarismo, autoritarismo ecc., spiegando il vero significato di queste etichette e la loro evoluzione nel tempo.
Le citazioni sono anche brillanti, e il preveggente Tocqueville (il piú citato di tutti) fa sempre piacere, tuttavia in questo modo non si approfondisce proprio nulla di nessun argomento, tantomeno del rapporto fra democrazia e populismo.
In effetti l'unico scopo dell'autore è dimostrare che negli ultimi secoli siamo sempre piú preda del nazionalismo (non propriamente del populismo), e che tutte le altre ideologie non contano proprio nulla.
Perciò ad esempio il socialismo non vale nulla, non significa niente: siamo tutti socialisti, anche Hitler lo era, e pure Stalin era nazional-socialista, ma soprattutto nazionalista, perché solo questo conta.
Per sostenere questa sua convinzione il povero Lukacs, forse a causa della vecchiaia, si inganna (e tenta di ingannarci) in modo incredibile: sostiene addirittura che la Russia nel 1917 stava vincendo, quasi, ma purtroppo sono arrivati quei pazzi dei bolscevichi che improvvisamente le hanno fatto perdere la guerra e – scellerati! – hanno perso gran parte delle conquiste da Pietro il Grande in poi.
E alla fine addirittura conclude che la nostra unica speranza è la Chiesa, depositaria di valori eterni! Poveri noi.
Però almeno alla fine possiamo dire (ricordando i suoi insegnamenti) che Lukacs non è un reazionario, ma un conservatore, perché il suo nemico principale è l'idea di Progresso, che giustamente ritiene abbia caratterizzato buona parte delle peggiori pagine della nostra storia recente.
A posteriori, poi, è curioso vedere all'opera gli autoinganni di un liberale di cui parla Chomsky ne "I nuovi mandarini".
Le citazioni sono anche brillanti, e il preveggente Tocqueville (il piú citato di tutti) fa sempre piacere, tuttavia in questo modo non si approfondisce proprio nulla di nessun argomento, tantomeno del rapporto fra democrazia e populismo.
In effetti l'unico scopo dell'autore è dimostrare che negli ultimi secoli siamo sempre piú preda del nazionalismo (non propriamente del populismo), e che tutte le altre ideologie non contano proprio nulla.
Perciò ad esempio il socialismo non vale nulla, non significa niente: siamo tutti socialisti, anche Hitler lo era, e pure Stalin era nazional-socialista, ma soprattutto nazionalista, perché solo questo conta.
Per sostenere questa sua convinzione il povero Lukacs, forse a causa della vecchiaia, si inganna (e tenta di ingannarci) in modo incredibile: sostiene addirittura che la Russia nel 1917 stava vincendo, quasi, ma purtroppo sono arrivati quei pazzi dei bolscevichi che improvvisamente le hanno fatto perdere la guerra e – scellerati! – hanno perso gran parte delle conquiste da Pietro il Grande in poi.
E alla fine addirittura conclude che la nostra unica speranza è la Chiesa, depositaria di valori eterni! Poveri noi.
Però almeno alla fine possiamo dire (ricordando i suoi insegnamenti) che Lukacs non è un reazionario, ma un conservatore, perché il suo nemico principale è l'idea di Progresso, che giustamente ritiene abbia caratterizzato buona parte delle peggiori pagine della nostra storia recente.
A posteriori, poi, è curioso vedere all'opera gli autoinganni di un liberale di cui parla Chomsky ne "I nuovi mandarini".
Vedi anche http://it.wikiquote.org/wiki/John_Lukacs
September 27, 2018
Far too many generalizations to take seriously, as well as certain undeniable errors and assumptions (Too many to list, but my fav will do: "[Hitler] was no sadist, he took no particular pleasure in watching, or even being informed about the sufferings of his declared enemies." Are. You. Kidding. Me?) In other parts be obsesses with precise definitions—the difference between snobbery and vanity—instead of analyzing and exploring them. I cam be a bit of a pendant myself and I'm all for clear thinking and being correct, but his hair-splitting does lead to clearer writing and discussion, but rather just seems to be there for him to show us he knows things no one else does.
Sentences ramble, his idea of punctuation is interesting at best (where was the editor?) and he repeats himself like the old man in the park who sits on the best bench and spends all afternoon talking to himself. The book reads like he sat down and did a one-draft brain dump and sent it all to his editor, who then just published it.
There is some good thinking here, but it's all been laid out already in his earlier books, so this one was pretty much unnecessary. And his connections to Tocqueville and Democracy in America are tenuous at best. Some others here are bothered by his lack of citations, but Tocqueville wrote one of the greatest and most insightful books of all time without any. Tocqueville went out of his way to be precise in his explanations and his thinking, however. Lukacs doesn't. He just writes with the assumption and assertion that he is right, and others who have written on the same subject are wrong. After a while, all you can do is nod and skim your way to the end of the book.
Sentences ramble, his idea of punctuation is interesting at best (where was the editor?) and he repeats himself like the old man in the park who sits on the best bench and spends all afternoon talking to himself. The book reads like he sat down and did a one-draft brain dump and sent it all to his editor, who then just published it.
There is some good thinking here, but it's all been laid out already in his earlier books, so this one was pretty much unnecessary. And his connections to Tocqueville and Democracy in America are tenuous at best. Some others here are bothered by his lack of citations, but Tocqueville wrote one of the greatest and most insightful books of all time without any. Tocqueville went out of his way to be precise in his explanations and his thinking, however. Lukacs doesn't. He just writes with the assumption and assertion that he is right, and others who have written on the same subject are wrong. After a while, all you can do is nod and skim your way to the end of the book.
October 16, 2023
I enjoyed and thought useful the fourth and final section of this book, the section the focused on the implications of rising populism for the present and near future. The rest of the book was something of a slog. If pressed to summarize, I'd say that Lukacs seems to be bringing the concerns of Tocqueville's Democracy in America forward to the present, with special concern for the major events of the 20th Century. Lukacs obviously holds Tocqueville in high regard, and he is the most frequently cited historian in Democracy and Populism. I think highly of Democracy in America, too, and so I am disappointed with Lukacs' book. I was irritated through much of the first 3/4ths of Lukacs' work by his insistence that nearly everyone has misunderstood and still misunderstands the distinctions between, you name it, public and popular, liberty and freedom, nationalism and patriotism, conservatism and liberalism, right and left, .... While it's important to be clear in the way one defines and uses terms, it can be alienating to read, again and again, that only Lukacs has clear understanding of them. I also don't find that he is good at clarifying my concepts of them. I'd recommend Tocqueville's book over Democracy and Populism. Lukacs is correct when he praises the French historian's clarity and precision.
June 26, 2025
Olvasási válságban voltam, de szerettem volna valami komolyabbal kezdeni. Nagy meglepetés nem ért, mivel már olvastam a szerzőtől, ezért egy érdekfeszítő és alapos elemzésre számítottam a demokrácia és populizmus lehetséges kapcsolatáról.
Rendkívül gördülékeny, szépirodalmi igényességgel megírt szöveg. Egyáltalán nem csak száraz történelmi tényeket dobált halomba a szerző. Meglehetősen merész elméletet vázol fel a demokrácia és populizmus kapcsolatáról, a bal- és jobboldal mibenlétéről. Túlnyomó többségben a 20. században megjelenő történelmi eseményeket, politikai eszméket, személyeket hoz fel példaként. Eljut a 2000-es évek első évtizedének közepéig, így sokkal kézzelfoghatóbbak voltak az eszmefuttatásai.
Egy rendkívül komplex elméletet ad arról, mi minden romolhat el egy demokráciában. Kíváncsi lennék, mit szólna a mai politikai felálláshoz.
Valamint értem, hogy minden politikai oldalnak vannak szélsőséges irányzatai. De (sajnálom) nekem nem tartozik ezek közé az abortuszhoz való jog, az eutanázia és a szociális védőháló megléte.
Elsősorban azoknak ajánlom, akik érdeklődnek a 20. század történelme és a politológia iránt.
Rendkívül gördülékeny, szépirodalmi igényességgel megírt szöveg. Egyáltalán nem csak száraz történelmi tényeket dobált halomba a szerző. Meglehetősen merész elméletet vázol fel a demokrácia és populizmus kapcsolatáról, a bal- és jobboldal mibenlétéről. Túlnyomó többségben a 20. században megjelenő történelmi eseményeket, politikai eszméket, személyeket hoz fel példaként. Eljut a 2000-es évek első évtizedének közepéig, így sokkal kézzelfoghatóbbak voltak az eszmefuttatásai.
Egy rendkívül komplex elméletet ad arról, mi minden romolhat el egy demokráciában. Kíváncsi lennék, mit szólna a mai politikai felálláshoz.
Valamint értem, hogy minden politikai oldalnak vannak szélsőséges irányzatai. De (sajnálom) nekem nem tartozik ezek közé az abortuszhoz való jog, az eutanázia és a szociális védőháló megléte.
Elsősorban azoknak ajánlom, akik érdeklődnek a 20. század történelme és a politológia iránt.
September 22, 2018
This book was published in 2005. I bought it in 2006, because I am (sort of) a Lukacs completist. I never read it until now, because everyone is talking about Populism these days, and I wanted to see how this pertained to the Age of Trump.
Basically, this book sums up a lot of things Lukacs said earlier in "Outgrowing Democracy" and "HIstorical Consciousness." However, there are some interesting points he makes, about how the working class admires the "right sort" of millionaire and the danger of computer fraud in regards to voting that make me say that this book might be seen as a warning that was ignored.
If you have read Lukacs' major works, such as the two books I mentioned above and "Last European War" and "The Hitler of History," you can probably skip this book. However, if you are unfamiliar with Lukacs' thought, this would be a good introduction.
Basically, this book sums up a lot of things Lukacs said earlier in "Outgrowing Democracy" and "HIstorical Consciousness." However, there are some interesting points he makes, about how the working class admires the "right sort" of millionaire and the danger of computer fraud in regards to voting that make me say that this book might be seen as a warning that was ignored.
If you have read Lukacs' major works, such as the two books I mentioned above and "Last European War" and "The Hitler of History," you can probably skip this book. However, if you are unfamiliar with Lukacs' thought, this would be a good introduction.
October 6, 2025
Wow. I apparently added this book to my “want to read” list in 2014. Now, eleven years later, all i can think is quo vadis? Everything Lukacs
September 27, 2016
The review below is from reading it in 2009. The re-read arises from thinking about the current American political climate and the rise of forces and personalities that Lukacs analyzes in this 2005 book.
Over an extended weekend during a trip to the Pacific Northwest I was able to read and complete Democracy and Populism: Fear and Hatred (2005) by John Lukacs. The book is an extended essay built around the topics of the title, looking primarily at nineteenth and twentieth century Europe and the United States. Lukacs is very difficult to summarize. In his more recent books he tends to offer opinions and conclusions without much in the way of argument, citation, or development. He provides some support for his opinions and conclusions, of course, but brief, and often all too fleeting. However, whatever these shortcomings, he challenges and inspires thought and consideration on just about any topic he touches upon. Thus, to give a sense, some quotes from the book to provide a sample of what he and his book are about:
“Perspective is an inevitable component of reality; and all perspective is, at least to some extent, historical, just as all knowledge depends on memory.” (7)
“As always, Samuel Johnson is right: ‘Definitions are tricks for pedants.” Still, Right and Left retain some meaning, even now. . . . The “Right”, by and large, feared and rejected the principle of popular sovereignty. The “Left” advocated or supported or at least would propose democracy. It still does. The “Right” for a long time, was not populist. But now often it is—which is perhaps a main argument of this book.” (18)
Over an extended weekend during a trip to the Pacific Northwest I was able to read and complete Democracy and Populism: Fear and Hatred (2005) by John Lukacs. The book is an extended essay built around the topics of the title, looking primarily at nineteenth and twentieth century Europe and the United States. Lukacs is very difficult to summarize. In his more recent books he tends to offer opinions and conclusions without much in the way of argument, citation, or development. He provides some support for his opinions and conclusions, of course, but brief, and often all too fleeting. However, whatever these shortcomings, he challenges and inspires thought and consideration on just about any topic he touches upon. Thus, to give a sense, some quotes from the book to provide a sample of what he and his book are about:
“Perspective is an inevitable component of reality; and all perspective is, at least to some extent, historical, just as all knowledge depends on memory.” (7)
“As always, Samuel Johnson is right: ‘Definitions are tricks for pedants.” Still, Right and Left retain some meaning, even now. . . . The “Right”, by and large, feared and rejected the principle of popular sovereignty. The “Left” advocated or supported or at least would propose democracy. It still does. The “Right” for a long time, was not populist. But now often it is—which is perhaps a main argument of this book.” (18)
May 10, 2013
You will be way smarter after reading this book.
This is an expansive, erudite rant by an insightful historian that is provocative and engaging throughout. Lukacs pulls no punches in this one, skewering conventional, and comfortable, narratives as he takes us through a brief history of nationalism and its relation to modern, respectable populist currents. Lukacs does a wonderful job of elucidating the main explanatory categories of modern history (liberalism, nationalism, populism, facism etc.), and extricating them from their usual, but not inevitable companions (most obviously democracy and liberalism). The book's roots are, inevitably, in the blood drenched soil of 20th century Europe. At a time when extremism, other than the Muslim variety, appears a spent force, Lukacs argues that nationalism is not over, not at all ...
I didn't give it five stars because it does presuppose a lot of background knowledge on the part of the reader. It's rather of a join the dots exercise. While this is not necessarily a flaw, it does reduce the accessibility of the book somewhat, which people should bear in mind before starting it.
This is an expansive, erudite rant by an insightful historian that is provocative and engaging throughout. Lukacs pulls no punches in this one, skewering conventional, and comfortable, narratives as he takes us through a brief history of nationalism and its relation to modern, respectable populist currents. Lukacs does a wonderful job of elucidating the main explanatory categories of modern history (liberalism, nationalism, populism, facism etc.), and extricating them from their usual, but not inevitable companions (most obviously democracy and liberalism). The book's roots are, inevitably, in the blood drenched soil of 20th century Europe. At a time when extremism, other than the Muslim variety, appears a spent force, Lukacs argues that nationalism is not over, not at all ...
I didn't give it five stars because it does presuppose a lot of background knowledge on the part of the reader. It's rather of a join the dots exercise. While this is not necessarily a flaw, it does reduce the accessibility of the book somewhat, which people should bear in mind before starting it.
October 23, 2011
Джон Лукач изследва демокрацията и популизма
http://www.knigolandia.info/2010/09/b...
Заигравката с думи е любим похват на политиката – патриотизъм, национализъм, демокрация, човешки права, бла, бла, бла. Зад тези думи рядко стои нещо, те са витиевати конструкции, които в различни периоди са натоварени с различно значение. Нерядко това значение бива трагично преиначавано и всякакви лумпени в името на “висши идеали” решават да се разправят с реални или въображаеми врагове. Затова книги като на Лукач са нужни.
http://www.knigolandia.info/2010/09/b...
Заигравката с думи е любим похват на политиката – патриотизъм, национализъм, демокрация, човешки права, бла, бла, бла. Зад тези думи рядко стои нещо, те са витиевати конструкции, които в различни периоди са натоварени с различно значение. Нерядко това значение бива трагично преиначавано и всякакви лумпени в името на “висши идеали” решават да се разправят с реални или въображаеми врагове. Затова книги като на Лукач са нужни.
April 6, 2016
Lukacs, a conservative historian, argues that democracy has devolved into populism, and patriotism has devolved into nationalism.
The text reads more like a draft than a finished product. It rambles, and there is a lot of parenthetical material. Nevertheless, I recommend reading anything by Lukacs. I've read several of his other books.
Content: 4 stars
Presentation: 3 stars
The text reads more like a draft than a finished product. It rambles, and there is a lot of parenthetical material. Nevertheless, I recommend reading anything by Lukacs. I've read several of his other books.
Content: 4 stars
Presentation: 3 stars
August 9, 2015
To paraphrase a keen observer of humanity, old man (and indeed it was a man) yells -- that primal expression of hatred -- at clouds[*].
[*] Clouds of course being merely condensed air. As de Tocqueville presciently noted, the hot air of controversy frequently obscures deeper truths. However: historians have failed to understand this.
[*] Clouds of course being merely condensed air. As de Tocqueville presciently noted, the hot air of controversy frequently obscures deeper truths. However: historians have failed to understand this.
August 27, 2008
Fascinating analysis of the folly of Populism.
Want to read
March 10, 2009Even with the Obama victory, feels like a lot of what this book has to say is still relevant; for one thing in regard to the aims of the Right in particular and how they seek to gain and hold power.
Want to read
September 22, 2011Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews