I certainly found the essay fascinating. It's an interesting concept, and one which I agree with a lot, but the exact defense of it found here did not seem to warrant the reputation that this essay has. There are interesting ideas which are not pursued to the extent that I think they could've been. James also takes the logical consequences of the ideas here to be his famous“pragmatism” which I also substantially disagree with.
James starts by acknowledging that the idea that truth is willed, may sound silly, even “vile.” Truth exists separately from us, it's the foundation of science, our civilization, and the pursuit and defense of truth is even a moral obligation that our secular time can agree to live by.
He clarifies what he means by the 'will' in the will to believe: “when I say 'willing nature,' I do not mean only such deliberate volitions as may have set up habits of belief that we cannot now escape from, I mean all such factors of belief as fear and hope, prejudice, and passion, imitation, and partisanship, the circumpressure of our caste and set. I absolutely agree that people are motivated to ignore facts due to bias, and not just the masses, but the intellectuals, which James alludes to, especially among scientists.
Look at the unfortunate phenomenon, certainly not contemporary with this book, but noted as far back to the works of Spargo of genuinely progressive people overlooking the Soviet Union's flaws, because they wanted to believe in its success. How does a Pulitzer prize winning journalist like Walter Duranty manage to overlook the Ukranian famine?
James also notes that in the case of most people, the truths which they accept are not truths that they discover themselves, but take from sources that they trust. “Not insight, but the prestige of the opinions, is what makes the spark shoot from them and light up our sleeping magazines of faith.”
Our reasons... in nine hundred and ninety nine cases out of every thousand of us, if it can find a few arguments that will do to recite in case our credulity is criticized by some one else. Our faith is faith in someone else's faith and in the greatest matters this is most the case. Our belief in truth itself
We are prone to believe what is useful to us, James claims, though he never defines utility, and indeed it will vary depending on the individual. In an amusing case James cites “a leading biologist, now dead, once said to me, that even if such a thing were true [telepathy] scientists ought to band together to keep it suppressed and concealed. It would undo the uniformity of Nature and all sorts of other things without which scientists cannot carry on their pursuits.”
This was very amusing, as I'm sure there are many scientists who would be fascinated by the existence of telepathy. Feynman makes such a claim in “The Meaning of it All”, even proposing a hypothetical experiment to discover the extent of a telepathic individual's capability, and in fact, James admits that if a scientist were to be convinced that telepathy would be useful and not dangerous to his career, he would eagerly accept it.
I think a better example to prove the nature of our stubborn biases would be our cherished political ideas. Imagine if you could prove that things are getting worse. That would actually be very popular as it's a political maxim that you never let a crisis go to waste. Consider all the sycophants that gathered around the maelstrom of the First World War in the hopes of building a new world order upon the ashes. George Herron even spoke of a feared, early compromise peace in gloomy terms as the beginning of “a reign of spiritual death.”
If you could prove that the world was getting worse, and that there was nothing that could be done, now that would be an unpopular idea. The intellectuals would have no use for it, it's a state of affairs, that gives them no place in society, a fate worse than death.
James divides epistemologies into two categories: empiricism and absolutism. The former is always agnostic in the wait for more evidence, the latter believes in certain cases where the intellect assents without any doubt. I have to say that I side with the latter, but rather than sacrifice objective truth I sacrifice the observer. Some people will be certain, but they will be wrong, others will be certain and be right, and its true that we have no supreme arbiter on Earth to vindicate the right, but what James is doing with pragmatism is making every individual their own valid arbiter.
He also notes, correctly, that people disagree on practically everything. “We find no proposition ever regarded by any one as evidently certain that has not been either been called a falsehood or at least had its truth sincerely questioned by some one else. The transcending of the axioms of geometry, not in play but in earnest, by certain of our contemporaries (Zollner and Charles H. Hinton) and the rejection of the whole Aristotelian logic by the Hegelians, are striking instances in point.”
Earlier he noted that “our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must decide an option between propositions whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances. Do not decide, but leave the question open, is itself a apassional decision just like deciding yes or no and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth.” At what point do we cross from uncertainty to certainty? Going with a certain option, or even remaining unconvinced, is described as an act of the will, and I don't consider that illegitimate at all.
An important consideration, James notes is which ideas actually translate to action if we believe in them? “What difference, indeed does it make to most of us whether we have or have not a theory of the Rontgen rays, whether we believe or not in mind-stuff, or have a conviction about the causality of conscious states?”
He notes that sometimes the belief precedes the action. Train robberies happen because the armed thieves have the advantage of certainty of action amongst themselves. If one passenger attempted to fight, where's the guarantee that everyone else will rise up? They are likelier to sit still and accept their loss in property rather than their lives, but what if everyone always rose up in unison? Then there would never be any train robberies (much like today there will never be another mid air plane hijacking where the hijackers take over the cockpit). Yet the conviction had to arise before the consequence.
Belief in the efficacy of medicine has been proven to influence its success, and I think many people continue to believe in far fetched political reforms, in the hopes that they will work if the general population can be convinced that they will work. In both cases, belief precedes the action.
Take the example of science. It will not work unless you approach it with some preconceived notions, ranging from the existence of a world independent of us, the orderly nature and uniformity of that world, the know-ability of that world, and the adequacy of our senses and language to describe the world. I certainly don't consider any of those beliefs irrational, but how does one arrive at them in the first place? Do not be surprised by doubters of any one of them.
James actually lashes out against excessive agnosticism. “A rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there, would be an irrational rule.” I agree with this. I concede that we deal with probability in most of the ideas that are presented before us, but to reject in certain to accept a certain truth simply because it is not a priori one hundred percent certain, is irrational.