Dodds, Klaus, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, third edition, 2019). “Geopolitics involves three qualities,” writes Dodd in his introduction to this short book. “First, it is concerned with questions of influence and power over space and territory. Second, it uses geographical frames to make sense of world affairs. Popular geographical templates include 'sphere of influence', 'bloc', 'backyard', 'neighbourhood', and 'near abroad. Third, geopolitics is future-orientated. It offers insights into the likely behaviour of states because their interests are fundamentally unchanging.” (3)
However, it would be a mistake to assume that Dodd takes a classical approach to his subject. On the contrary, his treatment of geopolitics is more of an intellectual and a cultural history than a discourse in international relations. Dodd, who places himself in the ‘critical’ rather than ‘classical’ school of thought about geopolitics, sees the geographical as “rather more fluid and subject to interpretation.” He takes issue with the view which conceptualizes “geography as deterministic” (something which Charles de Gaulle, for instance, was wont to do). He underscores the dynamic nature of the interrelationship between the human and the physical, and even of geography itself (as the small island nations in the Pacific, threatened by rising sea levels, know all too well). Geopolitics is far from set in stone. Dodd: “We are not imprisoned by geography.” (9)
Following this approach, Dodd discusses, in chapter 2, geopolitical thinking as ‘intellectual poison’, having been associated with colonialism in the 19th century and having provided “intellectual muscle to German statecraft involving invasion, expulsion, and mass murder” in the 1930s and 1940s. (17) “For one thing, the notion of the state as an organism encouraged a view of the world that focused on how to preserve national self-interest in an ultracompetitive environment comprising other rapacious states.” (23)
After World War II, geopolitics had therefore become “ideologically bankrupt and morally suspect.” (17) Yet it was never absent from strategic or popular thought, as it only got mixed up with the ideological strife between the Free West and Communist East. And the ‘return’ of geopolitical thinking over the past decade or so, is not only to be blamed on Russia, China and other states. Dodd: “We need to be clear on one thing: the very liberal order that some are worried about in terms of its future health is the same one that many feel has been protecting the interests and wishes of the richer and more privileged segments of humanity, often at the expense of other peoples, species, and environments.” (70)
In the remainder of his book, Dodd discusses the interplay — and in some cases: tension — between, on the one hand, geopolitical thinking and, on the other hand, the post-Cold War reality of globalization, the emergence and problems of the liberal international order, a variety of cultural expressions (e.g. in popular films), the formation of (national) identities and states, and Huntington’s influential thesis about a ‘clash of civilizations’. All this is certainly interesting and enriching. Yet, at the same time, I can’t help yearning for a slightly more ‘classical’ treatment of geopolitics. For instance, how should the geopolitical views of leaders such as Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, Donald Trump and Angela Merkel be understood? And how have the geopolitical identities of countries like the US, the UK, Russia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Egypt, Argentina, and — why not? — the Netherlands developed over time? Dodd is right in stating that “we are not imprisoned by geography.” Yet, as Charles de Gaulle remarked in his War Memoirs, “after all is said and done, Great Britain is an island; France the cape of a continent; the United States another world.”