Unique among World War I campaigns, the fighting at Gallipoli brought together a modern amphibious assault and multi-national combined operations. It took place on a landscape littered with classical and romantic sites - just across the Dardanelles from the ruins of Homer's Troy. The campaign became, perhaps, the greatest 'what if' of the war. The concept behind it was grand strategy of the highest order, had it been successful it might have led to conditions ending the war two years early on Allied terms. This could have avoided the bloodletting of 1916-18, saved Tsarist Russia from revolution and side stepped the disastrous Treaty of Versailles - in effect, altering the course of the entire 20th century. This book is the first to focus on operational and campaign level decisions and actions, which drove the conduct of the campaign. It departs from emotive first-hand accounts and offers a broader perspective of the large scale military planning and maneuvring involved in this monstrous struggle on the shores of European Turkey.
Edward J. Erickson is a retired regular U.S. Army officer at the Marine Corps University and is an authority on the Ottoman Army during World War I, a subject on which he has written widely. Erickson is also an associate of International Research Associates, Seattle, Washington.
This book looks at the command decisions pf the British and Turkish/German tactics during the unsuccessful British attempt to invade the Gallipoli peninsula during The Great War (aka WW I). It highlights the poor decision making by the British officers, who were not the most accomplished officers of the British empire. The second rate leadership, combined with inadequate troop levels and a lack of established amphibious warfare tactics and equipment, resulted in the failure to succesfully invade Turkey and take them out of the war.
The book is not an easy read. It utilizes military terminology that is does not define, and makes many references to places on the Gallipoli peninsula without providing the maps required follow the multiple British attacks and Turkish counter attacks.
This is a military history of a self-contained and key campaign within World War 1. There are many memorable books written about Gallipoli, many describing the human, low level soldier side of the story. This book takes a different approach concentrating on the senior commanding of the conflict at strategic, tactical and operational levels from both the viewpoint of both the British (and Commonwealth) side versus the Ottoman forces (with German advisors).
There is plenty of material here of interest but descriptions of troop movements in the Gallipoli peninsula and regular references to such and such Division, Corps, battalion, brigade, etc do not inspire. The author, a specialist on the Ottoman army, knows his stuff but whereas the format of each chronological chapter gives an appearance of balance it is clear that Erickson is more sympathetic to the Ottoman side. The final short section fails to give due credit to the Allied organisation of the miraculous, and brilliantly executed evacuation plan cobbled together in a very short time and which was expected to result in at least one third casualties.
Overall, an intriguing piece of military history but less interesting than the accounts of soldiers on the front line.
Excellent look at the Campaign at the operational level
This is an outstanding examination of the Gallipoli campaign at the operational level of war. I have read several of Mr Erickson's earlier works on the Ottoman Army and they all provide an insight into its true capabilities. Highly recommended.